riscv: Enable per-task stack canaries
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maintainerPATCH RESEND v4 1/1 riscv: Enable per-task stack canaries
From: Guo Ren <[email protected]>
This enables the use of per-task stack canary values if GCC has support for emitting the stack canary reference relative to the value of tp, which holds the task struct pointer in the riscv kernel.
After compare arm64 and x86 implementations, seems arm64's is more flexible and readable. The key point is how gcc get the offset of stack_canary from gs/el0_sp.
x86: Use a fix offset from gs, not flexible.
struct fixed_percpu_data {
/*
* GCC hardcodes the stack canary as %gs:40. Since the
* irq_stack is the object at %gs:0, we reserve the bottom
* 48 bytes of the irq stack for the canary.
*/
char gs_base[40]; // :(
unsigned long stack_canary;
};arm64: Use -mstack-protector-guard-offset & guard-reg
gcc options:
-mstack-protector-guard=sysreg -mstack-protector-guard-reg=sp_el0 -mstack-protector-guard-offset=xxx
riscv: Use -mstack-protector-guard-offset & guard-reg
gcc options:
-mstack-protector-guard=tls -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp -mstack-protector-guard-offset=xxx
GCC's implementation has been merged:
commit c931e8d5a96463427040b0d11f9c4352ac22b2b0
Author: Cooper Qu <[email protected]>
Date: Mon Jul 13 16:15:08 2020 +0800
RISC-V: Add support for TLS stack protector canary access
In the end, these codes are inserted by gcc before return:
* 0xffffffe00020b396 <+120>: ld a5,1008(tp) # 0x3f0 * 0xffffffe00020b39a <+124>: xor a5,a5,a4 * 0xffffffe00020b39c <+126>: mv a0,s5 * 0xffffffe00020b39e <+128>: bnez a5,0xffffffe00020b61c <_do_fork+766> 0xffffffe00020b3a2 <+132>: ld ra,136(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3a4 <+134>: ld s0,128(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3a6 <+136>: ld s1,120(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3a8 <+138>: ld s2,112(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3aa <+140>: ld s3,104(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3ac <+142>: ld s4,96(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3ae <+144>: ld s5,88(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3b0 <+146>: ld s6,80(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3b2 <+148>: ld s7,72(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3b4 <+150>: addi sp,sp,144 0xffffffe00020b3b6 <+152>: ret ... * 0xffffffe00020b61c <+766>: auipc ra,0x7f8 * 0xffffffe00020b620 <+770>: jalr -1764(ra) # 0xffffffe000a02f38 <__stack_chk_fail>
--- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 7 +++++++ arch/riscv/Makefile | 10 ++++++++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 3 ++- arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/Kconfig +7 -0
@@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ config EFI allow the kernel to be booted as an EFI application. This is only useful on systems that have UEFI firmware. +config CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS + def_bool $(cc-option,-mstack-protector-guard=tls -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp -mstack-protector-guard-offset=0) + +config STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK + def_bool y + depends on STACKPROTECTOR && CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS + endmenu config BUILTIN_DTB
arch/riscv/Makefile +10 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,16 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE += $(call cc-option,-mno-relax) # architectures. It's faster to have GCC emit only aligned accesses. KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mstrict-align) +ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK),y) +prepare: stack_protector_prepare +stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 + $(eval KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mstack-protector-guard=tls \ + -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp \ + -mstack-protector-guard-offset=$(shell \ + awk '{if ($$2 == "TSK_STACK_CANARY") print $$3;}' \ + include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) +endif + # arch specific predefines for sparse CHECKFLAGS += -D__riscv -D__riscv_xlen=$(BITS)
arch/riscv/include/asm/stackprotector.h +2 -1
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) canary &=CANARY_MASK ; current->stack_canary = canary; - __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK )) + __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; }#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c +3 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ void asm_offsets(void)OFFSET (TASK_THREAD_F30 , task_struct, thread.fstate.f[30 ]);OFFSET (TASK_THREAD_F31 , task_struct, thread.fstate.f[31 ]);OFFSET (TASK_THREAD_FCSR , task_struct, thread.fstate.fcsr); +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR +OFFSET (TSK_STACK_CANARY , task_struct, stack_canary); +#endif DEFINE (PT_SIZE ,sizeof (struct pt_regs ));OFFSET (PT_EPC , pt_regs, epc);
arch/riscv/kernel/process.c +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ registerunsigned long gp_in_global __asm__("gp" ); -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR +#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR ) && !defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK )#include <linux/stackprotector.h> unsigned long __stack_chk_guard__read_mostly ;EXPORT_SYMBOL (__stack_chk_guard);
Signature · 7 lines
2.7.4 _______________________________________________ linux-riscv mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
Quoted 146 lines · On Thu, 17 Dec 2020 08:29:18 PST (-0800), [email protected] wrote:
From: Guo Ren <[email protected]>
This enables the use of per-task stack canary values if GCC has support for emitting the stack canary reference relative to the value of tp, which holds the task struct pointer in the riscv kernel.
