mm/nommu.c: Fix improperly call of security API in mmap
Subsystems (5)
PATCH 1/1 mm/nommu.c: Fix improperly call of security API in mmap
From: Graff Yang <[email protected]>
The original code calling security_file_mmap() use user's hint address as it's 5th argument(addr). This is improper, as the hint address may be NULL.
In this case, the security_file_mmap() may incorrectly return -EPERM.
This patch moved the calling of security_file_mmap() out of validate_mmap_request() to do_mmap_pgoff(), and call this security API with the address that attempting to mmap.
--- mm/nommu.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/nommu.c +12 -6
@@ -862,7 +862,6 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file, unsigned long *_capabilities) {unsigned long capabilities, rlen; -unsigned long reqprot = prot;int ret;/* do the simple checks first */
@@ -1013,11 +1012,6 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file, prot |=PROT_EXEC ; } -/* allow the security API to have its say */ - ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr,0 ); -if (ret <0 ) -return ret; -/* looks okay */ *_capabilities = capabilities;return 0 ;
@@ -1231,6 +1225,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma;struct vm_region *region;struct rb_node *rb; +unsigned long reqprot = prot;unsigned long capabilities, vm_flags, result;int ret;
@@ -1327,6 +1322,12 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file,continue ; } +/* allow the security API to have its say */ + ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, + pregion->vm_start,0 ); +if (ret <0 ) + goto error_just_free; +/* we've found a region we can share */ atomic_inc (&pregion->vm_usage); vma->vm_region = pregion;
@@ -1394,6 +1395,11 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file,if (ret <0 ) goto error_put_region; + ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, + vma->vm_start,0 ); +if (ret <0 ) + goto error_put_region; +/* okay... we have a mapping; now we have to register it */ result = vma->vm_start;
Signature · 1 line
1.6.4.4
Quoted 8 lines · <[email protected]> wrote:
The original code calling
security_file_mmap()use user's hint address as it's 5th argument(addr). This is improper, as the hint address may be NULL.
In this case, thesecurity_file_mmap()may incorrectly return-EPERM.This patch moved the calling of
security_file_mmap()out ofvalidate_mmap_request()todo_mmap_pgoff(), and call this security API with the address that attempting to mmap.
I think this is the wrong approach. Firstly, the hint is cleared in NOMMU mode, and secondly, I think that the check against the minimum LSM address is pointless in NOMMU mode too.
So I think the attached patch is a better approach.
David
---
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
NOMMU: Ignore the address parameter in the file_mmap() security check
Ignore the address parameter in the various file_mmap() security checks when CONFIG_MMU=n as the address hint is ignored under those circumstances, and in any case the minimum mapping address check is pointless in NOMMU mode.
---
include/linux/security.h | 1 + mm/nommu.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 2 ++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)* @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * @flags contains the operational flags. +* @addr contains the mapping address, and should be ignored in NOMMU mode. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mprotect: * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
mm/nommu.c +1 -1
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file, }/* allow the security API to have its say */ - ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr,0 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags,0 ,0 );if (ret <0 )return ret;
security/commoncap.c +2 -0
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, {int ret =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );
@@ -1012,5 +1013,6 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,if (ret ==0 ) current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; } +#endif return ret; }
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -0
@@ -3046,6 +3046,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) { int rc = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU u32 sid =current_sid ();/*
@@ -3060,6 +3061,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,if (rc) return rc; } +#endif /* do DAC check on address space usage */ rc =cap_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
Hi, David,
Thanks your patch, I will test it.
Quoted 102 lines · David Howells
Quoted 8 lines · <[email protected]> wrote:
The original code calling
security_file_mmap()use user's hint address as it's 5th argument(addr). This is improper, as the hint address may be NULL.
In this case, thesecurity_file_mmap()may incorrectly return-EPERM.This patch moved the calling of
security_file_mmap()out ofvalidate_mmap_request()todo_mmap_pgoff(), and call this security API with the address that attempting to mmap.I think this is the wrong approach. Firstly, the hint is cleared in NOMMU mode, and secondly, I think that the check against the minimum LSM address is pointless in NOMMU mode too.
So I think the attached patch is a better approach.
