Skip to contentSkip to conversation

netfilter: complete validation of user input

PATCH Applied Eric Dumazet 3 participants 3 messages Apr 9, 2024 – Apr 11, 2024

Subsystems (3)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 netfilter: complete validation of user input

In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls.

In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check:

if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))

        return -EINVAL;
Fixes 0c83842df40f ("netfilter: validate user input for expected length")
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++++
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  | 4 ++++
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +4 -0
index b150c9929b12e86219a55c77da480e0c538b3449..14365b20f1c5c09964dd7024060116737f22cb63 100644
@@ -966,6 +966,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
@@ -1266,6 +1268,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +4 -0
index 487670759578168c5ff53bce6642898fc41936b3..fe89a056eb06c43743b2d7449e59f4e9360ba223 100644
@@ -1118,6 +1118,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
@@ -1504,6 +1506,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +4 -0
index 636b360311c5365fba2330f6ca2f7f1b6dd1363e..131f7bb2110d3a08244c6da40ff9be45a2be711b 100644
@@ -1135,6 +1135,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
@@ -1513,6 +1515,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.478.gd926399ef9-goog
maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Eric Dumazet

In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls.

I forgot too to git grep away from net/netfilter/ folder for some reason.

Quoted 6 lines

In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check:

if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))

        return -EINVAL;

Thanks for this fix.

Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 0c83842df40f ("netfilter: validate user input for expected length")
Quoted 76 lines
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++++
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  | 4 ++++
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +4 -0
index b150c9929b12e86219a55c77da480e0c538b3449..14365b20f1c5c09964dd7024060116737f22cb63 100644
@@ -966,6 +966,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
@@ -1266,6 +1268,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +4 -0
index 487670759578168c5ff53bce6642898fc41936b3..fe89a056eb06c43743b2d7449e59f4e9360ba223 100644
@@ -1118,6 +1118,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
@@ -1504,6 +1506,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +4 -0
index 636b360311c5365fba2330f6ca2f7f1b6dd1363e..131f7bb2110d3a08244c6da40ff9be45a2be711b 100644
@@ -1135,6 +1135,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
@@ -1513,6 +1515,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.478.gd926399ef9-goog
#2 lore raw
In reply to Eric Dumazet
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

Quoted 9 lines · On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 12:07:41 +0000 you wrote:

In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls.

In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check:

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [net] netfilter: complete validation of user input

    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/65acf6e0501a

You are awesome, thank you!

Signature · 2 lines
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html