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xfs: a remote xattr valuelen larger than its blocks makes getxattr() read a hole and warn

BUG New Kyuwon Cho 2 participants 3 messages Nov 19 – Nov 21 XFS filesystem

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Kyuwon Cho

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#0 lore raw

Hi Carlos, Darrick,

While testing v7.4-rc3 with an LLM-guided test generator that we are developing as a research prototype, we found that a remote xattr whose on-disk valuelen is larger than the blocks the value owns makes getxattr() read a hole, which ends in the WARN_ON() of xfs_buf_map_verify():

XFS (loop0): xfs_buf_map_verify: daddr 0x258000001a7f0 out of range, EOFS 0x96000

  WARNING: fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:423 at xfs_find_get_buf+0x160f/0x2350, CPU#1: test/114
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 114 Comm: test Not tainted 7.4.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
  RIP: 0010:xfs_find_get_buf (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:423 fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:567)
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   xfs_buf_read_map (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:648)
   xfs_attr_rmtval_get (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.h:243 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c:434)
   xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c:2718)
   xfs_attr_node_get (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c:1597)
   xfs_attr_get (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c:287)
   xfs_xattr_get (fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c:150)
   __vfs_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:446)
   vfs_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:479)
   do_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:808)
   filename_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:837)
   path_getxattrat (fs/xattr.c:876)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
   </TASK>

15ccd92a782a ("xfs: reject remote xattr entries with an out-of-range value length") makes the leaf verifier reject a remote valuelen above XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX, but a valuelen up to that limit is not checked against the value's blocks. xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue() computes rmtblkcnt from the on-disk valuelen, and xfs_attr_rmtval_get() maps that many blocks of the attr fork. It only asserts that a mapping is not a hole:

		for (i = 0; (i < nmap) && (valuelen > 0); i++) {
			...
			ASSERT((map[i].br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
			       (map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
			dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
			...
			error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt,
					0, &bp, &xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops);

Without CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG, a hole becomes the out-of-range daddr above. xfs_attr_rmtval_stale() in the same file checks for a hole at run time and returns -EFSCORRUPTED.

The reproducer runs as root on an empty XFS image (mkfs.xfs, 300 MiB, default v5 features). It gives a file a 16160-byte user.big xattr (four remote blocks), unmounts, rewrites the entry's valuelen in the attr leaf block to 65536 and fixes the block's CRC, mounts again, and calls getxattr() with a 65536-byte buffer. On an x86_64 QEMU guest with 2 vCPUs and KASAN (gcc 13.3), it warns every time, and getxattr() fails.

Checked against v7.4-rc3 (aebb72744764); xfs_attr_remote.c and xfs_attr_leaf.c are the same in the xfs for-next branch.

A patch is attached (git format-patch against v7.4-rc3; it applies to the xfs for-next branch):

0001-xfs-reject-a-hole-in-a-remote-xattr-value.patch

It replaces the ASSERT in xfs_attr_rmtval_get() with the run-time check that xfs_attr_rmtval_stale() uses, so the read fails with -EFSCORRUPTED. It was written with LLM assistance; we reviewed and tested it. With it, the reproducer no longer triggers the report.

The reproducer (repro.c), the kernel config and the patch are attached.

Thanks,
Kyuwon Cho

// WARNING in xfs_find_get_buf (xfs_buf_map_verify) from getxattr() on a remote xattr whose on-disk valuelen is // larger than the blocks it owns.
// Needs an empty XFS image at /files/attr.img (mkfs.xfs -f, 300 MiB, default v5 features) and runs as root. // 1. Mount it and give /tmp/mnt/leaf a 16160-byte user.big xattr (a leaf-form attr fork with a 4-block remote
// value; 16160 is 4 remote payloads of 4040 bytes).
// 2. Unmount and rewrite user.big's valuelen in the attr leaf block to 65536, which the leaf verifier accepts
// (it only rejects > XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX), and fix the block's CRC.
// 3. Mount again and getxattr() with a 65536-byte buffer: xfs_attr_rmtval_get() maps past the value's 4 blocks
// into a hole and reads a daddr past the end of the device.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <endian.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/fiemap.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define IMG "/files/attr.img"
#define MNT "/tmp/mnt"
#define BLK 4096
#define LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE 0x4C82
#define LOOP_SET_FD 0x4C00
#define LOOP_CLR_FD 0x4C01
#define BIG 16160
#define FAKE_LEN 65536

