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ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options.

PATCH Applied Young Xiao 3 participants 5 messages May 29, 2019 – May 30, 2019

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Young Xiao

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options.

The TCP option parsing routines in tcp_parse_options function could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.

1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 case TCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 case TCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access

If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.

Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2 -0
index 20f6fac..9775825 100644
@@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net,
 			length--;
 			continue;
 		default:
+			if (length < 2)
+				return;
 			opsize = *ptr++;
 			if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
 				return;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#1 lore raw
Quoted 34 lines · Young Xiao

The TCP option parsing routines in tcp_parse_options function could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.

1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 case TCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 case TCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access

If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.

Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +0 -0
index 20f6fac..9775825 100644

net/ipv4/tcp_input.c void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, · line 3798

Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2 -0
@@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net,
                        length--;
                        continue;
                default:
+                       if (length < 2)
+                               return;
                        opsize = *ptr++;
                        if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
                                return;

In practice we are good, since we have at least 320 bytes of room there, and the test done later catches silly options.

if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */

    return;

if (opsize > length) /* remember, opsize >= 2 here */
return; /* don't parse partial options */

I guess adding yet another conditional will make this code obviously correct for all eyes
and various tools.

Thanks.

author
#2 lore raw

Indeed, condition opsize < 2 and opsize > length can deduce that length >= 2. However, before the condition (if opsize < 2), there may be one-byte out-of-bound access in line 12.
I'm not sure whether I have put it very clearly.

Quoted 60 lines · Eric Dumazet
Quoted 34 lines · Young Xiao

The TCP option parsing routines in tcp_parse_options function could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.

1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 case TCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 case TCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access

If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.

Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +0 -0
index 20f6fac..9775825 100644

net/ipv4/tcp_input.c void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, · line 3798

Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2 -0
@@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net,
                        length--;
                        continue;
                default:
+                       if (length < 2)
+                               return;
                        opsize = *ptr++;
                        if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
                                return;

In practice we are good, since we have at least 320 bytes of room there, and the test done later catches silly options.

if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */

    return;

if (opsize > length) /* remember, opsize >= 2 here */
return; /* don't parse partial options */

I guess adding yet another conditional will make this code obviously correct for all eyes
and various tools.

Thanks.

Signature · 4 lines
Best regards!

Young
-----------------------------------------------------------
#3 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Yang Xiao

Indeed, condition opsize < 2 and opsize > length can deduce that length >= 2. However, before the condition (if opsize < 2), there may be one-byte out-of-bound access in line 12.
I'm not sure whether I have put it very clearly.

Maybe I should have been clear about the 320 bytes we have at the end of skb->head

This is the struct skb_shared_info

So reading one byte, 'out-of-bound' here is harmless.

Whatever value is read, we will return early without ever looking at a following byte.

Quoted 70 lines · Eric Dumazet
Quoted 53 lines · Young Xiao
Quoted 34 lines

The TCP option parsing routines in tcp_parse_options function could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.

1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 case TCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 case TCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access

If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.

Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +0 -0
index 20f6fac..9775825 100644

net/ipv4/tcp_input.c void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, · line 3798

Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2 -0
@@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net,
                        length--;
                        continue;
                default:
+                       if (length < 2)
+                               return;
                        opsize = *ptr++;
                        if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
                                return;

In practice we are good, since we have at least 320 bytes of room there, and the test done later catches silly options.

if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */

    return;

if (opsize > length) /* remember, opsize >= 2 here */
return; /* don't parse partial options */

Quoted 7 lines

I guess adding yet another conditional will make this code obviously correct for all eyes
and various tools.

Thanks.

--
Best regards!

Young
-----------------------------------------------------------

maintainer Applied
#4 lore raw
In reply to Young Xiao

From: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 16:10:59 +0800

Quoted 16 lines

The TCP option parsing routines in tcp_parse_options function could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.

1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 case TCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 case TCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access

Quoted 8 lines

If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.

Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.

Applied.