Skip to contentSkip to conversation

linux-yocto CVEs in need of triage

DISCUSSION Paul Barker 4 participants 5 messages Jun 29 – Aug 2

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

Hi all,

We would appreciate help triaging the following CVEs filed against the Linux Kernel, which therefore affect linux-yocto.

Each of these is missing an upstream fix version in the CVE data, so they show as unresolved in our CVE metrics. However, they may well be fixed already in the kernel versions that we ship. So we need some help to determine the appropriate upstream fix versions.

For each CVE, at a minimum we need to know if they are resolved in the mainline kernel, and if so then which release they were resolved in. A pointer to the exact upstream commit resolving the issue would be preferred. This may involve a bit of investigation, so please share the information you find that proves that a CVE is resolved in a particular kernel version.

Once you've investigated a particular CVE, if it is resolved upstream then please send a patch to update the linux-yocto cve-exclusion.inc file with the appropriate information. See recent commits to this file for examples of what we need, e.g:

    https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit/?id=ded28ca69b326e51ac5cf363f06c6f0931a9c1bd

Once we've got patches merged into the master branch, we can look at backporting to wrynose & scarthgap as appropriate.

The open linux-yocto CVEs lacking an upstream fix version and not currently tracked in cve-exclusion.inc are:

- CVE-2019-14899
- CVE-2021-3714
- CVE-2021-3864
- CVE-2022-0400
- CVE-2022-1247
- CVE-2022-4543
- CVE-2023-3397
- CVE-2023-3640
- CVE-2023-4010
- CVE-2023-6238
- CVE-2023-6240

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
#1 lore raw
Quoted 29 lines · Paul Barker via lists.yoctoproject.org

Hi all,

We would appreciate help triaging the following CVEs filed against the Linux Kernel, which therefore affect linux-yocto.

Each of these is missing an upstream fix version in the CVE data, so they show as unresolved in our CVE metrics. However, they may well be fixed already in the kernel versions that we ship. So we need some help to determine the appropriate upstream fix versions.

For each CVE, at a minimum we need to know if they are resolved in the mainline kernel, and if so then which release they were resolved in. A pointer to the exact upstream commit resolving the issue would be preferred. This may involve a bit of investigation, so please share the information you find that proves that a CVE is resolved in a particular kernel version.

Once you've investigated a particular CVE, if it is resolved upstream then please send a patch to update the linux-yocto cve-exclusion.inc file with the appropriate information. See recent commits to this file for examples of what we need, e.g:

     https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit/?id=ded28ca69b326e51ac5cf363f06c6f0931a9c1bd

Once we've got patches merged into the master branch, we can look at backporting to wrynose & scarthgap as appropriate.

The open linux-yocto CVEs lacking an upstream fix version and not currently tracked in cve-exclusion.inc are:

Quoted 11 lines

- CVE-2019-14899
- CVE-2021-3714
- CVE-2021-3864
- CVE-2022-0400
- CVE-2022-1247
- CVE-2022-4543
- CVE-2023-3397
- CVE-2023-3640
- CVE-2023-4010
- CVE-2023-6238
- CVE-2023-6240

Venkata, who goes by Adhitya, has looked into all of these issues.

He's found one CVEs:
   CVE-2023-3640 - x86 cpu_entry_area KASLR bypass. that we can backport via linux-stable.

He has notes on the rest of the CVEs and will reply himself shortly.

../Randy

Quoted 12 lines

Best regards,

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Links: You receive all messages sent to this group.
View/Reply Online (#66616):https://lists.yoctoproject.org/g/yocto/message/66616 Mute This Topic:https://lists.yoctoproject.org/mt/120036383/3616765 Group Owner:[email protected] Unsubscribe:https://lists.yoctoproject.org/g/yocto/unsub [[email protected]]
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

Signature · 2 lines
# Randy MacLeod
# Wind River Linux
#2 lore raw

On 7/22/26 10:45, MacLeod, Randy wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:33, Paul Barker via lists.yoctoproject.org wrote:

Hi all,

We would appreciate help triaging the following CVEs filed against the Linux Kernel, which therefore affect linux-yocto.

