LASS KVM virtualization support
cover LASS KVM virtualization support
Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious software will provide no paging-based timing information.
LASS works in long mode and partitions the 64-bit canonical linear address space into two halves:
1. Lower half (LA[63]=0) --> user space
2. Upper half (LA[63]=1) --> kernel space
When LASS is enabled, a general protection #GP fault or a stack fault #SS will be generated if software accesses the address from the half in which it resides to another half, e.g., either from user space to upper half, or from kernel space to lower half. This protection applies to data access, code execution.
This series add KVM LASS virtualization support.
When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the LASS violation check, while KVM also needs to apply LASS to instructions emulated by software and injects #GP or #SS fault to the guest.
Following LASS voilations check will be taken on KVM emulation path. User-mode access to supervisor space address:
LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3)
Supervisor-mode access to user space address:
Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3)
Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 &&
CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access)We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As current KVM unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule that kernel should run in the upper half, we use kernel module and application test to verify LASS functionalities in guest instead. The data access related x86 emulator code is verified with forced emulation prefix (FEP) mechanism. Other test cases are working in progress.
How to add tests for LASS in KUT or kselftest is still under investigation.
[1] Intel Architecutre Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features Programming Reference: Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368
Zeng Guang (6):
KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS violation check
KVM: x86: Add emulator helper for LASS violation check
KVM: x86: LASS protection on KVM emulation when LASS enabled
KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space
KVM: x86: Set KVM LASS based on hardware capability
arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 7 +++- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 8 +++-- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ 12 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 1/6 KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
Virtualize CR4.LASS[bit 27] under KVM control instead of being guest-owned as CR4.LASS generally set once for each vCPU at boot time and won't be toggled at runtime. Besides, only if VM has LASS capability enumerated with CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], KVM allows guest software to be able to set CR4.LASS. By design CR4.LASS can be manipulated by nested guest as well.
Notes: Setting CR4.LASS to 1 enable LASS in IA-32e mode. It doesn't take effect in legacy mode even if CR4.LASS is set.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_PCIDE \ | X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \ | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_VMXE \ - | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP)) + | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP | X86_CR4_LASS))#define CR8_RESERVED_BITS (~(unsigned long)X86_CR8_TPR)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3 -0
@@ -7569,6 +7569,9 @@ static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_UMIP , ecx,feature_bit (UMIP ));cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_LA57 , ecx,feature_bit (LA57 )); + entry =kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index (vcpu,0x7 ,1 ); +cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_LASS , eax,feature_bit (LASS )); +#undef cr4_fixed1_update }
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +2 -0
@@ -475,6 +475,8 @@ bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type); __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_VMXE ; \if (!__cpu_has (__c,X86_FEATURE_PCID )) \ __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_PCIDE ; \ +if (!__cpu_has (__c,X86_FEATURE_LASS )) \ + __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_LASS ; \ __reserved_bits; \ })
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH 1/6] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
one nit below
Quoted 1 line · Zeng Guang
Virtualize CR4.LASS[bit 27] under KVM control instead of being guest-owned
under control of KVM or under KVM's control
Or just simply use "intercept"?
Quoted 56 lines
as CR4.LASS generally set once for each vCPU at boot time and won't be toggled at runtime. Besides, only if VM has LASS capability enumerated with CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], KVM allows guest software to be able to set CR4.LASS. By design CR4.LASS can be manipulated by nested guest as well.
Notes: Setting CR4.LASS to 1 enable LASS in IA-32e mode. It doesn't take effect in legacy mode even if CR4.LASS is set.
Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-1@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_PCIDE \ | X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \ | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_VMXE \ - | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP)) + | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP | X86_CR4_LASS))#define CR8_RESERVED_BITS (~(unsigned long)X86_CR8_TPR)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3
-0@@ -7569,6 +7569,9 @@ static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_UMIP , ecx,feature_bit (UMIP ));cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_LA57 , ecx,feature_bit (LA57 )); + entry =kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index (vcpu,0x7 ,1 ); +cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_LASS , eax,feature_bit (LASS )); +#undef cr4_fixed1_update }arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +2
-0@@ -475,6 +475,8 @@ bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type); __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_VMXE ; \if (!__cpu_has (__c,X86_FEATURE_PCID )) \ __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_PCIDE ; \ +if (!__cpu_has (__c,X86_FEATURE_LASS )) \ + __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_LASS ; \ __reserved_bits; \ })
Re: [PATCH 1/6] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
Quoted 9 lines · Binbin Wu
Reviewed-by Binbin Wu <[email protected]>one nit below
Quoted 1 line · Zeng Guang
Virtualize CR4.LASS[bit 27] under KVM control instead of being guest-owned
under control of KVM or under KVM's control
Or just simply use "intercept"?
