vboot: Fix forged-configuration vulnerability
v2 cover vboot: Fix forged-configuration vulnerability
When booting a FIT, if 'bootm' is used without a specified configuration, U-Boot will use the default one provided in the FIT. But it does not actually check that the signature is for that configuration.
This means that it is possible to duplicate a configuration conf-1 to produce conf-2 (with all the signatures intact), set the default configuration to conf-2 and then boot the image. U-Boot will verify conf-2 (in fact since hashed-nodes specifies the conf-1 nodes it will effectively verify conf-1). Then it will happily boot conf-2 even though it might have a different kernel.
This series corrects this problem and adds a test to verify it. It also updates fit_check_sign to allow the configuration to be specified.
This vulnerability was found by Dmitry Janushkevich and Andrea Barisani of F-Secure, who also wrote the vboot_forge script included here.
This is CVE-2020-10648
Changes in v2:
- Bring in new vboot_forge file from the authors
Simon Glass (14):
image: Correct comment for fit_conf_get_node()
image: Be a little more verbose when checking signatures
image: Return an error message from fit_config_verify_sig()
test: vboot: Drop unnecessary parameter for fit_check_sign
test: vboot: Add a test for a forged configuration
test: vboot: Parameterise the test
image: Check hash-nodes when checking configurations
image: Load the correct configuration in fit_check_sign
fit_check_sign: Allow selecting the configuration to verify
test: vboot: Tidy up the code a little
test: vboot: Fix pylint errors
image: Use constants for 'required' and 'key-name-hint'
test: vboot: Move key creation into a function
test: vboot: Reduce fake kernel size to 500 bytes
common/bootm.c | 6 +- common/image-cipher.c | 2 +- common/image-fit.c | 26 +-- common/image-sig.c | 49 +++- include/image.h | 24 +- lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c | 6 +- test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 155 +++++++------ test/py/tests/vboot_forge.py | 423 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/fdt_host.h | 3 +- tools/fit_check_sign.c | 8 +- tools/image-host.c | 17 +- 11 files changed, 601 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/vboot_forge.py
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 1/14 image: Correct comment for fit_conf_get_node()
This should mention that conf_uname can be NULL and should be in the header file. Fix this.
---
Changes in v2: None
common/image-fit.c | 18 ------------------ include/image.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
common/image-fit.c +0 -18
@@ -1712,24 +1712,6 @@ int fit_conf_find_compat(const void *fit, const void *fdt)return best_match_offset; } -/** -* fit_conf_get_node - get node offset for configuration of a given unit name -* @fit: pointer to the FIT format image header -* @conf_uname: configuration node unit name -* -* fit_conf_get_node() finds a configuration (within the '/configurations' -* parent node) of a provided unit name. If configuration is found its node -* offset is returned to the caller. -* -* When NULL is provided in second argument fit_conf_get_node() will search -* for a default configuration node instead. Default configuration node unit -* name is retrieved from FIT_DEFAULT_PROP property of the '/configurations' -* node. -* -* returns: -* configuration node offset when found (>=0) -* negative number on failure (FDT_ERR_* code) -*/ int fit_conf_get_node (const void *fit,const char *conf_uname) {int noffset, confs_noffset;
include/image.h +20 -0
@@ -1092,7 +1092,27 @@ int fit_image_check_comp(const void *fit, int noffset, uint8_t comp);int fit_check_format (const void *fit);int fit_conf_find_compat (const void *fit,const void *fdt); + +/** +* fit_conf_get_node - get node offset for configuration of a given unit name +* @fit: pointer to the FIT format image header +* @conf_uname: configuration node unit name (NULL to use default) +* +* fit_conf_get_node() finds a configuration (within the '/configurations' +* parent node) of a provided unit name. If configuration is found its node +* offset is returned to the caller. +* +* When NULL is provided in second argument fit_conf_get_node() will search +* for a default configuration node instead. Default configuration node unit +* name is retrieved from FIT_DEFAULT_PROP property of the '/configurations' +* node. +* +* returns: +* configuration node offset when found (>=0) +* negative number on failure (FDT_ERR_* code) +*/ int fit_conf_get_node (const void *fit,const char *conf_uname); +int fit_conf_get_prop_node_count (const void *fit,int noffset,const char *prop_name); int fit_conf_get_prop_node_index(const void *fit, int noffset,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 2/14 image: Be a little more verbose when checking signatures
In reply to Simon GlassIt is useful to be a little more specific about what is being checked. Update a few messages to help with this.
---
Changes in v2: None
common/image-fit.c | 2 +- tools/image-host.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
common/image-fit.c +1 -1
@@ -1951,7 +1951,7 @@ int fit_image_load(bootm_headers_t *images, ulong addr, fit_uname =fit_get_name (fit, noffset,NULL ); }if (noffset <0 ) { -puts ("Could not find subimage node\n" ); +printf ("Could not find subimage node type '%s'\n" , prop_name);bootstage_error (bootstage_id +BOOTSTAGE_SUB_SUBNODE );return -ENOENT ; }
tools/image-host.c +2 -1
@@ -1034,7 +1034,8 @@ int fit_check_sign(const void *fit, const void *key)if (!cfg_noffset)return -1 ; -printf ("Verifying Hash Integrity ... " ); +printf ("Verifying Hash Integrity for node '%s'... " , +fdt_get_name (fit, cfg_noffset,NULL )); ret =fit_config_verify (fit, cfg_noffset);if (ret)return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 3/14 image: Return an error message from fit_config_verify_sig()
In reply to Simon GlassThis function only returns an error message sometimes. Update it to always return an error message if one is available. This makes it easier to see what went wrong.
