Skip to contentSkip to conversation

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] cgroup-v1: Correct privileges check in release_agent writes" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

PATCH [email protected] 1 participant 1 message Feb 23, 2022

Subsystems (2)
lore
Share & tools
lore

[email protected]

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 467a726b754f474936980da793b4ff2ec3e382a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Koutn=C3=BD?= <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 17:11:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] cgroup-v1: Correct privileges check in release_agent writes
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The idea is to check: a) the owning user_ns of cgroup_ns, b) capabilities in init_user_ns.

The commit 24f600856418 ("cgroup-v1: Require capabilities to set release_agent") got this wrong in the write handler of release_agent since it checked user_ns of the opener (may be different from the owning user_ns of cgroup_ns).
Secondly, to avoid possibly confused deputy, the capability of the opener must be checked.

Fixes 24f600856418 ("cgroup-v1: Require capabilities to set release_agent")
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c +4 -2
index 0e877dbcfeea..afc6c0e9c966 100644
@@ -546,6 +546,7 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_release_agent_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 					  char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
 {
 	struct cgroup *cgrp;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(cgrp->root->release_agent_path) < PATH_MAX);
 
@@ -553,8 +554,9 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_release_agent_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 	 * Release agent gets called with all capabilities,
 	 * require capabilities to set release agent.
 	 */
-	if ((of->file->f_cred->user_ns != &init_user_ns) ||
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	ctx = of->priv;
+	if ((ctx->ns->user_ns != &init_user_ns) ||
+	    !file_ns_capable(of->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	cgrp = cgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn, false);