Skip to contentSkip to conversation

bpf: Fix an issue in verifing allow_ptr_leaks

PATCH Applied Yafang Shao 2 participants 4 messages Aug 23, 2023

Subsystems (5)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v2 cover bpf: Fix an issue in verifing allow_ptr_leaks

Patch #1: An issue found in our local 6.1 kernel.
This issue also exists in bpf-next.
Patch #2: Selftess for #1

v1->v2:
- Add acked-by from Eduard
- Fix build error reported by Alexei

Yafang Shao (2):
bpf: Fix issue in verifying allow_ptr_leaks
selftests/bpf: Add selftest for allow_ptr_leaks

 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                           | 17 ++++++------
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tc_bpf.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_bpf.c | 13 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 bpf: Fix issue in verifying allow_ptr_leaks

After we converted the capabilities of our networking-bpf program from cap_sys_admin to cap_net_admin+cap_bpf, our networking-bpf program failed to start. Because it failed the bpf verifier, and the error log is "R3 pointer comparison prohibited".

A simple reproducer as follows,

SEC("cls-ingress")
int ingress(struct __sk_buff *skb)

{
	struct iphdr *iph = (void *)(long)skb->data + sizeof(struct ethhdr);

	if ((long)(iph + 1) > (long)skb->data_end)
		return TC_ACT_STOLEN;
	return TC_ACT_OK;
}

Per discussion with Yonghong and Alexei [1], comparison of two packet pointers is not a pointer leak. This patch fixes it.

Our local kernel is 6.1.y and we expect this fix to be backported to 6.1.y, so stable is CCed.

[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+Nmspr7Si+pxWn8zkE7hX-7s93ugwC+94aXSy4uQ9vBg@mail.gmail.com/

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +9 -8
index 4ccca1f..b6b60cd 100644
@@ -14047,6 +14047,12 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	/* check src2 operand */
+	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
 		if (insn->imm != 0) {
 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
@@ -14058,12 +14064,13 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
-		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
+		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
+		if (!(reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg)) &&
+		    is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
 				insn->src_reg);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
-		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
 	} else {
 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
@@ -14071,12 +14078,6 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* check src2 operand */
-	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
 	is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32;
 
 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 selftests/bpf: Add selftest for allow_ptr_leaks

In reply to Yafang Shao

- Without prev commit

  $ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs --name=tc_bpf
  #232/1   tc_bpf/tc_bpf_root:OK
  test_tc_bpf_non_root:PASS:set_cap_bpf_cap_net_admin 0 nsec
  test_tc_bpf_non_root:PASS:disable_cap_sys_admin 0 nsec
  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  ; if ((long)(iph + 1) > (long)skb->data_end)
  0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80)         ; R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R2_w=pkt_end(off=0,imm=0)
  ; struct iphdr *iph = (void *)(long)skb->data + sizeof(struct ethhdr);
  1: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76)         ; R1_w=pkt(off=0,r=0,imm=0)
  ; if ((long)(iph + 1) > (long)skb->data_end)
  2: (07) r1 += 34                      ; R1_w=pkt(off=34,r=0,imm=0)
  3: (b4) w0 = 1                        ; R0_w=1
  4: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+1
  R2 pointer comparison prohibited
  processed 5 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 0 peak_states 0 mark_read 0
  test_tc_bpf_non_root:FAIL:test_tc_bpf__open_and_load unexpected error: -13
  #233/2   tc_bpf_non_root:FAIL

- With prev commit

  $ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs --name=tc_bpf
  #232/1   tc_bpf/tc_bpf_root:OK
  #232/2   tc_bpf/tc_bpf_non_root:OK
  #232     tc_bpf:OK
  Summary: 1/2 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tc_bpf.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_bpf.c | 13 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/tc_bpf.c +35 -1
index e873766..48b5553 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <test_progs.h>
 #include <linux/pkt_cls.h>
 
+#include "cap_helpers.h"
 #include "test_tc_bpf.skel.h"
 
 #define LO_IFINDEX 1
@@ -327,7 +328,7 @@ static int test_tc_bpf_api(struct bpf_tc_hook *hook, int fd)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void test_tc_bpf(void)
+void tc_bpf_root(void)
 {
 	DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_tc_hook, hook, .ifindex = LO_IFINDEX,
 			    .attach_point = BPF_TC_INGRESS);
@@ -393,3 +394,36 @@ void test_tc_bpf(void)
 	}
 	test_tc_bpf__destroy(skel);
 }
+
+void tc_bpf_non_root(void)
+{
+	struct test_tc_bpf *skel = NULL;
+	__u64 caps = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* In case CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON is not set */
+	ret = cap_enable_effective(1ULL << CAP_BPF | 1ULL << CAP_NET_ADMIN, &caps);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "set_cap_bpf_cap_net_admin"))
+		return;
+	ret = cap_disable_effective(1ULL << CAP_SYS_ADMIN | 1ULL << CAP_PERFMON, NULL);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "disable_cap_sys_admin"))
+		goto restore_cap;
+
+	skel = test_tc_bpf__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "test_tc_bpf__open_and_load"))
+		goto restore_cap;
+
+	test_tc_bpf__destroy(skel);
+
+restore_cap:
+	if (caps)
+		cap_enable_effective(caps, NULL);
+}
+
+void test_tc_bpf(void)
+{
+	if (test__start_subtest("tc_bpf_root"))
+		tc_bpf_root();
+	if (test__start_subtest("tc_bpf_non_root"))
+		tc_bpf_non_root();
+}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tc_bpf.c +13 -0
index d28ca8d..ef7da41 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <linux/if_ether.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
 
 /* Dummy prog to test TC-BPF API */
 
@@ -10,3 +12,14 @@ int cls(struct __sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+/* Prog to verify tc-bpf without cap_sys_admin and cap_perfmon */
+SEC("tcx/ingress")
+int pkt_ptr(struct __sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct iphdr *iph = (void *)(long)skb->data + sizeof(struct ethhdr);
+
+	if ((long)(iph + 1) > (long)skb->data_end)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
#3 lore raw
In reply to Yafang Shao
This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:

Quoted 9 lines · On Wed, 23 Aug 2023 02:07:01 +0000 you wrote:

Patch #1: An issue found in our local 6.1 kernel.
This issue also exists in bpf-next.
Patch #2: Selftess for #1

v1->v2:
- Add acked-by from Eduard
- Fix build error reported by Alexei

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [v2,bpf-next,1/2] bpf: Fix issue in verifying allow_ptr_leaks

    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/d75e30dddf73
  - [v2,bpf-next,2/2] selftests/bpf: Add selftest for allow_ptr_leaks
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/0072e3624b46

You are awesome, thank you!

Signature · 2 lines
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html