pull request (net): ipsec 2026-04-08
Subsystems (3)
Steffen Klassert
maintainercover pull request (net): ipsec 2026-04-08
1) Clear trailing padding in build_polexpire() to prevent leaking unititialized memory. From Yasuaki Torimaru.
2) Fix aevent size calculation when XFRMA_IF_ID is used. From Keenan Dong.
3) Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit before freeing the policy hash tables.
4) Fix dome too eaerly dropped references on the netdev when uding transport mode. From Qi Tang.
5) Fix refcount leak in xfrm_migrate_policy_find(). From Kotlyarov Mihail.
6) Fix two fix info leaks in build_report() and
in build_mapping(). From Greg Kroah-Hartman.
7) Zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports.
From Zhengchuan Liang.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
Thanks!
The following changes since commit c4ea7d8907cf72b259bf70bd8c2e791e1c4ff70f:
net: mana: fix use-after-free in add_adev() error path (2026-03-24 21:07:58 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec.git tags/ipsec-2026-04-08
for you to fetch changes up to 426c355742f02cf743b347d9d7dbdc1bfbfa31ef:
net: af_key: zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports (2026-04-07 11:08:24 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
ipsec-2026-04-08
----------------------------------------------------------------
Greg Kroah-Hartman (2):
xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_mapping()
xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_report()
Keenan Dong (1):
xfrm: account XFRMA_IF_ID in aevent size calculation
Kotlyarov Mihail (1):
xfrm: fix refcount leak in xfrm_migrate_policy_find
Qi Tang (1):
xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK
Steffen Klassert (1):
xfrm: Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit
Yasuaki Torimaru (1):
xfrm: clear trailing padding in build_polexpire()
Zhengchuan Liang (1):
net: af_key: zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports
net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c | 5 ++++- net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 5 ++++- net/key/af_key.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 18 +++++++++++++---- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 5 ++--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 1/8 xfrm: clear trailing padding in build_polexpire()
From: Yasuaki Torimaru <[email protected]>
build_expire() clears the trailing padding bytes of struct xfrm_user_expire after setting the hard field via memset_after(), but the analogous function build_polexpire() does not do this for struct xfrm_user_polexpire.
The padding bytes after the __u8 hard field are left uninitialized from the heap allocation, and are then sent to userspace via netlink multicast to XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE listeners, leaking kernel heap memory contents.
Add the missing memset_after() call, matching build_expire().
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +2 -0
@@ -3960,6 +3960,8 @@ static int build_polexpire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_policy *xp,return err; } upe->hard = !!hard; +/* clear the padding bytes */ +memset_after (upe,0 , hard);nlmsg_end (skb, nlh);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH 1/8] xfrm: clear trailing padding in build_polexpire()
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>:
Quoted 8 lines · On Wed, 8 Apr 2026 11:58:57 +0200 you wrote:
From: Yasuaki Torimaru <[email protected]>
build_expire()clears the trailing padding bytes of structxfrm_user_expireafter setting the hard field viamemset_after(), but the analogous functionbuild_polexpire()does not do this for structxfrm_user_polexpire.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [1/8] xfrm: clear trailing padding in build_polexpire()
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/71a98248c63c - [2/8] xfrm: account XFRMA_IF_ID in aevent size calculation https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/7081d46d3231 - [3/8] xfrm: Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/069daad4f2ae - [4/8] xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/1c428b038400 - [5/8] xfrm: fix refcount leak in xfrm_migrate_policy_find https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/83317cce60a0 - [6/8] xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_mapping() https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/1beb76b2053b - [7/8] xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_report() https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/d10119968d0e - [8/8] net: af_key: zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/426c355742f0
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot. https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 2/8 xfrm: account XFRMA_IF_ID in aevent size calculation
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Keenan Dong <[email protected]>
xfrm_get_ae() allocates the reply skb with xfrm_aevent_msgsize(), then build_aevent() appends attributes including XFRMA_IF_ID when x->if_id is set.
xfrm_aevent_msgsize() does not include space for XFRMA_IF_ID. For states with if_id, build_aevent() can fail with -EMSGSIZE and hit BUG_ON(err < 0) in xfrm_get_ae(), turning a malformed netlink interaction into a kernel panic.