David
---
From: David Howells <[email protected]>NOMMU: Ignore the address parameter in the
file_mmap()security checkIgnore the address parameter in the various
file_mmap()security checks whenCONFIG_MMU=nas the address hint is ignored under those circumstances, and in any case the minimum mapping address check is pointless in NOMMU mode.Signed-off-by David Howells <[email protected]>---
include/linux/security.h | 1 +
mm/nommu.c | 2 +-
security/commoncap.c | 2 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * @flags contains the operational flags. + * @addr contains the mapping address, and should be ignored in NOMMU mode. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mprotect: * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.mm/nommu.c +1
-1@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file, } /* allow the security API to have its say */ - ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0); + ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) return ret;security/commoncap.c +2
-0@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, { int ret = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);@@ -1012,5 +1013,6 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, if (ret == 0) current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; } +#endif return ret; }security/selinux/hooks.c +2
-0@@ -3046,6 +3046,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) { int rc = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU u32 sid = current_sid(); /*@@ -3060,6 +3061,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, if (rc) return rc; } +#endif /* do DAC check on address space usage */ rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
Signature · 1 line
-Graff
Hi, David,
Your patch works both with SELINUX enabled or disabled.
But, how to prevent the address that attempting to be mapped to be lower than CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR/CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR? This is what the security_file_mmap() is doing and mmu's do_mmap_pgoff() has implemented.
Quoted 113 lines · graff yang
Hi, David,
Thanks your patch, I will test it.Quoted 95 lines · David Howells
Quoted 8 lines · <[email protected]> wrote:
The original code calling
security_file_mmap()use user's hint address as it's 5th argument(addr). This is improper, as the hint address may be NULL.
In this case, thesecurity_file_mmap()may incorrectly return-EPERM.This patch moved the calling of
security_file_mmap()out ofvalidate_mmap_request()todo_mmap_pgoff(), and call this security API with the address that attempting to mmap.I think this is the wrong approach. Firstly, the hint is cleared in NOMMU mode, and secondly, I think that the check against the minimum LSM address is pointless in NOMMU mode too.
So I think the attached patch is a better approach.
David
---
From: David Howells <[email protected]>NOMMU: Ignore the address parameter in the
file_mmap()security checkIgnore the address parameter in the various
file_mmap()security checks whenCONFIG_MMU=nas the address hint is ignored under those circumstances, and in any case the minimum mapping address check is pointless in NOMMU mode.Signed-off-by David Howells <[email protected]>---
include/linux/security.h | 1 +
mm/nommu.c | 2 +-
security/commoncap.c | 2 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * @flags contains the operational flags. + * @addr contains the mapping address, and should be ignored in NOMMU mode. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mprotect: * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.mm/nommu.c +1
-1@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file, } /* allow the security API to have its say */ - ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0); + ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) return ret;security/commoncap.c +2
-0@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, { int ret = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);@@ -1012,5 +1013,6 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, if (ret == 0) current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; } +#endif return ret; }security/selinux/hooks.c +1
-0@@ -3046,6 +3046,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) { int rc = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU u32 sid = current_sid(); /*security/selinux/hooks.c static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, · line 3067
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +1
-0@@ -3060,6 +3061,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, if (rc) return rc; } +#endif /* do DAC check on address space usage */ rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);--
-Graff
Signature · 1 line
-Graff
Quoted 1 line · graff yang
Your patch works both with SELINUX enabled or disabled.
Thanks.
Quoted 4 lines
But, how to prevent the address that attempting to be mapped to be lower than CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR/CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR? This is what the
security_file_mmap()is doing and mmu'sdo_mmap_pgoff()has implemented.
You need to ask yourself two questions:
(1) Does the test make any sense in the NOMMU context? Given that the userspace program _cannot_ specify that something should be mapped below that address (since MAP_FIXED gives an error and the hint is ignored), I'd say not.
(2) Is it likely that LSM security would be used with NOMMU anyway, given that there is nothing stopping userspace programs editing the kernel directly?
You need to show that it makes sense to do the test in a NOMMU context. Remember, if there is no physical medium at address 0 (RAM, flash, whatever), you can't map anything there. This might best be left to the arch to not provide page 0 of RAM to the page allocator during memory initialisation.
David
Mike Frysinger
Acked-byQuoted 10 lines · David Howells
Quoted 8 lines · <[email protected]> wrote:
The original code calling
security_file_mmap()use user's hint address as it's 5th argument(addr). This is improper, as the hint address may be NULL.