---
Changes in v2: None
common/image-sig.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
common/image-sig.c +3 -2
@@ -499,13 +499,14 @@ static int fit_config_verify_sig(const void *fit, int conf_noffset, goto error; } -return verified ?0 : -EPERM ; +if (verified) +return 0 ; error:printf (" error!\n%s for '%s' hash node in '%s' config node\n" , err_msg,fit_get_name (fit, noffset,NULL ),fit_get_name (fit, conf_noffset,NULL )); -return -1 ; +return -EPERM ; } int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 4/14 test: vboot: Drop unnecessary parameter for fit_check_sign
In reply to Simon GlassThis tool only uses the last -k parameter provided. Drop the earlier one since it has no effect.
---
Changes in v2: None
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py +1 -2
@@ -180,8 +180,7 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console): cons.log.action('%s: Check signed config on the host' % sha_algo) - util.run_and_log(cons, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', tmpdir, - '-k', dtb]) + util.run_and_log(cons, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', dtb]) # Replace header bytes bcfg = u_boot_console.config.buildconfig
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 5/14 test: vboot: Add a test for a forged configuration
In reply to Simon GlassAdd a check to make sure that it is not possible to add a new configuration and use the hashed nodes and hash of another configuration.
---
Changes in v2:
- Bring in new vboot_forge file from the authors
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 18 +- test/py/tests/vboot_forge.py | 423 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 440 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/vboot_forge.py
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py +17 -1
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import pytest import sys import struct import u_boot_utils as util +import vboot_forge @pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox') @pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('fit_signature')
@@ -182,7 +183,22 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console): util.run_and_log(cons, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', dtb]) - # Replace header bytes + # Make sure that U-Boot checks that the config is in the list of hashed + # nodes. If it isn't, a security bypass is possible. + with open(fit, 'rb') as fp: + root, strblock = vboot_forge.read_fdt(fp) + root, strblock = vboot_forge.manipulate(root, strblock) + with open(fit, 'w+b') as fp: + vboot_forge.write_fdt(root, strblock, fp) + util.run_and_log_expect_exception(cons, + [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', dtb], + 1, 'Failed to verify required signature') + + run_bootm(sha_algo, 'forged config', 'Bad Data Hash', False) + + # Create a new properly signed fit and replace header bytes + make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo, padding)) + sign_fit(sha_algo) bcfg = u_boot_console.config.buildconfig max_size = int(bcfg.get('config_fit_signature_max_size', 0x10000000), 0) existing_size = replace_fit_totalsize(max_size + 1)
test/py/tests/vboot_forge.py new file +423 -0
423 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 6/14 test: vboot: Parameterise the test
In reply to Simon GlassThis test is actually made up of five separate tests. Split them out so that they appear as separate tests.
Unfortunately this restarts U-Boot multiple times which adds about a second to the already-long vboot test, about 8 seconds total on my machine. We could add a special 'teardown' test afterwards but if the tests are executed out of order that would not work.
Changing test_vboot into a class causes it not to be discovered and makes it different from all other tests.
---
Changes in v2: None
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py +14 -6
@@ -30,13 +30,22 @@ import struct import u_boot_utils as util import vboot_forge +TESTDATA = [ + ['sha1', '', False], + ['sha1', '-pss', False], + ['sha256', '', False], + ['sha256', '-pss', False], + ['sha256', '-pss', True], +] + @pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox') @pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('fit_signature') @pytest.mark.requiredtool('dtc') @pytest.mark.requiredtool('fdtget') @pytest.mark.requiredtool('fdtput') @pytest.mark.requiredtool('openssl') -def test_vboot(u_boot_console): + at pytest.mark.parametrize("sha_algo,padding,required", TESTDATA) +def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): """Test verified boot signing with mkimage and verification with 'bootm'. This works using sandbox only as it needs to update the device tree used
@@ -297,11 +306,10 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console): # afterwards. old_dtb = cons.config.dtb cons.config.dtb = dtb - test_with_algo('sha1','') - test_with_algo('sha1','-pss') - test_with_algo('sha256','') - test_with_algo('sha256','-pss') - test_required_key('sha256','-pss') + if required: + test_required_key(sha_algo, padding) + else: + test_with_algo(sha_algo, padding) finally: # Go back to the original U-Boot with the correct dtb. cons.config.dtb = old_dtb
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 7/14 image: Check hash-nodes when checking configurations
In reply to Simon GlassIt is currently possible to use a different configuration's signature and thus bypass the configuration check. Make sure that the configuration node that was hashed matches the one being checked, to catch this problem.
Also add a proper function comment to fit_config_check_sig() and make it static.