struct ext { uint64_t phys, len; };

static char loopdev[32];
static int loopfd = -1;

static void die(const char *m) { printf("FATAL %s: %s\n", m, strerror(errno)); fflush(stdout); exit(2); }

static void attach(void) {
	int img = open(IMG, O_RDWR);
	if (img < 0) die("open image");
	int n = -1;
	int ctl = open("/dev/loop-control", O_RDWR);
	if (ctl >= 0) { n = ioctl(ctl, LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE); close(ctl); }
	for (int t = 0; t < 8; t++) {
		snprintf(loopdev, sizeof loopdev, "/dev/loop%d", n >= 0 ? n : t);
		loopfd = open(loopdev, O_RDWR);
		if (loopfd >= 0 && ioctl(loopfd, LOOP_SET_FD, img) == 0) { close(img); return; }
		if (loopfd >= 0) close(loopfd);
		if (n >= 0) break;
	}
	die("attach loop");
}
static void detach(void) {
	ioctl(loopfd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0);
	close(loopfd);
	loopfd = -1;
}
static void mount_xfs(void) {
	if (mount(loopdev, MNT, "xfs", 0, NULL)) die("mount xfs");
}
static void umount_xfs(void) {
	sync();
	if (umount2(MNT, 0)) die("umount");
}
static uint32_t crc32c_raw(uint32_t crc, const unsigned char *p, size_t n) {
	for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
		crc ^= p[i];
		for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++)
			crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (0x82F63B78u & -(crc & 1));
	}
	return crc;
}
static uint32_t xfs_blk_crc(const unsigned char *blk) {
	unsigned char tmp[BLK];
	memcpy(tmp, blk, BLK);
	memset(tmp + 12, 0, 4);
	return ~crc32c_raw(0xffffffffu, tmp, BLK);
}

static int attr_extents(const char *path, struct ext *out, int max) {

	int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	if (fd < 0) die("open file for fiemap");
	size_t sz = sizeof(struct fiemap) + 128 * sizeof(struct fiemap_extent);
	struct fiemap *fm = calloc(1, sz);
	fm->fm_start = 0;
	fm->fm_length = ~0ULL;
	fm->fm_flags = FIEMAP_FLAG_SYNC | FIEMAP_FLAG_XATTR;
	fm->fm_extent_count = 128;
	if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fm) < 0) die("fiemap xattr");
	int n = 0;
	for (unsigned i = 0; i < fm->fm_mapped_extents && n < max; i++) {
		out[n].phys = fm->fm_extents[i].fe_physical;
		out[n].len = fm->fm_extents[i].fe_length;
		n++;
	}
	free(fm);
	close(fd);
	return n;
}

// Patch the valuelen of the "big" remote entry in a leaf block in the image file. // Returns 1 if this block was patched.

static int patch_block(int img, uint64_t off) {
	unsigned char blk[BLK];
	unsigned char pat[8] = { 0 };
	uint32_t pbe = htobe32(BIG);
	memcpy(pat, &pbe, 4);
	pat[4] = 3;
	memcpy(pat + 5, "big", 3);
	if (pread(img, blk, BLK, off) != BLK) die("pread leaf");
	if (blk[8] != 0x3b || blk[9] != 0xee) return 0;           // XFS_ATTR3_LEAF_MAGIC
	unsigned char *hit = memmem(blk, BLK, pat, sizeof pat);
	if (!hit) return 0;
	uint32_t stored;
	memcpy(&stored, blk + 12, 4);
	uint32_t calc = xfs_blk_crc(blk);
	if (calc != stored) {
		printf("CRC self-check FAILED at off %llu: stored=%08x calc=%08x\n",
		       (unsigned long long)off, stored, calc);
		fflush(stdout);
		exit(3);
	}
	uint32_t be = htobe32(FAKE_LEN);
	memcpy(hit, &be, 4);                                      // valuelen field
	uint32_t nc = xfs_blk_crc(blk);
	memcpy(blk + 12, &nc, 4);
	if (pwrite(img, blk, BLK, off) != BLK) die("pwrite leaf");
	return 1;
}

int main(void)