In this case, thesecurity_file_mmap()may incorrectly return-EPERM.This patch moved the calling of
security_file_mmap()out ofvalidate_mmap_request()todo_mmap_pgoff(), and call this security API with the address that attempting to mmap.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this is the wrong approach. Firstly, the hint is cleared in NOMMU mode, and secondly, I think that the check against the minimum LSM address is pointless in NOMMU mode too.
So I think the attached patch is a better approach.
-mike
Quoted 7 lines · David Howells
Quoted 5 lines · <[email protected]> wrote:
The original code calling
security_file_mmap()use user's hint address as it's 5th argument(addr). This is improper, as the hint address may be NULL.
In this case, thesecurity_file_mmap()may incorrectly return-EPERM.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
This patch moved the calling of
security_file_mmap()out ofvalidate_mmap_request()todo_mmap_pgoff(), and call this security API with the address that attempting to mmap.I think this is the wrong approach. Firstly, the hint is cleared in NOMMU mode, and secondly, I think that the check against the minimum LSM address is pointless in NOMMU mode too.
I really don't like seeing such irrelevant (that's not the right word, but I can't think what is) ifdefs creeping down into the security layer as LSM authors are likely to mess them up in the future. I'd probably rather see the addr_only argument changed into a flags field.
One for addr_only and one flag for not_addr. The nommu case could
just set the not_addr flag and it's obvious how the LSMs (or capabilities if !CONFIG_SECURITY) should handle it, also works if some other future need arises...
-Eric
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Paris
I really don't like seeing such irrelevant (that's not the right word, but I can't think what is) ifdefs creeping down into the security layer as LSM authors are likely to mess them up in the future. I'd probably rather see the
addr_onlyargument changed into a flags field.
One foraddr_onlyand one flag fornot_addr. The nommu case could
just set thenot_addrflag and it's obvious how the LSMs (or capabilities if !CONFIG_SECURITY) should handle it, also works if some other future need arises...
A better way still, might be to deny the possibility of CONFIG_SECURITY if CONFIG_MMU=n. After all, security is sort of pointless when a userspace program can just edit the kernel at a whim.
David
Quoted 11 lines · David Howells
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Paris
I really don't like seeing such irrelevant (that's not the right word, but I can't think what is) ifdefs creeping down into the security layer as LSM authors are likely to mess them up in the future. I'd probably rather see the
addr_onlyargument changed into a flags field.
One foraddr_onlyand one flag fornot_addr. The nommu case could
just set thenot_addrflag and it's obvious how the LSMs (or capabilities if !CONFIG_SECURITY) should handle it, also works if some other future need arises...
Quoted 3 lines
A better way still, might be to deny the possibility of
CONFIG_SECURITYifCONFIG_MMU=n. After all, security is sort of pointless when a userspace program can just edit the kernel at a whim.
That would still call cap_file_mmap() and wouldn't solve your problem.
-Eric
Quoted 1 line · Eric Paris
That would still call
cap_file_mmap()and wouldn't solve your problem.
Hmmm... I guess I don't see the problem occur because I always run the programs as root.
I would guess that cap_file_mmap() and selinux_file_mmap() are, perhaps, too strict. The hint shouldn't be rejected unless MAP_FIXED is also set, surely, but should rather be revised upwards.
Certainly, addr==NULL and !MAP_FIXED is a reasonable case to permit, even in tightly secured MMU and SELinux mode... After all, the manual page says:
If addr is NULL, then the kernel chooses the address at which to create the mapping; this is the most portable method of creating a new map- ping.
David
Quoted 6 lines · David Howells
Quoted 1 line · Eric Paris
That would still call
cap_file_mmap()and wouldn't solve your problem.Hmmm... I guess I don't see the problem occur because I always run the programs as root.
most likely yes, your processes are going to have CAP_SYS_RAWIO and will happily sail through the cap_file_mmap().
Quoted 3 lines
I would guess that
cap_file_mmap()andselinux_file_mmap()are, perhaps, too strict. The hint shouldn't be rejected unlessMAP_FIXEDis also set, surely, but should rather be revised upwards.
On the mmu side we don't check until the kernel has turned the hint into a real address. Which is apparently different then where the hook was originally placed in the nommu side.
Quoted 6 lines
Certainly, addr==NULL and !MAP_FIXED is a reasonable case to permit, even in tightly secured MMU and SELinux mode... After all, the manual page says:
If addr is NULL, then the kernel chooses the address at which to create the mapping; this is the most portable method of creating a new map- ping.
