bpf: arm64: clear prog->jited_len along prog->jited
Subsystems (5)
PATCH 1/1 bpf: arm64: clear prog->jited_len along prog->jited
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
syzbot reported an illegal copy_to_user() attempt
from bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() [1]
There was no repro yet on this bug, but I think
that commit 0aef499f3172 ("mm/usercopy: Detect vmalloc overruns") is exposing a prior bug in bpf arm64.
bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd() looks at prog->jited_len to determine if the JIT image can be copied out to user space.
My theory is that syzbot managed to get a prog where prog->jited_len has been set to 43, while prog->bpf_func has ben cleared.
It is not clear why copy_to_user(uinsns, NULL, ulen) is triggering this particular warning.
I thought find_vma_area(NULL) would not find a vm_struct. As we do not hold vmap_area_lock spinlock, it might be possible that the found vm_struct was garbage.
[1]
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset 792633534417210172, size 43)! kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 25002 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-10139-g8291eaafed36 #0 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:101 lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89
sp : ffff80000b773a20
x29: ffff80000b773a30 x28: faff80000b745000 x27: ffff80000b773b48
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 000000000000002b x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 00000000000000e0 x22: ffff80000b75db67 x21: 0000000000000001
x20: 000000000000002b x19: ffff80000b75db3c x18: 00000000fffffffd
x17: 2820636f6c6c616d x16: 76206d6f72662064 x15: 6574636574656420
x14: 74706d6574746120 x13: 2129333420657a69 x12: 73202c3237313031
x11: 3237313434333533 x10: 3336323937207465 x9 : 657275736f707865 x8 : ffff80000a30c550 x7 : ffff80000b773830 x6 : ffff80000b773830 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff00007fbbaa10 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : f7ff000028fc0000 x0 : 0000000000000064
Call trace: usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:186 [inline] __check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:252 [inline] __check_object_size+0x198/0x36c mm/usercopy.c:214 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline] check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:235 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:159 [inline] bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd.isra.0+0xf14/0xfdc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3993 bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd+0x12c/0x510 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4253 __sys_bpf+0x900/0x2150 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4956 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5021 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019 [inline] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x28/0x40 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0xa0/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x44/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:624 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:642 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 Code: aa0003e3 d00038c0 91248000 97fff65f (d4210000)
--- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +1 -0
@@ -1478,6 +1478,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)bpf_jit_binary_free (header); prog->bpf_func =NULL ; prog->jited =0 ; + prog->jited_len =0 ; goto out_off; }bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro (header);
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1.255.ge46751e96f-goog
Quoted 66 lines · Eric Dumazet
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
syzbot reported an illegal
copy_to_user()attempt
frombpf_prog_get_info_by_fd()[1]There was no repro yet on this bug, but I think
that commit0aef499f3172("mm/usercopy: Detect vmalloc overruns") is exposing a prior bug in bpf arm64.
bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd()looks atprog->jited_lento determine if the JIT image can be copied out to user space.My theory is that syzbot managed to get a prog where
prog->jited_lenhas been set to 43, whileprog->bpf_funchas ben cleared.It is not clear why
copy_to_user(uinsns, NULL, ulen)is triggering this particular warning.
I thoughtfind_vma_area(NULL)would not find avm_struct. As we do not holdvmap_area_lockspinlock, it might be possible that the foundvm_structwas garbage.[1]
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset 792633534417210172, size 43)! kernel BUG atmm/usercopy.c:101!Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 25002 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-10139-g8291eaafed36 #0 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:101 lr : usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89sp :
ffff80000b773a20
x29:ffff80000b773a30x28:faff80000b745000x27:ffff80000b773b48
x26: 0000000000000000 x25:000000000000002bx24: 0000000000000000
x23:00000000000000e0x22:ffff80000b75db67x21: 0000000000000001
x20:000000000000002bx19:ffff80000b75db3cx18:00000000fffffffd
x17:2820636f6c6c616dx16:76206d6f72662064x15: 6574636574656420
x14:74706d6574746120x13:2129333420657a69x12:73202c3237313031
x11: 3237313434333533 x10: 3336323937207465 x9 :657275736f707865x8 :ffff80000a30c550x7 :ffff80000b773830x6 :ffff80000b773830x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 :ffff00007fbbaa10x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 :f7ff000028fc0000x0 : 0000000000000064Call trace: usercopy_abort+0x90/0x94 mm/usercopy.c:89 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:186 [inline] __check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:252 [inline] __check_object_size+0x198/0x36c mm/usercopy.c:214 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:199 [inline] check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:235 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:159 [inline] bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd.isra.0+0xf14/0xfdc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3993 bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd+0x12c/0x510 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4253 __sys_bpf+0x900/0x2150 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4956 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5021 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019 [inline] __arm64_sys_bpf+0x28/0x40 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5019 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0xa0/0xc0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x44/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:624 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:642 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 Code: aa0003e3 d00038c0 91248000 97fff65f (d4210000)
Quoted 3 lines
Fixes db496944fdaa ("bpf: arm64: add JIT support for multi-function programs")Signed-off-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>Reported-by syzbot <[email protected]>
Quoted 19 lines
--- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +1
-1@@ -1478,6 +1478,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)bpf_jit_binary_free (header); prog->bpf_func =NULL ; prog->jited =0 ; + prog->jited_len =0 ; goto out_off; }bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro (header); --2.36.1.255.ge46751e96f-goog
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master) by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master)
by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>:
Quoted 10 lines · On Tue, 31 May 2022 14:51:13 -0700 you wrote:
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
syzbot reported an illegal
copy_to_user()attempt
frombpf_prog_get_info_by_fd()[1]There was no repro yet on this bug, but I think
that commit0aef499f3172("mm/usercopy: Detect vmalloc overruns") is exposing a prior bug in bpf arm64.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf] bpf: arm64: clear prog->jited_len along prog->jited
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf/c/e0491b11c131
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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