{
	char *v = malloc(FAKE_LEN), path[] = MNT "/leaf";
	struct ext e[64];
	int n, patched = 0, img;

	memset(v, 'A', BIG);
	mkdir(MNT, 0755);
	attach();
	mount_xfs();
	close(creat(path, 0644));
	if (setxattr(path, "user.big", v, BIG, 0))
		die("setxattr");
	n = attr_extents(path, e, 64);		/* the extents stay valid after unmount */
	umount_xfs();
	detach();

	img = open(IMG, O_RDWR);
	for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)
		for (uint64_t o = 0; o < e[i].len; o += BLK)
			patched += patch_block(img, e[i].phys + o);
	fsync(img);
	close(img);
	printf("patched %d leaf block(s)\n", patched);

	attach();
	mount_xfs();
	printf("getxattr(65536) = %zd (%s)\n", getxattr(path, "user.big", v, FAKE_LEN), strerror(errno));
	umount_xfs();
	detach();
	return 0;
}
Quoted 1 line

From 497e52f18128c6f7c83ab8d52bc8506fac24f1d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Kyuwon Cho <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 11:36:52 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] xfs: reject a hole in a remote xattr value

xfs_attr_rmtval_get() maps the blocks of a remote xattr value from the on-disk value length and only asserts that a mapping is not a hole. The leaf verifier caps the length at XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX but does not check it against the blocks the value owns, so a larger length makes the read reach a hole. Without CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG the hole becomes a disk address past the end of the device:

xfs_buf_map_verify: daddr 0x258000001a7f0 out of range, EOFS 0x96000

  WARNING: fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:423 at xfs_find_get_buf+0x160f/0x2350
  Call Trace:
   xfs_buf_read_map (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:648)
   xfs_attr_rmtval_get (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c:434)
   xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c:2718)

Check for a hole or a delalloc extent at run time and return -EFSCORRUPTED, as xfs_attr_rmtval_stale() does.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c +5 -2
index e6c8dd1a997a..722440f005ca 100644
@@ -427,8 +427,11 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_get(
 			xfs_daddr_t	dblkno;
 			int		dblkcnt;
 
-			ASSERT((map[i].br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
-			       (map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
+			if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, map[i].br_startblock == DELAYSTARTBLOCK) ||
+			    XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, map[i].br_startblock == HOLESTARTBLOCK)) {
+				xfs_bmap_mark_sick(args->dp, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
+				return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			}
 			dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
 			dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map[i].br_blockcount);
 			error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt,
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw

Not going to complain about a fix if you send it, but the usual PSA
applies: іnjecting malicious changes to the on-disk format (and regenerating the CRC) is not part of the threat model for XFS.

Quoted 297 lines · Kyuwon Cho

Hi Carlos, Darrick,

While testing v7.4-rc3 with an LLM-guided test generator that we are developing as a research prototype, we found that a remote xattr whose on-disk valuelen is larger than the blocks the value owns makes getxattr() read a hole, which ends in the WARN_ON() of xfs_buf_map_verify():

XFS (loop0): xfs_buf_map_verify: daddr 0x258000001a7f0 out of range, EOFS 0x96000

