Patch "x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
Subsystems (4)
[email protected]
AppliedThis is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-speculation-support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.
From foo@baz Tue 14 May 2019 08:29:35 PM CEST
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:29 -0500
Subject: x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 upstream.
Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.
The default behavior is unchanged.
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Drop the auto,nosmt option and the l1tf mitigation selection, which we can't support
- Adjust filenames, context]
--- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 14 +++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++++-- arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -5
@@ -2174,15 +2174,19 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git mitigations= - Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities. - This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each - of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific - options. + [X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU + vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated, + arch-independent options, each of which is an + aggregation of existing arch-specific options. off Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This improves system performance, but it may also expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. + Equivalent to: nopti [X86] + nospectre_v2 [X86] + spectre_v2_user=off [X86] + spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86] auto (default) Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2190,7 +2194,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes users who don't want to be surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks. - This is the default behavior. + Equivalent to: (default behavior) mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -2
@@ -479,7 +479,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __char arg[20 ];int ret, i; -if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nospectre_v2" )) +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nospectre_v2" ) || +cpu_mitigations_off ())return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE ; ret =cmdline_find_option (boot_command_line,"spectre_v2" , arg,sizeof (arg));
@@ -743,7 +744,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init sschar arg[20 ];int ret, i; -if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nospec_store_bypass_disable" )) { +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nospec_store_bypass_disable" ) || +cpu_mitigations_off ()) {return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ; }else { ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c +3 -1
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/ftrace.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "Kernel/User page tables isolation: " fmt
@@ -297,7 +298,8 @@ void __init kaiser_check_boottime_disabl goto skip; } -if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nopti" )) +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nopti" ) || +cpu_mitigations_off ()) goto disable; skip:
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-fix-documentation-typo.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-add-mitigations-support-for-mds.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-rework-smt-state-change.patch queue-4.4/cpu-speculation-add-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-fix-comment.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-reorder-the-spec_v2-code.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-add-prctl-control-for-indirect-branch-speculation.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-provide-ibpb-always-command-line-options.patch queue-4.4/x86-kconfig-select-sched_smt-if-smp-enabled.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-add-smt-warning-message.patch queue-4.4/x86-process-consolidate-and-simplify-switch_to_xtra-code.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-reorganize-speculation-control-msrs-update.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-update-the-tif_ssbd-comment.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-propagate-information-about-rsb-filling-mitigation-to-sysfs.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-unify-conditional-spectre-v2-print-functions.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-disable-stibp-when-enhanced-ibrs-is-in-use.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-rename-ssbd-update-functions.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-enable-prctl-mode-for-spectre_v2_user.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mark-string-arrays-const-correctly.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-move-arch_smt_update-call-to-after-mitigation-decisions.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-add-seccomp-spectre-v2-user-space-protection-mode.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-clean-up-spectre_v2_parse_cmdline.patch queue-4.4/x86-mm-use-write_once-when-setting-ptes.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-apply-ibpb-more-strictly-to-avoid-cross-process-data-leak.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-add-command-line-control-for-indirect-branch-speculation.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-move-stipb-ibpb-string-conditionals-out-of-cpu_show_common.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-remove-unnecessary-ret-variable-in-cpu_show_common.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-prepare-for-per-task-indirect-branch-speculation-control.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-avoid-__switch_to_xtra-calls.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-mds-print-smt-vulnerable-on-msbds-with-mitigations-off.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-split-out-tif-update.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-prepare-for-conditional-ibpb-in-switch_mm.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-prepare-arch_smt_update-for-prctl-mode.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-enable-cross-hyperthread-spectre-v2-stibp-mitigation.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculataion-mark-command-line-parser-data-__initdata.patch queue-4.4/x86-speculation-prevent-stale-spec_ctrl-msr-content.patch
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