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bpf: Fix verifier WARN on narrow read of bpf_tcp_sock u64 fields

PATCH Applied Jiayuan Chen 2 participants 3 messages Oct 17

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 bpf: Fix verifier WARN on narrow read of bpf_tcp_sock u64 fields

A BPF program can read the middle of a u64 field in struct bpf_tcp_sock:

	tp = bpf_tcp_sock(listener);
	/* +0x54 is in the middle of the u64 bytes_received */
	unsigned hi = *(unsigned *)((char *)tp + 0x54);

bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access() allows this 4-byte read (the default case only checks size == 4), but bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access() only knows the field starts and has no idea how to handle such an offset. It emits no instruction, cnt stays 0 and the fixup pass trips verifier_bug():

verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion (0)

Just disallow the narrower access by matching the whole u64 range of the two fields, so it is turned down at check time:

invalid tcp_sock access off=84 size=4

Fixes 655a51e536c0 ("bpf: Add struct bpf_tcp_sock and BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock")

---
v1 -> v2: Add a selftest (Alexei).
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#t

---
 net/core/filter.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +2 -2
index ba536be2915f..f0eae1c14b2f 100644
@@ -7600,8 +7600,8 @@ bool bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type,
 		return false;
 
 	switch (off) {
-	case offsetof(struct bpf_tcp_sock, bytes_received):
-	case offsetof(struct bpf_tcp_sock, bytes_acked):
+	case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_tcp_sock, bytes_received):
+	case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_tcp_sock, bytes_acked):
 		return size == sizeof(__u64);
 	default:
 		return size == sizeof(__u32);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 selftests/bpf: Test narrow read of bpf_tcp_sock u64 fields

Add a test that reads the two u64 fields bytes_received and bytes_acked at offset + 4 with a u32 load, to make sure such a narrower access is rejected with "invalid tcp_sock access".

---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sock.c       | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sock.c +48 -0
index 565c4d8bc3fa..d8e65938c35c 100644
@@ -611,6 +611,54 @@ l1_%=:	r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + %[bpf_tcp_sock_bytes_acked__end]);\
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("cgroup/skb")
+__description("bpf_tcp_sock(skb->sk): narrow load of tp->bytes_received")
+__failure __msg("invalid tcp_sock access")
+__failure_unpriv
+__naked void skb_sk_tp_bytes_received_narrow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r1 = *(u64*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_sk]);		\
+	if r1 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+l0_%=:	call %[bpf_tcp_sock];				\
+	if r0 != 0 goto l1_%=;				\
+	exit;						\
+l1_%=:	r0 = *(u32*)(r0 + %[off]);			\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_tcp_sock),
+	  __imm_const(__sk_buff_sk, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	  __imm_const(off, offsetof(struct bpf_tcp_sock, bytes_received) + 4)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup/skb")
+__description("bpf_tcp_sock(skb->sk): narrow load of tp->bytes_acked")
+__failure __msg("invalid tcp_sock access")
+__failure_unpriv
+__naked void skb_sk_tp_bytes_acked_narrow(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r1 = *(u64*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_sk]);		\
+	if r1 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+l0_%=:	call %[bpf_tcp_sock];				\
+	if r0 != 0 goto l1_%=;				\
+	exit;						\
+l1_%=:	r0 = *(u32*)(r0 + %[off]);			\
+	r0 = 0;						\
+	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_tcp_sock),
+	  __imm_const(__sk_buff_sk, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	  __imm_const(off, offsetof(struct bpf_tcp_sock, bytes_acked) + 4)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 SEC("cgroup/skb")
 __description("bpf_tcp_sock(bpf_sk_fullsock(skb->sk)): tp->snd_cwnd")
 __success __success_unpriv __retval(0)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#2 lore raw
In reply to Jiayuan Chen
This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:

Quoted 6 lines · On Sat, 17 Oct 2026 22:38:12 +0800 you wrote:

A BPF program can read the middle of a u64 field in struct bpf_tcp_sock:

	tp = bpf_tcp_sock(listener);
	/* +0x54 is in the middle of the u64 bytes_received */
	unsigned hi = *(unsigned *)((char *)tp + 0x54);
Quoted 6 lines

bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access() allows this 4-byte read (the default case only checks size == 4), but bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access() only knows the field starts and has no idea how to handle such an offset. It emits no instruction, cnt stays 0 and the fixup pass trips verifier_bug():

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf,v2,1/2] bpf: Fix verifier WARN on narrow read of bpf_tcp_sock u64 fields

    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/af873495cbcb
  - [bpf,v2,2/2] selftests/bpf: Test narrow read of bpf_tcp_sock u64 fields
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/5256161e3573

You are awesome, thank you!

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