mtdchar_write_ioctl(): prevent integer overflow, use kvmalloc()
cover mtdchar_write_ioctl(): prevent integer overflow, use kvmalloc()
This patch series addresses two flaws in mtdchar_write_ioctl() found by Richard Weinberger while he was reviewing v3 of the patch series proposing a new MEMREAD ioctl [1].
Richard, I included a Suggested-by tag crediting you in both of the patches in this series. I hope that is okay with you, but please let me know if it isn't.
Once this patch series is reviewed and accepted, I will apply similar fixes in v4 of the MEMREAD ioctl patch series.
[1] https://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-mtd/2022-February/091276.html
Michał Kępień (2):
mtdchar: prevent integer overflow in a safety check
mtdchar: use kvmalloc() for potentially large allocations
drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c | 13 ++++++++----- include/uapi/mtd/mtd-abi.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
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2.36.1 ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/
PATCH 1/2 mtdchar: prevent integer overflow in a safety check
Commit 6420ac0af95d ("mtdchar: prevent unbounded allocation in MEMWRITE ioctl") added a safety check to mtdchar_write_ioctl() which attempts to ensure that the write request sent by user space does not extend beyond the MTD device's size. However, that check contains an addition of two struct mtd_write_req fields, 'start' and 'len', both of which are u64 variables. The result of that addition can overflow, allowing the safety check to be bypassed.
The arguably simplest fix - changing the data types of the relevant struct mtd_write_req fields - is not feasible as it would break user space.
Fix by making mtdchar_write_ioctl() truncate the value provided by user space in the 'len' field of struct mtd_write_req, so that only the lower 32 bits of that field are used, preventing the overflow.
While the 'ooblen' field of struct mtd_write_req is not currently used in any similarly flawed safety check, also truncate it to 32 bits, for consistency with the 'len' field and with other MTD routines handling OOB data.
Update include/uapi/mtd/mtd-abi.h accordingly.
--- drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c | 3 +++ include/uapi/mtd/mtd-abi.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c +3 -0
@@ -615,6 +615,9 @@ static int mtdchar_write_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd,if (!usr_oob) req.ooblen =0 ; + req.len &=0xffffffff ; + req.ooblen &=0xffffffff ; +if (req.start + req.len > mtd->size)return -EINVAL ;
include/uapi/mtd/mtd-abi.h +2 -2
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ enum {* struct mtd_write_req - data structure for requesting a write operation * * @start: start address -* @len: length of data buffer -* @ooblen: length of OOB buffer +* @len: length of data buffer (only lower 32 bits are used) +* @ooblen: length of OOB buffer (only lower 32 bits are used) * @usr_data: user-provided data buffer * @usr_oob: user-provided OOB buffer * @mode: MTD mode (see "MTD operation modes")
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2.36.1 ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/
Richard Weinberger
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/2] mtdchar: prevent integer overflow in a safety check
----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
Quoted 41 lines
Von: "Michał Kępień" <[email protected]>
An: "Miquel Raynal" <[email protected]>, "richard" <[email protected]>, "Vignesh Raghavendra" <[email protected]>
CC: "linux-mtd" <[email protected]>, "linux-kernel" <[email protected]>
Gesendet: Montag, 16. Mai 2022 09:06:00
Betreff: [PATCH 1/2] mtdchar: prevent integer overflow in a safety checkCommit
6420ac0af95d("mtdchar: prevent unbounded allocation in MEMWRITE ioctl") added a safety check tomtdchar_write_ioctl()which attempts to ensure that the write request sent by user space does not extend beyond the MTD device's size. However, that check contains an addition of two structmtd_write_reqfields, 'start' and 'len', both of which are u64 variables. The result of that addition can overflow, allowing the safety check to be bypassed.The arguably simplest fix - changing the data types of the relevant struct
mtd_write_reqfields - is not feasible as it would break user space.Fix by making
mtdchar_write_ioctl()truncate the value provided by user space in the 'len' field of structmtd_write_req, so that only the lower 32 bits of that field are used, preventing the overflow.While the 'ooblen' field of struct
mtd_write_reqis not currently used in any similarly flawed safety check, also truncate it to 32 bits, for consistency with the 'len' field and with other MTD routines handling OOB data.Update
include/uapi/mtd/mtd-abi.haccordingly.Suggested-by Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Michał Kępień <[email protected]>---
drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c| 3 +++include/uapi/mtd/mtd-abi.h| 4 ++--2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c +0
-0
drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c static int mtdchar_write_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, · line 620
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c +3
-0@@ -615,6 +615,9 @@ static int mtdchar_write_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd,if (!usr_oob) req.ooblen =0 ; + req.len &=0xffffffff ; + req.ooblen &=0xffffffff ; +
Yeah, I think it is reasonable to limit write requests to 4GiB.
