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Netfilter fixes for net

PATCH Applied Pablo Neira Ayuso 3 participants 9 messages Jul 5, 2023 – Jul 6, 2023

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Pablo Neira Ayuso

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover Netfilter fixes for net

Hi,

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

1) Fix missing overflow use refcount checks in nf_tables.

2) Do not set IPS_ASSURED for IPS_NAT_CLASH entries in GRE tracker, from Florian Westphal.

3) Bail out if nf_ct_helper_hash is NULL before registering helper, from Florent Revest.

4) Use siphash() instead siphash_4u64() to fix performance regression, also from Florian.

5) Do not allow to add rules to removed chains via ID, from Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo.

6) Fix oob read access in byteorder expression, also from Thadeu.

Please, pull these changes from:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf.git nf-23-07-06

Thanks.

----------------------------------------------------------------

The following changes since commit c451410ca7e3d8eeb31d141fc20c200e21754ba4:

Merge branch 'mptcp-fixes' (2023-07-05 10:51:14 +0100)

are available in the Git repository at:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf.git tags/nf-23-07-06

for you to fetch changes up to caf3ef7468f7534771b5c44cd8dbd6f7f87c2cbd:

netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval (2023-07-06 00:53:14 +0200)

----------------------------------------------------------------
netfilter pull request 23-07-06

----------------------------------------------------------------
Florent Revest (1):
netfilter: conntrack: Avoid nf_ct_helper_hash uses after free

Florian Westphal (2):
netfilter: conntrack: gre: don't set assured flag for clash entries
netfilter: conntrack: don't fold port numbers into addresses before hashing

Pablo Neira Ayuso (1):
netfilter: nf_tables: report use refcount overflow

Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo (2):
netfilter: nf_tables: do not ignore genmask when looking up chain by id
netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval

 include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tuple.h |   3 +
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h          |  31 ++++-
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c          |  20 ++--
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c        |   4 +
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_gre.c     |  10 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c              | 174 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c              |  14 +--
 net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c           |   6 +-
 net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c              |   8 +-
 net/netfilter/nft_objref.c                 |   8 +-
 10 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/6 netfilter: nf_tables: report use refcount overflow

Overflow use refcount checks are not complete.

Add helper function to deal with object reference counter tracking. Report -EMFILE in case UINT_MAX is reached.

nft_use_dec() splats in case that reference counter underflows, which should not ever happen.

Add nft_use_inc_restore() and nft_use_dec_restore() which are used to restore reference counter from error and abort paths.

Use u32 in nft_flowtable and nft_object since helper functions cannot work on bitfields.

Remove the few early incomplete checks now that the helper functions are in place and used to check for refcount overflow.

Fixes 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
---
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h |  31 +++++-
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c     | 163 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c  |   6 +-
 net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c     |   8 +-
 net/netfilter/nft_objref.c        |   8 +-
 5 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h +27 -4
index 84f2fd85fd5a..640441a2f926 100644
@@ -1211,6 +1211,29 @@ int __nft_release_basechain(struct nft_ctx *ctx);
 
 unsigned int nft_do_chain(struct nft_pktinfo *pkt, void *priv);
 
+static inline bool nft_use_inc(u32 *use)
+{
+	if (*use == UINT_MAX)
+		return false;
+
+	(*use)++;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void nft_use_dec(u32 *use)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE((*use)-- == 0);
+}
+
+/* For error and abort path: restore use counter to previous state. */
+static inline void nft_use_inc_restore(u32 *use)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!nft_use_inc(use));
+}
+
+#define nft_use_dec_restore	nft_use_dec
+
 /**
  *	struct nft_table - nf_tables table
  *
@@ -1296,8 +1319,8 @@ struct nft_object {
 	struct list_head		list;
 	struct rhlist_head		rhlhead;
 	struct nft_object_hash_key	key;
-	u32				genmask:2,
-					use:30;
+	u32				genmask:2;
+	u32				use;
 	u64				handle;
 	u16				udlen;
 	u8				*udata;
@@ -1399,8 +1422,8 @@ struct nft_flowtable {
 	char				*name;
 	int				hooknum;
 	int				ops_len;
-	u32				genmask:2,
-					use:30;
+	u32				genmask:2;
+	u32				use;
 	u64				handle;
 	/* runtime data below here */
 	struct list_head		hook_list ____cacheline_aligned;
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +101 -62

