sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause()
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause()
sctp_init_cause() accepts a chunk when skb_tailroom() can hold the cause header and the payload. sctp_addto_chunk() then writes 0-3 bytes of padding before that header so the chunk stays 4-byte aligned. The check does not include the padding, and the following skb_put() calls skb_over_panic() from softirq.
Count the padding sctp_addto_chunk() is about to write. The cause length on the wire stays the header plus the payload.
--- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +8 -1
@@ -133,20 +133,27 @@ static const struct sctp_paramhdr prsctp_param = {* cause codes will be embedded inside an abort chunk. */ int sctp_init_cause (struct sctp_chunk *chunk,__be16 cause_code,size_t paylen) {struct sctp_errhdr err; +int chunklen, padlen;__u16 len;/* Cause code constants are now defined in network order. */ err.cause = cause_code; len =sizeof (err) + paylen; err.length =htons (len); -if (skb_tailroom (chunk->skb) < len) +/* sctp_addto_chunk() pads the chunk up to a 4-byte boundary before +* appending the cause, so account for that padding here as well. +*/ + chunklen =ntohs (chunk->chunk_hdr->length); + padlen =SCTP_PAD4 (chunklen) - chunklen; + +if (skb_tailroom (chunk->skb) < padlen + len)return -ENOSPC ; chunk->subh.err_hdr =sctp_addto_chunk (chunk,sizeof (err), &err);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.47.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThis is an automated message. This series looks like a fix, but its commit messages seem to be missing some information:
Hi!
This is an automated message. This series looks like a fix, but its commit messages seem to be missing some information:
- How the issue was discovered, e.g. hit in production, hit during development, syzbot report, manual code inspection, LLM or static analysis tool scan.
- Whether the issue was actually triggered, or is only theoretical (e.g. found by code inspection). If it was triggered please include the symptoms, like the stack trace or error messages.
Please do not repost the series just to address the above. Instead, reply to this email with the missing information, so that reviewers can take it into account. If the series needs another revision for other reasons, please include the information in the commit messages then.
The evaluation is done by an LLM so it may be wrong, if you think that is the case please reply and explain.
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): CAGGuW1XarBs3ZD7eKeysDs7qGL3=Zgd5-vsY1ReuF57gz8aLFQ@mail.gmail.com
The missing tailroom was found by reading sctp_init_cause() against the padding that sctp_addto_chunk() writes first. AI assistance was used for that reading.
The bug was triggered, not only found by inspection. The panic was confirmed on local virtual machines running 7.3.0-rc7 and 7.3.0-ga1c2b1da93f5 (CONFIG_KASAN unset). The symptom is a softirq panic:
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
skb_put() calls skb_over_panic() before the copy. The observed pointers were tail 0x6c1 and end 0x6c0. The same panic occurred for a listening socket, an established association, and an unprivileged client socket.
2026年10月27日(火) 17:50 ソーストマト <[email protected]>:
Quoted 41 lines
The missing tailroom was found by reading
sctp_init_cause()against the padding thatsctp_addto_chunk()writes first. AI assistance was used for that reading.The bug was triggered, not only found by inspection. The panic was confirmed on local virtual machines running 7.3.0-rc7 and 7.3.0-ga1c2b1da93f5 (
CONFIG_KASANunset). The symptom is a softirq panic:kernel BUG at
net/core/skbuff.c:214!Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
skb_put()callsskb_over_panic()before the copy. The observed pointers were tail0x6c1and end0x6c0. The same panic occurred for a listening socket, an established association, and an unprivileged client socket.2026年10月27日(火) 17:35 <[email protected]>:
Quoted 22 lines
Hi!
This is an automated message. This series looks like a fix, but its commit messages seem to be missing some information:
- How the issue was discovered, e.g. hit in production, hit during development, syzbot report, manual code inspection, LLM or static analysis tool scan.
- Whether the issue was actually triggered, or is only theoretical (e.g. found by code inspection). If it was triggered please include the symptoms, like the stack trace or error messages.
Please do not repost the series just to address the above. Instead, reply to this email with the missing information, so that reviewers can take it into account. If the series needs another revision for other reasons, please include the information in the commit messages then.
The evaluation is done by an LLM so it may be wrong, if you think that is the case please reply and explain.
Quoted 51 lines · Masafumi Suzuki
sctp_init_cause()accepts a chunk whenskb_tailroom()can hold the cause header and the payload.sctp_addto_chunk()then writes 0-3 bytes of padding before that header so the chunk stays 4-byte aligned. The check does not include the padding, and the followingskb_put()callsskb_over_panic()from softirq.Count the padding
sctp_addto_chunk()is about to write. The cause length on the wire stays the header plus the payload.Fixes 8914f4bace3f ("sctp: add sctp_make_op_error_limited and reuse inner functions")Signed-off-by Masafumi Suzuki <[email protected]>--- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +8
-2@@ -133,20 +133,27 @@ static const struct sctp_paramhdr prsctp_param = {* cause codes will be embedded inside an abort chunk. */ int sctp_init_cause (struct sctp_chunk *chunk,__be16 cause_code,size_t paylen) {struct sctp_errhdr err; +int chunklen, padlen;__u16 len;/* Cause code constants are now defined in network order. */ err.cause = cause_code; len =sizeof (err) + paylen; err.length =htons (len); -if (skb_tailroom (chunk->skb) < len) +/* sctp_addto_chunk() pads the chunk up to a 4-byte boundary before +* appending the cause, so account for that padding here as well. +*/ + chunklen =ntohs (chunk->chunk_hdr->length); + padlen =SCTP_PAD4 (chunklen) - chunklen; + +if (skb_tailroom (chunk->skb) < padlen + len)return -ENOSPC ; chunk->subh.err_hdr =sctp_addto_chunk (chunk,sizeof (err), &err);return 0 ; } --
Quoted 1 line
2.47.0
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Quoted 10 lines · On Tue, 27 Oct 2026 17:24:05 +0900 you wrote:
sctp_init_cause()accepts a chunk whenskb_tailroom()can hold the cause header and the payload.sctp_addto_chunk()then writes 0-3 bytes of padding before that header so the chunk stays 4-byte aligned. The check does not include the padding, and the followingskb_put()callsskb_over_panic()from softirq.Count the padding
sctp_addto_chunk()is about to write. The cause length on the wire stays the header plus the payload.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net] sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause()
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/ed6c53b27be4
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot. https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html