OK. Will change it.
Quoted 56 lines
Quoted 56 lines
as CR4.LASS generally set once for each vCPU at boot time and won't be toggled at runtime. Besides, only if VM has LASS capability enumerated with CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], KVM allows guest software to be able to set CR4.LASS. By design CR4.LASS can be manipulated by nested guest as well.
Notes: Setting CR4.LASS to 1 enable LASS in IA-32e mode. It doesn't take effect in legacy mode even if CR4.LASS is set.
Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-1@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_PCIDE \ | X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \ | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_VMXE \ - | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP)) + | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP | X86_CR4_LASS))#define CR8_RESERVED_BITS (~(unsigned long)X86_CR8_TPR)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3
-0@@ -7569,6 +7569,9 @@ static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_UMIP , ecx,feature_bit (UMIP ));cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_LA57 , ecx,feature_bit (LA57 )); + entry =kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index (vcpu,0x7 ,1 ); +cr4_fixed1_update (X86_CR4_LASS , eax,feature_bit (LASS )); +#undef cr4_fixed1_update }arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +2
-0@@ -475,6 +475,8 @@ bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type); __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_VMXE ; \if (!__cpu_has (__c,X86_FEATURE_PCID )) \ __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_PCIDE ; \ +if (!__cpu_has (__c,X86_FEATURE_LASS )) \ + __reserved_bits |=X86_CR4_LASS ; \ __reserved_bits; \ })
Re: [PATCH 1/6] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
In reply to Zeng GuangQuoted 8 lines · Zeng Guang
Virtualize CR4.LASS[bit 27] under KVM control instead of being guest-owned as CR4.LASS generally set once for each vCPU at boot time and won't be toggled at runtime. Besides, only if VM has LASS capability enumerated with CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], KVM allows guest software to be able to set CR4.LASS.
By design CR4.LASS can be manipulated by nested guest as well.
This is inaccurate. The change in nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update() is to allow L1 guests to set CR4.LASS in VMX operation. I would say:
Set the CR4.LASS bit in the emulated IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1 MSR for guests to allow guests to enable LASS in nested VMX operation.
Re: [PATCH 1/6] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
Quoted 10 lines · Chao
Quoted 7 lines · Zeng Guang
Virtualize CR4.LASS[bit 27] under KVM control instead of being guest-owned as CR4.LASS generally set once for each vCPU at boot time and won't be toggled at runtime. Besides, only if VM has LASS capability enumerated with CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], KVM allows guest software to be able to set CR4.LASS.
By design CR4.LASS can be manipulated by nested guest as
well.This is inaccurate. The change in
nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update()is to allow L1 guests to set CR4.LASS in VMX operation.
Essentially it allows nested guest to set CR4.LASS. L1 guest uses cr4_fixed1 to check cr4 value requested to set by nested guest valid or not. Nested guest will get #GP fault if it's not allowed.
Quoted 4 lines
I would say:
Set the CR4.LASS bit in the emulated
IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1MSR for guests to allow guests to enable LASS in nested VMX operation.
Re: [PATCH 1/6] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
Quoted 10 lines · Zeng Guang
Quoted 8 lines · Chao
Quoted 7 lines · Zeng Guang
Virtualize CR4.LASS[bit 27] under KVM control instead of being guest-owned as CR4.LASS generally set once for each vCPU at boot time and won't be toggled at runtime. Besides, only if VM has LASS capability enumerated with CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], KVM allows guest software to be able to set CR4.LASS.
By design CR4.LASS can be manipulated by nested guest as
well.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This is inaccurate. The change in
nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update()is to allow L1 guests to set CR4.LASS in VMX operation.Essentially it allows nested guest to set CR4.LASS. L1 guest uses
cr4_fixed1to check
cr4 value requested to set by nested guest valid or not. Nested guest will get #GP
fault if it's not allowed.
The change to CR4_FIXED1 has more impacts. Without CR4_FIXED1 change, guest shouldn't enable LASS in VMX operation; it means:
1. before VMXON, LASS should be disabled
2. in VMX operation, LASS cannot be enabled
What you said (i.e., L1 guest allows L2 to enable LASS) belongs in #2. But #1 isn't covered. That's why I said "inaccurate".