Each of these is missing an upstream fix version in the CVE data, so they show as unresolved in our CVE metrics. However, they may well be fixed already in the kernel versions that we ship. So we need some help to determine the appropriate upstream fix versions.

For each CVE, at a minimum we need to know if they are resolved in the mainline kernel, and if so then which release they were resolved in. A pointer to the exact upstream commit resolving the issue would be preferred. This may involve a bit of investigation, so please share the information you find that proves that a CVE is resolved in a particular kernel version.

Once you've investigated a particular CVE, if it is resolved upstream then please send a patch to update the linux-yocto cve-exclusion.inc file with the appropriate information. See recent commits to this file for examples of what we need, e.g:

    https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit/?id=ded28ca69b326e51ac5cf363f06c6f0931a9c1bd

Once we've got patches merged into the master branch, we can look at backporting to wrynose & scarthgap as appropriate.

The open linux-yocto CVEs lacking an upstream fix version and not currently tracked in cve-exclusion.inc are:

- CVE-2019-14899
- CVE-2021-3714
- CVE-2021-3864
- CVE-2022-0400
- CVE-2022-1247
- CVE-2022-4543
- CVE-2023-3397
- CVE-2023-3640
- CVE-2023-4010
- CVE-2023-6238
- CVE-2023-6240

Venkata, who goes by Adhitya, has looked into all of these issues.

He's found one CVEs:
CVE-2023-3640 - x86 cpu_entry_area KASLR bypass.
that we can backport via linux-stable.

He has notes on the rest of the CVEs and will reply himself shortly.

../Randy

Best regards,

--
# Randy MacLeod
# Wind River Linux

Hello,

Regarding CVE-2023-3640 (x86 cpu_entry_area KASLR bypass, CVSS 7.8):
The mainline fix is commit 97e3d26b5e5f ("x86/mm: Randomize per-cpu entry area") by Peter Zijlstra, merged in v6.2-rc1 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=97e3d26b5e5f

So, for Yocto releases shipping kernel >=6.2 version this fix is already present. This fix needs back porting to kernel <6.2

For now, I can prepare a patch to add this CVE in the cve-exclusion.inc to stop the CVE tool from reporting on this.

Best Regards,
Adhitya

#3 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Venkata Adhitya via lists.openembedded.org

Hello,

Regarding CVE-2023-3640 (x86 cpu_entry_area KASLR bypass, CVSS 7.8):
The mainline fix is commit 97e3d26b5e5f ("x86/mm: Randomize per-cpu entry area") by Peter Zijlstra, merged in v6.2-rc1 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=97e3d26b5e5f

So, for Yocto releases shipping kernel >=6.2 version this fix is already present. This fix needs back porting to kernel <6.2

For now, I can prepare a patch to add this CVE in the cve-exclusion.inc to stop the CVE tool from reporting on this.

Hi Adhitya,

Please send a patch to update cve-exclusion.inc, in the commit message please include any information or references you have to to identify commit 97e3d26b5e5f as the fix.

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
#4 lore raw
In reply to Paul Barker

Hi Paul,

I have independently triaged the CVEs on this list other than CVE-2023-3640, which Adhitya already covered. For the seven with a conclusive status I have sent a patch for cve-exclusion.inc to the OE-core list ("cve-exclusion: set status for 7 kernel CVEs lacking upstream fix data"). Summary of all verdicts below; every claimed commit was verified against mainline history (linux-next 20260727), and I note explicitly where a tie is my inference rather than a distro/CNA statement.

Fixed upstream (nobody has connected the dots yet):

* CVE-2022-1247 (rose_connect() refcount race): actually fixed in v6.17 by d860d1faa6b2 ("net: rose: convert 'use' field to refcount_t") plus da9c9c877597, from Takamitsu Iwai's Aug-2025 series. The commit message describes the CVE's premise almost verbatim ("The 'use' field in struct rose_neigh is used as a reference counter but lacks atomicity") and the diff removes the exact rose->neighbour->use++ in rose_connect(). Backported to 6.1.y/6.6.y/6.12.y/6.16.y in the 2025-09-02 stable round. The whole rose/hamradio subsystem was then removed in v7.1 (dd8d4bc28ad7), so

Quoted 1 line

= v7.1 is unaffected by construction. Ubuntu/Debian/Red Hat

trackers all still show this as open - it may be worth feeding the correction back to them. Caution: the two 2022 Duoming Zhou rose patches referenced by Ubuntu's tracker fix different rose bugs and are not this CVE's fix.