508 lines not on this page · raw message

net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c +4 -2
index 5ef9146e74ad..ab3362c483b4 100644
@@ -408,8 +408,10 @@ static int nft_flow_offload_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 	if (IS_ERR(flowtable))
 		return PTR_ERR(flowtable);
 
+	if (!nft_use_inc(&flowtable->use))
+		return -EMFILE;
+
 	priv->flowtable = flowtable;
-	flowtable->use++;
 
 	return nf_ct_netns_get(ctx->net, ctx->family);
 }
@@ -428,7 +430,7 @@ static void nft_flow_offload_activate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	struct nft_flow_offload *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr);
 
-	priv->flowtable->use++;
+	nft_use_inc_restore(&priv->flowtable->use);
 }
 
 static void nft_flow_offload_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c +4 -4
index 3d76ebfe8939..407d7197f75b 100644
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void nft_immediate_deactivate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 			default:
 				nft_chain_del(chain);
 				chain->bound = false;
-				chain->table->use--;
+				nft_use_dec(&chain->table->use);
 				break;
 			}
 			break;
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static void nft_immediate_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 		 * let the transaction records release this chain and its rules.
 		 */
 		if (chain->bound) {
-			chain->use--;
+			nft_use_dec(&chain->use);
 			break;
 		}
 
@@ -206,9 +206,9 @@ static void nft_immediate_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 		chain_ctx = *ctx;
 		chain_ctx.chain = chain;
 
-		chain->use--;
+		nft_use_dec(&chain->use);
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(rule, n, &chain->rules, list) {
-			chain->use--;
+			nft_use_dec(&chain->use);
 			list_del(&rule->list);
 			nf_tables_rule_destroy(&chain_ctx, rule);
 		}
net/netfilter/nft_objref.c +5 -3
index a48dd5b5d45b..509011b1ef59 100644
@@ -41,8 +41,10 @@ static int nft_objref_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 	if (IS_ERR(obj))
 		return -ENOENT;
 
+	if (!nft_use_inc(&obj->use))
+		return -EMFILE;
+
 	nft_objref_priv(expr) = obj;
-	obj->use++;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ static void nft_objref_deactivate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 	if (phase == NFT_TRANS_COMMIT)
 		return;
 
-	obj->use--;
+	nft_use_dec(&obj->use);
 }
 
 static void nft_objref_activate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ static void nft_objref_activate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	struct nft_object *obj = nft_objref_priv(expr);
 
-	obj->use++;
+	nft_use_inc_restore(&obj->use);
 }
 
 static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_ops = {
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
maintainer
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH net 1/6] netfilter: nf_tables: report use refcount overflow

Quoted 7 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso

Overflow use refcount checks are not complete.

Add helper function to deal with object reference counter tracking. Report -EMFILE in case UINT_MAX is reached.

nft_use_dec() splats in case that reference counter underflows, which should not ever happen.

For the records, I also once had the need for an non atomic reference counters implementing sanity checks on underflows/overflows. I resorted to use plain refcount_t, since the atomic op overhead was not noticeable in my use-case.

[not blocking this series, just thinking aloud] I'm wondering if a generic, non-atomic refcounter infra could be useful?

Cheers,

Paolo

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH net 1/6] netfilter: nf_tables: report use refcount overflow

In reply to Pablo Neira Ayuso
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>:

Quoted 9 lines · On Thu, 6 Jul 2023 01:04:01 +0200 you wrote:

Overflow use refcount checks are not complete.

Add helper function to deal with object reference counter tracking. Report -EMFILE in case UINT_MAX is reached.

nft_use_dec() splats in case that reference counter underflows, which should not ever happen.

