pull request (net): ipsec 2021-08-04
Subsystems (4)
Steffen Klassert
maintainer1) Fix a sysbot reported memory leak in xfrm_user_rcv_msg. From Pavel Skripkin.
2) Revert "xfrm: policy: Read seqcount outside of rcu-read side in xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype". This commit tried to fix a lockin bug, but only cured some of the symptoms. A proper fix is applied on top of this revert.
3) Fix a locking bug on xfrm state hash resize. A recent change on sequence counters accidentally repaced a spinlock by a mutex. Fix from Frederic Weisbecker.
4) Fix possible user-memory-access in xfrm_user_rcv_msg_compat(). From Dmitry Safonov.
5) Add initialiation sefltest fot xfrm_spdattr_type_t. From Dmitry Safonov.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
Thanks!
The following changes since commit a118ff661889ecee3ca90f8125bad8fb5bbc07d5:
selftests: net: devlink_port_split: check devlink returned an element before dereferencing it (2021-06-28 16:14:38 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec.git master
for you to fetch changes up to 480e93e12aa04d857f7cc2e6fcec181c0d690404:
net: xfrm: Fix end of loop tests for list_for_each_entry (2021-07-26 12:26:28 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dmitry Safonov (2):
net/xfrm/compat: Copy xfrm_spdattr_type_t atributes selftests/net/ipsec: Add test for xfrm_spdattr_type_t
Frederic Weisbecker (1):
xfrm: Fix RCU vs hash_resize_mutex lock inversion
Harshvardhan Jha (1):
net: xfrm: Fix end of loop tests for list_for_each_entry
Pavel Skripkin (1):
net: xfrm: fix memory leak in xfrm_user_rcv_msg
Steffen Klassert (2):
Revert "xfrm: policy: Read seqcount outside of rcu-read side in xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype" Merge branch 'xfrm/compat: Fix xfrm_spdattr_type_t copying'
include/net/netns/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 49 +++++++++-- net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 32 +++---- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 10 +++ tools/testing/selftests/net/ipsec.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 231 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 1/6 net: xfrm: fix memory leak in xfrm_user_rcv_msg
From: Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>
Syzbot reported memory leak in xfrm_user_rcv_msg(). The problem was is non-freed skb's frag_list.
In skb_release_all() skb_release_data() will be called only in case of skb->head != NULL, but netlink_skb_destructor() sets head to NULL. So, allocated frag_list skb should be freed manualy, since consume_skb() won't take care of it
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +10 -0
@@ -2811,6 +2811,16 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, err = link->doit (skb, nlh, attrs); +/* We need to free skb allocated in xfrm_alloc_compat() before +* returning from this function, because consume_skb() won't take +* care of frag_list since netlink destructor sets +* sbk->head to NULL. (see netlink_skb_destructor()) +*/ +if (skb_has_frag_list (skb)) { +kfree_skb (skb_shinfo (skb)->frag_list); +skb_shinfo (skb)->frag_list =NULL ; + } + err:kvfree (nlh64);return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 1/6] net: xfrm: fix memory leak in xfrm_user_rcv_msg
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Hello:
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Quoted 11 lines · On Wed, 4 Aug 2021 09:03:24 +0200 you wrote:
From: Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>
Syzbot reported memory leak in
xfrm_user_rcv_msg(). The problem was is non-freed skb'sfrag_list.In
skb_release_all()skb_release_data()will be called only in case ofskb->head!= NULL, butnetlink_skb_destructor()sets head to NULL. So, allocatedfrag_listskb should be freed manualy, sinceconsume_skb()won't take care of it[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [1/6] net: xfrm: fix memory leak in xfrm_user_rcv_msg
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/7c1a80e80cde - [2/6] Revert "xfrm: policy: Read seqcount outside of rcu-read side in xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype" https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/eaf228263921 - [3/6] xfrm: Fix RCU vs hash_resize_mutex lock inversion https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/2580d3f40022 - [4/6] net/xfrm/compat: Copy xfrm_spdattr_type_t atributes https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/4e9505064f58 - [5/6] selftests/net/ipsec: Add test for xfrm_spdattr_type_t https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/70bfdf62e93a - [6/6] net: xfrm: Fix end of loop tests for list_for_each_entry https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/480e93e12aa0
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 2/6 Revert "xfrm: policy: Read seqcount outside of rcu-read side in xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype"
In reply to Steffen KlassertThis reverts commit d7b0408934c749f546b01f2b33d07421a49b6f3e.
