x86/ima: require signed kernel modules
Subsystems (4)
Mimi Zohar
maintainerPATCH v2 1/1 x86/ima: require signed kernel modules
Require signed kernel modules on systems with secure boot mode enabled.
Requiring appended kernel module signatures may be configured, enabled on the boot command line, or with this patch enabled in secure boot mode. This patch defines set_module_sig_enforced().
To coordinate between appended kernel module signatures and IMA signatures, only define an IMA MODULE_CHECK policy rule if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is not enabled.
---
Changelog:
- Removed new "sig_required" flag and associated functions, directly set sig_enforce.
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 9 ++++++++- include/linux/module.h | 1 + kernel/module.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +8 -1
@@ -64,12 +64,19 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" , #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK" , +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) +"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" , +#endif +"measure func=MODULE_CHECK" ,NULL };const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy (void ) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG )) +set_module_sig_enforced ();return sb_arch_rules; + }return NULL ; }
include/linux/module.h +1 -0
@@ -660,6 +660,7 @@ static inline bool is_livepatch_module(struct module *mod)#endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ bool is_module_sig_enforced (void ); +void set_module_sig_enforced (void );#else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */
kernel/module.c +5 -0
@@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (is_module_sig_enforced); +void set_module_sig_enforced (void ) +{ + sig_enforce = true; +} +/* Block module loading/unloading? */ int modules_disabled =0 ;core_param (nomodule, modules_disabled, bint,0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.7.5
Luis Chamberlain
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
Require signed kernel modules on systems with secure boot mode enabled.
Requiring appended kernel module signatures may be configured, enabled on the boot command line, or with this patch enabled in secure boot mode.
But only if IMA is enabled? If so, should this statement be true if IMA is disabled?
Either way, this is not clear from the commit log and code, can the commit log be clear if set_module_sig_enforced() will be set if IMA is disabled but secure boot mode enabled?
Quoted 48 lines
This patch defines
set_module_sig_enforced().To coordinate between appended kernel module signatures and IMA signatures, only define an IMA
MODULE_CHECKpolicy rule ifCONFIG_MODULE_SIGis not enabled.Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>---
Changelog:
- Removed new "sig_required" flag and associated functions, directly setsig_enforce.arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 9 ++++++++- include/linux/module.h | 1 + kernel/module.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +8
-1@@ -64,12 +64,19 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" , #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK" , +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) +"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" , +#endif +"measure func=MODULE_CHECK" ,NULL };const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy (void ) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG )) +set_module_sig_enforced ();return sb_arch_rules; + }return NULL ; }include/linux/module.h +0
-0
include/linux/module.h static inline bool is_livepatch_module(struct module *mod) · line 665
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include/linux/module.h +1
-0@@ -660,6 +660,7 @@ static inline bool is_livepatch_module(struct module *mod)#endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ bool is_module_sig_enforced (void ); +void set_module_sig_enforced (void );#else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */
I think you need the !CONFIG_MODULES definition of set_module_sig_enforced() then...
kernel/module.c bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) · line 292
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kernel/module.c +4
-0@@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (is_module_sig_enforced); +void set_module_sig_enforced (void ) +{ + sig_enforce = true; +}
The export is not needed as it is bool eh?
Luis
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Luis Chamberlain
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
Require signed kernel modules on systems with secure boot mode enabled.
Requiring appended kernel module signatures may be configured, enabled on the boot command line, or with this patch enabled in secure boot mode.
But only if IMA is enabled?
The patch subject line indicates this is for IMA, but sure I can amend the patch description, making it clearer.
Quoted 2 lines
If so, should this statement be true if
IMA is disabled?
This patch coordinates the PE and IMA signatures so that both signature types aren't required. Only if "CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE" is not enabled, is an IMA policy rule defined. A custom IMA policy can still define an IMA kexec rule, requiring an IMA signature, even if the PE signature is required.
For the case when IMA is disabled and PE signatures are required, then there isn't a problem. The issue is when neither signature verification method is enabled. I'll leave that for someone else to address.
Quoted 55 lines
Either way, this is not clear from the commit log and code, can the commit log be clear if
set_module_sig_enforced()will be set if IMA is disabled but secure boot mode enabled?Quoted 50 lines
This patch defines
set_module_sig_enforced().To coordinate between appended kernel module signatures and IMA signatures, only define an IMA
MODULE_CHECKpolicy rule ifCONFIG_MODULE_SIGis not enabled.Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>---
Changelog:
- Removed new "sig_required" flag and associated functions, directly setsig_enforce.arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 9 ++++++++- include/linux/module.h | 1 + kernel/module.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +8
-1@@ -64,12 +64,19 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" , #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK" , +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) +"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" , +#endif +"measure func=MODULE_CHECK" ,NULL };const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy (void ) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG )) +set_module_sig_enforced ();return sb_arch_rules; + }return NULL ; }include/linux/module.h +0
-0@@ -660,6 +660,7 @@ static inline bool is_livepatch_module(struct module *mod)#endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/module.h static inline bool is_livepatch_module(struct module *mod) · line 665
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/module.h +1
-0bool is_module_sig_enforced (void ); +void set_module_sig_enforced (void );#else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */ I think you need the !CONFIG_MODULES definition of
set_module_sig_enforced()then...
Good catch, thanks.
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kernel/module.c +0
-0@@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (is_module_sig_enforced);
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/module.c bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) · line 292
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/module.c +4
-0+void set_module_sig_enforced (void ) +{ + sig_enforce = true; +}The export is not needed as it is bool eh?
IMA is builtin, so it doesn't need to be exported.
Mimi
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = { · line 79
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +3
-1-if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG )) +set_module_sig_enforced ();return sb_arch_rules;
Linus previously pushed back on having the lockdown features automatically enabled on secure boot systems. Why are we doing the same in IMA?
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Matthew Garrett
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = { · line 79
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +3
-1-if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG )) +set_module_sig_enforced ();return sb_arch_rules;Linus previously pushed back on having the lockdown features automatically enabled on secure boot systems. Why are we doing the same in IMA?
IMA-appraisal is extending the "secure boot" concept to the running system.
Mimi
Quoted 9 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 7 lines · Matthew Garrett
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +3
-1-if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG )) +set_module_sig_enforced ();return sb_arch_rules;
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Linus previously pushed back on having the lockdown features automatically enabled on secure boot systems. Why are we doing the same in IMA?
IMA-appraisal is extending the "secure boot" concept to the running system.
Right, but how is this different to what Linus was objecting to?
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Matthew Garrett
Quoted 9 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 7 lines · Matthew Garrett
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +3
-1-if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG )) +set_module_sig_enforced ();return sb_arch_rules;
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Linus previously pushed back on having the lockdown features automatically enabled on secure boot systems. Why are we doing the same in IMA?
IMA-appraisal is extending the "secure boot" concept to the running system.
Right, but how is this different to what Linus was objecting to?
Both Andy Lutomirski and Linus objected to limiting the "lockdown" patch set to secure boot enabled systems.
Mimi
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 1 line · Matthew Garrett
Right, but how is this different to what Linus was objecting to?
Both Andy Lutomirski and Linus objected to limiting the "lockdown" patch set to secure boot enabled systems.
No, Linus objected to it being automatically enabled when secure boot was enabled. It was always possible to enable it at boot on any platform.