I agree, I think the choices are
A) agree that we just shouldn't check the address on nommu A1) change kconfig to not allow the setting of these (easy to do for the LSM check, but not easy as it stands today for the cap_file_mmap() check)
A2) change the addr_only to be a flags which indicate not to check
(my original suggestion)
A3) push the config_nommu down into the security code
(your patch)
B) actually check the address, which requires moving the hook to a location where it has been resolved.
(graff yang's patch)
I'll leave it up to you to determine which you like the best since you know the implications of nommu.
-Eric
Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 40 lines · On Fri, 16 Oct 2009 11:55:29 -0400 Eric Paris <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 6 lines · David Howells
Quoted 1 line · Eric Paris
That would still call
cap_file_mmap()and wouldn't solve your problem.Hmmm... I guess I don't see the problem occur because I always run the programs as root.
most likely yes, your processes are going to have
CAP_SYS_RAWIOand will happily sail through thecap_file_mmap().Quoted 3 lines
I would guess that
cap_file_mmap()andselinux_file_mmap()are, perhaps, too strict. The hint shouldn't be rejected unlessMAP_FIXEDis also set, surely, but should rather be revised upwards.On the mmu side we don't check until the kernel has turned the hint into a real address. Which is apparently different then where the hook was originally placed in the nommu side.
Quoted 6 lines
Certainly, addr==NULL and !MAP_FIXED is a reasonable case to permit, even in tightly secured MMU and SELinux mode... After all, the manual page says:
If addr is NULL, then the kernel chooses the address at which to create the mapping; this is the most portable method of creating a new map- ping.
I agree, I think the choices are
A) agree that we just shouldn't check the address on nommu A1) change kconfig to not allow the setting of these (easy to do for the LSM check, but not easy as it stands today for the
cap_file_mmap()check)
A2) change theaddr_onlyto be a flags which indicate not to check
(my original suggestion)
A3) push theconfig_nommudown into the security code
(your patch)
B) actually check the address, which requires moving the hook to a location where it has been resolved.
(graff yang's patch)
Quoted 3 lines
I'll leave it up to you to determine which you like the best since you know the implications of nommu.
So what's the status of this issue now? Should I merge the below into 2.6.32?
Thanks.
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
Ignore the address parameter in the various file_mmap() security checks when CONFIG_MMU=n as the address hint is ignored under those circumstances, and in any case the minimum mapping address check is pointless in NOMMU mode.
---
include/linux/security.h | 1 + mm/nommu.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 2 ++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/security.h renamed from include/linux/security.h~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check +1 -0
@@ -609,6 +609,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * @flags contains the operational flags. +* @addr contains the mapping address, and should be ignored in NOMMU mode. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mprotect: * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
mm/nommu.c renamed from mm/nommu.c~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check +1 -1
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct }/* allow the security API to have its say */ - ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr,0 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags,0 ,0 );if (ret <0 )return ret;
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check +2 -0
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, uns {int ret =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );
@@ -1012,5 +1013,6 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsif (ret ==0 ) current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; } +#endif return ret; }
security/selinux/hooks.c renamed from security/selinux/hooks.c~nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check +2 -0
@@ -3046,6 +3046,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) { int rc = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU u32 sid =current_sid ();/*
@@ -3060,6 +3061,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct fileif (rc) return rc; } +#endif /* do DAC check on address space usage */ rc =cap_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
_
Quoted 40 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 39 lines · On Fri, 16 Oct 2009 11:55:29 -0400 Eric Paris wrote:
Quoted 5 lines · David Howells
Quoted 1 line · Eric Paris
That would still call
cap_file_mmap()and wouldn't solve your problem.Hmmm... I guess I don't see the problem occur because I always run the programs as root.
most likely yes, your processes are going to have
CAP_SYS_RAWIOand will happily sail through thecap_file_mmap().Quoted 3 lines
I would guess that
cap_file_mmap()andselinux_file_mmap()are, perhaps, too strict. The hint shouldn't be rejected unlessMAP_FIXEDis also set, surely, but should rather be revised upwards.On the mmu side we don't check until the kernel has turned the hint into a real address. Which is apparently different then where the hook was originally placed in the nommu side.
Quoted 6 lines
Certainly, addr==NULL and !MAP_FIXED is a reasonable case to permit, even in tightly secured MMU and SELinux mode... After all, the manual page says:
If addr is NULL, then the kernel chooses the address at which to create the mapping; this is the most portable method of creating a new map- ping.