This commit tried to fix a locking bug introduced by commit 77cc278f7b20 ("xfrm: policy: Use sequence counters with associated lock"). As it turned out, this patch did not really fix the bug. A proper fix for this bug is applied on top of this revert.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 21 +++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +7 -14
@@ -2092,15 +2092,12 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(struct net *net, u8 type,if (unlikely (!daddr || !saddr))return NULL ; - retry: - sequence =read_seqcount_begin (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation);rcu_read_lock (); - - chain =policy_hash_direct (net, daddr, saddr, family, dir); -if (read_seqcount_retry (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence)) { -rcu_read_unlock (); - goto retry; - } + retry: +do { + sequence =read_seqcount_begin (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation); + chain =policy_hash_direct (net, daddr, saddr, family, dir); + }while (read_seqcount_retry (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence)); ret =NULL ;hlist_for_each_entry_rcu (pol, chain, bydst) {
@@ -2131,15 +2128,11 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(struct net *net, u8 type, } skip_inexact: -if (read_seqcount_retry (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence)) { -rcu_read_unlock (); +if (read_seqcount_retry (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence)) goto retry; - } -if (ret && !xfrm_pol_hold_rcu (ret)) { -rcu_read_unlock (); +if (ret && !xfrm_pol_hold_rcu (ret)) goto retry; - } fail:rcu_read_unlock ();
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 3/6 xfrm: Fix RCU vs hash_resize_mutex lock inversion
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
xfrm_bydst_resize() calls synchronize_rcu() while holding hash_resize_mutex. But then on PREEMPT_RT configurations, xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype() may acquire that mutex while running in an RCU read side critical section. This results in a deadlock.
In fact the scope of hash_resize_mutex is way beyond the purpose of xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype() to just fetch a coherent and stable policy for a given destination/direction, along with other details.
The lower level net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock, which among other things protects per destination/direction references to policy entries, is enough to serialize and benefit from priority inheritance against the write side. As a bonus, it makes it officially a per network namespace synchronization business where a policy table resize on namespace A shouldn't block a policy lookup on namespace B.
--- include/net/netns/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/net/netns/xfrm.h +1 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ struct netns_xfrm {#endif spinlock_t xfrm_state_lock;seqcount_spinlock_t xfrm_state_hash_generation; +seqcount_spinlock_t xfrm_policy_hash_generation;spinlock_t xfrm_policy_lock;struct mutex xfrm_cfg_mutex;
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +8 -9
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static struct xfrm_policy_afinfo const __rcu *xfrm_policy_afinfo[AF_INET6 + 1]__read_mostly ;static struct kmem_cache *xfrm_dst_cache__ro_after_init ; -static __read_mostly seqcount_mutex_t xfrm_policy_hash_generation;static struct rhashtable xfrm_policy_inexact_table;static const struct rhashtable_params xfrm_pol_inexact_params;
@@ -585,7 +584,7 @@ static void xfrm_bydst_resize(struct net *net, int dir)return ;spin_lock_bh (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock); -write_seqcount_begin (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation); +write_seqcount_begin (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_hash_generation); odst =rcu_dereference_protected (net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].table,lockdep_is_held (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock));
@@ -596,7 +595,7 @@ static void xfrm_bydst_resize(struct net *net, int dir)rcu_assign_pointer (net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].table, ndst); net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].hmask = nhashmask; -write_seqcount_end (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation); +write_seqcount_end (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_hash_generation);spin_unlock_bh (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);synchronize_rcu ();
@@ -1245,7 +1244,7 @@ static void xfrm_hash_rebuild(struct work_struct *work) }while (read_seqretry (&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lock, seq));spin_lock_bh (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock); -write_seqcount_begin (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation); +write_seqcount_begin (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_hash_generation);/* make sure that we can insert the indirect policies again before * we start with destructive action.