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [net,1/6] netfilter: nf_tables: report use refcount overflow

    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/1689f25924ad
  - [net,2/6] netfilter: conntrack: gre: don't set assured flag for clash entries
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/8a9dc07ba924
  - [net,3/6] netfilter: conntrack: Avoid nf_ct_helper_hash uses after free
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/6eef7a2b9338
  - [net,4/6] netfilter: conntrack: don't fold port numbers into addresses before hashing
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/eaf9e7192ec9
  - [net,5/6] netfilter: nf_tables: do not ignore genmask when looking up chain by id
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/515ad530795c
  - [net,6/6] netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/caf3ef7468f7

You are awesome, thank you!

Signature · 2 lines
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author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/6 netfilter: conntrack: gre: don't set assured flag for clash entries

In reply to Pablo Neira Ayuso

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

Now that conntrack core is allowd to insert clashing entries, make sure GRE won't set assured flag on NAT_CLASH entries, just like UDP.

Doing so prevents early_drop logic for these entries.

Fixes d671fd82eaa9 ("netfilter: conntrack: allow insertion clash of gre protocol")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_gre.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_gre.c +9 -1
index ad6f0ca40cd2..af369e686fc5 100644
@@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ int nf_conntrack_gre_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 			    enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo,
 			    const struct nf_hook_state *state)
 {
+	unsigned long status;
+
 	if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)) {
 		unsigned int *timeouts = nf_ct_timeout_lookup(ct);
 
@@ -217,11 +219,17 @@ int nf_conntrack_gre_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 		ct->proto.gre.timeout = timeouts[GRE_CT_UNREPLIED];
 	}
 
+	status = READ_ONCE(ct->status);
 	/* If we've seen traffic both ways, this is a GRE connection.
 	 * Extend timeout. */
-	if (ct->status & IPS_SEEN_REPLY) {
+	if (status & IPS_SEEN_REPLY) {
 		nf_ct_refresh_acct(ct, ctinfo, skb,
 				   ct->proto.gre.stream_timeout);
+
+		/* never set ASSURED for IPS_NAT_CLASH, they time out soon */
+		if (unlikely((status & IPS_NAT_CLASH)))
+			return NF_ACCEPT;
+
 		/* Also, more likely to be important, and not a probe. */
 		if (!test_and_set_bit(IPS_ASSURED_BIT, &ct->status))
 			nf_conntrack_event_cache(IPCT_ASSURED, ct);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 3/6 netfilter: conntrack: Avoid nf_ct_helper_hash uses after free

In reply to Pablo Neira Ayuso

From: Florent Revest <[email protected]>

If nf_conntrack_init_start() fails (for example due to a register_nf_conntrack_bpf() failure), the nf_conntrack_helper_fini() clean-up path frees the nf_ct_helper_hash map.

When built with NF_CONNTRACK=y, further netfilter modules (e.g:
netfilter_conntrack_ftp) can still be loaded and call nf_conntrack_helpers_register(), independently of whether nf_conntrack initialized correctly. This accesses the nf_ct_helper_hash dangling pointer and causes a uaf, possibly leading to random memory corruption.

This patch guards nf_conntrack_helper_register() from accessing a freed or uninitialized nf_ct_helper_hash pointer and fixes possible uses-after-free when loading a conntrack module.

Fixes 12f7a505331e ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c +4 -0
index 0c4db2f2ac43..f22691f83853 100644
@@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ int nf_conntrack_helper_register(struct nf_conntrack_helper *me)
 	BUG_ON(me->expect_class_max >= NF_CT_MAX_EXPECT_CLASSES);
 	BUG_ON(strlen(me->name) > NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN - 1);
 
+	if (!nf_ct_helper_hash)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
 	if (me->expect_policy->max_expected > NF_CT_EXPECT_MAX_CNT)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -515,4 +518,5 @@ int nf_conntrack_helper_init(void)
 void nf_conntrack_helper_fini(void)
 {
 	kvfree(nf_ct_helper_hash);
+	nf_ct_helper_hash = NULL;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 4/6 netfilter: conntrack: don't fold port numbers into addresses before hashing

In reply to Pablo Neira Ayuso

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

Originally this used jhash2() over tuple and folded the zone id, the pernet hash value, destination port and l4 protocol number into the 32bit seed value.

