af_unix: Terminate sun_path when bind()ing pathname socket.
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 af_unix: Terminate sun_path when bind()ing pathname socket.
kernel test robot reported slab-out-of-bounds access in strlen(). [0]
Commit 06d4c8a80836 ("af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().") removed unix_mkname_bsd() call in unix_bind_bsd().
If sunaddr->sun_path is not terminated by user and we don't enable CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y, strlen() will do the out-of-bounds access during file creation.
Let's go back to strlen()-with-sockaddr_storage way and pack all 108 trickiness into unix_mkname_bsd() with bold comments.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strlen (lib/string.c:?) Read of size 1 at addr ffff000015492777 by task fortify_strlen_/168 CPU: 0 PID: 168 Comm: fortify_strlen_ Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00333-g3329b603ebba #16 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:235) show_stack (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:242) dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:365 mm/kasan/report.c:475) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:590) __asan_report_load1_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:378) strlen (lib/string.c:?) getname_kernel (./include/linux/fortify-string.h:? fs/namei.c:226) kern_path_create (fs/namei.c:3926) unix_bind (net/unix/af_unix.c:1221 net/unix/af_unix.c:1324) __sys_bind (net/socket.c:1792) __arm64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1801) invoke_syscall (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:? arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52) el0_svc_common (./include/linux/thread_info.h:127 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:147) do_el0_svc (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:189) el0_svc (./arch/arm64/include/asm/daifflags.h:28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:133 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:144 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:648) el0t_64_sync_handler (arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:?) el0t_64_sync (arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591) Allocated by task 168: kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:45 mm/kasan/common.c:52) kasan_save_alloc_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:512) __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:383) __kmalloc (mm/slab_common.c:? mm/slab_common.c:998) unix_bind (net/unix/af_unix.c:257 net/unix/af_unix.c:1213 net/unix/af_unix.c:1324) __sys_bind (net/socket.c:1792) __arm64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1801) invoke_syscall (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:? arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52) el0_svc_common (./include/linux/thread_info.h:127 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:147) do_el0_svc (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:189) el0_svc (./arch/arm64/include/asm/daifflags.h:28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:133 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:144 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:648) el0t_64_sync_handler (arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:?) el0t_64_sync (arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000015492700 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 119-byte region [ffff000015492700, ffff000015492777)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000aeab52ba refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x55492
anon flags: 0x3fffc0000000200(slab|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 03fffc0000000200 ffff0000084018c0 fffffc00003d0e00 0000000000000005
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff000015492600: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff000015492680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff000015492700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 fc
^
ffff000015492780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff000015492800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +16 -5
@@ -289,17 +289,29 @@ static int unix_validate_addr(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len)return 0 ; } -static void unix_mkname_bsd (struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,int addr_len) +static int unix_mkname_bsd (struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,int addr_len) { +struct sockaddr_storage *addr = (struct sockaddr_storage *)sunaddr; +short offset = offsetof(struct sockaddr_storage , __data); + +BUILD_BUG_ON (offset != offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path)); +/* This may look like an off by one error but it is a bit more * subtle. 108 is the longest valid AF_UNIX path for a binding. * sun_path[108] doesn't as such exist. However in kernel space * we are guaranteed that it is a valid memory location in our * kernel address buffer because syscall functions always pass * a pointer of struct sockaddr_storage which has a bigger buffer -* than 108. +* than 108. Also, we must terminate sun_path for strlen() in +* getname_kernel(). +*/ + addr->__data[addr_len - offset] =0 ; + +/* Don't pass sunaddr->sun_path to strlen(). Otherwise, 108 will +* cause panic if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. Let __fortify_strlen() +* know the actual buffer. */ - ((char *)sunaddr)[addr_len] =0 ; +return strlen (addr->__data) + offset +1 ; }static void __unix_remove_socket (struct sock *sk)
@@ -1208,8 +1220,7 @@ static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,struct path parent;int err; - addr_len =strnlen (sunaddr->sun_path,sizeof (sunaddr->sun_path)) - + offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +1 ; + addr_len =unix_mkname_bsd (sunaddr, addr_len); addr =unix_create_addr (sunaddr, addr_len);if (!addr)return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Quoted 5 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
kernel test robot reported slab-out-of-bounds access in
strlen(). [0]Commit
06d4c8a80836("af_unix: Fixfortify_panic()inunix_bind_bsd().") removedunix_mkname_bsd()call inunix_bind_bsd().
Quoted 7 lines
If
sunaddr->sun_pathis not terminated by user and we don't enableCONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y,strlen()will do the out-of-bounds access during file creation.Let's go back to strlen()-with-sockaddr_storage way and pack all 108 trickiness into
unix_mkname_bsd()with bold comments.
Okay, this does at least collapse all the scary casting into a single function. :) Thanks for navigating this!
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Quoted 10 lines · On Wed, 26 Jul 2023 12:08:28 -0700 you wrote:
kernel test robot reported slab-out-of-bounds access in
strlen(). [0]Commit
06d4c8a80836("af_unix: Fixfortify_panic()inunix_bind_bsd().") removedunix_mkname_bsd()call inunix_bind_bsd().If
sunaddr->sun_pathis not terminated by user and we don't enableCONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y,strlen()will do the out-of-bounds access during file creation.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [v1,net] af_unix: Terminate sun_path when bind()ing pathname socket.
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/ecb4534b6a1c
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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