fs/seq_file.c: Fix a UAF vulnerability in seq_release()
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 fs/seq_file.c: Fix a UAF vulnerability in seq_release()
In seq_release(), 'm->buf' points to a chunk. It is freed but not cleared to null right away. It can be reused by seq_read() or srm_env_proc_write(). For example, /arch/alpha/kernel/srm_env.c provide several interfaces to userspace, like 'single_release', 'seq_read' and 'srm_env_proc_write'. Thus in userspace, one can exploit this UAF vulnerability to escape privilege.
Even if 'm->buf' is cleared by kmem_cache_free(), one can still create several threads to exploit this vulnerability.
And 'm->buf' should be cleared right after being freed.
--- fs/seq_file.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/seq_file.c +1 -0
@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ int seq_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) {struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;kvfree (m->buf); + m->buf =NULL ;kmem_cache_free (seq_file_cache, m);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Quoted 17 lines · bsauce
In
seq_release(), 'm->buf' points to a chunk. It is freed but not cleared to null right away. It can be reused byseq_read()orsrm_env_proc_write(). For example, /arch/alpha/kernel/srm_env.c provide several interfaces to userspace, like 'single_release', 'seq_read' and 'srm_env_proc_write'. Thus in userspace, one can exploit this UAF vulnerability to escape privilege.
Even if 'm->buf' is cleared bykmem_cache_free(), one can still create several threads to exploit this vulnerability.
And 'm->buf' should be cleared right after being freed.Signed-off-by bsauce <[email protected]>--- fs/seq_file.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)fs/seq_file.c +0
-0
fs/seq_file.c int seq_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) · line 364
Quoted 7 lines
fs/seq_file.c +1
-0@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ int seq_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) {struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;kvfree (m->buf); + m->buf =NULL ;kmem_cache_free (seq_file_cache, m);return 0 ; }
This makes no sense, since m is freed right away anyway.
So whatever is trying to 'reuse' m is in big trouble.
Quoted 1 line · bsauce
In
seq_release(), 'm->buf' points to a chunk. It is freed but not cleared to null right away. It can be reused byseq_read()orsrm_env_proc_write().
Well, no. The ->release method is called when there are no more file descriptors referring to this file. So there's no way to call seq_read() or srm_env_proc_write() after seq_release() is called.
Quoted 2 lines
For example, /arch/alpha/kernel/srm_env.c provide several interfaces to userspace, like '
single_release', 'seq_read' and 'srm_env_proc_write'. Thus in userspace, one can exploit this UAF vulnerability to escape privilege.
Please provide a PoC.
Quoted 8 lines · bsauce
In
seq_release(), 'm->buf' points to a chunk. It is freed but not cleared to null right away. It can be reused byseq_read()orsrm_env_proc_write(). For example, /arch/alpha/kernel/srm_env.c provide several interfaces to userspace, like 'single_release', 'seq_read' and 'srm_env_proc_write'. Thus in userspace, one can exploit this UAF vulnerability to escape privilege.
Even if 'm->buf' is cleared bykmem_cache_free(), one can still create several threads to exploit this vulnerability.
And 'm->buf' should be cleared right after being freed.Signed-off-by bsauce <[email protected]>
So I am pretty sure this "Signed-off-by" line is incorrect. Take a look in Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst for more information. It specifically it calls out that you need to use your real name, no pseudonyms.
Quoted 9 lines
--- fs/seq_file.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)fs/seq_file.c +0
-0
fs/seq_file.c int seq_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) · line 364
Quoted 7 lines
fs/seq_file.c +1
-0@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ int seq_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) {struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;kvfree (m->buf); + m->buf =NULL ;kmem_cache_free (seq_file_cache, m);return 0 ; }
As has already been pointed out we are calling kmem_cache_free on m in the very next line. As such setting m->buf to NULL would have no effect as m will be freed and could be reused/overwritten at that point.