When the switch to siphash was done, I used an on-stack temporary buffer to build a suitable key to be hashed via siphash().

But this showed up as performance regression, so I got rid of the temporary copy and collected to-be-hashed data in 4 u64 variables.

This makes it easy to build tuples that produce the same hash, which isn't desirable even though chain lengths are limited.

Switch back to plain siphash, but just like with jhash2(), take advantage of the fact that most of to-be-hashed data is already in a suitable order.

Use an empty struct as annotation in 'struct nf_conntrack_tuple' to mark last member that can be used as hash input.

The only remaining data that isn't present in the tuple structure are the zone identifier and the pernet hash: fold those into the key.

Fixes d2c806abcf0b ("netfilter: conntrack: use siphash_4u64")
---
 include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tuple.h |  3 +++
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c          | 20 +++++++-------------
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tuple.h +3 -0
index 9334371c94e2..f7dd950ff250 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ struct nf_conntrack_tuple {
 		/* The protocol. */
 		u_int8_t protonum;
 
+		/* The direction must be ignored for the tuplehash */
+		struct { } __nfct_hash_offsetend;
+
 		/* The direction (for tuplehash) */
 		u_int8_t dir;
 	} dst;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +7 -13
index d119f1d4c2fc..992393102d5f 100644
@@ -211,24 +211,18 @@ static u32 hash_conntrack_raw(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 			      unsigned int zoneid,
 			      const struct net *net)
 {
-	u64 a, b, c, d;
+	siphash_key_t key;
 
 	get_random_once(&nf_conntrack_hash_rnd, sizeof(nf_conntrack_hash_rnd));
 
-	/* The direction must be ignored, handle usable tuplehash members manually */
-	a = (u64)tuple->src.u3.all[0] << 32 | tuple->src.u3.all[3];
-	b = (u64)tuple->dst.u3.all[0] << 32 | tuple->dst.u3.all[3];
+	key = nf_conntrack_hash_rnd;
 
-	c = (__force u64)tuple->src.u.all << 32 | (__force u64)tuple->dst.u.all << 16;
-	c |= tuple->dst.protonum;
+	key.key[0] ^= zoneid;
+	key.key[1] ^= net_hash_mix(net);
 
-	d = (u64)zoneid << 32 | net_hash_mix(net);
-
-	/* IPv4: u3.all[1,2,3] == 0 */
-	c ^= (u64)tuple->src.u3.all[1] << 32 | tuple->src.u3.all[2];
-	d += (u64)tuple->dst.u3.all[1] << 32 | tuple->dst.u3.all[2];
-
-	return (u32)siphash_4u64(a, b, c, d, &nf_conntrack_hash_rnd);
+	return siphash((void *)tuple,
+			offsetofend(struct nf_conntrack_tuple, dst.__nfct_hash_offsetend),
+			&key);
 }
 
 static u32 scale_hash(u32 hash)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 5/6 netfilter: nf_tables: do not ignore genmask when looking up chain by id

In reply to Pablo Neira Ayuso

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]>

When adding a rule to a chain referring to its ID, if that chain had been deleted on the same batch, the rule might end up referring to a deleted chain.