Account XFRMA_IF_ID in the size calculation unconditionally and replace the BUG_ON with normal error unwinding.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +8 -2
@@ -2677,7 +2677,8 @@ static inline unsigned int xfrm_aevent_msgsize(struct xfrm_state *x) +nla_total_size (4 )/* XFRM_AE_RTHR */ +nla_total_size (4 )/* XFRM_AE_ETHR */ +nla_total_size (sizeof (x->dir))/* XFRMA_SA_DIR */ - +nla_total_size (4 );/* XFRMA_SA_PCPU */ + +nla_total_size (4 )/* XFRMA_SA_PCPU */ + +nla_total_size (sizeof (x->if_id));/* XFRMA_IF_ID */ }static int build_aevent (struct sk_buff *skb,struct xfrm_state *x,const struct km_event *c)
@@ -2789,7 +2790,12 @@ static int xfrm_get_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, c.portid = nlh->nlmsg_pid; err =build_aevent (r_skb, x, &c); -BUG_ON (err <0 ); +if (err <0 ) { +spin_unlock_bh (&x->lock); +xfrm_state_put (x); +kfree_skb (r_skb); +return err; + } err =nlmsg_unicast (xfrm_net_nlsk (net, skb), r_skb,NETLINK_CB (skb).portid);spin_unlock_bh (&x->lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 3/8 xfrm: Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit
In reply to Steffen Klassertxfrm_policy_fini() frees the policy_bydst hash tables after flushing the policy work items and deleting all policies, but it does not wait for concurrent RCU readers to leave their read-side critical sections first.
The policy_bydst tables are published via rcu_assign_pointer() and are looked up through rcu_dereference_check(), so netns teardown must also wait for an RCU grace period before freeing the table memory.
Fix this by adding synchronize_rcu() before freeing the policy hash tables.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +2 -0
@@ -4290,6 +4290,8 @@ static void xfrm_policy_fini(struct net *net)#endif xfrm_policy_flush (net,XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN , false); +synchronize_rcu (); +WARN_ON (!list_empty (&net->xfrm.policy_all));for (dir =0 ; dir <XFRM_POLICY_MAX ; dir++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 4/8 xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Qi Tang <[email protected]>
After async crypto completes, xfrm_input_resume() calls dev_put() immediately on re-entry before the skb reaches transport_finish. The skb->dev pointer is then used inside NF_HOOK and its okfn, which can race with device teardown.
Remove the dev_put from the async resumption entry and instead drop the reference after the NF_HOOK call in transport_finish, using a saved device pointer since NF_HOOK may consume the skb. This covers NF_DROP, NF_QUEUE and NF_STOLEN paths that skip the okfn.
For non-transport exits (decaps, gro, drop) and secondary async return points, release the reference inline when async is set.
--- net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c | 5 ++++- net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 5 ++++- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c +4 -1
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int xfrm4_transport_finish(struct sk_buff *skb, int async) {struct xfrm_offload *xo =xfrm_offload (skb);struct iphdr *iph =ip_hdr (skb); +struct net_device *dev = skb->dev; iph->protocol =XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB (skb)->protocol;
@@ -73,8 +74,10 @@ int xfrm4_transport_finish(struct sk_buff *skb, int async) }NF_HOOK (NFPROTO_IPV4 ,NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING , -dev_net (skb->dev),NULL , skb, skb->dev,NULL , +dev_net (dev),NULL , skb, dev,NULL , xfrm4_rcv_encap_finish); +if (async) +dev_put (dev);return 0 ; }
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +4 -1
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ static int xfrm6_transport_finish2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,int xfrm6_transport_finish (struct sk_buff *skb,int async) {struct xfrm_offload *xo =xfrm_offload (skb); +struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;int nhlen = -skb_network_offset (skb); skb_network_header(skb)[IP6CB(skb)->nhoff] =
@@ -68,8 +69,10 @@ int xfrm6_transport_finish(struct sk_buff *skb, int async) }NF_HOOK (NFPROTO_IPV6 ,NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING , -dev_net (skb->dev),NULL , skb, skb->dev,NULL , +dev_net (dev),NULL , skb, dev,NULL , xfrm6_transport_finish2); +if (async) +dev_put (dev);return 0 ; }
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +14 -4
@@ -506,7 +506,6 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)/* An encap_type of -1 indicates async resumption. */ if (encap_type ==-1 ) { async =1 ; -dev_put (skb->dev); seq =XFRM_SKB_CB (skb)->seq.input.low;spin_lock (&x->lock); goto resume;
