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EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs

PATCH Superseded Matthew Garrett 2 participants 4 messages Apr 27, 2018 – May 1, 2018

Subsystems (4)

v2 of 6 Superseded Latest is v6 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs

Sites may wish to provide additional metadata alongside files in order to make more fine-grained security decisions[1]. The security of this is enhanced if this metadata is protected, something that EVM makes possible. However, the kernel cannot know about the set of extended attributes that local admins may wish to protect, and hardcoding this policy in the kernel makes it difficult to change over time and less convenient for distributions to enable.

This patch adds a new /sys/kernel/security/evm_xattrs node, which can be read to obtain the current set of EVM-protected extended attributes or written to in order to add new entries. Extending this list will not change the validity of any existing signatures provided that the file in question does not have any of the additional extended attributes - missing xattrs are skipped when calculating the EVM hash.

[1] For instance, a package manager could install information about the package uploader in an additional extended attribute. Local LSM policy could then be associated with that extended attribute in order to restrict the privileges available to packages from less trusted uploaders.

---

Mimi, annotating the list_head __ro_after_init doesn't work - adding entries after init will attempt to modify its ->prev pointer.

 Documentation/ABI/testing/evm       |  13 ++++
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h        |   7 +-
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c |  10 +--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   |  73 +++++++++++++++-----
 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c  | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/evm +13 -0
index d12cb2eae9ee..bfe529eb26b2 100644
@@ -57,3 +57,16 @@ Description:
 		dracut (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
 		core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot
 		time.
+
+What:		security/evm_xattrs
+Date:		April 2018
+Contact:	Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
+Description:
+		Shows the set of extended attributes used to calculate or
+		validate the EVM signature, and allows additional attributes
+		to be added at runtime. Adding additional extended attributes
+		will result in any existing signatures generated without the
+		additional attributes becoming invalid, and any signatures
+		generated after additional attributes are added will only be
+		valid if the same additional attributes are configured on
+		system boot.
security/integrity/evm/evm.h +6 -1
index 45c4a89c02ff..1257c3c24723 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@
 #define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE | \
 		       EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
 
+struct xattr_list {
+	struct list_head list;
+	char *name;
+};
+
 extern int evm_initialized;
 
 #define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID		0x0001
@@ -40,7 +45,7 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
 extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
 
 /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
-extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
+extern struct list_head evm_config_xattrnames;
 
 int evm_init_key(void);
 int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +5 -5
index a46fba322340..caeea20670cc 100644
@@ -192,8 +192,8 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
 				char type, char *digest)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct xattr_list *xattr;
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
-	char **xattrname;
 	size_t xattr_size = 0;
 	char *xattr_value = NULL;
 	int error;
@@ -208,14 +208,14 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
 		return PTR_ERR(desc);
 
 	error = -ENODATA;
-	for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
+	list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		bool is_ima = false;
 
-		if (strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
+		if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
 			is_ima = true;
 
 		if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
-		    && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
+		    && !strcmp(xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) {
 			error = 0;
 			crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
 					     req_xattr_value_len);
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
 				ima_present = true;
 			continue;
 		}
-		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
+		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, xattr->name,
 					  &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
 		if (size == -ENOMEM) {
 			error = -ENOMEM;
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +56 -17

150 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +96 -6

115 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.0.441.gb46fe60e1d-goog
#1 lore raw
Quoted 33 lines · Matthew Garrett
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +8 -2
index 9ea9c19a545c..86b1632d6b5b 100644
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
 };
 int evm_hmac_attrs;
 
-char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
+char *evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
 	XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 #endif
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
 	NULL
 };
 
+LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames);
+
 static int evm_fixmode;
 static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
 {
@@ -66,12 +68,30 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
 }
 __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
 
-static void __init evm_init_config(void)
+static int __init evm_init_config(void)
 {
+	struct xattr_list *tmp;
+	char **xattrname;
+
+	for (xattrname = evm_config_default_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL;

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) · line 86

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +10 -0
+	     xattrname++) {
+		tmp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!tmp)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		tmp->name = kstrdup(*xattrname, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!tmp->name) {
+			kfree(tmp);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		list_add_tail(&tmp->list, &evm_config_xattrnames);

If evm_config_xattrnames[] is defined as struct xattr_list, there's no need for allocating memory for the xattr_list and name. Something like in ima_init_policy() would work.

Could we break this patch up to simplify review? The first patch would create and use the xattrname list. The subsequent patch(es) would add the new functionality.

thanks,

Mimi

Quoted 12 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +4 -0
+	}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
 	evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
 #endif
 	pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
#2 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 1 line · Matthew Garrett

+ for (xattrname = evm_config_default_xattrnames; *xattrname !=

NULL;

Quoted 11 lines

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) · line 86

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +10 -0
+          xattrname++) {
+             tmp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+             if (!tmp)
+                     return -ENOMEM;
+             tmp->name = kstrdup(*xattrname, GFP_KERNEL);
+             if (!tmp->name) {
+                     kfree(tmp);
+                     return -ENOMEM;
+             }
+             list_add_tail(&tmp->list, &evm_config_xattrnames);
Quoted 3 lines

If evm_config_xattrnames[] is defined as struct xattr_list, there's no need for allocating memory for the xattr_list and name. Something like in ima_init_policy() would work.

Hm. Do you mean evm_config_default_xattrnames?

Quoted 3 lines

Could we break this patch up to simplify review? The first patch would create and use the xattrname list. The subsequent patch(es) would add the new functionality.

Sure, I'll do that.

#3 lore raw
Quoted 16 lines · Matthew Garrett
Quoted 2 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 1 line · Matthew Garrett

+ for (xattrname = evm_config_default_xattrnames; *xattrname !=

NULL;

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +10 -0
+          xattrname++) {
+             tmp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+             if (!tmp)
+                     return -ENOMEM;
+             tmp->name = kstrdup(*xattrname, GFP_KERNEL);
+             if (!tmp->name) {
+                     kfree(tmp);
+                     return -ENOMEM;
+             }
+             list_add_tail(&tmp->list, &evm_config_xattrnames);
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

If evm_config_xattrnames[] is defined as struct xattr_list, there's no need for allocating memory for the xattr_list and name. Something like in ima_init_policy() would work.

Hm. Do you mean evm_config_default_xattrnames?

Yes, or:

        for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
                list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
                              &ima_default_rules);
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Could we break this patch up to simplify review? The first patch would create and use the xattrname list. The subsequent patch(es) would add the new functionality.

Sure, I'll do that.

thanks!

Mimi