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bpf: Disallow bpf_{g,s}etsockopt() in cgroup UNIX getname hooks

PATCH Applied Junseo Lim 4 participants 4 messages Aug 12 – Aug 17

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Junseo Lim

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 bpf: Disallow bpf_{g,s}etsockopt() in cgroup UNIX getname hooks

_bpf_setsockopt() and _bpf_getsockopt() call sock_owned_by_me() for full sockets, so these helpers expect the socket lock to be held.

BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME and BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME run BPF programs without acquiring the socket lock. A program attached to either hook can therefore trigger the sock_owned_by_me() warning by calling bpf_setsockopt() or bpf_getsockopt().

Disallow bpf_setsockopt() and bpf_getsockopt() for CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME and CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME.

Fixes 859051dd165e ("bpf: Implement cgroup sockaddr hooks for unix sockets")

---
BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK() acquires the socket lock around the BPF program invocation:

#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_UNIX_CONNECT_LOCK(sk, uaddr, uaddrlen) \
BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, uaddrlen, CGROUP_UNIX_CONNECT, NULL)

In contrast, the UNIX getname hooks use BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG():

		if (peer)
			BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, &err,
					       CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME);
		else
			BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, uaddr, &err,
					       CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME);

So, another possible patch is to take the lock at these call sites, but I am unsure about the locking semantics in AF_UNIX.

Below is an excerpt of the warning:

	WARNING: ./include/net/sock.h:1799 at bpf_sock_addr_setsockopt+0x12f/0x160, CPU#0: syz.5.18/253
	Call Trace:
	<TASK>
	bpf_prog_55ed9fb09f700adf+0xc0/0xd3
	__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr+0x464/0xc80
	unix_getname+0x35e/0x510
	do_getsockname+0x122/0x1c0
	__sys_getsockname+0xc0/0x140
	__x64_sys_getsockname+0x74/0xb0
	do_syscall_64+0xae/0x5e0
	entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

This issue was found by a custom fuzzer developed by Sechang Lim <[email protected]>.

 net/core/filter.c | 4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +0 -4
index 16845987b244..1e80a52ef86d 100644
@@ -8350,10 +8350,8 @@ sock_addr_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_SENDMSG:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME:
-		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME:
-		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME:
 			return &bpf_sock_addr_setsockopt_proto;
 		default:
 			return NULL;
@@ -8373,10 +8371,8 @@ sock_addr_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_SENDMSG:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME:
-		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME:
-		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME:
 			return &bpf_sock_addr_getsockopt_proto;
 		default:
 			return NULL;
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#1 lore raw
Is this removal a deliberate ABI restriction? Programs that previously loaded with expected_attach_type BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME or BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME and called bpf_setsockopt() or…
Quoted 16 lines
net/core/filter.c +0 -2
index 16845987b244..1e80a52ef86d 100644
@@ -8350,10 +8350,8 @@ sock_addr_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_SENDMSG:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME:
-		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME:
-		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME:
 			return &bpf_sock_addr_setsockopt_proto;
 		default:
 			return NULL;

net/core/filter.c sock_addr_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) · line 8376

Quoted 8 lines
net/core/filter.c +0 -2
@@ -8373,10 +8371,8 @@ sock_addr_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_SENDMSG:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME:
-		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME:
 		case BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME:
-		case BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME:
 			return &bpf_sock_addr_getsockopt_proto;

Is this removal a deliberate ABI restriction? Programs that previously loaded with expected_attach_type BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME or BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME and called bpf_setsockopt() or bpf_getsockopt() now fail BPF_PROG_LOAD with 'unknown func bpf_setsockopt#...'.

For BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR, bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type() requires an exact match:

case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
...

	return attach_type == prog->expected_attach_type ? 0 : -EINVAL;

in kernel/bpf/syscall.c (bpf_link creation enforces the same check). Gating on prog->expected_attach_type at verification time cannot be worked around, so any working deployment can stop loading its programs across a stable point release if this patch lands in stable kernels.

