FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anthony Steinhauser <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2020 05:44:19 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for
indirect branches.

Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result (force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.

Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails with -EPERM as described in the documentation.

index 8d57562b1d2c..56f573aa764f 100644
@@ -1175,11 +1175,14 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 			return 0;
 		/*
 		 * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
-		 * mode.
+		 * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
+		 * by a  previous prctl call.
+
 		 */
 		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
 		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+		    task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
 			return -EPERM;
 		task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
 		task_update_spec_tif(task);