@@ -659,8 +658,11 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)dev_hold (skb->dev); nexthdr = x->type->input (x, skb); -if (nexthdr == -EINPROGRESS ) +if (nexthdr == -EINPROGRESS ) { +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);return 0 ; + }dev_put (skb->dev);spin_lock (&x->lock);
@@ -695,9 +697,11 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB (skb)->protocol = nexthdr; err =xfrm_inner_mode_input (x, skb); -if (err == -EINPROGRESS ) +if (err == -EINPROGRESS ) { +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);return 0 ; -else if (err) { + }else if (err) {XFRM_INC_STATS (net,LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEMODEERROR ); goto drop; }
@@ -734,6 +738,8 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type) sp->olen =0 ;if (skb_valid_dst (skb))skb_dst_drop (skb); +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);gro_cells_receive (&gro_cells, skb);return 0 ; }else {
@@ -753,6 +759,8 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type) sp->olen =0 ;if (skb_valid_dst (skb))skb_dst_drop (skb); +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);gro_cells_receive (&gro_cells, skb);return err; }
@@ -763,6 +771,8 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type) drop_unlock:spin_unlock (&x->lock); drop: +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);xfrm_rcv_cb (skb, family, x && x->type ? x->type->proto : nexthdr,-1 );kfree_skb (skb);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 5/8 xfrm: fix refcount leak in xfrm_migrate_policy_find
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Kotlyarov Mihail <[email protected]>
syzkaller reported a memory leak in xfrm_policy_alloc:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888114d79000 (size 1024):
comm "syz.1.17", pid 931
...
xfrm_policy_alloc+0xb3/0x4b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:432The root cause is a double call to xfrm_pol_hold_rcu() in xfrm_migrate_policy_find(). The lookup function already returns a policy with held reference, making the second call redundant.
Remove the redundant xfrm_pol_hold_rcu() call to fix the refcount imbalance and prevent the memory leak.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +0 -3
@@ -4528,9 +4528,6 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_migrate_policy_find(const struct xfrm_selector * pol =xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype (net, type, &fl, sel->family, dir, if_id);if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (pol)) goto out_unlock; - -if (!xfrm_pol_hold_rcu (pol)) - pol =NULL ; out_unlock:rcu_read_unlock ();return pol;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 6/8 xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_mapping()
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
struct xfrm_usersa_id has a one-byte padding hole after the proto field, which ends up never getting set to zero before copying out to userspace. Fix that up by zeroing out the whole structure before setting individual variables.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +1 -0
@@ -4172,6 +4172,7 @@ static int build_mapping(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x, um =nlmsg_data (nlh); +memset (&um->id,0 ,sizeof (um->id));memcpy (&um->id.daddr, &x->id.daddr,sizeof (um->id.daddr)); um->id.spi = x->id.spi; um->id.family = x->props.family;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 7/8 xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_report()
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
struct xfrm_user_report is a __u8 proto field followed by a struct xfrm_selector which means there is three "empty" bytes of padding, but the padding is never zeroed before copying to userspace. Fix that up by zeroing the structure before setting individual member variables.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +1 -0
@@ -4125,6 +4125,7 @@ static int build_report(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 proto,return -EMSGSIZE ; ur =nlmsg_data (nlh); +memset (ur,0 ,sizeof (*ur)); ur->proto = proto;memcpy (&ur->sel, sel,sizeof (ur->sel));
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 8/8 net: af_key: zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>
PF_KEY export paths use pfkey_sockaddr_size() when reserving sockaddr payload space, so IPv6 addresses occupy 32 bytes on the wire. However, pfkey_sockaddr_fill() initializes only the first 28 bytes of struct sockaddr_in6, leaving the final 4 aligned bytes uninitialized.
