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x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()

PATCH Superseded Dianzhang Chen 2 participants 2 messages Jun 25, 2019 – Jun 27, 2019

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v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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PATCH v2 1/1 x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()

The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The n can be controlled from:

    ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.

Fix this by sanitizing n before using it to index thread->ptrace_bps.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +4 -1
index a166c96..cbac646 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -643,9 +644,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
 {
 	struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
 	unsigned long val = 0;
+	int index = n;
 
 	if (n < HBP_NUM) {
-		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+		index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
+		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
 
 		if (bp)
 			val = bp->hw.info.address;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#1 lore raw
x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()
Commit-ID:  31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415
Author:     Dianzhang Chen <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:30:17 +0800
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CommitDate: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 23:48:04 +0200

x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()

The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via
syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

The index can be controlled from:

    ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.

Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access thread->ptrace_bps.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +4 -1
index a166c960bc9e..cbac64659dc4 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -643,9 +644,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
 {
 	struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
 	unsigned long val = 0;
+	int index = n;
 
 	if (n < HBP_NUM) {
-		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+		index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
+		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
 
 		if (bp)
 			val = bp->hw.info.address;