@@ -1354,7 +1353,7 @@ static void xfrm_hash_rebuild(struct work_struct *work) out_unlock:__xfrm_policy_inexact_flush (net); -write_seqcount_end (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation); +write_seqcount_end (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_hash_generation);spin_unlock_bh (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);mutex_unlock (&hash_resize_mutex);
@@ -2095,9 +2094,9 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(struct net *net, u8 type,rcu_read_lock (); retry:do { - sequence =read_seqcount_begin (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation); + sequence =read_seqcount_begin (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_hash_generation); chain =policy_hash_direct (net, daddr, saddr, family, dir); - }while (read_seqcount_retry (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence)); + }while (read_seqcount_retry (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence)); ret =NULL ;hlist_for_each_entry_rcu (pol, chain, bydst) {
@@ -2128,7 +2127,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(struct net *net, u8 type, } skip_inexact: -if (read_seqcount_retry (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence)) +if (read_seqcount_retry (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence)) goto retry;if (ret && !xfrm_pol_hold_rcu (ret))
@@ -4084,6 +4083,7 @@ static int __net_init xfrm_net_init(struct net *net)/* Initialize the per-net locks here */ spin_lock_init (&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);spin_lock_init (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock); +seqcount_spinlock_init (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_hash_generation, &net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);mutex_init (&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex); rv =xfrm_statistics_init (net);
@@ -4128,7 +4128,6 @@ void __init xfrm_init(void) {register_pernet_subsys (&xfrm_net_ops);xfrm_dev_init (); -seqcount_mutex_init (&xfrm_policy_hash_generation, &hash_resize_mutex);xfrm_input_init ();#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_ESPINTCP
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 4/6 net/xfrm/compat: Copy xfrm_spdattr_type_t atributes
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
The attribute-translator has to take in mind maxtype, that is xfrm_link::nla_max. When it is set, attributes are not of xfrm_attr_type_t. Currently, they can be only XFRMA_SPD_MAX (message XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO), their UABI is the same for 64/32-bit, so just copy them.
Thanks to YueHaibing for reporting this:
In xfrm_user_rcv_msg_compat() if maxtype is not zero and less than XFRMA_MAX, nlmsg_parse_deprecated() do not initialize attrs array fully. xfrm_xlate32() will access uninit 'attrs[i]' while iterating all attrs array.
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000041b58ab0-0x0000000041b58ab7] CPU: 0 PID: 15799 Comm: syz-executor.2 Tainted: G W 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 RIP: 0010:nla_type include/net/netlink.h:1130 [inline] RIP: 0010:xfrm_xlate32_attr net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c:410 [inline] RIP: 0010:xfrm_xlate32 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c:532 [inline] RIP: 0010:xfrm_user_rcv_msg_compat+0x5e5/0x1070 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c:577 [...] Call Trace: xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x556/0x8b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2774 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6b/0x90 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2824 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:702 [inline]