  WARNING: fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:423 at xfs_find_get_buf+0x160f/0x2350, CPU#1: test/114
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 114 Comm: test Not tainted 7.4.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
  RIP: 0010:xfs_find_get_buf (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:423 fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:567)
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   xfs_buf_read_map (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:648)
   xfs_attr_rmtval_get (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.h:243 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c:434)
   xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c:2718)
   xfs_attr_node_get (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c:1597)
   xfs_attr_get (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c:287)
   xfs_xattr_get (fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c:150)
   __vfs_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:446)
   vfs_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:479)
   do_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:808)
   filename_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:837)
   path_getxattrat (fs/xattr.c:876)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
   </TASK>

15ccd92a782a ("xfs: reject remote xattr entries with an out-of-range value length") makes the leaf verifier reject a remote valuelen above XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX, but a valuelen up to that limit is not checked against the value's blocks. xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue() computes rmtblkcnt from the on-disk valuelen, and xfs_attr_rmtval_get() maps that many blocks of the attr fork. It only asserts that a mapping is not a hole:

		for (i = 0; (i < nmap) && (valuelen > 0); i++) {
			...
			ASSERT((map[i].br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
			       (map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
			dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
			...
			error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt,
					0, &bp, &xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops);

Without CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG, a hole becomes the out-of-range daddr above. xfs_attr_rmtval_stale() in the same file checks for a hole at run time and returns -EFSCORRUPTED.

The reproducer runs as root on an empty XFS image (mkfs.xfs, 300 MiB, default v5 features). It gives a file a 16160-byte user.big xattr (four remote blocks), unmounts, rewrites the entry's valuelen in the attr leaf block to 65536 and fixes the block's CRC, mounts again, and calls getxattr() with a 65536-byte buffer. On an x86_64 QEMU guest with 2 vCPUs and KASAN (gcc 13.3), it warns every time, and getxattr() fails.

Checked against v7.4-rc3 (aebb72744764); xfs_attr_remote.c and xfs_attr_leaf.c are the same in the xfs for-next branch.

A patch is attached (git format-patch against v7.4-rc3; it applies to the xfs for-next branch):

0001-xfs-reject-a-hole-in-a-remote-xattr-value.patch

It replaces the ASSERT in xfs_attr_rmtval_get() with the run-time check that xfs_attr_rmtval_stale() uses, so the read fails with -EFSCORRUPTED. It was written with LLM assistance; we reviewed and tested it. With it, the reproducer no longer triggers the report.

The reproducer (repro.c), the kernel config and the patch are attached.

Thanks,
Kyuwon Cho

// WARNING in xfs_find_get_buf (xfs_buf_map_verify) from getxattr() on a remote xattr whose on-disk valuelen is // larger than the blocks it owns.
// Needs an empty XFS image at /files/attr.img (mkfs.xfs -f, 300 MiB, default v5 features) and runs as root. // 1. Mount it and give /tmp/mnt/leaf a 16160-byte user.big xattr (a leaf-form attr fork with a 4-block remote
// value; 16160 is 4 remote payloads of 4040 bytes).
// 2. Unmount and rewrite user.big's valuelen in the attr leaf block to 65536, which the leaf verifier accepts
// (it only rejects > XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX), and fix the block's CRC.
// 3. Mount again and getxattr() with a 65536-byte buffer: xfs_attr_rmtval_get() maps past the value's 4 blocks
// into a hole and reads a daddr past the end of the device.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <endian.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/fiemap.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define IMG "/files/attr.img"
#define MNT "/tmp/mnt"
#define BLK 4096
#define LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE 0x4C82
#define LOOP_SET_FD 0x4C00
#define LOOP_CLR_FD 0x4C01
#define BIG 16160
#define FAKE_LEN 65536

struct ext { uint64_t phys, len; };

static char loopdev[32];
static int loopfd = -1;

static void die(const char *m) { printf("FATAL %s: %s\n", m, strerror(errno)); fflush(stdout); exit(2); }

