target/ppc/spapr: Update H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS L1D cache flush bits
PATCH 1/1 target/ppc/spapr: Update H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS L1D cache flush bits
There are several new L1D cache flush bits added to the hcall which reflect hardware security features for speculative cache access issues.
These behaviours are now being specified as negative in order to simplify patched kernel compatibility with older firmware (a new problem found in existing systems would automatically be vulnerable).
--- hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c | 2 ++ include/hw/ppc/spapr.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c +2 -0
@@ -1299,6 +1299,8 @@ static target_ulong h_get_cpu_characteristics(PowerPCCPU *cpu, behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR ;break ;case SPAPR_CAP_FIXED : + behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ; + behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ;break ;default :/* broken */ assert (safe_cache ==SPAPR_CAP_BROKEN );
include/hw/ppc/spapr.h +3 -0
@@ -398,10 +398,13 @@ struct SpaprMachineState {#define H_CPU_CHAR_THR_RECONF_TRIG PPC_BIT(6)#define H_CPU_CHAR_CACHE_COUNT_DIS PPC_BIT(7)#define H_CPU_CHAR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST PPC_BIT(9) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY PPC_BIT(0)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR PPC_BIT(1)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR PPC_BIT(2)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE PPC_BIT(5) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY PPC_BIT(7) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS PPC_BIT(8)/* Each control block has to be on a 4K boundary */ #define H_CB_ALIGNMENT 4096
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Quoted 6 lines · Nicholas Piggin
There are several new L1D cache flush bits added to the hcall which reflect hardware security features for speculative cache access issues.
These behaviours are now being specified as negative in order to simplify patched kernel compatibility with older firmware (a new problem found in existing systems would automatically be vulnerable).
I don't really understand all the consequences of that. What I need to know here, is if it's safe to unconditionally enable these bits, even for older machine types.
Quoted 37 lines
Signed-off-by Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>--- hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c | 2 ++ include/hw/ppc/spapr.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c +2
-0@@ -1299,6 +1299,8 @@ static target_ulong h_get_cpu_characteristics(PowerPCCPU *cpu, behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR ;break ;case SPAPR_CAP_FIXED : + behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ; + behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ;break ;default :/* broken */ assert (safe_cache ==SPAPR_CAP_BROKEN );include/hw/ppc/spapr.h +3
-0@@ -398,10 +398,13 @@ struct SpaprMachineState {#define H_CPU_CHAR_THR_RECONF_TRIG PPC_BIT(6)#define H_CPU_CHAR_CACHE_COUNT_DIS PPC_BIT(7)#define H_CPU_CHAR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST PPC_BIT(9) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY PPC_BIT(0)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR PPC_BIT(1)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR PPC_BIT(2)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE PPC_BIT(5) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY PPC_BIT(7) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS PPC_BIT(8)/* Each control block has to be on a 4K boundary */ #define H_CB_ALIGNMENT 4096
Signature · 4 lines
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
Excerpts from David Gibson's message of June 19, 2021 7:26 pm:
Quoted 11 lines · Nicholas Piggin
Quoted 6 lines
There are several new L1D cache flush bits added to the hcall which reflect hardware security features for speculative cache access issues.
These behaviours are now being specified as negative in order to simplify patched kernel compatibility with older firmware (a new problem found in existing systems would automatically be vulnerable).
I don't really understand all the consequences of that. What I need to know here, is if it's safe to unconditionally enable these bits, even for older machine types.
Unconditionally on the condition that the cap is set to fixed? It should be fine AFAIKS. If the older machine types are running on older hardware that acutally does require the flush, then the fixed cap would cause the existing flush bit to be clear and the kernel to skip the exit flush, so that would be broken already. Does that sound right?
One thing I'm not entirely clear on is:
All these (entry/exit/uaccess) flush requirements stem from basically the same underlying mechanism, so that gets resolved in hardware and software can stop doing all of them. That's fine, but it was decided to add different bits to the hcall basically to have flexibility let's say in case a new issue is discovered one day that requires just the uaccess flush, for example.
In that case we can just set the right combination of bits in firmware, and kernels in the field will just do the right thing, and we don't need to do all the other flushes that would be worse for performance.
How would that work with qemu? I assume we don't have a cap per bit in the hcall, but rather a cap per vulnerability class, so you would set that new class as vulnerable, and this code will have to translate those and work out the correct combination of bits to set in these fields.
If I'm way off base or there's a better way to do it, that could mean this patch needs to be done a different way.