This will lead to a WARNING like following:

[   33.098431] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   33.098678] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 69 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2037 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.099217] Modules linked in:
[   33.099388] CPU: 5 PID: 69 Comm: kworker/5:1 Not tainted 6.4.0+ #409
[   33.099726] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work
[   33.100018] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.100306] Code: 8b 7c 24 68 e8 64 9c ed fe 4c 89 e7 e8 5c 9c ed fe 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7
[   33.101271] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004ffc48 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   33.101546] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888006fc0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   33.101920] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   33.102649] RBP: ffffc900004ffc78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   33.103018] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880135ef500
[   33.103385] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dead000000000122 R15: ffff888006fc0a10
[   33.103762] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888024c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   33.104184] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   33.104493] CR2: 00007fe863b56a50 CR3: 00000000124b0001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[   33.104872] PKRU: 55555554
[   33.104999] Call Trace:
[   33.105113]  <TASK>
[   33.105214]  ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
[   33.105371]  ? __warn+0xa5/0x210
[   33.105520]  ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.105732]  ? report_bug+0x1f2/0x200
[   33.105902]  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[   33.106546]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x50
[   33.106762]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[   33.106995]  ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.107249]  ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x30/0x260
[   33.107506]  nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x669/0x680
[   33.107782]  ? mark_held_locks+0x28/0xa0
[   33.107996]  ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10
[   33.108294]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x70
[   33.108538]  process_one_work+0x68c/0xb70
[   33.108755]  ? lock_acquire+0x17f/0x420
[   33.108977]  ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
[   33.109218]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x128/0x1d0
[   33.109435]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x71/0x80
[   33.109634]  worker_thread+0x2bd/0x700
[   33.109817]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[   33.110254]  kthread+0x18b/0x1d0
[   33.110410]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   33.110581]  ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[   33.110757]  </TASK>
[   33.110866] irq event stamp: 1651
[   33.111017] hardirqs last  enabled at (1659): [<ffffffffa206a209>] __up_console_sem+0x79/0xa0
[   33.111379] hardirqs last disabled at (1666): [<ffffffffa206a1ee>] __up_console_sem+0x5e/0xa0
[   33.111740] softirqs last  enabled at (1616): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[   33.112094] softirqs last disabled at (1367): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[   33.112453] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This is due to the nft_chain_lookup_byid ignoring the genmask. After this change, adding the new rule will fail as it will not find the chain.

Fixes 837830a4b439 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID attribute")
Reported-by Mingi Cho of Theori working with ZDI
---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +7 -4
index 86b3c4de7f40..237f739da3ca 100644
@@ -2699,7 +2699,7 @@ static int nf_tables_updchain(struct nft_ctx *ctx, u8 genmask, u8 policy,
 
 static struct nft_chain *nft_chain_lookup_byid(const struct net *net,
 					       const struct nft_table *table,
-					       const struct nlattr *nla)
+					       const struct nlattr *nla, u8 genmask)
 {
 	struct nftables_pernet *nft_net = nft_pernet(net);
 	u32 id = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla));
@@ -2710,7 +2710,8 @@ static struct nft_chain *nft_chain_lookup_byid(const struct net *net,
 
 		if (trans->msg_type == NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN &&
 		    chain->table == table &&
-		    id == nft_trans_chain_id(trans))
+		    id == nft_trans_chain_id(trans) &&
+		    nft_active_genmask(chain, genmask))
 			return chain;
 	}
 	return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
@@ -3814,7 +3815,8 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nfnl_info *info,
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	} else if (nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID]) {
-		chain = nft_chain_lookup_byid(net, table, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID]);
+		chain = nft_chain_lookup_byid(net, table, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID],
+					      genmask);
 		if (IS_ERR(chain)) {
 			NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID]);
 			return PTR_ERR(chain);
@@ -10540,7 +10542,8 @@ static int nft_verdict_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_data *data,
 						 genmask);
 		} else if (tb[NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID]) {
 			chain = nft_chain_lookup_byid(ctx->net, ctx->table,
-						      tb[NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID]);
+						      tb[NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID],
+						      genmask);
 			if (IS_ERR(chain))
 				return PTR_ERR(chain);
 		} else {
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 6/6 netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval

In reply to Pablo Neira Ayuso

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]>

When evaluating byteorder expressions with size 2, a union with 32-bit and 16-bit members is used. Since the 16-bit members are aligned to 32-bit, the array accesses will be out-of-bounds.

