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mm: slub: print kernel addresses in slub debug messages

RFC PATCH In review [email protected] 3 participants 6 messages Aug 9, 2019 – Aug 12, 2019

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#0 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 1/1 mm: slub: print kernel addresses in slub debug messages

From: Miles Chen <[email protected]>

This RFC patch is sent to discuss the printing address with %p issue.

Since commit ad67b74d2469d9b8 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p"), %p gives obfuscated addresses now. When CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y, it is still useful to get real virtual addresses.

Possible approaches are:
1. stop printing kernel addresses
2. print with %pK,
3. print with %px.
4. do nothing

This patch takes %px approach and shows the output here. (%px will causes checkpatch warnings, let us ignore the warning here to have the discussion). Also, use DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET instead of DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS.

Before this patch:

INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=1408 fp=0x(____ptrval____) Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
...
FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0x(____ptrval____) not freed

After this patch:

INFO: Slab 0xffffffbf00f57000 objects=25 used=23 fp=0xffffffc03d5c3500
INFO: Object 0xffffffc03d5c3500 @offset=13568 fp=0xffffffc03d5c0800 Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000010: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000020: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000030: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000040: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000050: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000060: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000070: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Object 00000000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000010: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000020: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000030: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000040: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000050: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000060: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000070: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Padding 00000000: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding 00000010: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding 00000020: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding 00000030: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
...
FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0xffffffc03d5c3500 not freed

Cc Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
 mm/slub.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/slub.c +6 -6
index 8834563cdb4b..bc1fb8e81557 100644
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr,
 			  unsigned int length)
 {
 	metadata_access_enable();
-	print_hex_dump(level, text, DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, addr,
+	print_hex_dump(level, text, DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 1, addr,
 			length, 1);
 	metadata_access_disable();
 }
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ static void print_tracking(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
 
 static void print_page_info(struct page *page)
 {
-	pr_err("INFO: Slab 0x%p objects=%u used=%u fp=0x%p flags=0x%04lx\n",
+	pr_err("INFO: Slab 0x%px objects=%u used=%u fp=0x%px flags=0x%04lx\n",
 	       page, page->objects, page->inuse, page->freelist, page->flags);
 
 }
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
 
 	print_page_info(page);
 
-	pr_err("INFO: Object 0x%p @offset=%tu fp=0x%p\n\n",
+	pr_err("INFO: Object 0x%px @offset=%tu fp=0x%px\n\n",
 	       p, p - addr, get_freepointer(s, p));
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
@@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ static void trace(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, void *object,
 								int alloc)
 {
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_TRACE) {
-		pr_info("TRACE %s %s 0x%p inuse=%d fp=0x%p\n",
+		pr_info("TRACE %s %s 0x%px inuse=%d fp=0x%p\n",
 			s->name,
 			alloc ? "alloc" : "free",
 			object, page->inuse,
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ static noinline int free_debug_processing(
 	slab_unlock(page);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n->list_lock, flags);
 	if (!ret)
-		slab_fix(s, "Object at 0x%p not freed", object);
+		slab_fix(s, "Object at 0x%px not freed", object);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -3693,7 +3693,7 @@ static void list_slab_objects(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 	for_each_object(p, s, addr, page->objects) {
 
 		if (!test_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map)) {
-			pr_err("INFO: Object 0x%p @offset=%tu\n", p, p - addr);
+			pr_err("INFO: Object 0x%px @offset=%tu\n", p, p - addr);
 			print_tracking(s, p);
 		}
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.18.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800…

Possible approaches are:
1. stop printing kernel addresses
2. print with %pK,
3. print with %px.

No. The point of obscuring kernel addresses is that if the attacker manages to find a way to get the kernel to spit out some debug messages that we shouldn't leak all this extra information.

Quoted 1 line

4. do nothing

5. Find something more useful to print.

Quoted 1 line

INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)

... you don't have any randomness on your platform?

Quoted 16 lines

INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=1408 fp=0x(____ptrval____) Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b

Quoted 8 lines

Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
...
FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0x(____ptrval____) not freed

But if you have randomness, at least some of these "pointers" are valuable because you can compare them against "pointers" printed by other parts of the kernel.