After compare arm64 and x86 implementations, seems arm64's is more flexible and readable. The key point is how gcc get the offset of
stack_canaryfrom gs/el0_sp.x86: Use a fix offset from gs, not flexible.
struct fixed_percpu_data { /* * GCC hardcodes the stack canary as %gs:40. Since the * irq_stack is the object at %gs:0, we reserve the bottom * 48 bytes of the irq stack for the canary. */ char gs_base[40]; // :( unsigned long stack_canary; };arm64: Use -mstack-protector-guard-offset & guard-reg
gcc options:
-mstack-protector-guard=sysreg -mstack-protector-guard-reg=sp_el0 -mstack-protector-guard-offset=xxxriscv: Use -mstack-protector-guard-offset & guard-reg
gcc options:
-mstack-protector-guard=tls -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp -mstack-protector-guard-offset=xxxGCC's implementation has been merged:
commitc931e8d5a96463427040b0d11f9c4352ac22b2b0
Author: Cooper Qu <[email protected]>
Date: Mon Jul 13 16:15:08 2020 +0800RISC-V: Add support for TLS stack protector canary access
In the end, these codes are inserted by gcc before return:
* 0xffffffe00020b396 <+120>: ld a5,1008(tp) # 0x3f0 * 0xffffffe00020b39a <+124>: xor a5,a5,a4 * 0xffffffe00020b39c <+126>: mv a0,s5 * 0xffffffe00020b39e <+128>: bnez a5,0xffffffe00020b61c <_do_fork+766> 0xffffffe00020b3a2 <+132>: ld ra,136(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3a4 <+134>: ld s0,128(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3a6 <+136>: ld s1,120(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3a8 <+138>: ld s2,112(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3aa <+140>: ld s3,104(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3ac <+142>: ld s4,96(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3ae <+144>: ld s5,88(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3b0 <+146>: ld s6,80(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3b2 <+148>: ld s7,72(sp) 0xffffffe00020b3b4 <+150>: addi sp,sp,144 0xffffffe00020b3b6 <+152>: ret ... * 0xffffffe00020b61c <+766>: auipc ra,0x7f8 * 0xffffffe00020b620 <+770>: jalr -1764(ra) # 0xffffffe000a02f38 <__stack_chk_fail>Signed-off-by Guo Ren <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Cooper Qu <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>--- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 7 +++++++ arch/riscv/Makefile | 10 ++++++++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 3 ++- arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/riscv/Kconfig +7
-0@@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ config EFI allow the kernel to be booted as an EFI application. This is only useful on systems that have UEFI firmware. +config CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS + def_bool $(cc-option,-mstack-protector-guard=tls -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp -mstack-protector-guard-offset=0) + +config STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK + def_bool y + depends on STACKPROTECTOR && CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS + endmenu config BUILTIN_DTBarch/riscv/Makefile +10
-0@@ -67,6 +67,16 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE += $(call cc-option,-mno-relax) # architectures. It's faster to have GCC emit only aligned accesses. KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mstrict-align) +ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK),y) +prepare: stack_protector_prepare +stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 + $(eval KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mstack-protector-guard=tls \ + -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp \ + -mstack-protector-guard-offset=$(shell \ + awk '{if ($$2 == "TSK_STACK_CANARY") print $$3;}' \ + include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) +endif + # arch specific predefines for sparse CHECKFLAGS += -D__riscv -D__riscv_xlen=$(BITS)arch/riscv/include/asm/stackprotector.h +2
-1@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) canary &=CANARY_MASK ; current->stack_canary = canary; - __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK )) + __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; }#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_STACKPROTECTOR_H */ arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c +3
-0@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ void asm_offsets(void)OFFSET (TASK_THREAD_F30 , task_struct, thread.fstate.f[30 ]);OFFSET (TASK_THREAD_F31 , task_struct, thread.fstate.f[31 ]);OFFSET (TASK_THREAD_FCSR , task_struct, thread.fstate.fcsr); +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR +OFFSET (TSK_STACK_CANARY , task_struct, stack_canary); +#endif DEFINE (PT_SIZE ,sizeof (struct pt_regs ));OFFSET (PT_EPC , pt_regs, epc);arch/riscv/kernel/process.c +0
-0
arch/riscv/kernel/process.c line 30
Quoted 8 lines
arch/riscv/kernel/process.c +1
-1@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ registerunsigned long gp_in_global __asm__("gp" ); -#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR +#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR ) && !defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK )#include <linux/stackprotector.h> unsigned long __stack_chk_guard__read_mostly ;EXPORT_SYMBOL (__stack_chk_guard);
Thanks, this is on for-next.
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