icmp: randomize the global rate limiter
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 icmp: randomize the global rate limiter
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Keyu Man reported that the ICMP rate limiter could be used by attackers to get useful signal. Details will be provided in an upcoming academic publication.
Our solution is to add some noise, so that the attackers no longer can get help from the predictable token bucket limiter.
--- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 4 +++- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 7 +++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +3 -1
@@ -1142,13 +1142,15 @@ icmp_ratelimit - INTEGER icmp_msgs_per_sec - INTEGER Limit maximal number of ICMP packets sent per second from this host. Only messages whose type matches icmp_ratemask (see below) are - controlled by this limit. + controlled by this limit. For security reasons, the precise count + of messages per second is randomized. Default: 1000 icmp_msgs_burst - INTEGER icmp_msgs_per_sec controls number of ICMP packets sent per second, while icmp_msgs_burst controls the burst size of these packets. + For security reasons, the precise burst size is randomized. Default: 50
net/ipv4/icmp.c +5 -2
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static struct {/** * icmp_global_allow - Are we allowed to send one more ICMP message ? * -* Uses a token bucket to limit our ICMP messages to sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec. +* Uses a token bucket to limit our ICMP messages to ~sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec. * Returns false if we reached the limit and can not send another packet. * Note: called with BH disabled */
@@ -267,7 +267,10 @@ bool icmp_global_allow(void) } credit =min_t (u32, icmp_global.credit + incr, sysctl_icmp_msgs_burst);if (credit) { - credit--; +/* We want to use a credit of one in average, but need to randomize +* it for security reasons. +*/ + credit =max_t (int, credit -prandom_u32_max (3 ),0 ); rc = true; }WRITE_ONCE (icmp_global.credit, credit);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Quoted 6 lines · On Thu, 15 Oct 2020 11:42:00 -0700 Eric Dumazet wrote:
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Keyu Man reported that the ICMP rate limiter could be used by attackers to get useful signal. Details will be provided in an upcoming academic publication.
Quoted 6 lines
Our solution is to add some noise, so that the attackers no longer can get help from the predictable token bucket limiter.
Fixes 4cdf507d5452 ("icmp: add a global rate limitation")Signed-off-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>Reported-by Keyu Man <[email protected]>
Applied, queued up, thank you!
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Quoted 10 lines · On Thu, 15 Oct 2020 11:42:00 -0700 you wrote:
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Keyu Man reported that the ICMP rate limiter could be used by attackers to get useful signal. Details will be provided in an upcoming academic publication.
Our solution is to add some noise, so that the attackers no longer can get help from the predictable token bucket limiter.
[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net] icmp: randomize the global rate limiter
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/b38e7819cae9
You are awesome, thank you!
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