It may lead to a stack-out-of-bounds access like the one below:

[   23.095215] ==================================================================
[   23.095625] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.096020] Read of size 2 at addr ffffc90000007948 by task ping/115
[   23.096358]
[   23.096456] CPU: 0 PID: 115 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.4.0+ #413
[   23.096770] Call Trace:
[   23.096910]  <IRQ>
[   23.097030]  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xc0
[   23.097218]  print_report+0xcf/0x630
[   23.097388]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.097577]  ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0xd/0xc0
[   23.097760]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.097949]  kasan_report+0xc9/0x110
[   23.098106]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.098298]  __asan_load2+0x83/0xd0
[   23.098453]  nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.098659]  nft_do_chain+0x1c8/0xc50
[   23.098852]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain+0x10/0x10
[   23.099078]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[   23.099295]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[   23.099535]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[   23.099745]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[   23.099929]  nft_do_chain_ipv4+0xfe/0x140
[   23.100105]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x10/0x10
[   23.100327]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.100515]  ? nf_hook.constprop.0+0x340/0x550
[   23.100779]  nf_hook_slow+0x6c/0x100
[   23.100977]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x10/0x10
[   23.101223]  nf_hook.constprop.0+0x334/0x550
[   23.101443]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
[   23.101677]  ? __pfx_nf_hook.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
[   23.101882]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv_finish+0x10/0x10
[   23.102071]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
[   23.102291]  ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x4b/0x70
[   23.102481]  ip_local_deliver+0xbb/0x110
[   23.102665]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[   23.102839]  ip_rcv+0x199/0x2a0
[   23.102980]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[   23.103140]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13e/0x150
[   23.103362]  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10
[   23.103647]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
[   23.103819]  ? process_backlog+0x36c/0x380
[   23.103999]  __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xc0
[   23.104179]  process_backlog+0x91/0x380
[   23.104350]  __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x66/0x360
[   23.104589]  ? net_rx_action+0x1cb/0x610
[   23.104811]  net_rx_action+0x33e/0x610
[   23.105024]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x50
[   23.105257]  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
[   23.105485]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
[   23.105741]  __do_softirq+0xfa/0x5ab
[   23.105956]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x765/0x1c00
[   23.106193]  do_softirq.part.0+0x49/0xc0
[   23.106423]  </IRQ>
[   23.106547]  <TASK>
[   23.106670]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf5/0x120
[   23.106903]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x789/0x1c00
[   23.107131]  ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
[   23.107381]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.107585]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.107798]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x185/0x350
[   23.108049]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
[   23.108265]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x185/0x350
[   23.108514]  neigh_resolve_output+0x246/0x350
[   23.108753]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x246/0x350
[   23.109003]  ip_finish_output2+0x3c3/0x10b0
[   23.109250]  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10
[   23.109510]  ? __pfx_nf_hook+0x10/0x10
[   23.109732]  __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x390
[   23.109978]  ip_finish_output+0x2f/0x130
[   23.110207]  ip_output+0xc9/0x170
[   23.110404]  ip_push_pending_frames+0x1a0/0x240
[   23.110652]  raw_sendmsg+0x102e/0x19e0
[   23.110871]  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[   23.111093]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.111304]  ? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0x148/0x330
[   23.111567]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.111777]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.111993]  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x7c/0x2f0
[   23.112225]  ? aa_sk_perm+0x18a/0x550
[   23.112431]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x4f1/0x900
[   23.112665]  ? __pfx_aa_sk_perm+0x10/0x10
[   23.112880]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.113098]  inet_sendmsg+0xa0/0xb0
[   23.113297]  ? inet_sendmsg+0xa0/0xb0
[   23.113500]  ? __pfx_inet_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[   23.113727]  sock_sendmsg+0xf4/0x100
[   23.113924]  ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.0+0x4f/0xa0
[   23.114190]  __sys_sendto+0x1d4/0x290
[   23.114391]  ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10
[   23.114621]  ? __pfx_mark_lock.part.0+0x10/0x10
[   23.114869]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.115076]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.115287]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x60
[   23.115503]  ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x6e2/0x860
[   23.115778]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[   23.116008]  ? blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x8d/0x770
[   23.116285]  ? mark_held_locks+0x28/0xa0
[   23.116503]  ? do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90
[   23.116713]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x7f/0xb0
[   23.116924]  do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90
[   23.117123]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x30
[   23.117387]  ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[   23.117593]  ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x140
[   23.117806]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[   23.118081] RIP: 0033:0x7f744aee2bba
[   23.118282] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89
[   23.119237] RSP: 002b:00007ffd04a7c9f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[   23.119644] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd04a7e0a0 RCX: 00007f744aee2bba
[   23.120023] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000056488e9e6300 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   23.120413] RBP: 000056488e9e6300 R08: 00007ffd04a80320 R09: 0000000000000010
[   23.120809] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040
[   23.121219] R13: 00007ffd04a7dc38 R14: 00007ffd04a7ca00 R15: 00007ffd04a7e0a0
[   23.121617]  </TASK>
[   23.121749]
[   23.121845] The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
[   23.121845]  [ffffc90000000000, ffffc90000009000) created by:
[   23.121845]  irq_init_percpu_irqstack+0x1cf/0x270
[   23.122707]
[   23.122803] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   23.123104] page:0000000072ac19f0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x24a09
[   23.123609] flags: 0xfffffc0001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[   23.123998] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[   23.124194] raw: 000fffffc0001000 ffffea0000928248 ffffea0000928248 0000000000000000
[   23.124610] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   23.125023] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   23.125326]
[   23.125421] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   23.125682]  ffffc90000007800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   23.126072]  ffffc90000007880: 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f2 f2 00
[   23.126455] >ffffc90000007900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00
[   23.126840]                                               ^
[   23.127138]  ffffc90000007980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3
[   23.127522]  ffffc90000007a00: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
[   23.127906] ==================================================================
[   23.128324] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Using simple s16 pointers for the 16-bit accesses fixes the problem. For the 32-bit accesses, src and dst can be used directly.