---
Changes in v2: None
common/image-sig.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
common/image-sig.c +33 -3
@@ -359,20 +359,39 @@ int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,return 0 ; } -int fit_config_check_sig (const void *fit,int noffset,int required_keynode, -char **err_msgp) +/** +* fit_config_check_sig() - Check the signature of a config +* +* @fit: FIT to check +* @noffset: Offset of configuration node (e.g. /configurations/conf-1) +* @required_keynode: Offset in the control FDT of the required key node, +* if any. If this is given, then the configuration wil not +* pass verification unless that key is used. If this is +* -1 then any signature will do. +* @conf_noffset: Offset of the configuration subnode being checked (e.g. +* /configurations/conf-1/kernel) +* @err_msgp: In the event of an error, this will be pointed to a +* help error string to display to the user. +* @return 0 if all verified ok, <0 on error +*/ +static int fit_config_check_sig (const void *fit,int noffset, +int required_keynode,int conf_noffset, +char **err_msgp) {char *const exc_prop[] = {"data" };const char *prop, *end, *name;struct image_sign_info info;const uint32_t *strings; +const char *config_name;uint8_t *fit_value;int fit_value_len; +bool found_config;int max_regions;int i, prop_len;char path[200 ];int count; + config_name =fit_get_name (fit, conf_noffset,NULL );debug ("%s: fdt=%p, conf='%s', sig='%s'\n" , __func__,gd_fdt_blob (),fit_get_name (fit, noffset,NULL ),fit_get_name (gd_fdt_blob (), required_keynode,NULL ));
@@ -413,9 +432,20 @@ int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int required_keynode,char *node_inc[count];debug ("Hash nodes (%d):\n" , count); + found_config = false;for (name = prop, i =0 ; name < end; name +=strlen (name) +1 , i++) {debug (" '%s'\n" , name); node_inc[i] = (char *)name; +if (!strncmp (FIT_CONFS_PATH , name,strlen (FIT_CONFS_PATH )) && + name[sizeof (FIT_CONFS_PATH ) -1 ] =='/' && + !strcmp (name +sizeof (FIT_CONFS_PATH ), config_name)) { +debug (" (found config node %s)" , config_name); + found_config = true; + } + } +if (!found_config) { + *err_msgp ="Selected config not in hashed nodes" ; +return -1 ; }/*
@@ -483,7 +513,7 @@ static int fit_config_verify_sig(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,if (!strncmp (name,FIT_SIG_NODENAME ,strlen (FIT_SIG_NODENAME ))) { ret =fit_config_check_sig (fit, noffset, sig_offset, - &err_msg); + conf_noffset, &err_msg);if (ret) {puts ("- " ); }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 8/14 image: Load the correct configuration in fit_check_sign
In reply to Simon GlassAt present bootm_host_load_images() is passed the configuration that has been verified, but ignores it and just uses the default configuration. This may not be the same.
Update this function to use the selected configuration.
---
Changes in v2: None
common/bootm.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
common/bootm.c +4 -2
@@ -819,7 +819,8 @@ void __weak switch_to_non_secure_mode(void) #else /* USE_HOSTCC */ #if defined(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) -static int bootm_host_load_image(const void *fit, int req_image_type) +static int bootm_host_load_image(const void *fit, int req_image_type, + int cfg_noffset) { const char *fit_uname_config = NULL; ulong data, len;
@@ -831,6 +832,7 @@ static int bootm_host_load_image(const void *fit, int req_image_type)void *load_buf;int ret; + fit_uname_config =fdt_get_name (fit, cfg_noffset,NULL );memset (&images,'\0' ,sizeof (images)); images.verify =1 ; noffset = fit_image_load(&images, (ulong)fit,
@@ -878,7 +880,7 @@ int bootm_host_load_images(const void *fit, int cfg_noffset)for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (image_types); i++) {int ret; - ret =bootm_host_load_image (fit, image_types[i]); + ret =bootm_host_load_image (fit, image_types[i], cfg_noffset);if (!err && ret && ret != -ENOENT ) err = ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 9/14 fit_check_sign: Allow selecting the configuration to verify
In reply to Simon GlassThis tool always verifies the default configuration. It is useful to be able to verify a specific one. Add a command-line flag for this and plumb the logic through.
