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arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually

PATCH Superseded Liu Song 2 participants 5 messages Aug 5, 2022 – Aug 26, 2022

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Liu Song

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test, the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%. So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the kernel by adjusting the config.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +9 -1
index 40be3a7..bd16903 100644
@@ -988,6 +988,14 @@ static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
 	isb();
 }
 
+static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
+{
+	__nospectre_bhb = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
+
 void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 {
 	bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
@@ -1001,7 +1009,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 		/* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
 	} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
 		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n");
-	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb) {
 		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 	} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
 		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
author
#1 lore raw

Hi,

Is there any potential problem with this modification? Looking forward to your reply.

Thanks

Quoted 42 lines

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test, the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%. So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the kernel by adjusting the config.

---
  arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 10 +++++++++-
  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +9 -1
index 40be3a7..bd16903 100644
@@ -988,6 +988,14 @@ static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
  	isb();
  }
 
+static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
+{
+	__nospectre_bhb = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
+
  void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
  {
  	bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
@@ -1001,7 +1009,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
  		/* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
  	} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
  		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n");
-	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb) {
  		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
  	} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
  		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Liu Song
Quoted 34 lines · Liu Song

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test, the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%. So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the kernel by adjusting the config.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +8 -0
index 40be3a7..bd16903 100644
@@ -988,6 +988,14 @@ static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
 	isb();
 }
 
+static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
+{
+	__nospectre_bhb = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
+
 void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 {
 	bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;

arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) · line 1015

Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +1 -1
@@ -1001,7 +1009,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 		/* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
 	} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
 		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n");
-	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb) {
 		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 	} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
 		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;

It would be good to have an Ack (or a shrug) from somebody @arm.com on this one.

Other than that, the documentation needs updating for the new option.

Will

author
#3 lore raw
Quoted 46 lines · Liu Song
Quoted 34 lines

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test, the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%. So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the kernel by adjusting the config.

---
  arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 10 +++++++++-
  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +8 -0
index 40be3a7..bd16903 100644
@@ -988,6 +988,14 @@ static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
  	isb();
  }
 
+static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
+{
+	__nospectre_bhb = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
+
  void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
  {
  	bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;

arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) · line 1015

Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +1 -1
@@ -1001,7 +1009,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
  		/* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
  	} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
  		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n");
-	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb) {
  		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
  	} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
  		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;

It would be good to have an Ack (or a shrug) from somebody @arm.com on this one.

Quoted 1 line

Other than that, the documentation needs updating for the new option.

Thanks for the reminder, I will post another V2 version.

Thanks

Quoted 2 lines

Will

author
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 arm64: spectre: increase parameters that can be used to turn off bhb mitigation individually

From: Liu Song <[email protected]>

In our environment, it was found that the mitigation BHB has a great impact on the benchmark performance. For example, in the lmbench test, the "process fork && exit" test performance drops by 20%. So it is necessary to have the ability to turn off the mitigation individually through cmdline, thus avoiding having to compile the kernel by adjusting the config.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  5 +++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c                 | 10 +++++++++-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5 -0
index d7f3090..1edc9a6 100644
@@ -3207,6 +3207,7 @@
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
+					       nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
 					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
@@ -3631,6 +3632,10 @@
 			vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
 			option.
 
+	nospectre_bhb	[ARM64] Disable all mitigations for Spectre-BHB (branch
+			history injection) vulnerability. System may allow data leaks
+			with this option.
+
 	nospec_store_bypass_disable
 			[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
 
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +9 -1
index 40be3a7..bd16903 100644
@@ -988,6 +988,14 @@ static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
 	isb();
 }
 
+static bool __read_mostly __nospectre_bhb;
+static int __init parse_spectre_bhb_param(char *str)
+{
+	__nospectre_bhb = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_bhb", parse_spectre_bhb_param);
+
 void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 {
 	bp_hardening_cb_t cpu_cb;
@@ -1001,7 +1009,7 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 		/* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */
 	} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) {
 		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n");
-	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || __nospectre_bhb) {
 		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 	} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
 		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1