Not every PF_KEY message is affected. The state and policy dump builders already zero the whole message buffer before filling the sockaddr payloads. Keep the fix to the export paths that still append aligned sockaddr payloads with plain skb_put():
- SADB_ACQUIRE
- SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING
- SADB_X_MIGRATE
Fix those paths by clearing only the aligned sockaddr tail after pfkey_sockaddr_fill().
--- net/key/af_key.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
net/key/af_key.c +34 -18
@@ -757,6 +757,22 @@ static unsigned int pfkey_sockaddr_fill(const xfrm_address_t *xaddr, __be16 portreturn 0 ; } +static unsigned int pfkey_sockaddr_fill_zero_tail (const xfrm_address_t *xaddr, +__be16 port, +struct sockaddr *sa, +unsigned short family) +{ +unsigned int prefixlen; +int sockaddr_len =pfkey_sockaddr_len (family); +int sockaddr_size =pfkey_sockaddr_size (family); + + prefixlen =pfkey_sockaddr_fill (xaddr, port, sa, family); +if (sockaddr_size > sockaddr_len) +memset ((u8 *)sa + sockaddr_len,0 , sockaddr_size - sockaddr_len); + +return prefixlen; +} +static struct sk_buff *__pfkey_xfrm_state2msg (const struct xfrm_state *x,int add_keys,int hsc) {
@@ -3206,9 +3222,9 @@ static int pfkey_send_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *t, struct addr->sadb_address_proto =0 ; addr->sadb_address_reserved =0 ; addr->sadb_address_prefixlen = -pfkey_sockaddr_fill (&x->props.saddr,0 , - (struct sockaddr *) (addr +1 ), - x->props.family); +pfkey_sockaddr_fill_zero_tail (&x->props.saddr,0 , + (struct sockaddr *)(addr +1 ), + x->props.family);if (!addr->sadb_address_prefixlen)BUG ();
@@ -3221,9 +3237,9 @@ static int pfkey_send_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *t, struct addr->sadb_address_proto =0 ; addr->sadb_address_reserved =0 ; addr->sadb_address_prefixlen = -pfkey_sockaddr_fill (&x->id.daddr,0 , - (struct sockaddr *) (addr +1 ), - x->props.family); +pfkey_sockaddr_fill_zero_tail (&x->id.daddr,0 , + (struct sockaddr *)(addr +1 ), + x->props.family);if (!addr->sadb_address_prefixlen)BUG ();
@@ -3421,9 +3437,9 @@ static int pfkey_send_new_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr, addr->sadb_address_proto =0 ; addr->sadb_address_reserved =0 ; addr->sadb_address_prefixlen = -pfkey_sockaddr_fill (&x->props.saddr,0 , - (struct sockaddr *) (addr +1 ), - x->props.family); +pfkey_sockaddr_fill_zero_tail (&x->props.saddr,0 , + (struct sockaddr *)(addr +1 ), + x->props.family);if (!addr->sadb_address_prefixlen)BUG ();
@@ -3443,9 +3459,9 @@ static int pfkey_send_new_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr, addr->sadb_address_proto =0 ; addr->sadb_address_reserved =0 ; addr->sadb_address_prefixlen = -pfkey_sockaddr_fill (ipaddr,0 , - (struct sockaddr *) (addr +1 ), - x->props.family); +pfkey_sockaddr_fill_zero_tail (ipaddr,0 , + (struct sockaddr *)(addr +1 ), + x->props.family);if (!addr->sadb_address_prefixlen)BUG ();
@@ -3474,15 +3490,15 @@ static int set_sadb_address(struct sk_buff *skb, int sasize, int type,switch (type) {case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC : addr->sadb_address_prefixlen = sel->prefixlen_s; -pfkey_sockaddr_fill (&sel->saddr,0 , - (struct sockaddr *)(addr +1 ), - sel->family); +pfkey_sockaddr_fill_zero_tail (&sel->saddr,0 , + (struct sockaddr *)(addr +1 ), + sel->family);break ;case SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST : addr->sadb_address_prefixlen = sel->prefixlen_d; -pfkey_sockaddr_fill (&sel->daddr,0 , - (struct sockaddr *)(addr +1 ), - sel->family); +pfkey_sockaddr_fill_zero_tail (&sel->daddr,0 , + (struct sockaddr *)(addr +1 ), + sel->family);break ;default :return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0