---
Changes in v2: None
tools/fdt_host.h | 3 ++- tools/fit_check_sign.c | 8 ++++++-- tools/image-host.c | 6 ++++-- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
tools/fdt_host.h +2 -1
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@*/ int fdt_remove_unused_strings (const void *old,void *new); -int fit_check_sign (const void *working_fdt,const void *key); +int fit_check_sign (const void *fit,const void *key, +const char *fit_uname_config);#endif /* __FDT_HOST_H__ */
tools/fit_check_sign.c +6 -2
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)void *fit_blob;char *fdtfile =NULL ;char *keyfile =NULL ; +char *config_name =NULL ;char cmdname[256 ];int ret;void *key_blob;
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)strncpy (cmdname, *argv,sizeof (cmdname) -1 ); cmdname[sizeof (cmdname) -1 ] ='\0' ; -while ((c =getopt (argc, argv,"f:k:" )) !=-1 ) +while ((c =getopt (argc, argv,"f:k:c:" )) !=-1 )switch (c) {case 'f' : fdtfile = optarg;
@@ -56,6 +57,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)case 'k' : keyfile = optarg;break ; +case 'c' : + config_name = optarg; +break ;default :usage (cmdname);break ;
@@ -78,7 +82,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)return EXIT_FAILURE ;image_set_host_blob (key_blob); - ret =fit_check_sign (fit_blob, key_blob); + ret =fit_check_sign (fit_blob, key_blob, config_name);if (!ret) { ret =EXIT_SUCCESS ;fprintf (stderr,"Signature check OK\n" );
tools/image-host.c +4 -2
@@ -1025,12 +1025,13 @@ int fit_add_verification_data(const char *keydir, void *keydest, void *fit, }#ifdef CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE -int fit_check_sign (const void *fit,const void *key) +int fit_check_sign (const void *fit,const void *key, +const char *fit_uname_config) {int cfg_noffset;int ret; - cfg_noffset =fit_conf_get_node (fit,NULL ); + cfg_noffset =fit_conf_get_node (fit, fit_uname_config);if (!cfg_noffset)return -1 ;
@@ -1039,6 +1040,7 @@ int fit_check_sign(const void *fit, const void *key) ret =fit_config_verify (fit, cfg_noffset);if (ret)return ret; +printf ("Verified OK, loading images\n" ); ret =bootm_host_load_images (fit, cfg_noffset);return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 10/14 test: vboot: Tidy up the code a little
In reply to Simon GlassFix some long lines and comments. Use a distinct name for the 'required key' test.
---
Changes in v2: None
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py +21 -13
@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): if boots: assert('sandbox: continuing, as we cannot run' in ''.join(output)) else: - assert('sandbox: continuing, as we cannot run' not in ''.join(output)) + assert('sandbox: continuing, as we cannot run' + not in ''.join(output)) def make_fit(its): """Make a new FIT from the .its source file.
@@ -211,7 +212,8 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): bcfg = u_boot_console.config.buildconfig max_size = int(bcfg.get('config_fit_signature_max_size', 0x10000000), 0) existing_size = replace_fit_totalsize(max_size + 1) - run_bootm(sha_algo, 'Signed config with bad hash', 'Bad Data Hash', False) + run_bootm(sha_algo, 'Signed config with bad hash', 'Bad Data Hash', + False) cons.log.action('%s: Check overflowed FIT header totalsize' % sha_algo) # Replace with existing header bytes
@@ -229,7 +231,8 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): util.run_and_log(cons, 'fdtput -t bx %s %s value %s' % (fit, sig_node, sig)) - run_bootm(sha_algo, 'Signed config with bad hash', 'Bad Data Hash', False) + run_bootm(sha_algo, 'Signed config with bad hash', 'Bad Data Hash', + False) cons.log.action('%s: Check bad config on the host' % sha_algo) util.run_and_log_expect_exception(cons, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit,
@@ -238,12 +241,11 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): def test_required_key(sha_algo, padding): """Test verified boot with the given hash algorithm. - This function test if u-boot reject an image when a required - key isn't used to sign a FIT. + This function tests if U-Boot rejects an image when a required key isn't + used to sign a FIT. Args: - sha_algo: Either 'sha1' or 'sha256', to select the algorithm to - use. + sha_algo: Either 'sha1' or 'sha256', to select the algorithm to use """ # Compile our device tree files for kernel and U-Boot. These are # regenerated here since mkimage will modify them (by adding a
@@ -251,18 +253,24 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): dtc('sandbox-kernel.dts') dtc('sandbox-u-boot.dts') - # Build the FIT with prod key (keys required) - # Build the FIT with dev key (keys NOT required) - # The dtb contain the key prod and dev and the key prod are set as required. - # Then try to boot the FIT with dev key - # This FIT should not be accepted by u-boot because the key prod is required cons.log.action('%s: Test FIT with configs images' % sha_algo) + + # Build the FIT with prod key (keys required) and sign it. This puts the + # signature into sandbox-u-boot.dtb, marked 'required' make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s-prod.its' % (sha_algo , padding)) sign_fit(sha_algo) + + # Build the FIT with dev key (keys NOT required). This adds the + # signature into sandbox-u-boot.dtb, NOT marked 'required'. make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo , padding)) sign_fit(sha_algo) - run_bootm(sha_algo, 'signed configs', '', False) + # So now sandbox-u-boot.dtb two signatures, for the prod and dev keys. + # Only the prod key is set as 'required'. But FIT we just built has + # a dev signature only (sign_fit() overwrites the FIT). + # Try to boot the FIT with dev key. This FIT should not be accepted by + # U-Boot because the prod key is required. + run_bootm(sha_algo, 'required key', '', False) cons = u_boot_console tmpdir = cons.config.result_dir + '/'
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 11/14 test: vboot: Fix pylint errors
In reply to Simon GlassFix various minor things noticed by pylint.