An alternative fix exists that removes the bug without removing
functionality: run the hook under BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK (as used in unix_connect, unix_sendmsg, unix_recvmsg in net/unix/af_unix.c), which wraps the run in lock_sock()/release_sock(). inet_getname() and inet6_getname() take lock_sock() themselves, which is why the INET GETPEERNAME/GETSOCKNAME labels can safely stay in the lists. Only unix_getname() runs the hook without acquiring the socket lock (it uses smp_load_acquire(&unix_sk(sk)->addr) instead).

The design intent points the other way: beecf11bc218 ("bpf:
Bpf_{g,s}etsockopt for struct bpf_sock_addr") introduced these helpers with the explicit assumption that 'context sk is already locked and socket lock is non-nestable', and cgroup_common_func_proto() in kernel/bpf/cgroup.c already returns NULL for bpf_get_retval/ bpf_set_retval on these same getname attach types, so per-attach-type helper gating has precedent. No in-tree selftest breaks.

Should the changelog state that the removal is deliberate and that no users are expected, making the ABI trade-off explicit for the maintainer and for stable? Or explain why locking unix_getname()'s hook was rejected as the fix?

Quoted 7 lines
net/core/filter.c +0 -0
    _bpf_setsockopt() and _bpf_getsockopt() call sock_owned_by_me() for
    full sockets, so these helpers expect the socket lock to be held.

BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME and BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME run BPF programs without acquiring the socket lock. A program attached to either hook can therefore trigger the sock_owned_by_me() warning by calling bpf_setsockopt() or bpf_getsockopt().

Is describing the impact as triggering 'the sock_owned_by_me() warning' accurate?

sock_owned_by_me() is a no-op unless lockdep is built in:

static inline void sock_owned_by_me(const struct sock *sk) {

  #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
	  WARN_ON_ONCE(!lockdep_sock_is_held(sk) && debug_locks);

#endif
}

in include/net/sock.h. On a production kernel without CONFIG_LOCKDEP nothing is printed at all, so a reader may conclude the issue is debug-only and does not warrant a Fixes: tag or a stable backport.

The actual consequence is that _bpf_setsockopt() proceeds unconditionally after the assertion:

if (sk_fullsock(sk))

	  sock_owned_by_me(sk);

return __bpf_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);

in net/core/filter.c (the same shape appears in _bpf_getsockopt()). AF_UNIX sockets are always full sockets (sk_fullsock() is true), and unix_getname() runs the hook with no socket lock at all. So a BPF program on these hooks mutates socket state through sk_setsockopt() with no serialization against concurrent socket operations.

---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md

CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/31583057641

Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Junseo Lim
Quoted 9 lines · Junseo Lim

_bpf_setsockopt() and _bpf_getsockopt() call sock_owned_by_me() for full sockets, so these helpers expect the socket lock to be held.

BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME and BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME run BPF programs without acquiring the socket lock. A program attached to either hook can therefore trigger the sock_owned_by_me() warning by calling bpf_setsockopt() or bpf_getsockopt().

Quoted 6 lines

Disallow bpf_setsockopt() and bpf_getsockopt() for CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME and CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME.

Fixes 859051dd165e ("bpf: Implement cgroup sockaddr hooks for unix sockets")

Makes sense, probably no one calls getsockopt/setsockopt() at the hook.

#3 lore raw
In reply to Junseo Lim
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This patch was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>:

Quoted 9 lines · On Wed, 12 Aug 2026 18:16:54 +0900 you wrote:

_bpf_setsockopt() and _bpf_getsockopt() call sock_owned_by_me() for full sockets, so these helpers expect the socket lock to be held.

BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME and BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME run BPF programs without acquiring the socket lock. A program attached to either hook can therefore trigger the sock_owned_by_me() warning by calling bpf_setsockopt() or bpf_getsockopt().

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf] bpf: Disallow bpf_{g,s}etsockopt() in cgroup UNIX getname hooks

    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/84473a7e1813

You are awesome, thank you!

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