Thanks,
Nick
Quoted 45 lines
Quoted 38 lines
Signed-off-by Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>--- hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c | 2 ++ include/hw/ppc/spapr.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c +2
-0@@ -1299,6 +1299,8 @@ static target_ulong h_get_cpu_characteristics(PowerPCCPU *cpu, behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR ;break ;case SPAPR_CAP_FIXED : + behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ; + behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ;break ;default :/* broken */ assert (safe_cache ==SPAPR_CAP_BROKEN );include/hw/ppc/spapr.h +3
-0@@ -398,10 +398,13 @@ struct SpaprMachineState {#define H_CPU_CHAR_THR_RECONF_TRIG PPC_BIT(6)#define H_CPU_CHAR_CACHE_COUNT_DIS PPC_BIT(7)#define H_CPU_CHAR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST PPC_BIT(9) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY PPC_BIT(0)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR PPC_BIT(1)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR PPC_BIT(2)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE PPC_BIT(5) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY PPC_BIT(7) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS PPC_BIT(8)/* Each control block has to be on a 4K boundary */ #define H_CB_ALIGNMENT 4096Signature · 4 lines
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
Quoted 9 lines · Nicholas Piggin
Excerpts from David Gibson's message of June 19, 2021 7:26 pm:
Quoted 8 lines · Nicholas Piggin
Quoted 6 lines
There are several new L1D cache flush bits added to the hcall which reflect hardware security features for speculative cache access issues.
These behaviours are now being specified as negative in order to simplify patched kernel compatibility with older firmware (a new problem found in existing systems would automatically be vulnerable).
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I don't really understand all the consequences of that. What I need to know here, is if it's safe to unconditionally enable these bits, even for older machine types.
Unconditionally on the condition that the cap is set to fixed?
Sorry, poor phrashing. I meant it's not conditional on the machine version, which means we are technically changing behaviour for existing machine versions. That's a big red flag, though there can be circumstances in which it's justified.
Quoted 6 lines
It
should be fine AFAIKS. If the older machine types are running on older hardware that acutally does require the flush, then the fixed cap would cause the existing flush bit to be clear and the kernel to skip the exit flush, so that would be broken already. Does that sound right?
Urgh. The fact that some bits have different sense to others is doing my head in.
Quoted 9 lines
One thing I'm not entirely clear on is:
All these (entry/exit/uaccess) flush requirements stem from basically the same underlying mechanism, so that gets resolved in hardware and software can stop doing all of them. That's fine, but it was decided to add different bits to the hcall basically to have flexibility let's say in case a new issue is discovered one day that requires just the uaccess flush, for example.
Quoted 3 lines
In that case we can just set the right combination of bits in firmware, and kernels in the field will just do the right thing, and we don't need to do all the other flushes that would be worse for performance.
Right, but that doesn't work for qemu guests. Qemu needs to advertise things so that guests will do all the things that are necessary not just on this host, but on any host we might be migrated to.
Quoted 4 lines
How would that work with qemu? I assume we don't have a cap per bit in the hcall, but rather a cap per vulnerability class, so you would set that new class as vulnerable, and this code will have to translate those and work out the correct combination of bits to set in these fields.
Something like that, yes. Actually doing so can be pretty complicated because of the need to have a consistent migration domain.
Quoted 2 lines
If I'm way off base or there's a better way to do it, that could mean this patch needs to be done a different way.
I think we need to find a time to discuss this (Slack or call or whatever), so you can step me through this bit by bit.
Signature · 4 lines
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
Quoted 8 lines · Nicholas Piggin
There are several new L1D cache flush bits added to the hcall which reflect hardware security features for speculative cache access issues.
These behaviours are now being specified as negative in order to simplify patched kernel compatibility with older firmware (a new problem found in existing systems would automatically be vulnerable).
Signed-off-by Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
After our discussion, I'm convinced that the small behaviour change for old machine types is safe. I've added an explanatory note to the commit message and merged to ppc-for-6.1.
Quoted 36 lines
--- hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c | 2 ++ include/hw/ppc/spapr.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c +2
-0@@ -1299,6 +1299,8 @@ static target_ulong h_get_cpu_characteristics(PowerPCCPU *cpu, behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR ;break ;case SPAPR_CAP_FIXED : + behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ; + behaviour |=H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ;break ;default :/* broken */ assert (safe_cache ==SPAPR_CAP_BROKEN );include/hw/ppc/spapr.h +3
-0@@ -398,10 +398,13 @@ struct SpaprMachineState {#define H_CPU_CHAR_THR_RECONF_TRIG PPC_BIT(6)#define H_CPU_CHAR_CACHE_COUNT_DIS PPC_BIT(7)#define H_CPU_CHAR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST PPC_BIT(9) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY PPC_BIT(0)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR PPC_BIT(1)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR PPC_BIT(2)#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE PPC_BIT(5) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY PPC_BIT(7) +#define H_CPU_BEHAV_NO_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS PPC_BIT(8)/* Each control block has to be on a 4K boundary */ #define H_CB_ALIGNMENT 4096
Signature · 4 lines
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson