vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.
If new command line option debug_boot_weak_hash is enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.
---
This patch was previously submitted as the last in the set
[PATCH v3 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers
Helps debugging using ftrace. Original problem reported by Anna-Maria, solution requested by Steve.
Changes since above mentioned patch set
- change option name from debug_early_boot -> debug_boot_weak_hash (suggested by Steve).
I have only tested this by enabling the option and printing some pointers. This does not _prove_ that it fixes the ftrace issue.
thanks,
Tobin.
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +8 -0
@@ -748,6 +748,14 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level). + debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable debugging early in the boot sequence. If + enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash + pointers. Use this option if you need to see pointer + values during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances + of '(___ptrval___)') - cryptographically insecure, + please do not use on production kernels. + debug_locks_verbose= [KNL] verbose self-tests Format=<0|1>
lib/vsprintf.c +18 -0
@@ -1654,6 +1654,18 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,return widen_string (buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); } +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */ +static int debug_boot_weak_hash__ro_after_init ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (debug_boot_weak_hash); + +static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable (char *str) +{ + debug_boot_weak_hash =1 ; +pr_info ("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n" ); +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("debug_boot_weak_hash" , debug_boot_weak_hash_enable); +static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key__read_mostly ;static siphash_key_t ptr_key__read_mostly ;
@@ -1694,6 +1706,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)const char *str =sizeof (ptr) ==8 ?"(____ptrval____)" :"(ptrval)" ;unsigned long hashval; +/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash */ +if (unlikely (debug_boot_weak_hash)) { + hashval =hash_long ((unsigned long )ptr,32 ); +return pointer_string (buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); + } +if (unlikely (!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) { spec.field_width =2 *sizeof (ptr);/* string length must be less than default_width */
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Steven Rostedt
maintainerAnna-Maria,
Can you test this patch on that kernel you were having issues with (the one triggering the RCU stalls, and not having entropy to show the pointers of the timer events).
And report back what you find.
Thanks!
-- Steve
Quoted 92 lines · On Tue, 15 May 2018 14:38:35 +1000 "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]> wrote:
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(
____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.If new command line option
debug_boot_weak_hashis enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>---
This patch was previously submitted as the last in the set
[PATCH v3 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers
Helps debugging using ftrace. Original problem reported by Anna-Maria, solution requested by Steve.
Changes since above mentioned patch set
- change option name fromdebug_early_boot->debug_boot_weak_hash(suggested by Steve).I have only tested this by enabling the option and printing some pointers. This does not _prove_ that it fixes the ftrace issue.
thanks,
Tobin.Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +8
-0@@ -748,6 +748,14 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level). + debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable debugging early in the boot sequence. If + enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash + pointers. Use this option if you need to see pointer + values during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances + of '(___ptrval___)') - cryptographically insecure, + please do not use on production kernels. + debug_locks_verbose= [KNL] verbose self-tests Format=<0|1>lib/vsprintf.c +18
-0@@ -1654,6 +1654,18 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,return widen_string (buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); } +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */ +static int debug_boot_weak_hash__ro_after_init ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (debug_boot_weak_hash); + +static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable (char *str) +{ + debug_boot_weak_hash =1 ; +pr_info ("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n" ); +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("debug_boot_weak_hash" , debug_boot_weak_hash_enable); +static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key__read_mostly ;static siphash_key_t ptr_key__read_mostly ;@@ -1694,6 +1706,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)const char *str =sizeof (ptr) ==8 ?"(____ptrval____)" :"(ptrval)" ;unsigned long hashval; +/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash */ +if (unlikely (debug_boot_weak_hash)) { + hashval =hash_long ((unsigned long )ptr,32 ); +return pointer_string (buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); + } +if (unlikely (!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) { spec.field_width =2 *sizeof (ptr);/* string length must be less than default_width */
Randy Dunlap
reviewerQuoted 9 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 752
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2
-0@@ -748,6 +748,14 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level). + debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable debugging early in the boot sequence. If
That makes it sound like "debug_boot_weak_hash" turns on early debugging.
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 755
Quoted 3 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0+ enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash + pointers. Use this option if you need to see pointer + values during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances
i.e.
Quoted 6 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0+ of '(___ptrval___)') - cryptographically insecure, + please do not use on production kernels. + debug_locks_verbose= [KNL] verbose self-tests Format=<0|1>
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
Quoted 12 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 10 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -748,6 +748,14 @@
Quoted 6 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 752
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2
-0debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level). + debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable debugging early in the boot sequence. IfThat makes it sound like "
debug_boot_weak_hash" turns on early debugging.
Thanks Randy, I'll have another go at writing this.
Tobin