ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
Yiming Qian reported :
<quote>
I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via skb_under_panic() (local DoS).
The core issue is a mismatch between:
- a 16-bit length accumulator (struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen, type __u16) and
- a pointer to the *last* provided destination-options header (opt->dst1opt)
when multiple IPV6_DSTOPTS control messages (cmsgs) are provided.
- include/net/ipv6.h:
- struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen is __u16 (wrap possible).
(lines 291-307, especially 298)
- net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl():
- Accepts repeated IPV6_DSTOPTS and accumulates into opt_flen
without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933)
- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data():
- Uses opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen to compute header
sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465)
- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb():
- Calls ipv6_push_frag_opts() if opt->opt_flen is non-zero.
(lines 1930-1934)
- net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts() / ipv6_push_exthdr():
- Push size comes from ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt) (based on the
pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211)
1. opt_flen is a 16-bit accumulator:
- include/net/ipv6.h:298 defines __u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */.
2. ip6_datagram_send_ctl() accepts *repeated* IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsgs and increments opt_flen each time:
- In net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933, for IPV6_DSTOPTS:
- It computes len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);
- It checks CAP_NET_RAW using `ns_capable(net->user_ns,
CAP_NET_RAW)`. (line 922)
- Then it does:
- opt->opt_flen += len; (line 927)
- opt->dst1opt = hdr; (line 928)
There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy IPV6_2292DSTOPTS path which rejects duplicates at net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904).
If enough large IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsgs are provided, opt_flen wraps while dst1opt still points to a large (2048-byte) destination-options header.
In the attached PoC (poc.c):
- 32 cmsgs with hdrlen=255 => len = (255+1)*8 = 2048
- 1 cmsg with hdrlen=0 => len = 8
- Total increment: 32*2048 + 8 = 65544, so (__u16)opt_flen == 8
- The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so dst1opt points to a 2048-byte header.
3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped opt_flen:
- In net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465:
- `headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen +
opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;`
With wrapped opt_flen, headersize/headroom decisions underestimate what will be pushed later.
4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from dst1opt and is not limited by wrapped opt_flen:
- In net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934:
- if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);
- In net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211, ipv6_push_frag_opts() pushes dst1opt via ipv6_push_exthdr().
- In net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184, ipv6_push_exthdr() does:
- skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));
- memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));
With insufficient headroom, skb_push() underflows and triggers skb_under_panic() -> BUG():
- net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675 (skb_push() calls skb_under_panic())
- net/core/skbuff.c:207-214 (skb_panic() ends in BUG())
- The IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsg path requires CAP_NET_RAW in the target netns user namespace (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)).
- Root (or any task with CAP_NET_RAW) can trigger this without user namespaces.
- An unprivileged uid=1000 user can trigger this if unprivileged user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain namespaced CAP_NET_RAW (the attached PoC does this).
- Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash).
- Reproducible with a small userspace PoC.
</quote>
This patch does not reject duplicated options, as this might break some user applications.
Instead, it makes sure to adjust opt_flen and opt_nflen to correctly reflect the size of the current option headers, preventing the overflows and the potential for panics.
This applies to IPV6_DSTOPTS, IPV6_HOPOPTS, and IPV6_RTHDR.
Specifically:
When a new IPV6_DSTOPTS is processed, the length of the old opt->dst1opt is subtracted from opt->opt_flen before adding the new length.
When a new IPV6_HOPOPTS is processed, the length of the old opt->dst0opt is subtracted from opt->opt_nflen.
When a new Routing Header (IPV6_RTHDR or IPV6_2292RTHDR) is processed, the length of the old opt->srcrt is subtracted from opt->opt_nflen.
In the special case within IPV6_2292RTHDR handling where dst1opt is moved to dst0opt, the length of the old opt->dst0opt is subtracted from opt->opt_nflen before the new one is added.
--- net/ipv6/datagram.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/datagram.c +10 -0
@@ -763,6 +763,7 @@ int ip6_datagram_send_ctl(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, {struct in6_pktinfo *src_info;struct cmsghdr *cmsg; +struct ipv6_rt_hdr *orthdr;struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr;struct ipv6_opt_hdr *hdr;struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = ipc6->opt;
@@ -924,9 +925,13 @@ int ip6_datagram_send_ctl(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, goto exit_f; }if (cmsg->cmsg_type ==IPV6_DSTOPTS ) { +if (opt->dst1opt) + opt->opt_flen -=ipv6_optlen (opt->dst1opt); opt->opt_flen += len; opt->dst1opt = hdr; }else { +if (opt->dst0opt) + opt->opt_nflen -=ipv6_optlen (opt->dst0opt); opt->opt_nflen += len; opt->dst0opt = hdr; }
@@ -969,12 +974,17 @@ int ip6_datagram_send_ctl(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, goto exit_f; } + orthdr = opt->srcrt; +if (orthdr) + opt->opt_nflen -= ((orthdr->hdrlen +1 ) <<3 ); opt->opt_nflen += len; opt->srcrt = rthdr;if (cmsg->cmsg_type ==IPV6_2292RTHDR && opt->dst1opt) {int dsthdrlen = ((opt->dst1opt->hdrlen+1 )<<3 ); +if (opt->dst0opt) + opt->opt_nflen -=ipv6_optlen (opt->dst0opt); opt->opt_nflen += dsthdrlen; opt->dst0opt = opt->dst1opt; opt->dst1opt =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0.1118.gaef5881109-goog
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Quoted 9 lines · On Wed, 1 Apr 2026 15:47:21 +0000 you wrote:
Yiming Qian reported :
<quote>
I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel viaskb_under_panic()(local DoS).The core issue is a mismatch between:
[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net] ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/4e453375561f
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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