---
 net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c +7 -7
index 9a85e797ed58..e596d1a842f7 100644
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ void nft_byteorder_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
 	const struct nft_byteorder *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr);
 	u32 *src = &regs->data[priv->sreg];
 	u32 *dst = &regs->data[priv->dreg];
-	union { u32 u32; u16 u16; } *s, *d;
+	u16 *s16, *d16;
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	s = (void *)src;
-	d = (void *)dst;
+	s16 = (void *)src;
+	d16 = (void *)dst;
 
 	switch (priv->size) {
 	case 8: {
@@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ void nft_byteorder_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
 		switch (priv->op) {
 		case NFT_BYTEORDER_NTOH:
 			for (i = 0; i < priv->len / 4; i++)
-				d[i].u32 = ntohl((__force __be32)s[i].u32);
+				dst[i] = ntohl((__force __be32)src[i]);
 			break;
 		case NFT_BYTEORDER_HTON:
 			for (i = 0; i < priv->len / 4; i++)
-				d[i].u32 = (__force __u32)htonl(s[i].u32);
+				dst[i] = (__force __u32)htonl(src[i]);
 			break;
 		}
 		break;
@@ -74,11 +74,11 @@ void nft_byteorder_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
 		switch (priv->op) {
 		case NFT_BYTEORDER_NTOH:
 			for (i = 0; i < priv->len / 2; i++)
-				d[i].u16 = ntohs((__force __be16)s[i].u16);
+				d16[i] = ntohs((__force __be16)s16[i]);
 			break;
 		case NFT_BYTEORDER_HTON:
 			for (i = 0; i < priv->len / 2; i++)
-				d[i].u16 = (__force __u16)htons(s[i].u16);
+				d16[i] = (__force __u16)htons(s16[i]);
 			break;
 		}
 		break;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2