---
Changes in v2: None
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 53 +++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py +19 -34
@@ -24,9 +24,8 @@ For configuration verification: Tests run with both SHA1 and SHA256 hashing. """ -import pytest -import sys import struct +import pytest import u_boot_utils as util import vboot_forge
@@ -85,11 +84,11 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): with cons.log.section('Verified boot %s %s' % (sha_algo, test_type)): output = cons.run_command_list( ['host load hostfs - 100 %stest.fit' % tmpdir, - 'fdt addr 100', - 'bootm 100']) - assert(expect_string in ''.join(output)) + 'fdt addr 100', + 'bootm 100']) + assert expect_string in ''.join(output) if boots: - assert('sandbox: continuing, as we cannot run' in ''.join(output)) + assert 'sandbox: continuing, as we cannot run' in ''.join(output) else: assert('sandbox: continuing, as we cannot run' not in ''.join(output))
@@ -119,20 +118,6 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): util.run_and_log(cons, [mkimage, '-F', '-k', tmpdir, '-K', dtb, '-r', fit]) - def sign_fit_norequire(sha_algo): - """Sign the FIT - - Signs the FIT and writes the signature into it. It also writes the - public key into the dtb. - - Args: - sha_algo: Either 'sha1' or 'sha256', to select the algorithm to - use. - """ - cons.log.action('%s: Sign images' % sha_algo) - util.run_and_log(cons, [mkimage, '-F', '-k', tmpdir, '-K', dtb, - fit]) - def replace_fit_totalsize(size): """Replace FIT header's totalsize with something greater.
@@ -171,7 +156,7 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): # Build the FIT, but don't sign anything yet cons.log.action('%s: Test FIT with signed images' % sha_algo) - make_fit('sign-images-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo , padding)) + make_fit('sign-images-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo, padding)) run_bootm(sha_algo, 'unsigned images', 'dev-', True) # Sign images with our dev keys
@@ -182,7 +167,7 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): dtc('sandbox-u-boot.dts') cons.log.action('%s: Test FIT with signed configuration' % sha_algo) - make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo , padding)) + make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo, padding)) run_bootm(sha_algo, 'unsigned config', '%s+ OK' % sha_algo, True) # Sign images with our dev keys
@@ -195,14 +180,14 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): # Make sure that U-Boot checks that the config is in the list of hashed # nodes. If it isn't, a security bypass is possible. - with open(fit, 'rb') as fp: - root, strblock = vboot_forge.read_fdt(fp) + with open(fit, 'rb') as fd: + root, strblock = vboot_forge.read_fdt(fd) root, strblock = vboot_forge.manipulate(root, strblock) - with open(fit, 'w+b') as fp: - vboot_forge.write_fdt(root, strblock, fp) - util.run_and_log_expect_exception(cons, - [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', dtb], - 1, 'Failed to verify required signature') + with open(fit, 'w+b') as fd: + vboot_forge.write_fdt(root, strblock, fd) + util.run_and_log_expect_exception( + cons, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', dtb], + 1, 'Failed to verify required signature') run_bootm(sha_algo, 'forged config', 'Bad Data Hash', False)
@@ -235,8 +220,9 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): False) cons.log.action('%s: Check bad config on the host' % sha_algo) - util.run_and_log_expect_exception(cons, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, - '-k', dtb], 1, 'Failed to verify required signature') + util.run_and_log_expect_exception( + cons, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', dtb], + 1, 'Failed to verify required signature') def test_required_key(sha_algo, padding): """Test verified boot with the given hash algorithm.
@@ -257,12 +243,12 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): # Build the FIT with prod key (keys required) and sign it. This puts the # signature into sandbox-u-boot.dtb, marked 'required' - make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s-prod.its' % (sha_algo , padding)) + make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s-prod.its' % (sha_algo, padding)) sign_fit(sha_algo) # Build the FIT with dev key (keys NOT required). This adds the # signature into sandbox-u-boot.dtb, NOT marked 'required'. - make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo , padding)) + make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo, padding)) sign_fit(sha_algo) # So now sandbox-u-boot.dtb two signatures, for the prod and dev keys.
@@ -274,7 +260,6 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): cons = u_boot_console tmpdir = cons.config.result_dir + '/' - tmp = tmpdir + 'vboot.tmp' datadir = cons.config.source_dir + '/test/py/tests/vboot/' fit = '%stest.fit' % tmpdir mkimage = cons.config.build_dir + '/tools/mkimage'
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 12/14 image: Use constants for 'required' and 'key-name-hint'
In reply to Simon GlassThese are used in multiple places so update them to use a shared #define.
