nfc: llcp: validate TLV length to prevent out-of-bounds read
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 nfc: llcp: validate TLV length to prevent out-of-bounds read
nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv() walk a TLV array taken from an LLCP PDU received from a remote peer. The loop is bounded only by "offset < tlv_array_len", so it reads the length byte tlv[1] and, via llcp_tlv8()/llcp_tlv16(), the value bytes tlv[2] and tlv[3] without checking that the full TLV (2 + length bytes) actually fits inside the array.
A truncated or malformed TLV therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of the received skb data. For example a CONNECT PDU whose payload after the 2-byte LLCP header is a single MIUX type byte gives tlv_array_len == 1:
tlv[1] is read one byte past the buffer, and the MIUX handler goes on to read tlv[2]/tlv[3] via llcp_tlv16(). A TLV whose length field runs past the end of the array makes the following iteration dereference tlv well beyond the buffer. nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv() parses the data directly out of the received skb (net/nfc/llcp_core.c), so the read runs off the end of the slab allocation.
Reject any TLV that does not fully fit in the remaining array before reading its length and value.
---
net/nfc/llcp_commands.c +14 -0
@@ -201,6 +201,13 @@ int nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv(struct nfc_llcp_local *local,return -ENODEV ;while (offset < tlv_array_len) { +if (tlv_array_len - offset <2 || + tlv[1 ] > tlv_array_len - offset -2 ) { +pr_err ("Malformed TLV, offset %d array length %d\n" , + offset, tlv_array_len); +return -EINVAL ; + } + type = tlv[0 ]; length = tlv[1 ];
@@ -251,6 +258,13 @@ int nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock,return -ENOTCONN ;while (offset < tlv_array_len) { +if (tlv_array_len - offset <2 || + tlv[1 ] > tlv_array_len - offset -2 ) { +pr_err ("Malformed TLV, offset %d array length %d\n" , + offset, tlv_array_len); +return -EINVAL ; + } + type = tlv[0 ]; length = tlv[1 ];
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2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)