nvmet-auth: validate NEGOTIATE message length against the transfer length
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 nvmet-auth: validate NEGOTIATE message length against the transfer length
nvmet_auth_negotiate() reads the protocol descriptor and then iterates over the hash and DH group id lists using the halen and dhlen counts from the received NEGOTIATE message, without checking that the lists fit into the buffer that was actually received. The buffer is allocated with the transfer length from the AUTH_SEND command, which the host controls. An unauthenticated host can therefore send a NEGOTIATE message with a small transfer length and large halen/dhlen values and read out of bounds from the heap buffer before authentication completes.
The path is: the host issues an AUTH_SEND command with the DH-HMAC-CHAP protocol identifier, nvmet_execute_auth_send() allocates a buffer of the transfer length tl from the command, copies the message into it and dispatches the NEGOTIATE message to nvmet_auth_negotiate(). halen and dhlen are single bytes, so the id list loops can read up to about 300 bytes past the end of the kmalloc(tl) buffer. The buffer is a heap object, so KASAN reports the over-read.
The REPLY and other received messages are already validated against the transfer length; do the same for NEGOTIATE by checking that the protocol descriptor and both id lists fit into the transfer length before reading them.
--- drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c +19 -2
@@ -31,11 +31,19 @@ void nvmet_auth_sq_init(struct nvmet_sq *sq) sq->dhchap_step =NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE ; } -static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate (struct nvmet_req *req,void *d) +static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate (struct nvmet_req *req,void *d,u32 tl) {struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl;struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data *data = d;int i, hash_id =0 , fallback_hash_id =0 , dhgid, fallback_dhgid; +size_t proto_off = offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data , + auth_protocol); +size_t idlist_off = proto_off + + offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_protocol_descriptor , idlist); + +/* Validate that the protocol descriptor fits the transfer length */ +if (tl < proto_off +sizeof (union nvmf_auth_protocol )) +return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD ; pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: data sc_d %d napd %d authid %d halen %d dhlen %d\n", __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid,
@@ -53,6 +61,10 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_AUTH_ID)return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD ; +/* Validate that the hash id list fits the transfer length */ +if (tl < idlist_off + data->auth_protocol[0 ].dhchap.halen) +return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD ; +for (i =0 ; i < data->auth_protocol[0 ].dhchap.halen; i++) {u8 host_hmac_id = data->auth_protocol[0 ].dhchap.idlist[i];
@@ -78,6 +90,11 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) dhgid =-1 ; fallback_dhgid =-1 ; + +/* The DH group id list starts at idlist offset 30 */ +if (tl < idlist_off +30 + data->auth_protocol[0 ].dhchap.dhlen) +return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD ; +for (i =0 ; i < data->auth_protocol[0 ].dhchap.dhlen; i++) {int tmp_dhgid = data->auth_protocol[0 ].dhchap.idlist[i +30 ];
@@ -265,7 +282,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req) }else if (data->auth_id != req->sq->dhchap_step) goto done_failure1;/* Validate negotiation parameters */ - dhchap_status =nvmet_auth_negotiate (req, d); + dhchap_status =nvmet_auth_negotiate (req, d, tl);if (dhchap_status ==0 ) req->sq->dhchap_step =NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_CHALLENGE ;
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2.43.5