---
Changes in v2: None
common/image-cipher.c | 2 +- common/image-fit.c | 6 +++--- common/image-sig.c | 8 +++++--- include/image.h | 4 +++- lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c | 6 +++--- tools/image-host.c | 8 ++++---- 6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
common/image-cipher.c +1 -1
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int fit_image_setup_decrypt(struct image_cipher_info *info,return -1 ; } - info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, cipher_noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, cipher_noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL );if (!info->keyname) {printf ("Can't get key name\n" );return -1 ;
common/image-fit.c +3 -3
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void fit_image_print_data(const void *fit, int noffset, const char *p,int value_len;char *algo;const char *padding; -int required; +bool required;int ret, i; debug("%s %s node: '%s'\n", p, type,
@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ static void fit_image_print_data(const void *fit, int noffset, const char *p,return ; }printf ("%s" , algo); - keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); - required =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"required" ,NULL ) !=NULL ; + keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL ); + required =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_REQUIRED ,NULL ) !=NULL ;if (keyname)printf (":%s" , keyname);if (required)
common/image-sig.c +5 -3
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info, padding_name =RSA_DEFAULT_PADDING_NAME ;memset (info,'\0' ,sizeof (*info)); - info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL ); info->fit = (void *)fit; info->node_offset = noffset; info->name = algo_name;
@@ -340,7 +340,8 @@ int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,const char *required;int ret; - required =fdt_getprop (sig_blob, noffset,"required" ,NULL ); + required =fdt_getprop (sig_blob, noffset,FIT_KEY_REQUIRED , +NULL );if (!required ||strcmp (required,"image" ))continue ; ret = fit_image_verify_sig(fit, image_noffset, data, size,
@@ -557,7 +558,8 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,const char *required;int ret; - required =fdt_getprop (sig_blob, noffset,"required" ,NULL ); + required =fdt_getprop (sig_blob, noffset,FIT_KEY_REQUIRED , +NULL );if (!required ||strcmp (required,"conf" ))continue ; ret = fit_config_verify_sig(fit, conf_noffset, sig_blob,
include/image.h +3 -1
@@ -939,12 +939,14 @@ int booti_setup(ulong image, ulong *relocated_addr, ulong *size,#define FIT_IMAGES_PATH "/images"#define FIT_CONFS_PATH "/configurations" -/* hash/signature node */ +/* hash/signature/key node */ #define FIT_HASH_NODENAME "hash"#define FIT_ALGO_PROP "algo"#define FIT_VALUE_PROP "value"#define FIT_IGNORE_PROP "uboot-ignore"#define FIT_SIG_NODENAME "signature" +#define FIT_KEY_REQUIRED "required" +#define FIT_KEY_HINT "key-name-hint"/* cipher node */ #define FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME "cipher"
lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c +3 -3
@@ -792,8 +792,8 @@ int rsa_add_verify_data(struct image_sign_info *info, void *keydest) }if (!ret) { - ret =fdt_setprop_string (keydest, node,"key-name-hint" , - info->keyname); + ret =fdt_setprop_string (keydest, node,FIT_KEY_HINT , + info->keyname); }if (!ret) ret =fdt_setprop_u32 (keydest, node,"rsa,num-bits" , bits);
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ int rsa_add_verify_data(struct image_sign_info *info, void *keydest) info->name); }if (!ret && info->require_keys) { - ret =fdt_setprop_string (keydest, node,"required" , + ret =fdt_setprop_string (keydest, node,FIT_KEY_REQUIRED , info->require_keys); } done:
tools/image-host.c +4 -4
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int fit_image_setup_sig(struct image_sign_info *info,memset (info,'\0' ,sizeof (*info)); info->keydir = keydir; - info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL ); info->fit = fit; info->node_offset = noffset; info->name =strdup (algo_name);
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static int fit_image_process_sig(const char *keydir, void *keydest,free (value);/* Get keyname again, as FDT has changed and invalidated our pointer */ - info.keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info.keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL );/* * Write the public key into the supplied FDT file; this might fail
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int fit_image_setup_cipher(struct image_cipher_info *info, info->keydir = keydir;/* Read the key name */ - info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL );if (!info->keyname) {printf ("Can't get key name for cipher '%s' in image '%s'\n" , node_name, image_name);
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ static int fit_config_process_sig(const char *keydir, void *keydest,free (region_prop);/* Get keyname again, as FDT has changed and invalidated our pointer */ - info.keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info.keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL );/* Write the public key into the supplied FDT file */ if (keydest) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 12/14 image: Use constants for 'required' and 'key-name-hint'
Quoted 7 lines
Objet: [PATCH v2 12/14] image: Use constants for 'required' and 'key-name-hint'
These are used in multiple places so update them to use a shared #define.