Thanks,
//richard
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Re: [PATCH 1/2] mtdchar: prevent integer overflow in a safety check
In reply to Michał KępieńQuoted 21 lines · On Mon, 2022-05-16 at 07:06:00 UTC, =?utf-8?b?TWljaGHFgiBLxJlwaWXFhA==?= wrote:
Commit
6420ac0af95d("mtdchar: prevent unbounded allocation in MEMWRITE ioctl") added a safety check tomtdchar_write_ioctl()which attempts to ensure that the write request sent by user space does not extend beyond the MTD device's size. However, that check contains an addition of two structmtd_write_reqfields, 'start' and 'len', both of which are u64 variables. The result of that addition can overflow, allowing the safety check to be bypassed.The arguably simplest fix - changing the data types of the relevant struct
mtd_write_reqfields - is not feasible as it would break user space.Fix by making
mtdchar_write_ioctl()truncate the value provided by user space in the 'len' field of structmtd_write_req, so that only the lower 32 bits of that field are used, preventing the overflow.While the 'ooblen' field of struct
mtd_write_reqis not currently used in any similarly flawed safety check, also truncate it to 32 bits, for consistency with the 'len' field and with other MTD routines handling OOB data.
Quoted 4 lines
Update
include/uapi/mtd/mtd-abi.haccordingly.Suggested-by Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Michał Kępień <[email protected]>
Applied to https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mtd/linux.git mtd/next, thanks.
Miquel
PATCH 2/2 mtdchar: use kvmalloc() for potentially large allocations
In reply to Michał Kępieńmtdchar_write_ioctl() calls kmalloc() with the 'size' argument set to the smaller of two values: the write request's data/OOB length provided by user space and the erase block size of the MTD device. If the latter is large, kmalloc() may not be able to serve such allocation requests. Use kvmalloc() instead. Correspondingly, replace kfree() calls with kvfree() calls.
--- drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c +5 -5
@@ -623,16 +623,16 @@ static int mtdchar_write_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, datbuf_len =min_t (size_t, req.len, mtd->erasesize);if (datbuf_len >0 ) { - datbuf =kmalloc (datbuf_len,GFP_KERNEL ); + datbuf =kvmalloc (datbuf_len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!datbuf)return -ENOMEM ; } oobbuf_len =min_t (size_t, req.ooblen, mtd->erasesize);if (oobbuf_len >0 ) { - oobbuf =kmalloc (oobbuf_len,GFP_KERNEL ); + oobbuf =kvmalloc (oobbuf_len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!oobbuf) { -kfree (datbuf); +kvfree (datbuf);return -ENOMEM ; } }
@@ -682,8 +682,8 @@ static int mtdchar_write_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, usr_oob += ops.oobretlen; } -kfree (datbuf); -kfree (oobbuf); +kvfree (datbuf); +kvfree (oobbuf);return ret; }
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2.36.1 ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/
Re: [PATCH 2/2] mtdchar: use kvmalloc() for potentially large allocations
----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
Quoted 13 lines
Von: "Michał Kępień" <[email protected]>
An: "Miquel Raynal" <[email protected]>, "richard" <[email protected]>, "Vignesh Raghavendra" <[email protected]>
CC: "linux-mtd" <[email protected]>, "linux-kernel" <[email protected]>
Gesendet: Montag, 16. Mai 2022 09:06:01
Betreff: [PATCH 2/2] mtdchar: usekvmalloc()for potentially large allocations
mtdchar_write_ioctl()callskmalloc()with the 'size' argument set to the smaller of two values: the write request's data/OOB length provided by user space and the erase block size of the MTD device. If the latter is large,kmalloc()may not be able to serve such allocation requests. Usekvmalloc()instead. Correspondingly, replacekfree()calls withkvfree()calls.
Quoted 2 lines
Suggested-by Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Michał Kępień <[email protected]>
Looks good to me.
Thanks,
//richard
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Re: [PATCH 2/2] mtdchar: use kvmalloc() for potentially large allocations
In reply to Michał KępieńQuoted 10 lines · On Mon, 2022-05-16 at 07:06:01 UTC, =?utf-8?b?TWljaGHFgiBLxJlwaWXFhA==?= wrote:
mtdchar_write_ioctl()callskmalloc()with the 'size' argument set to the smaller of two values: the write request's data/OOB length provided by user space and the erase block size of the MTD device. If the latter is large,kmalloc()may not be able to serve such allocation requests. Usekvmalloc()instead. Correspondingly, replacekfree()calls withkvfree()calls.Suggested-by Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Michał Kępień <[email protected]>
Applied to https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mtd/linux.git mtd/next, thanks.
Miquel