SNP guest policy support
Paolo/Sean,
I'm looking to expand the supported set of policy bits that the VMM can supply on an SNP guest launch (e.g. requiring ciphertext hiding, etc.).
Right now we have the SNP_POLICY_MASK_VALID bitmask that is used to check for KVM supported policy bits. From the previous patches I submitted to add the SMT and SINGLE_SOCKET policy bit support, there was some thought of possibly providing supported policy bits to userspace.
Should we just update the mask as we add support for new policy bits? Or should we do something similar to the sev_supported_vmsa_features support and add a KVM_X86_SEV_POLICY_SUPPORT attribute to the KVM_X86_GRP_SEV? Or...?
Thoughts?
Thanks,
Tom
Sean Christopherson
reviewerQuoted 10 lines · Tom Lendacky
Paolo/Sean,
I'm looking to expand the supported set of policy bits that the VMM can supply on an SNP guest launch (e.g. requiring ciphertext hiding, etc.).
Right now we have the
SNP_POLICY_MASK_VALIDbitmask that is used to check for KVM supported policy bits. From the previous patches I submitted to add the SMT andSINGLE_SOCKETpolicy bit support, there was some thought of possibly providing supported policy bits to userspace.
Quoted 4 lines
Should we just update the mask as we add support for new policy bits? Or should we do something similar to the
sev_supported_vmsa_featuressupport and add aKVM_X86_SEV_POLICY_SUPPORTattribute to theKVM_X86_GRP_SEV? Or...?
I think adding KVM_X86_SEV_POLICY_SUPPORT to KVM_X86_GRP_SEV makes the most sense.
If we allow new bits, then we definitely need a way to enumerate support to userspace. Even if we made KVM fully permissive, we'd need/want a way to communicate _that_ to userspace, which means adding a capability or something similar.
In other words, we need new uAPI, and if we need new uAPI, then I'd much prefer to retain control in KVM just in case a policy comes along that we don't want to (or can't) support for whatever reason.