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c +44 -5
@@ -298,8 +298,16 @@ static int xfrm_xlate64(struct sk_buff *dst, const struct nlmsghdr *nlh_src) len =nlmsg_attrlen (nlh_src, xfrm_msg_min[type]);nla_for_each_attr (nla, attrs, len, remaining) { -int err =xfrm_xlate64_attr (dst, nla); +int err; +switch (type) { +case XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO : + err =xfrm_nla_cpy (dst, nla,nla_len (nla)); +break ; +default : + err =xfrm_xlate64_attr (dst, nla); +break ; + }if (err)return err; }
@@ -341,7 +349,8 @@ static int xfrm_alloc_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nlmsghdr *nlh_src/* Calculates len of translated 64-bit message. */ static size_t xfrm_user_rcv_calculate_len64 (const struct nlmsghdr *src, -struct nlattr *attrs[XFRMA_MAX +1 ]) +struct nlattr *attrs[XFRMA_MAX +1 ], +int maxtype) {size_t len =nlmsg_len (src);
@@ -358,10 +367,20 @@ static size_t xfrm_user_rcv_calculate_len64(const struct nlmsghdr *src,case XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE : len +=8 ;break ; +case XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO : +/* attirbutes are xfrm_spdattr_type_t, not xfrm_attr_type_t */ +return len;default :break ; } +/* Unexpected for anything, but XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO, please +* correct both 64=>32-bit and 32=>64-bit translators to copy +* new attributes. +*/ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (maxtype)) +return len; +if (attrs[XFRMA_SA ]) len +=4 ;if (attrs[XFRMA_POLICY ])
@@ -440,7 +459,8 @@ static int xfrm_xlate32_attr(void *dst, const struct nlattr *nla,static int xfrm_xlate32 (struct nlmsghdr *dst,const struct nlmsghdr *src,struct nlattr *attrs[XFRMA_MAX +1 ], -size_t size,u8 type,struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) +size_t size,u8 type,int maxtype, +struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) {size_t pos;int i;
@@ -520,6 +540,25 @@ static int xfrm_xlate32(struct nlmsghdr *dst, const struct nlmsghdr *src, } pos = dst->nlmsg_len; +if (maxtype) { +/* attirbutes are xfrm_spdattr_type_t, not xfrm_attr_type_t */ +WARN_ON_ONCE (src->nlmsg_type !=XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO ); + +for (i =1 ; i <= maxtype; i++) { +int err; + +if (!attrs[i]) +continue ; + +/* just copy - no need for translation */ + err =xfrm_attr_cpy32 (dst, &pos, attrs[i], size, +nla_len (attrs[i]),nla_len (attrs[i])); +if (err) +return err; + } +return 0 ; + } +for (i =1 ; i <XFRMA_MAX +1 ; i++) {int err;
@@ -564,7 +603,7 @@ static struct nlmsghdr *xfrm_user_rcv_msg_compat(const struct nlmsghdr *h32,if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); - len =xfrm_user_rcv_calculate_len64 (h32, attrs); + len =xfrm_user_rcv_calculate_len64 (h32, attrs, maxtype);/* The message doesn't need translation */ if (len ==nlmsg_len (h32))return NULL ;
@@ -574,7 +613,7 @@ static struct nlmsghdr *xfrm_user_rcv_msg_compat(const struct nlmsghdr *h32,if (!h64)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - err =xfrm_xlate32 (h64, h32, attrs, len, type, extack); + err =xfrm_xlate32 (h64, h32, attrs, len, type, maxtype, extack);if (err <0 ) {kvfree (h64);return ERR_PTR (err);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 5/6 selftests/net/ipsec: Add test for xfrm_spdattr_type_t
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
Set hthresh, dump it again and verify thresh.lbits && thresh.rbits. They are passed as attributes of xfrm_spdattr_type_t, different from other message attributes that use xfrm_attr_type_t.
Also, test attribute that is bigger than XFRMA_SPD_MAX, currently it should be silently ignored.