Quoted 19 lines

After this patch:

INFO: Slab 0xffffffbf00f57000 objects=25 used=23 fp=0xffffffc03d5c3500
INFO: Object 0xffffffc03d5c3500 @offset=13568 fp=0xffffffc03d5c0800 Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000010: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000020: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000030: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000040: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000050: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000060: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000070: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Object 00000000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000010: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000020: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000030: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000040: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000050: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000060: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b

Quoted 8 lines

Object 00000070: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Padding 00000000: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding 00000010: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding 00000020: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding 00000030: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
...
FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0xffffffc03d5c3500 not freed

It looks prettier, but I'm not convinced it's more useful. Unless your platform lacks randomness ...

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, [email protected] wrote:

Possible approaches are:
1. stop printing kernel addresses
2. print with %pK,
3. print with %px.

No. The point of obscuring kernel addresses is that if the attacker manages to find a way to get the kernel to spit out some debug messages that we shouldn't leak all this extra information.

got it.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

4. do nothing

5. Find something more useful to print.

agree

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)

... you don't have any randomness on your platform?

We have randomized base on our platforms.

Quoted 3 lines

But if you have randomness, at least some of these "pointers" are valuable because you can compare them against "pointers" printed by other parts of the kernel.

Understood. Keep current %p, do not leak kernel addresses.

I'll collect more cases and see if we really need some extra information. (maybe the @offset in current message is enough)

thanks for your comments!

#3 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Miles Chen
Quoted 4 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 1 line · On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, [email protected] wrote:

INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)

... you don't have any randomness on your platform?

We have randomized base on our platforms.

Look at initialize_ptr_random(). If you have randomness, then you get a siphash_1u32() of the address. With no randomness, you get this ___ptrval___ string instead.

author
#4 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 4 lines · Miles Chen
Quoted 3 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 1 line · On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, [email protected] wrote:

INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

... you don't have any randomness on your platform?

We have randomized base on our platforms.

Look at initialize_ptr_random(). If you have randomness, then you get a siphash_1u32() of the address. With no randomness, you get this ___ptrval___ string instead.

You are right. There is no randomness in this platform. (I ran my test code on Qemu with no randomness)

thanks again

#5 lore raw
In reply to Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 8 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, [email protected] wrote:

Possible approaches are:
1. stop printing kernel addresses
2. print with %pK,
3. print with %px.

No. The point of obscuring kernel addresses is that if the attacker manages to find a way to get the kernel to spit out some debug messages that we shouldn't leak all this extra information.

On the other hand, while CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y is common, the actual checks and printing happens when the (relatively expensive) checks are actually enabled during boot, i.e. during a debugging session, not production defaults. I can see how knowing the exact address might be useful when e.g. a crash dump is also taken. I would say %pK would be a good fit, if kptr_restrict also had a setting that makes %pK behave like %px (looks like it doesn't), so that setting would be enabled in such a debugging session.

Quoted 68 lines
Quoted 1 line

4. do nothing

5. Find something more useful to print.

Quoted 1 line

INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)

... you don't have any randomness on your platform?

Quoted 16 lines

INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=1408 fp=0x(____ptrval____) Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b

Quoted 8 lines

Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
...
FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0x(____ptrval____) not freed

But if you have randomness, at least some of these "pointers" are valuable because you can compare them against "pointers" printed by other parts of the kernel.

Quoted 19 lines

After this patch:

INFO: Slab 0xffffffbf00f57000 objects=25 used=23 fp=0xffffffc03d5c3500
INFO: Object 0xffffffc03d5c3500 @offset=13568 fp=0xffffffc03d5c0800 Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000010: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000020: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000030: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000040: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000050: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000060: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Redzone 00000070: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb Object 00000000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000010: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000020: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000030: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000040: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000050: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b Object 00000060: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b

Quoted 8 lines

Object 00000070: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Padding 00000000: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding 00000010: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding 00000020: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a Padding 00000030: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
...
FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0xffffffc03d5c3500 not freed

It looks prettier, but I'm not convinced it's more useful. Unless your platform lacks randomness ...