Signed-off-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>
Quoted 180 lines
---
Changes in v2: None
common/image-cipher.c| 2 +-common/image-fit.c| 6 +++---common/image-sig.c| 8 +++++---include/image.h| 4 +++-lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c| 6 +++---tools/image-host.c| 8 ++++----6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)common/image-cipher.c +1
-1@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int fit_image_setup_decrypt(struct image_cipher_info *info, return -1 ; } - info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, cipher_noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, cipher_noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL );if (!info->keyname) {printf ("Can't get key name\n" );return -1;
common/image-fit.c +1
-1@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void fit_image_print_data(const void *fit, int noffset, const char *p, int value_len;char *algo;const char *padding; -int required; +bool required;int ret, i;debug("%s %s node: '%s'\n", p, type,
common/image-fit.c +2
-2@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ static void fit_image_print_data(const void *fit, int noffset, const char *p, return; }printf ("%s" , algo); - keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); - required =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"required" ,NULL ) !=NULL ; + keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL ); + required =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_REQUIRED ,NULL ) !=NULL ;if (keyname)printf (":%s" , keyname);if (required)
common/image-sig.c +1
-1@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info, padding_name =RSA_DEFAULT_PADDING_NAME ;memset (info,'\0' ,sizeof (*info)); - info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL ); info->fit = (void *)fit; info->node_offset = noffset;
info->name=algo_name;common/image-sig.c +2
-1@@ -340,7 +340,8 @@ int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset, const char *required;int ret; - required =fdt_getprop (sig_blob, noffset,"required" ,NULL ); + required =fdt_getprop (sig_blob, noffset,FIT_KEY_REQUIRED , +NULL );if (!required ||strcmp (required,"image" ))continue ;ret = fit_image_verify_sig(fit,
image_noffset, data, size,common/image-sig.c +2
-1@@ -557,7 +558,8 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset, const char *required;int ret; - required =fdt_getprop (sig_blob, noffset,"required" ,NULL ); + required =fdt_getprop (sig_blob, noffset,FIT_KEY_REQUIRED , +NULL );if (!required ||strcmp (required,"conf" ))continue ;ret = fit_config_verify_sig(fit,
conf_noffset,sig_blob,include/image.h +3
-1@@ -939,12 +939,14 @@ int booti_setup(ulong image, ulong *relocated_addr, ulong *size,#define FIT_IMAGES_PATH "/images"#define FIT_CONFS_PATH "/configurations" -/* hash/signature node */ +/* hash/signature/key node */ #define FIT_HASH_NODENAME "hash"#define FIT_ALGO_PROP "algo"#define FIT_VALUE_PROP "value"#define FIT_IGNORE_PROP "uboot-ignore"#define FIT_SIG_NODENAME "signature" +#define FIT_KEY_REQUIRED "required" +#define FIT_KEY_HINT "key-name-hint"/* cipher node */ #define
FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME"cipher"lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c +2
-2@@ -792,8 +792,8 @@ int rsa_add_verify_data(struct image_sign_info *info, void *keydest) }if (!ret) { - ret =fdt_setprop_string (keydest, node,"key-name-hint" , - info->keyname); + ret =fdt_setprop_string (keydest, node,FIT_KEY_HINT , + info->keyname); }if (!ret)ret =
fdt_setprop_u32(keydest, node, "rsa,num-bits", bits);lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c +1
-1@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ int rsa_add_verify_data(struct image_sign_info *info, void *keydest) info->name); }if (!ret && info->require_keys) { - ret =fdt_setprop_string (keydest, node,"required" , + ret =fdt_setprop_string (keydest, node,FIT_KEY_REQUIRED , info->require_keys); }done:
tools/image-host.c +2
-2@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int fit_image_setup_sig(struct image_sign_info *info,memset (info,'\0' ,sizeof (*info)); info->keydir = keydir; - info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL ); info->fit = fit; info->node_offset = noffset; info->name =strdup (algo_name);@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static int fit_image_process_sig(const char *keydir, void *keydest,free (value);/* Get keyname again, as FDT has changed and invalidated our pointer */ - info.keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info.keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL );/* * Write the public key into the supplied FDT file; this might fail
tools/image-host.c +1
-1@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int fit_image_setup_cipher(struct image_cipher_info *info, info->keydir = keydir;/* Read the key name */ - info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info->keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL );if (!info->keyname) { printf("Can't get key name for cipher '%s' in image '%s'\n",
node_name,image_name);tools/image-host.c +1
-1@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ static int fit_config_process_sig(const char *keydir, void *keydest,free (region_prop);/* Get keyname again, as FDT has changed and invalidated our pointer */ - info.keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,"key-name-hint" ,NULL ); + info.keyname =fdt_getprop (fit, noffset,FIT_KEY_HINT ,NULL );/* Write the public key into the supplied FDT file */ if (keydest) {
--
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 13/14 test: vboot: Move key creation into a function
In reply to Simon GlassThis code is repeated so move it into a function with a parameter.
---
Changes in v2: None
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 39 +++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py +18 -21
@@ -138,6 +138,22 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): handle.write(struct.pack(">I", size)) return struct.unpack(">I", total_size)[0] + def create_rsa_pair(name): + """Generate a new RSA key paid and certificate + + Args: + name: Name of of the key (e.g. 'dev') + """ + public_exponent = 65537 + util.run_and_log(cons, 'openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out %s%s.key ' + '-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 ' + '-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:%d' % + (tmpdir, name, public_exponent)) + + # Create a certificate containing the public key + util.run_and_log(cons, 'openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key %s%s.key ' + '-out %s%s.crt' % (tmpdir, name, tmpdir, name)) + def test_with_algo(sha_algo, padding): """Test verified boot with the given hash algorithm.
@@ -268,27 +284,8 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): dtb = '%ssandbox-u-boot.dtb' % tmpdir sig_node = '/configurations/conf-1/signature' - # Create an RSA key pair - public_exponent = 65537 - util.run_and_log(cons, 'openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out %sdev.key ' - '-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 ' - '-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:%d' % - (tmpdir, public_exponent)) - - # Create a certificate containing the public key - util.run_and_log(cons, 'openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key %sdev.key -out ' - '%sdev.crt' % (tmpdir, tmpdir)) - - # Create an RSA key pair (prod) - public_exponent = 65537 - util.run_and_log(cons, 'openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out %sprod.key ' - '-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 ' - '-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:%d' % - (tmpdir, public_exponent)) - - # Create a certificate containing the public key (prod) - util.run_and_log(cons, 'openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key %sprod.key -out ' - '%sprod.crt' % (tmpdir, tmpdir)) + create_rsa_pair('dev') + create_rsa_pair('prod') # Create a number kernel image with zeroes with open('%stest-kernel.bin' % tmpdir, 'w') as fd:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
PATCH v2 14/14 test: vboot: Reduce fake kernel size to 500 bytes
In reply to Simon GlassWe don't need 5KB to test things out. A smaller size makes it easier to look at the FIT with fdtdump.