I agree, I think the choices are
A) agree that we just shouldn't check the address on nommu A1) change kconfig to not allow the setting of these (easy to do for the LSM check, but not easy as it stands today for the
cap_file_mmap()check)
A2) change theaddr_onlyto be a flags which indicate not to check (my original suggestion)
A3) push theconfig_nommudown into the security code (your patch)
B) actually check the address, which requires moving the hook to a location where it has been resolved.
(graff yang's patch)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'll leave it up to you to determine which you like the best since you know the implications of nommu.
So what's the status of this issue now? Should I merge the below into 2.6.32?
i think the patch as posted is the way to go, at least for now, and should be merged. it certainly works for us under Blackfin going by Graff's tests. but obviously this is ultimately David's call. -mike
Quoted 43 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 40 lines · On Fri, 16 Oct 2009 11:55:29 -0400 Eric Paris <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 6 lines · David Howells
Quoted 1 line · Eric Paris
That would still call
cap_file_mmap()and wouldn't solve your problem.Hmmm... I guess I don't see the problem occur because I always run the programs as root.
most likely yes, your processes are going to have
CAP_SYS_RAWIOand will happily sail through thecap_file_mmap().Quoted 3 lines
I would guess that
cap_file_mmap()andselinux_file_mmap()are, perhaps, too strict. The hint shouldn't be rejected unlessMAP_FIXEDis also set, surely, but should rather be revised upwards.On the mmu side we don't check until the kernel has turned the hint into a real address. Which is apparently different then where the hook was originally placed in the nommu side.
Quoted 6 lines
Certainly, addr==NULL and !MAP_FIXED is a reasonable case to permit, even in tightly secured MMU and SELinux mode... After all, the manual page says:
If addr is NULL, then the kernel chooses the address at which to create the mapping; this is the most portable method of creating a new map- ping.
I agree, I think the choices are
A) agree that we just shouldn't check the address on nommu A1) change kconfig to not allow the setting of these (easy to do for the LSM check, but not easy as it stands today for the
cap_file_mmap()check)
A2) change theaddr_onlyto be a flags which indicate not to check
(my original suggestion)
A3) push theconfig_nommudown into the security code
(your patch)
B) actually check the address, which requires moving the hook to a location where it has been resolved.
(graff yang's patch)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I'll leave it up to you to determine which you like the best since you know the implications of nommu.
So what's the status of this issue now? Should I merge the below into 2.6.32?
Thanks.
David??
I think A2 is the right fix. Apparmour is pushing to get in soon and
I know their implementation didn't check for CONFIG_MMU. It's just too easy for an LSM writer to get this wrong. This patch is better than what we have today, but I'll try to get something by the end of the week which I think makes us all happy.
-Eric
Quoted 2 lines · Andrew Morton
So what's the status of this issue now? Should I merge the below into 2.6.32?
Yes please.
Thanks,
David
Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · On Fri, 20 Nov 2009 15:00:09 +0000 David Howells <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · Andrew Morton
So what's the status of this issue now? Should I merge the below into 2.6.32?
Yes please.
I'll hold off, as Eric is preparing an alternative for "the end of this week". If that doesn't work out, we can add nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check.patch to 2.6.32.1, OK?
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Morton
I'll hold off, as Eric is preparing an alternative for "the end of this week". If that doesn't work out, we can add nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check.patch to 2.6.32.1, OK?
I'll be on holiday next week.
David
Quoted 8 lines · David Howells
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Morton
I'll hold off, as Eric is preparing an alternative for "the end of this week". If that doesn't work out, we can add nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check.patch to 2.6.32.1, OK?
I'll be on holiday next week.
Can we give this a whirl? I can't even seem to make a config not select MMU, so it isn't even compile tested in that case. If it is good, I'll send as a clean message for James Morris to take through the security tree....