static void attach(void) {
	int img = open(IMG, O_RDWR);
	if (img < 0) die("open image");
	int n = -1;
	int ctl = open("/dev/loop-control", O_RDWR);
	if (ctl >= 0) { n = ioctl(ctl, LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE); close(ctl); }
	for (int t = 0; t < 8; t++) {
		snprintf(loopdev, sizeof loopdev, "/dev/loop%d", n >= 0 ? n : t);
		loopfd = open(loopdev, O_RDWR);
		if (loopfd >= 0 && ioctl(loopfd, LOOP_SET_FD, img) == 0) { close(img); return; }
		if (loopfd >= 0) close(loopfd);
		if (n >= 0) break;
	}
	die("attach loop");
}
static void detach(void) {
	ioctl(loopfd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0);
	close(loopfd);
	loopfd = -1;
}
static void mount_xfs(void) {
	if (mount(loopdev, MNT, "xfs", 0, NULL)) die("mount xfs");
}
static void umount_xfs(void) {
	sync();
	if (umount2(MNT, 0)) die("umount");
}
static uint32_t crc32c_raw(uint32_t crc, const unsigned char *p, size_t n) {
	for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
		crc ^= p[i];
		for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++)
			crc = (crc >> 1) ^ (0x82F63B78u & -(crc & 1));
	}
	return crc;
}
static uint32_t xfs_blk_crc(const unsigned char *blk) {
	unsigned char tmp[BLK];
	memcpy(tmp, blk, BLK);
	memset(tmp + 12, 0, 4);
	return ~crc32c_raw(0xffffffffu, tmp, BLK);
}

static int attr_extents(const char *path, struct ext *out, int max) {

	int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	if (fd < 0) die("open file for fiemap");
	size_t sz = sizeof(struct fiemap) + 128 * sizeof(struct fiemap_extent);
	struct fiemap *fm = calloc(1, sz);
	fm->fm_start = 0;
	fm->fm_length = ~0ULL;
	fm->fm_flags = FIEMAP_FLAG_SYNC | FIEMAP_FLAG_XATTR;
	fm->fm_extent_count = 128;
	if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fm) < 0) die("fiemap xattr");
	int n = 0;
	for (unsigned i = 0; i < fm->fm_mapped_extents && n < max; i++) {
		out[n].phys = fm->fm_extents[i].fe_physical;
		out[n].len = fm->fm_extents[i].fe_length;
		n++;
	}
	free(fm);
	close(fd);
	return n;
}

// Patch the valuelen of the "big" remote entry in a leaf block in the image file. // Returns 1 if this block was patched.

static int patch_block(int img, uint64_t off) {
	unsigned char blk[BLK];
	unsigned char pat[8] = { 0 };
	uint32_t pbe = htobe32(BIG);
	memcpy(pat, &pbe, 4);
	pat[4] = 3;
	memcpy(pat + 5, "big", 3);
	if (pread(img, blk, BLK, off) != BLK) die("pread leaf");
	if (blk[8] != 0x3b || blk[9] != 0xee) return 0;           // XFS_ATTR3_LEAF_MAGIC
	unsigned char *hit = memmem(blk, BLK, pat, sizeof pat);
	if (!hit) return 0;
	uint32_t stored;
	memcpy(&stored, blk + 12, 4);
	uint32_t calc = xfs_blk_crc(blk);
	if (calc != stored) {
		printf("CRC self-check FAILED at off %llu: stored=%08x calc=%08x\n",
		       (unsigned long long)off, stored, calc);
		fflush(stdout);
		exit(3);
	}
	uint32_t be = htobe32(FAKE_LEN);
	memcpy(hit, &be, 4);                                      // valuelen field
	uint32_t nc = xfs_blk_crc(blk);
	memcpy(blk + 12, &nc, 4);
	if (pwrite(img, blk, BLK, off) != BLK) die("pwrite leaf");
	return 1;
}

int main(void)

{
	char *v = malloc(FAKE_LEN), path[] = MNT "/leaf";
	struct ext e[64];
	int n, patched = 0, img;

	memset(v, 'A', BIG);
	mkdir(MNT, 0755);
	attach();
	mount_xfs();
	close(creat(path, 0644));
	if (setxattr(path, "user.big", v, BIG, 0))
		die("setxattr");
	n = attr_extents(path, e, 64);		/* the extents stay valid after unmount */
	umount_xfs();
	detach();

	img = open(IMG, O_RDWR);
	for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)
		for (uint64_t o = 0; o < e[i].len; o += BLK)
			patched += patch_block(img, e[i].phys + o);
	fsync(img);
	close(img);
	printf("patched %d leaf block(s)\n", patched);

	attach();
	mount_xfs();
	printf("getxattr(65536) = %zd (%s)\n", getxattr(path, "user.big", v, FAKE_LEN), strerror(errno));
	umount_xfs();
	detach();
	return 0;
}
Quoted 1 line

From 497e52f18128c6f7c83ab8d52bc8506fac24f1d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Kyuwon Cho <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 11:36:52 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] xfs: reject a hole in a remote xattr value

xfs_attr_rmtval_get() maps the blocks of a remote xattr value from the on-disk value length and only asserts that a mapping is not a hole. The leaf verifier caps the length at XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX but does not check it against the blocks the value owns, so a larger length makes the read reach a hole. Without CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG the hole becomes a disk address past the end of the device:

xfs_buf_map_verify: daddr 0x258000001a7f0 out of range, EOFS 0x96000

  WARNING: fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:423 at xfs_find_get_buf+0x160f/0x2350
  Call Trace:
   xfs_buf_read_map (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:648)
   xfs_attr_rmtval_get (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c:434)
   xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c:2718)

Check for a hole or a delalloc extent at run time and return -EFSCORRUPTED, as xfs_attr_rmtval_stale() does.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c +5 -2
index e6c8dd1a997a..722440f005ca 100644
@@ -427,8 +427,11 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_get(
 			xfs_daddr_t	dblkno;
 			int		dblkcnt;
 
-			ASSERT((map[i].br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
-			       (map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
+			if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, map[i].br_startblock == DELAYSTARTBLOCK) ||
+			    XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, map[i].br_startblock == HOLESTARTBLOCK)) {
+				xfs_bmap_mark_sick(args->dp, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
+				return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			}
 			dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
 			dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map[i].br_blockcount);
 			error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt,
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0

---end quoted text---

author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 xfs: reject a hole in a remote xattr value

xfs_attr_rmtval_get() maps the blocks of a remote xattr value from the on-disk value length and only asserts that a mapping is not a hole. The leaf verifier caps the length at XFS_XATTR_SIZE_MAX but does not check it against the blocks the value owns, so a larger length makes the read reach a hole. Without CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG the hole becomes a disk address past the end of the device:

xfs_buf_map_verify: daddr 0x258000001a7f0 out of range, EOFS 0x96000

  WARNING: fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:423 at xfs_find_get_buf+0x160f/0x2350
  Call Trace:
   xfs_buf_read_map (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:648)
   xfs_attr_rmtval_get (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c:434)
   xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c:2718)

Check for a hole or a delalloc extent at run time and return -EFSCORRUPTED, as xfs_attr_rmtval_stale() does.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")

---
Christoph, understood: an image with crafted metadata and recomputed CRCs is outside the XFS threat model, so this is a hardening fix for such an image, not a security fix. It does the same run-time check as xfs_attr_rmtval_stale().

The patch was written with LLM assistance; we reviewed and tested it. It applies to the xfs for-next branch. With it, the reproducer from the report no longer triggers the warning, and XFS reports the corruption instead.

 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c +5 -2
index e6c8dd1a997a..722440f005ca 100644
@@ -427,8 +427,11 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_get(
 			xfs_daddr_t	dblkno;
 			int		dblkcnt;
 
-			ASSERT((map[i].br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
-			       (map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
+			if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, map[i].br_startblock == DELAYSTARTBLOCK) ||
+			    XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, map[i].br_startblock == HOLESTARTBLOCK)) {
+				xfs_bmap_mark_sick(args->dp, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
+				return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			}
 			dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
 			dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map[i].br_blockcount);
 			error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt,
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0