---
Changes in v2: None
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py +1 -1
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, required): # Create a number kernel image with zeroes with open('%stest-kernel.bin' % tmpdir, 'w') as fd: - fd.write(5000 * chr(0)) + fd.write(500 * chr(0)) try: # We need to use our own device tree file. Remember to restore it
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1.481.gfbce0eb801-goog
v2 cover vboot: Fix forged-configuration vulnerability
In reply to Simon GlassHi,
Quoted 39 lines · Simon Glass
When booting a FIT, if 'bootm' is used without a specified configuration, U-Boot will use the default one provided in the FIT. But it does not actually check that the signature is for that configuration.
This means that it is possible to duplicate a configuration conf-1 to produce conf-2 (with all the signatures intact), set the default configuration to conf-2 and then boot the image. U-Boot will verify conf-2 (in fact since hashed-nodes specifies the conf-1 nodes it will effectively verify conf-1). Then it will happily boot conf-2 even though it might have a different kernel.
This series corrects this problem and adds a test to verify it. It also updates
fit_check_signto allow the configuration to be specified.This vulnerability was found by Dmitry Janushkevich and Andrea Barisani of F-Secure, who also wrote the
vboot_forgescript included here.This is CVE-2020-10648
Changes in v2:
- Bring in newvboot_forgefile from the authorsSimon Glass (14):
image: Correct comment forfit_conf_get_node()
image: Be a little more verbose when checking signatures
image: Return an error message fromfit_config_verify_sig()
test: vboot: Drop unnecessary parameter forfit_check_sign
test: vboot: Add a test for a forged configuration
test: vboot: Parameterise the test
image: Check hash-nodes when checking configurations
image: Load the correct configuration infit_check_sign
fit_check_sign: Allow selecting the configuration to verify
test: vboot: Tidy up the code a little
test: vboot: Fix pylint errors
image: Use constants for 'required' and 'key-name-hint'
test: vboot: Move key creation into a function
test: vboot: Reduce fake kernel size to 500 bytes
Quoted 13 lines
common/bootm.c | 6 +- common/image-cipher.c | 2 +- common/image-fit.c | 26 +-- common/image-sig.c | 49 +++- include/image.h | 24 +- lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c | 6 +- test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 155 +++++++------ test/py/tests/vboot_forge.py | 423 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/fdt_host.h | 3 +- tools/fit_check_sign.c | 8 +- tools/image-host.c | 17 +- 11 files changed, 601 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/vboot_forge.py
This is applied to dm/master.
Tom, shall I send a pull request?
Regards,
Simon
v2 cover vboot: Fix forged-configuration vulnerability
Quoted 56 lines · Simon Glass
Hi,
Quoted 39 lines · Simon Glass
When booting a FIT, if 'bootm' is used without a specified configuration, U-Boot will use the default one provided in the FIT. But it does not actually check that the signature is for that configuration.
This means that it is possible to duplicate a configuration conf-1 to produce conf-2 (with all the signatures intact), set the default configuration to conf-2 and then boot the image. U-Boot will verify conf-2 (in fact since hashed-nodes specifies the conf-1 nodes it will effectively verify conf-1). Then it will happily boot conf-2 even though it might have a different kernel.
This series corrects this problem and adds a test to verify it. It also updates
fit_check_signto allow the configuration to be specified.This vulnerability was found by Dmitry Janushkevich and Andrea Barisani of F-Secure, who also wrote the
vboot_forgescript included here.This is CVE-2020-10648
Changes in v2:
- Bring in newvboot_forgefile from the authorsSimon Glass (14):
image: Correct comment forfit_conf_get_node()
image: Be a little more verbose when checking signatures
image: Return an error message fromfit_config_verify_sig()
test: vboot: Drop unnecessary parameter forfit_check_sign
test: vboot: Add a test for a forged configuration
test: vboot: Parameterise the test
image: Check hash-nodes when checking configurations
image: Load the correct configuration infit_check_sign
fit_check_sign: Allow selecting the configuration to verify
test: vboot: Tidy up the code a little
test: vboot: Fix pylint errors
image: Use constants for 'required' and 'key-name-hint'
test: vboot: Move key creation into a function
test: vboot: Reduce fake kernel size to 500 bytesQuoted 13 lines
common/bootm.c | 6 +- common/image-cipher.c | 2 +- common/image-fit.c | 26 +-- common/image-sig.c | 49 +++- include/image.h | 24 +- lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c | 6 +- test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 155 +++++++------ test/py/tests/vboot_forge.py | 423 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/fdt_host.h | 3 +- tools/fit_check_sign.c | 8 +- tools/image-host.c | 17 +- 11 files changed, 601 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/vboot_forge.py
Quoted 3 lines
This is applied to dm/master.
Tom, shall I send a pull request?
Yes please, thanks!
Signature · 8 lines
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