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/ipsec.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 163 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/net/ipsec.c +163 -2
@@ -484,13 +484,16 @@ enum desc_type { MONITOR_ACQUIRE,EXPIRE_STATE ,EXPIRE_POLICY , + SPDINFO_ATTRS, };const char *desc_name[] = {"create tunnel" ,"alloc spi" ,"monitor acquire" ,"expire state" , -"expire policy" +"expire policy" , +"spdinfo attributes" , +"" };struct xfrm_desc {enum desc_type type;
@@ -1593,6 +1596,155 @@ static int xfrm_expire_policy(int xfrm_sock, uint32_t *seq,return ret; } +static int xfrm_spdinfo_set_thresh (int xfrm_sock,uint32_t *seq, +unsigned thresh4_l,unsigned thresh4_r, +unsigned thresh6_l,unsigned thresh6_r, +bool add_bad_attr) + +{ +struct { +struct nlmsghdr nh; +union { +uint32_t unused; +int error; + }; +char attrbuf[MAX_PAYLOAD ]; + } req; +struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh; + +memset (&req,0 ,sizeof (req)); + req.nh.nlmsg_len =NLMSG_LENGTH (sizeof (req.unused)); + req.nh.nlmsg_type =XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO ; + req.nh.nlmsg_flags =NLM_F_REQUEST |NLM_F_ACK ; + req.nh.nlmsg_seq = (*seq)++; + + thresh.lbits = thresh4_l; + thresh.rbits = thresh4_r; +if (rtattr_pack (&req.nh,sizeof (req),XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH , &thresh,sizeof (thresh))) +return -1 ; + + thresh.lbits = thresh6_l; + thresh.rbits = thresh6_r; +if (rtattr_pack (&req.nh,sizeof (req),XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH , &thresh,sizeof (thresh))) +return -1 ; + +if (add_bad_attr) { +BUILD_BUG_ON (XFRMA_IF_ID <=XFRMA_SPD_MAX +1 ); +if (rtattr_pack (&req.nh,sizeof (req),XFRMA_IF_ID ,NULL ,0 )) { +pr_err ("adding attribute failed: no space" ); +return -1 ; + } + } + +if (send (xfrm_sock, &req, req.nh.nlmsg_len,0 ) <0 ) { +pr_err ("send()" ); +return -1 ; + } + +if (recv (xfrm_sock, &req,sizeof (req),0 ) <0 ) { +pr_err ("recv()" ); +return -1 ; + }else if (req.nh.nlmsg_type !=NLMSG_ERROR ) { +printk ("expected NLMSG_ERROR, got %d" , (int )req.nh.nlmsg_type); +return -1 ; + } + +if (req.error) { +printk ("NLMSG_ERROR: %d: %s" , req.error,strerror (-req.error)); +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static int xfrm_spdinfo_attrs (int xfrm_sock,uint32_t *seq) +{ +struct { +struct nlmsghdr nh; +union { +uint32_t unused; +int error; + }; +char attrbuf[MAX_PAYLOAD ]; + } req; + +if (xfrm_spdinfo_set_thresh (xfrm_sock, seq,32 ,31 ,120 ,16 , false)) { +pr_err ("Can't set SPD HTHRESH" ); +return KSFT_FAIL ; + } + +memset (&req,0 ,sizeof (req)); + + req.nh.nlmsg_len =NLMSG_LENGTH (sizeof (req.unused)); + req.nh.nlmsg_type =XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO ; + req.nh.nlmsg_flags =NLM_F_REQUEST ; + req.nh.nlmsg_seq = (*seq)++; +if (send (xfrm_sock, &req, req.nh.nlmsg_len,0 ) <0 ) { +pr_err ("send()" ); +return KSFT_FAIL ; + } + +if (recv (xfrm_sock, &req,sizeof (req),0 ) <0 ) { +pr_err ("recv()" ); +return KSFT_FAIL ; + }else if (req.nh.nlmsg_type ==XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO ) { +size_t len =NLMSG_PAYLOAD (&req.nh,sizeof (req.unused)); +struct rtattr *attr = (void *)req.attrbuf; +int got_thresh =0 ; + +for (;RTA_OK (attr, len); attr =RTA_NEXT (attr, len)) { +if (attr->rta_type ==XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH ) { +struct xfrmu_spdhthresh *t =RTA_DATA (attr); + + got_thresh++; +if (t->lbits !=32 || t->rbits !=31 ) { +pr_err ("thresh differ: %u, %u" , + t->lbits, t->rbits); +return KSFT_FAIL ; + } + } +if (attr->rta_type ==XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH ) { +struct xfrmu_spdhthresh *t =RTA_DATA (attr); + + got_thresh++; +if (t->lbits !