ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options.
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options.
The TCP option parsing routines in tcp_parse_options function could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.
1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 case TCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 case TCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access
If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.
Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2 -0
@@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, length--;continue ;default : +if (length <2 ) +return ; opsize = *ptr++;if (opsize <2 )/* "silly options" */ return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Quoted 34 lines · Young Xiao
The TCP option parsing routines in
tcp_parse_optionsfunction could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 caseTCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 caseTCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound accessIf length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.
Signed-off-by Young Xiao <[email protected]>--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +0
-0
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, · line 3798
Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2
-0@@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, length--;continue ;default : +if (length <2 ) +return ; opsize = *ptr++;if (opsize <2 )/* "silly options" */ return ;
In practice we are good, since we have at least 320 bytes of room there, and the test done later catches silly options.
if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
return;
if (opsize > length) /* remember, opsize >= 2 here */
return; /* don't parse partial options */
I guess adding yet another conditional will make this code obviously correct for all eyes
and various tools.
Thanks.
Indeed, condition opsize < 2 and opsize > length can deduce that length >= 2. However, before the condition (if opsize < 2), there may be one-byte out-of-bound access in line 12.
I'm not sure whether I have put it very clearly.
Quoted 60 lines · Eric Dumazet
Quoted 34 lines · Young Xiao
The TCP option parsing routines in
tcp_parse_optionsfunction could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 caseTCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 caseTCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound accessIf length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.
Signed-off-by Young Xiao <[email protected]>--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +0
-0net/ipv4/tcp_input.c void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, · line 3798
Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2
-0@@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, length--;continue ;default : +if (length <2 ) +return ; opsize = *ptr++;if (opsize <2 )/* "silly options" */ return ;In practice we are good, since we have at least 320 bytes of room there, and the test done later catches silly options.
if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
return;if (opsize > length) /* remember, opsize >= 2 here */
return; /* don't parse partial options */I guess adding yet another conditional will make this code obviously correct for all eyes
and various tools.Thanks.
Signed-off-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signature · 4 lines
Best regards! Young -----------------------------------------------------------
Quoted 5 lines · Yang Xiao
Indeed, condition opsize < 2 and opsize > length can deduce that length >= 2. However, before the condition (if opsize < 2), there may be one-byte out-of-bound access in line 12.
I'm not sure whether I have put it very clearly.
Maybe I should have been clear about the 320 bytes we have at the end of skb->head
This is the struct skb_shared_info
So reading one byte, 'out-of-bound' here is harmless.
Whatever value is read, we will return early without ever looking at a following byte.
Quoted 70 lines · Eric Dumazet
Quoted 53 lines · Young Xiao
Quoted 34 lines
The TCP option parsing routines in
tcp_parse_optionsfunction could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 caseTCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 caseTCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound accessIf length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.
Signed-off-by Young Xiao <[email protected]>--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +0
-0net/ipv4/tcp_input.c void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, · line 3798
Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2
-0@@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, length--;continue ;default : +if (length <2 ) +return ; opsize = *ptr++;if (opsize <2 )/* "silly options" */ return ;In practice we are good, since we have at least 320 bytes of room there, and the test done later catches silly options.
if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
return;if (opsize > length) /* remember, opsize >= 2 here */
return; /* don't parse partial options */Quoted 7 lines
I guess adding yet another conditional will make this code obviously correct for all eyes
and various tools.Thanks.
Signed-off-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>--
Best regards!Young
-----------------------------------------------------------
From: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 16:10:59 +0800
Quoted 16 lines
The TCP option parsing routines in
tcp_parse_optionsfunction could read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 caseTCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 caseTCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access
Quoted 8 lines
If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.
Signed-off-by Young Xiao <[email protected]>
Applied.