* CVE-2023-4010: the function named by the CVE (usb_giveback_urb()) does not exist in the kernel. The reporter's own PoC repo output points at drivers/media/rc/imon.c: an unthrottled URB resubmit loop producing a printk flood on -EPROTO (Ubuntu triage: "There is no system lockup happening"). That loop was stopped by eecd203ada43 ("media: imon: make send_packet() more robust") in v6.18. The commit carries no CVE reference, so this tie is inferred - flagged as such in the patch; treating it as "disputed" instead would also be defensible.

No fix exists or is planned (proposed as upstream-wontfix/disputed in the patch):

* CVE-2019-14899: weak host model property, config-only mitigations (wg-quick ships a firewall rule); NVD CPE is unversioned so it can never match a fixed version.

* CVE-2021-3714: KSM dedup side channel; Red Hat bz#1931327 CLOSED WONTFIX. Note CONFIG_KSM=y is set in kernel-cache (intel-x86 BSP and paravirt_kvm), but ksmd is off by default and pages must opt in via MADV_MERGEABLE/PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE.

* CVE-2021-3864: setuid coredump LPE; the Waiman Long and Wander Costa fix attempts (Dec 2021/Jan 2022) were rejected or fizzled and the flagged fs/exec.c logic is unchanged today. Only exploitable with a relative kernel.core_pattern; happy to drop this entry if you would rather keep it visible for sysvinit images that ship the kernel default "core" pattern.

* CVE-2022-0400 (net/smc OOB read): never substantiated - Red Hat bz#2044575 CLOSED NOTABUG, SUSE bsc#1195329 RESOLVED INVALID, Debian "non issue"; the originating report (bz#2040604) was never made public and the CNA recorded no affected version.

* CVE-2022-4543 ("EntryBleed"): entry text is still cloned _PAGE_GLOBAL into user page tables (arch/x86/mm/pti.c); upstream and Debian position is that KASLR is not a boundary against local attackers. One clarification worth recording since the two are often
confused: 97e3d26b5e5f ("x86/mm: Randomize per-cpu entry area", v6.2) is the fix for the cpu_entry_area issue - i.e. CVE-2023-3640, as Adhitya identified - and does not address EntryBleed, which leaks the KASLR base via entry_SYSCALL_64 itself.

Genuinely unfixed - deliberately NOT added to cve-exclusion.inc, so they stay visible in the metrics:

* CVE-2023-3397: real subsystem is JFS (txEnd()/lmLogClose() UAF), not slub. The only proposed fix (lore [email protected]) was withdrawn by its author after review; the racy code is unchanged at HEAD and syzbot was still reproducing slab-use-after-free in txEnd in June 2026.

* CVE-2023-6238 (NVMe passthrough metadata DMA overflow): a mitigation ("nvme: remove unprivileged passthrough support", [email protected]) was applied to nvme-6.6 and then explicitly backed out by Keith Busch, over Christoph Hellwig's objection ("We leave an exploitable hole in"); nothing re-landed and nvme_map_user_request() still passes the user meta_len through without an NLB*MS cross-check. One actionable
nuance: the exposure was introduced by 855b7717f44b in v6.2, so linux-yocto branches < v6.2 (5.15, 6.1) are not affected - Debian independently reached the same conclusion.

* CVE-2023-6240 ("Marvin" RSA timing oracle): nothing to do with Marvell or s390; the leaky code is the generic pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete() in crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c, which still branches on secret-derived data at HEAD. Fixed only in RHEL downstream (RHSA-2024:2758 etc.); Ubuntu notes "appears unfixed in upstream as of 2024.08.24". Practical exposure needs a service driving KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT with a long-lived key, which is narrow, but the primitive is present.

I kept CVE-2023-3640 out of the patch since Adhitya has it in hand; the 4543-vs-3640 note above is just so the two KASLR CVEs don't get cross-wired in the data later.

Happy to adjust any of the statuses or wording, and to help with the wrynose/scarthgap backports once the master patch is settled.

Best regards,
Junjie Cao