=120 || t->rbits !=16 ) { +pr_err ("thresh differ: %u, %u" , + t->lbits, t->rbits); +return KSFT_FAIL ; + } + } + } +if (got_thresh !=2 ) { +pr_err ("only %d thresh returned by XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO" , got_thresh); +return KSFT_FAIL ; + } + }else if (req.nh.nlmsg_type !=NLMSG_ERROR ) { +printk ("expected NLMSG_ERROR, got %d" , (int )req.nh.nlmsg_type); +return KSFT_FAIL ; + }else { +printk ("NLMSG_ERROR: %d: %s" , req.error,strerror (-req.error)); +return -1 ; + } + +/* Restore the default */ +if (xfrm_spdinfo_set_thresh (xfrm_sock, seq,32 ,32 ,128 ,128 , false)) { +pr_err ("Can't restore SPD HTHRESH" ); +return KSFT_FAIL ; + } + +/* +* At this moment xfrm uses nlmsg_parse_deprecated(), which +* implies NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL - ignoring attributes with +* (type > maxtype). nla_parse_depricated_strict() would enforce +* it. Or even stricter nla_parse(). +* Right now it's not expected to fail, but to be ignored. +*/ +if (xfrm_spdinfo_set_thresh (xfrm_sock, seq,32 ,32 ,128 ,128 , true)) +return KSFT_PASS ; + +return KSFT_PASS ; +} +static int child_serv (int xfrm_sock,uint32_t *seq,unsigned int nr,int cmd_fd,void *buf,struct xfrm_desc *desc) {
@@ -1717,6 +1869,9 @@ static int child_f(unsigned int nr, int test_desc_fd, int cmd_fd, void *buf)case EXPIRE_POLICY : ret =xfrm_expire_policy (xfrm_sock, &seq, nr, &desc);break ; +case SPDINFO_ATTRS : + ret =xfrm_spdinfo_attrs (xfrm_sock, &seq); +break ;default :printk ("Unknown desc type %d" , desc.type);exit (KSFT_FAIL );
@@ -1994,8 +2149,10 @@ static int write_proto_plan(int fd, int proto)* sizeof(xfrm_user_polexpire) = 168 | sizeof(xfrm_user_polexpire) = 176 * * Check the affected by the UABI difference structures. +* Also, check translation for xfrm_set_spdinfo: it has it's own attributes +* which needs to be correctly copied, but not translated. */ -const unsigned int compat_plan =4 ; +const unsigned int compat_plan =5 ;static int write_compat_struct_tests (int test_desc_fd) {struct xfrm_desc desc = {};
@@ -2019,6 +2176,10 @@ static int write_compat_struct_tests(int test_desc_fd)if (__write_desc (test_desc_fd, &desc))return -1 ; + desc.type =SPDINFO_ATTRS ; +if (__write_desc (test_desc_fd, &desc)) +return -1 ; +return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 6/6 net: xfrm: Fix end of loop tests for list_for_each_entry
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Harshvardhan Jha <[email protected]>
The list_for_each_entry() iterator, "pos" in this code, can never be NULL so the warning will never be printed.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c +1 -1
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static void ipcomp_free_tfms(struct crypto_comp * __percpu *tfms)break ; } -WARN_ON (!pos); +WARN_ON (list_entry_is_head (pos, &ipcomp_tfms_list, list));if (--pos->users)return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
This pull request was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Hello:
This pull request was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
Quoted 9 lines · On Wed, 4 Aug 2021 09:03:23 +0200 you wrote:
1) Fix a sysbot reported memory leak in
xfrm_user_rcv_msg. From Pavel Skripkin.2) Revert "xfrm: policy: Read seqcount outside of rcu-read side in
xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype". This commit tried to fix a lockin bug, but only cured some of the symptoms. A proper fix is applied on top of this revert.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- pull request (net): ipsec 2021-08-04
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/d00551b40201
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