sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness
When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure of Staleness that follows the cause header:
err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data); stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));
err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the 4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT, leaking uninitialized memory.
sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too short to hold the staleness field is discarded.
The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket in a user and network namespace.
--- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +14 -9
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(const struct sctp_association *asoc, const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, - struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands, + struct sctp_errhdr *err); static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5( struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
@@ -2529,9 +2530,15 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err(* errors. */ sctp_walk_errors(err, chunk->chunk_hdr) { -if (SCTP_ERROR_STALE_COOKIE == err->cause) -return sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale (net, ep, asoc, type, - arg, commands); +if (err->cause !=SCTP_ERROR_STALE_COOKIE ) +continue ; +/* The staleness is only meaningful if the cause is long +* enough to hold it; a shorter one is malformed. +*/ +if (ntohs (err->length) <sizeof (*err) +sizeof (__be32)) +break ; +return sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale (net, ep, asoc, type, + arg, commands, err); }/* It is possible to have malformed error causes, and that
@@ -2573,13 +2580,13 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(const struct sctp_association *asoc, const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, - struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands, + struct sctp_errhdr *err) { int attempts = asoc->init_err_counter + 1; -struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg, *reply;struct sctp_cookie_preserve_param bht;struct sctp_bind_addr *bp; -struct sctp_errhdr *err; +struct sctp_chunk *reply;u32 stale;if (attempts > asoc->max_init_attempts) {
@@ -2590,8 +2597,6 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DELETE_TCB ; } - err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data); -/* When calculating the time extension, an implementation * SHOULD use the RTT information measured based on the * previous COOKIE ECHO / ERROR exchange, and should add no
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 25 lines · Weiming Shi
When an ERROR chunk with a
STALE_COOKIEcause is received in theCOOKIE_ECHOEDstate,sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale()reads the 4-byte Measure of Staleness that follows the cause header:err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data); stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));err is the first cause in the chunk, not the
STALE_COOKIEcause that caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is present.sctp_walk_errors()only requires a cause to be as long as the 4-byte header, so for aSTALE_COOKIEcause of length 4 the read runs past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk pastskb->tail. The value is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT, leaking uninitialized memory.
sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err()already walks to theSTALE_COOKIEcause, so check its length there and pass it tosctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which reads that cause instead of the first one. ASTALE_COOKIEcause too short to hold the staleness field is discarded.The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into
COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket in a user and network namespace.
Quoted 5 lines
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")Reported-by Xiang Mei <[email protected]>Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8Signed-off-by Weiming Shi <[email protected]>
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Quoted 8 lines · On Fri, 3 Jul 2026 20:35:46 -0700 you wrote:
When an ERROR chunk with a
STALE_COOKIEcause is received in theCOOKIE_ECHOEDstate,sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale()reads the 4-byte Measure of Staleness that follows the cause header:err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data); stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net] sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/1cd23ca80784
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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