Patch "[PATCH 27/32] powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
AppliedThis is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
[PATCH 27/32] powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
0027-powerpc-speculation-Support-mitigations-cmdline-opti.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.
From c13106d187bda2ee47a8c3c62b9ec49aaec07d14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:30 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 27/32] powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline
option
commit 782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9 upstream
Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
The default behavior is unchanged.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++---- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 6 +++--- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5 -4
@@ -2389,7 +2389,7 @@ http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git mitigations= - [X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU + [X86,PPC] Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2398,10 +2398,11 @@ Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This improves system performance, but it may also expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. - Equivalent to: nopti [X86] - nospectre_v2 [X86] + Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC] + nospectre_v1 [PPC] + nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC] spectre_v2_user=off [X86] - spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86] + spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] l1tf=off [X86] auto (default)
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +3 -3
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void) enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) &&security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR ); -if (!no_nospec) +if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off ())enable_barrier_nospec (enable); }
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)early_param ("nospectre_v2" , handle_nospectre_v2);void setup_spectre_v2 (void ) { -if (no_spectrev2) +if (no_spectrev2 ||cpu_mitigations_off ())do_btb_flush_fixups ();else btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void) stf_enabled_flush_types = type; -if (!no_stf_barrier) +if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off ())stf_barrier_enable (enable); }
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +1 -1
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) enabled_flush_types = types; -if (!no_rfi_flush) +if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off ())rfi_flush_enable (enable); }
Signature · 23 lines
2.21.0 Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are queue-4.14/0022-x86-speculation-mds-Add-SMT-warning-message.patch queue-4.14/0027-powerpc-speculation-Support-mitigations-cmdline-opti.patch queue-4.14/0025-cpu-speculation-Add-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.14/0029-x86-speculation-mds-Add-mitigations-support-for-MDS.patch queue-4.14/0028-s390-speculation-Support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.14/0032-x86-speculation-mds-Fix-documentation-typo.patch queue-4.14/0023-x86-speculation-mds-Fix-comment.patch queue-4.14/0002-Documentation-l1tf-Fix-small-spelling-typo.patch queue-4.14/0024-x86-speculation-mds-Print-SMT-vulnerable-on-MSBDS-wi.patch queue-4.14/0026-x86-speculation-Support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.14/0021-x86-speculation-Move-arch_smt_update-call-to-after-m.patch queue-4.14/0020-x86-speculation-mds-Add-mds-full-nosmt-cmdline-optio.patch _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel