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NFSv4: use mach cred for SECINFO_NO_NAME w/ integrity

PATCH Matt W. Benjamin 2 participants 4 messages Sep 4, 2013 – Sep 5, 2013 1 message not in the archive

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#1 lore raw

Hi

It honestly feels quite odd to me for sec=sys to actually connote krb5i.

Matt

Quoted 117 lines · ----- "Weston Andros Adamson

Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression
that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if:

1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by
default)
2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials

This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted
for not having run kinit.

The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity
protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME.

Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall
back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case.

We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the
mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the filesystem's auth flavor.

---

This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch

 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +2 -1
index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644
@@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out:
  */
 static int
 _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh
 *fhandle,
-		    struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors)
+		    struct nfs_fsinfo *info,
+		    struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity)
 {
 	struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = {
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +17 -2
 		.style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH,
@@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server
 *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
 		.rpc_argp = &args,
 		.rpc_resp = &res,
 	};
-	return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server,
 &msg,
-				&args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
+	struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client;
+	int status;
+
+	if (use_integrity) {
+		clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient;
+		msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client);
+	}
+
+	dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
+	status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args,
+				&res.seq_res, 0);
+	dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status);
+
+	if (msg.rpc_cred)
+		put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred);
+
+	return status;
 }

static int

fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +18 -1
@@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server
 *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
 	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
 	int err;
 	do {
-		err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors);
+		/* first try using integrity protection */
+		err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC;
+
+		/* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */
+		if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client))
+			err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info,
+							  flavors, true);
+
+		/*
+		 * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with
+		 * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is
+		 * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use
+		 * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred.
+		 */
+		if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC)
+			err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info,
+							  flavors, false);
+
 		switch (err) {
 		case 0:

case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:

Signature · 7 lines
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Signature · 10 lines
Matt Benjamin
The Linux Box
206 South Fifth Ave. Suite 150
Ann Arbor, MI  48104

http://linuxbox.com

tel.  734-761-4689 
fax.  734-769-8938 
cel.  734-216-5309 
#2 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Matt W. Benjamin

Hi

It honestly feels quite odd to me for sec=sys to actually connote krb5i.

I should point out that my patches don't introduce the use of krb5i here, they just fix it.

I personally don't think it's weird for the client to use a *more* secure flavor for certain (infrequent) operations when it makes sense. What worries me that currently sec=krb5p can cross a SECINFO boundary and suddenly be using sec=sys!

I'm testing patches that fix that now and also allow multiple sec= options (in the same form as nfsd exports, i.e. sec=krb5:krb5i, but I'm trying to fix all the recent regressions surrounding auth flavors / SECINFO first...

-dros

Quoted 134 lines

Matt

Quoted 117 lines · ----- "Weston Andros Adamson

Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression
that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if:

1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default)
2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials

This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted
for not having run kinit.

The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity
protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME.

Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall
back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case.

We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the
mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the filesystem's auth flavor.

---

This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch

fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----

1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +0 -0
index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644
@@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out:
 */

static int
_nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,

fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +2 -1
-		    struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors)
+		    struct nfs_fsinfo *info,
+		    struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity)
{
	struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = {
		.style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH,
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +17 -2
@@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server
 *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
 		.rpc_argp = &args,
 		.rpc_resp = &res,
 	};
-	return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server,
 &msg,
-				&args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
+	struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client;
+	int status;
+
+	if (use_integrity) {
+		clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient;
+		msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client);
+	}
+
+	dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
+	status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args,
+				&res.seq_res, 0);
+	dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status);
+
+	if (msg.rpc_cred)
+		put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred);
+
+	return status;
 }

static int

fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +18 -1
@@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server
 *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
 	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
 	int err;
 	do {
-		err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors);
+		/* first try using integrity protection */
+		err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC;
+
+		/* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */
+		if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client))
+			err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info,
+							  flavors, true);
+
+		/*
+		 * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with
+		 * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is
+		 * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use
+		 * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred.
+		 */
+		if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC)
+			err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info,
+							  flavors, false);
+
 		switch (err) {
 		case 0:

case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:

Signature · 7 lines
1.7.12.4 (Apple Git-37)

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Signature · 10 lines
Matt Benjamin
The Linux Box
206 South Fifth Ave. Suite 150
Ann Arbor, MI  48104

http://linuxbox.com

tel.  734-761-4689 
fax.  734-769-8938 
cel.  734-216-5309 
#3 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 10 lines · ----- "Dros Adamson
Quoted 3 lines · Matt W. Benjamin

Hi

It honestly feels quite odd to me for sec=sys to actually connote

krb5i.

I should point out that my patches don't introduce the use of krb5i here, they just fix it.

Ack.

Quoted 5 lines

I personally don't think it's weird for the client to use a *more* secure flavor for certain (infrequent) operations when it makes sense. What worries me that currently sec=krb5p can cross a SECINFO boundary and suddenly be using sec=sys!

I think the behavior is obviously reasonable, but giving that policy a different name would allow sec=sys to continue mean what it says.

Quoted 5 lines

I'm testing patches that fix that now and also allow multiple sec= options (in the same form as nfsd exports, i.e. sec=krb5:krb5i, but I'm trying to fix all the recent regressions surrounding auth flavors / SECINFO first...

That sounds great.

Quoted 4 lines

-dros

Quoted 1 line

Thanks,

Matt

Signature · 10 lines
Matt Benjamin
The Linux Box
206 South Fifth Ave. Suite 150
Ann Arbor, MI  48104

http://linuxbox.com

tel.  734-761-4689 
fax.  734-769-8938 
cel.  734-216-5309 
#4 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Matt W. Benjamin

Hi,

Quoted 10 lines · ----- "Dros Adamson
Quoted 3 lines · Matt W. Benjamin

Hi

It honestly feels quite odd to me for sec=sys to actually connote

krb5i.

I should point out that my patches don't introduce the use of krb5i here, they just fix it.

Ack.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I personally don't think it's weird for the client to use a *more* secure flavor for certain (infrequent) operations when it makes sense. What worries me that currently sec=krb5p can cross a SECINFO boundary and suddenly be using sec=sys!

I think the behavior is obviously reasonable, but giving that policy a different name would allow sec=sys to continue mean what it says.

I think there is definitely room for discussion on how sec= behavior has changed and how this will affect users, especially when I add the patches mentioned below.

-dros

Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I'm testing patches that fix that now and also allow multiple sec= options (in the same form as nfsd exports, i.e. sec=krb5:krb5i, but I'm trying to fix all the recent regressions surrounding auth flavors / SECINFO first...

That sounds great.

Quoted 4 lines

-dros

Quoted 1 line

Thanks,

Matt

Signature · 10 lines
Matt Benjamin
The Linux Box
206 South Fifth Ave. Suite 150
Ann Arbor, MI  48104

http://linuxbox.com

tel.  734-761-4689 
fax.  734-769-8938 
cel.  734-216-5309