-Eric
---
commit 58c728c7f9c2c8e2c62f7dfda3e10f77524c4379
Author: Eric Paris <[email protected]> Date: Fri Nov 20 14:23:57 2009 -0500
security: do not check mmap_min_addr on nommu systems
nommu systems can do anything with memory they please and so they already win. mmap_min_addr is the least of their worries. Currently the mmap_min_addr implementation is problamatic on such systems. This patch changes the addr_only argument to be a flags which can take the arguments for addr_only or not_addr. LSMs then need to properly implement these two flags.
include/linux/security.h +11 -5
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1 +/* sec_flags for security_file_mmap */ +#define SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY 0x01 +#define SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR 0x02 +struct ctl_table ;struct audit_krule ;
@@ -69,7 +73,7 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_inode_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only); +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags);extern int cap_task_fix_setuid (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,int flags);extern int cap_task_prctl (int option,unsigned long arg2,unsigned long arg3,unsigned long arg4,unsigned long arg5);
@@ -609,6 +613,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)* @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * @flags contains the operational flags. +* @addr address vm will map to +* @sec_flags what security checks should be done * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mprotect: * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
@@ -1556,7 +1562,7 @@ struct security_operations {int (*file_mmap) (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags,unsigned long addr, -unsigned long addr_only); +unsigned long sec_flags);int (*file_mprotect) (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot);
@@ -1826,7 +1832,7 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file);int security_file_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg);int security_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only); +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags);int security_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot);int security_file_lock (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd);
@@ -2323,9 +2329,9 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr, - unsigned long addr_only) + unsigned long sec_flags) { - return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, sec_flags); } static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
mm/mmap.c +4 -2
@@ -1664,7 +1664,8 @@ static int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,return -ENOMEM ; address &=PAGE_MASK ; - error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , address,1 ); + error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , address, +SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY );if (error)return error;
@@ -2005,7 +2006,8 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)if (is_hugepage_only_range (mm, addr, len))return -EINVAL ; - error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , addr,1 ); + error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , addr, +SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY );if (error)return error;
mm/mremap.c +4 -2
@@ -313,7 +313,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long addr,if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr) goto out; - ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr,1 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr, +SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY );if (ret) goto out;
@@ -421,7 +422,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long addr, goto out; } - ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr,1 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr, +SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY );if (ret) goto out; }
mm/nommu.c +2 -1
@@ -974,7 +974,8 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file, }/* allow the security API to have its say */ - ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr,0 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags,0 , +SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR );if (ret <0 )return ret;
security/commoncap.c +4 -3
@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)* @prot: unused * @flags: unused * @addr: address attempting to be mapped -* @addr_only: unused +* @sec_flags: should the addr be checked? * * If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
@@ -1001,11 +1001,12 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)*/ int cap_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags) {int ret =0 ; -if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { +if (!(sec_flags &SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR ) && + (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)) { ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
security/security.c +2 -2
@@ -677,11 +677,11 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)int security_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags) {int ret; - ret = security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + ret = security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, sec_flags);if (ret)return ret;return ima_file_mmap (file, prot);
security/selinux/hooks.c +5 -4
@@ -3043,7 +3043,7 @@ error:static int selinux_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags) {int rc =0 ;u32 sid =current_sid ();
@@ -3054,7 +3054,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,* at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even * if DAC would have also denied the operation. */ -if (addr <CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR ) { +if (!(sec_flags &SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR ) && + (addr <CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR )) { rc =avc_has_perm (sid, sid,SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT ,MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO ,NULL );if (rc)
@@ -3062,8 +3063,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, }/* do DAC check on address space usage */ - rc =cap_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); -if (rc || addr_only) + rc =cap_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, sec_flags); +if (rc || (sec_flags &SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY ))return rc;if (selinux_checkreqprot)
Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · On Fri, 20 Nov 2009 14:32:02 -0500 Eric Paris <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 7 lines · David Howells
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Morton
I'll hold off, as Eric is preparing an alternative for "the end of this week". If that doesn't work out, we can add nommu-ignore-the-address-parameter-in-the-file_mmap-security-check.patch to 2.6.32.1, OK?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
I'll be on holiday next week.
Can we give this a whirl? I can't even seem to make a config not select MMU, so it isn't even compile tested in that case. If it is good, I'll send as a clean message for James Morris to take through the security tree....
You'll need a cross-compiler.
Quoted 6 lines
commit
58c728c7f9c2c8e2c62f7dfda3e10f77524c4379Author: Eric Paris <[email protected]> Date: Fri Nov 20 14:23:57 2009 -0500security: do not check
mmap_min_addron nommu systems
Quoted 8 lines
nommu systems can do anything with memory they please and so they already win.
mmap_min_addris the least of their worries. Currently themmap_min_addrimplementation is problamatic on such systems. This patch changes theaddr_onlyargument to be a flags which can take the arguments foraddr_onlyornot_addr. LSMs then need to properly implement these two flags.Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Patch doesn't apply to current mainline for some reason. I fixed that up and checked that the affected files compile OK on superh.
