net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
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A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 2026041858-estimator-shower-0f16@gregkh
PATCH 1/1 net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel (tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +13 -8
@@ -2718,7 +2718,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) {struct sk_buff *skb =NULL ;struct net_device *dev; -struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr =NULL ; +struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr; +bool has_vnet_hdr = false;struct sockcm_cookie sockc;__be16 proto;int err, reserve =0 ;
@@ -2819,16 +2820,20 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) hlen =LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dev); tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;if (vnet_hdr_sz) { - vnet_hdr = data; data += vnet_hdr_sz; tp_len -= vnet_hdr_sz; -if (tp_len <0 || -__packet_snd_vnet_parse (vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { +if (tp_len <0 ) { + tp_len = -EINVAL ; + goto tpacket_error; + } +memcpy (&vnet_hdr, data - vnet_hdr_sz,sizeof (vnet_hdr)); +if (__packet_snd_vnet_parse (&vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } copylen =__virtio16_to_cpu (vio_le (), - vnet_hdr->hdr_len); + vnet_hdr.hdr_len); + has_vnet_hdr = true; } copylen =max_t (int, copylen, dev->hard_header_len); skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&po->sk,
@@ -2865,12 +2870,12 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) } } -if (vnet_hdr_sz) { -if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { +if (has_vnet_hdr) { +if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, &vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } -virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, vnet_hdr); +virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, &vnet_hdr); } skb->destructor = tpacket_destruct_skb;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Quoted 13 lines · Bingquan Chen
In
tpacket_snd(), whenPACKET_VNET_HDRis enabled,vnet_hdrpoints directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via__packet_snd_vnet_parse()but then re-reads all fields later invirtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify thevnet_hdrfields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.The non-TPACKET path (
packet_snd()) already correctly copiesvnet_hdrto a stack-local variable. All othervnet_hdrconsumers in the kernel (tun.c,tap.c,virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller ofvirtio_net_hdr_to_skb()that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory.
Quoted 6 lines
Fix this by copying
vnet_hdrfrom the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used inpacket_snd()and all other callers.Fixes 1d036d25e560 ("packet: tpacket_snd gso and checksum offload")Signed-off-by Bingquan Chen <[email protected]>
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Quoted 8 lines · On Sat, 18 Apr 2026 19:20:06 +0800 you wrote:
In
tpacket_snd(), whenPACKET_VNET_HDRis enabled,vnet_hdrpoints directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via__packet_snd_vnet_parse()but then re-reads all fields later invirtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify thevnet_hdrfields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net] net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/2c054e17d9d4
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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