libbpf: reject linker STT_SECTION symbols with out-of-range st_shndx
PATCH 1/1 libbpf: reject linker STT_SECTION symbols with out-of-range st_shndx
linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab() only validates a symbol's st_shndx against the section count when it is below SHN_LORESERVE:
if (sym->st_shndx < SHN_LORESERVE && sym->st_shndx >= obj->sec_cnt) return -EINVAL;
For a STT_SECTION symbol the following check only rejects a non-zero st_value, so a section symbol carrying a reserved index such as SHN_ABS (0xfff1) with st_value == 0 passes validation.
When a relocation references such a symbol, linker_append_elf_relos() indexes the per-object section array with no bound check:
if (ELF64_ST_TYPE(src_sym->st_info) == STT_SECTION) {
struct src_sec *sec = &obj->secs[src_sym->st_shndx];
...
insn->imm += sec->dst_off;obj->secs holds only obj->sec_cnt entries, so obj->secs[0xfff1] dereferences memory tens of thousands of entries past the allocation (reading sec->dst_off) when linking a crafted relocatable object, an out-of-bounds read that faults or folds unrelated heap contents into the patched instruction.
A STT_SECTION symbol must reference a real section, so reject one whose st_shndx is not a valid section index. Reserved indices are always
Quoted 1 line
=
SHN_LORESERVE, which exceedssec_cnt, and the in-range case is
already handled above, so a single sec_cnt bound closes the gap without affecting valid inputs.
---
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c +1 -1
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static int linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab(struct src_obj *obj, struct src_sec *sreturn -EINVAL ; }if (sym_type ==STT_SECTION ) { -if (sym->st_value !=0 ) +if (sym->st_value !=0 || sym->st_shndx >= obj->sec_cnt)return -EINVAL ;continue ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Missing bounds check on relocation r_offset allows arbitrary out-of-bounds heap read/write during ELF linking.
- [High] A NULL pointer dereference occurs in linker_append_elf_sym when resolving global symbols with reserved section indices (e.g., SHN_ABS).
- [High] Integer overflow in sym_idx bounds check on 32-bit systems allows massive out-of-bounds heap read and information leak. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] libbpf: reject linker STT_SECTION symbols with out-of-range st_shndx --- commit a15a7b75755bef67d993d3117ac49d59af2c299e
Author: Naveed Khan <[email protected]>
libbpf: reject linker STT_SECTION symbols with out-of-range st_shndx
This patch adds a bounds check in linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab() to ensure that STT_SECTION symbols do not have an out-of-range st_shndx. This prevents out-of-bounds reads when processing relocations against such symbols.
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c static int linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab(struct src_obj *obj, struct src_sec *s · line 979
Quoted 13 lines
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c +1
-1@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static int linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab(struct src_obj *obj, struct src_sec *sreturn -EINVAL ; }if (sym_type ==STT_SECTION ) { -if (sym->st_value !=0 ) +if (sym->st_value !=0 || sym->st_shndx >= obj->sec_cnt)return -EINVAL ;continue ; }
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but can we experience a NULL pointer dereference in linker_append_elf_sym() when resolving global symbols with reserved section indices like SHN_ABS?
When resolving a global symbol, we update the destination symbol:
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:linker_append_elf_sym() {
...
dst_sym->st_shndx = dst_sec->sec_idx;
dst_sym->st_value = src_sec->dst_off + sym->st_value;
dst_sym->st_size = sym->st_size;
...
}If the symbol uses a reserved section index, could src_sec and dst_sec be NULL, causing a crash here?
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does linker_sanity_check_elf_relos() miss a bounds check on the relocation offset against the section size?
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:linker_sanity_check_elf_relos() {
...
if (link_sec->shdr->sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR) {
if (relo->r_offset % sizeof(struct bpf_insn) != 0) {
...
}Without validating r_offset against the section size, when linker_append_elf_relos() processes relocations, could it lead to an out-of-bounds heap read and write?
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:linker_append_elf_relos() {
...
insn = dst_linked_sec->raw_data + dst_rel->r_offset;
if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
insn->imm += sec->dst_off / sizeof(struct bpf_insn);
else
insn->imm += sec->dst_off;
...
}[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can the symbol index bounds check overflow on 32-bit systems?
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:linker_sanity_check_elf_relos() {
...
if (!sym_idx || sym_idx * sizeof(Elf64_Sym) >= sym_sec->shdr->sh_size) {
...
}If sym_idx is maliciously crafted (e.g., 0xaaaaaaab), could the multiplication wrap around and bypass the check?
Later in linker_append_elf_relos(), the unchecked index is used to access the symbol map:
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:linker_append_elf_relos() {
...
dst_sym_idx = obj->sym_map[src_sym_idx];
...
}Could this lead to an out-of-bounds heap read being leaked into the relocated output?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Ihor Solodrai
reviewerQuoted 37 lines · Naveed Khan
linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab()only validates a symbol'sst_shndxagainst the section count when it is belowSHN_LORESERVE:if (sym->st_shndx < SHN_LORESERVE && sym->st_shndx >= obj->sec_cnt) return -EINVAL;For a
STT_SECTIONsymbol the following check only rejects a non-zerost_value, so a section symbol carrying a reserved index such asSHN_ABS(0xfff1) withst_value== 0 passes validation.When a relocation references such a symbol,
linker_append_elf_relos()indexes the per-object section array with no bound check:if (ELF64_ST_TYPE(src_sym->st_info) == STT_SECTION) { struct src_sec *sec = &obj->secs[src_sym->st_shndx]; ... insn->imm += sec->dst_off;
obj->secsholds onlyobj->sec_cntentries, so obj->secs[0xfff1] dereferences memory tens of thousands of entries past the allocation (readingsec->dst_off) when linking a crafted relocatable object, an out-of-bounds read that faults or folds unrelated heap contents into the patched instruction.A
STT_SECTIONsymbol must reference a real section, so reject one whosest_shndxis not a valid section index. Reserved indices are alwaysQuoted 1 line
=
SHN_LORESERVE, which exceedssec_cnt, and the in-range case isalready handled above, so a single
sec_cntbound closes the gap without affecting valid inputs.Signed-off-by Naveed Khan <[email protected]>---
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c +0
-0
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c static int linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab(struct src_obj *obj, struct src_sec *s · line 976
Quoted 5 lines
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c +1
-1@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static int linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab(struct src_obj *obj, struct src_sec *sreturn -EINVAL ; }if (sym_type ==STT_SECTION ) { -if (sym->st_value !=0 ) +if (sym->st_value !=0 || sym->st_shndx >= obj->sec_cnt)
As far as I can tell, this is only a problem when the ELF object is corrupted. If you don't have a user report, or at least an example of a normally compiled ELF object that can cause a crash, it's a NACK.
libbpf does not aim to be a safe parser for arbitrary malformed ELF.
pw-bot: cr
..An unsolicited piece of advice unrelated to the patch:
I checked your email on lore, and it appears you are a new contributor trying to land similar patches across multiple subsystems. And I'm pretty sure AI finds these bugs for you by inspecting code, and then generates patches.
I can understand the motivation to get your name out, but this is not a good way to do it.
Pick an area that interests you, or (if you don't have a preference) pick something useful and/or neglected, like selftests. Read the mailing list to understand what areas need work. Then figure out how to actually improve the system, not just fix random unimportant bugs. Come up with a strategy and start small. Use AI, but also try to actually learn what's going on, don't just relay the output.
Good luck!
Quoted 3 lines
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c +0
-0return -EINVAL ;continue ; }