The patch adds trailing whitespace. If only we had a tool for that ;)
include/linux/security.h renamed from include/linux/security.h~mm-nommuc-fix-improperly-call-of-security-api-in-mmap +11 -5
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1 +/* sec_flags for security_file_mmap */ +#define SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY 0x01 +#define SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR 0x02 +struct ctl_table ;struct audit_krule ;
@@ -69,7 +73,7 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(strucextern int cap_inode_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only); +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags);extern int cap_task_fix_setuid (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,int flags);extern int cap_task_prctl (int option,unsigned long arg2,unsigned long arg3,unsigned long arg4,unsigned long arg5);
@@ -593,6 +597,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * @flags contains the operational flags. +* @addr address vm will map to +* @sec_flags what security checks should be done * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_mprotect: * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
@@ -1535,7 +1541,7 @@ struct security_operations {int (*file_mmap) (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags,unsigned long addr, -unsigned long addr_only); +unsigned long sec_flags);int (*file_mprotect) (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot);
@@ -1804,7 +1810,7 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *filint security_file_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg);int security_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only); +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags);int security_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot);int security_file_lock (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd);
@@ -2300,9 +2306,9 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(strunsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr, - unsigned long addr_only) + unsigned long sec_flags) { - return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, sec_flags); } static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
mm/mmap.c renamed from mm/mmap.c~mm-nommuc-fix-improperly-call-of-security-api-in-mmap +4 -2
@@ -1668,7 +1668,8 @@ static int expand_downwards(struct vm_arreturn -ENOMEM ; address &=PAGE_MASK ; - error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , address,1 ); + error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , address, +SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY );if (error)return error;
@@ -2009,7 +2010,8 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,if (is_hugepage_only_range (mm, addr, len))return -EINVAL ; - error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , addr,1 ); + error =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , addr, +SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY );if (error)return error;
mm/mremap.c renamed from mm/mremap.c~mm-nommuc-fix-improperly-call-of-security-api-in-mmap +4 -2
@@ -313,7 +313,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long adif ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr) goto out; - ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr,1 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr, +SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY );if (ret) goto out;
@@ -421,7 +422,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad goto out; } - ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr,1 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , new_addr, +SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY );if (ret) goto out; }
mm/nommu.c renamed from mm/nommu.c~mm-nommuc-fix-improperly-call-of-security-api-in-mmap +2 -1
@@ -974,7 +974,8 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct }/* allow the security API to have its say */ - ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr,0 ); + ret =security_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags,0 , +SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR );if (ret <0 )return ret;
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~mm-nommuc-fix-improperly-call-of-security-api-in-mmap +4 -3
@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struc* @prot: unused * @flags: unused * @addr: address attempting to be mapped -* @addr_only: unused +* @sec_flags: should the addr be checked? * * If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
@@ -1001,11 +1001,12 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struc*/ int cap_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags) {int ret =0 ; -if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { +if (!(sec_flags &SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR ) && + (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr)) { ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
security/security.c renamed from security/security.c~mm-nommuc-fix-improperly-call-of-security-api-in-mmap +2 -2
@@ -637,9 +637,9 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *filint security_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags) { -return security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); +return security_ops->file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, sec_flags); } int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
security/selinux/hooks.c renamed from security/selinux/hooks.c~mm-nommuc-fix-improperly-call-of-security-api-in-mmap +5 -4
@@ -3043,7 +3043,7 @@ error:static int selinux_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +unsigned long addr,unsigned long sec_flags) {int rc =0 ;u32 sid =current_sid ();
@@ -3054,7 +3054,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file* at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even * if DAC would have also denied the operation. */ -if (addr <CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR ) { +if (!(sec_flags &SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR ) && + (addr <CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR )) { rc =avc_has_perm (sid, sid,SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT ,MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO ,NULL );if (rc)
@@ -3062,8 +3063,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file }/* do DAC check on address space usage */ - rc =cap_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); -if (rc || addr_only) + rc =cap_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, sec_flags); +if (rc || (sec_flags &SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY ))return rc;if (selinux_checkreqprot)
_
Quoted 11 lines · Andrew Morton
On Fri, 20 Nov 2009 14:32:02 -0500
Quoted 9 lines
security: do not check
mmap_min_addron nommu systemsnommu systems can do anything with memory they please and so they already win.
mmap_min_addris the least of their worries. Currently themmap_min_addrimplementation is problamatic on such systems. This patch changes theaddr_onlyargument to be a flags which can take the arguments foraddr_onlyornot_addr. LSMs then need to properly implement these two flags.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>Patch doesn't apply to current mainline for some reason. I fixed that up and checked that the affected files compile OK on superh.
It was against my linux-next devel tree, probably something new in James' for-next tree. Are people hoping for this in stable or should we just queue for -next? This is a pretty old bug I guess people are just hitting for the first time...
Quoted 1 line
The patch adds trailing whitespace. If only we had a tool for that ;)
Fixed.
include/linux/security.h line 48
Quoted 3 lines · Eric Paris
include/linux/security.h +3
-0+/* sec_flags for security_file_mmap */ +#define SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY 0x01 +#define SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR 0x02
Please add comments to these to indicate what they're intended to convey. Would ADDR_ONLY be better as EXACT_ADDR?
David
Quoted 8 lines · David Howells
include/linux/security.h line 48
Quoted 3 lines · Eric Paris
include/linux/security.h +3
-0+/* sec_flags for security_file_mmap */ +#define SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY 0x01 +#define SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR 0x02Please add comments to these to indicate what they're intended to convey. Would
ADDR_ONLYbe better asEXACT_ADDR?
I think I should point out that this hook checks 2 things. Originally it was only used to check if a file should be allowed to be mmaped. It was later enhanced to check if the return address of mmap, if it is file backed or anonymous, is acceptable. These flags only influence the later.
ADDR_ONLY means the security system should only check the address. NOT_ADDR means they security system should not check the address.
You need ADDR_ONLY when the hook is called on map that is not file backed or where that has already been dealt with. You need NOT_ADDR only for nommu where the whole idea of mmap_min_addr is pointless.
I'm not sure what comments would convey....
/* security hook should only check the address */
#define SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY 0x01
/* security hook should not check the address */
#define SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR 0x02
Does that add something?
Still haven't heard where people scream they absolutely need this today, so I'm going to ask James to carry it in his for-next tree.
Quoted 29 lines · Eric Paris
Quoted 7 lines · David Howells
include/linux/security.h line 48
Quoted 3 lines · Eric Paris
include/linux/security.h +3
-0+/* sec_flags for security_file_mmap */ +#define SECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY 0x01 +#define SECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR 0x02Please add comments to these to indicate what they're intended to convey. Would
ADDR_ONLYbe better asEXACT_ADDR?I think I should point out that this hook checks 2 things. Originally it was only used to check if a file should be allowed to be mmaped. It was later enhanced to check if the return address of mmap, if it is file backed or anonymous, is acceptable. These flags only influence the later.
ADDR_ONLYmeans the security system should only check the address.NOT_ADDRmeans they security system should not check the address.You need
ADDR_ONLYwhen the hook is called on map that is not file backed or where that has already been dealt with. You needNOT_ADDRonly for nommu where the whole idea ofmmap_min_addris pointless.I'm not sure what comments would convey....
/* security hook should only check the address */
#defineSECURITY_MMAP_ADDR_ONLY0x01
/* security hook should not check the address */
#defineSECURITY_MMAP_NOT_ADDR0x02
Quoted 5 lines
Does that add something?
Still haven't heard where people scream they absolutely need this today, so I'm going to ask James to carry it in his for-next tree.
The comments convey a tad more but I don't think they are necessary, and I concur, it would be good if it went into the for-next tree.
Quoted 10 lines · David Howells
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Paris
I really don't like seeing such irrelevant (that's not the right word, but I can't think what is) ifdefs creeping down into the security layer as LSM authors are likely to mess them up in the future. I'd probably rather see the
addr_onlyargument changed into a flags field. One foraddr_onlyand one flag fornot_addr. The nommu case could just set thenot_addrflag and it's obvious how the LSMs (or capabilities if !CONFIG_SECURITY) should handle it, also works if some other future need arises...
Quoted 3 lines
A better way still, might be to deny the possibility of
CONFIG_SECURITYifCONFIG_MMU=n. After all, security is sort of pointless when a userspace program can just edit the kernel at a whim.
except for MPU users, and arent some security restrictions useful when talking about networked daemons ?
-mike