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I would say:
Set the CR4.LASS bit in the emulated
IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1MSR for guests to allow guests to enable LASS in nested VMX operation.
PATCH 2/6 KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS violation check
In reply to Zeng GuangIntel introduce LASS (Linear Address Separation) feature providing an independent mechanism to achieve the mode-based protection.
LASS partitions 64-bit linear address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). It stops any code execution or data access
1. from user mode to supervisor-mode address space
2. from supervisor mode to user-mode address space
and generates LASS violation fault accordingly.
A supervisor mode data access causes a LASS violation only if supervisor mode access protection is enabled (CR4.SMAP = 1) and either RFLAGS.AC = 0 or the access implicitly accesses a system data structure.
Following are the rule of LASS violation check on the linear address(LA). User access to supervisor-mode address space:
LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3)
Supervisor access to user-mode address space:
Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3)
Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 &&
CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access)Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops to do LASS violation check.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -0
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed) KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons); +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(check_lass); #undef KVM_X86_OP #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +5 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@#define KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_VALID_BITS (KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED | \ KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER) +/* x86-specific emulation flags */ +#define KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS _BITULL(1) +/* x86-specific vcpu->requests bit members */ #define KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER KVM_ARCH_REQ(0)#define KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS KVM_ARCH_REQ(1)
@@ -1706,6 +1709,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {* Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons */ unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +bool (*check_lass)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags); };struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +55 -0
67 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +2 -0
@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool __vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags); +static inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 msr,int type,bool value) {
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH 2/6] KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS violation check
Quoted 1 line · Zeng Guang
Intel introduce LASS (Linear Address Separation) feature providing
/s/introduce/introduces
Quoted 8 lines
an independent mechanism to achieve the mode-based protection.
LASS partitions 64-bit linear address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). It stops any code execution or data access
1. from user mode to supervisor-mode address space
2. from supervisor mode to user-mode address space
and generates LASS violation fault accordingly.
IMO, the description of the point 2 may be misleading that LASS stops any data access from supervisor mode to user mode address space, although the description following adds the conditions.
Quoted 6 lines
A supervisor mode data access causes a LASS violation only if supervisor mode access protection is enabled (CR4.SMAP = 1) and either RFLAGS.AC = 0 or the access implicitly accesses a system data structure.
Following are the rule of LASS violation check on the linear address(LA).
/s/rule/rules
Quoted 34 lines
User access to supervisor-mode address space:
LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3) Supervisor access to user-mode address space: Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3) Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 && CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access)Add new ops in
kvm_x86_opsto do LASS violation check.Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1
-0@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed) KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons); +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(check_lass); #undef KVM_X86_OP #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONALarch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0
-0
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h line 73
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2
-0@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@#define KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_VALID_BITS (KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED | \ KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER) +/* x86-specific emulation flags */ +#define KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS _BITULL(1)
Do you use the flag outside of emulator?
For LAM patch, it's planned to move the flags inside emulator.
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h struct kvm_x86_ops { · line 1713
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +3
-0+/* x86-specific vcpu->requests bit members */ #define KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER KVM_ARCH_REQ(0)#define KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS KVM_ARCH_REQ(1)@@ -1706,6 +1709,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {* Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons */ unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +bool (*check_lass)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags);
The flags may be dropped if the caller knows to skip it or not.
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0
-0};struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) · line 8076
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +4
-0@@ -8070,6 +8070,59 @@ static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)free_pages ((unsigned long )kvm_vmx->pid_table,vmx_get_pid_table_order (kvm)); } +/* +* Determine whether an access to the linear address causes a LASS violation. +* LASS protection is only effective in long mode. As a prerequisite, caller +* should make sure VM
Should be vCPU?
Quoted 75 lines
running in long mode and invoke this api to do LASS
+ * violation check.
+ */arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +49
-0+bool __vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags) +{ +bool user_mode, user_as, rflags_ac; + +if (!!(flags &KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS ) || + !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set (vcpu,X86_CR4_LASS )) +return false; + +WARN_ON_ONCE (!is_long_mode (vcpu)); + + user_as = !(la >>63 ); + +/* +* An access is a supervisor-mode access if CPL < 3 or if it implicitly +* accesses a system data structure. For implicit accesses to system +* data structure, the processor acts as if RFLAGS.AC is clear. +*/ +if (access &PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS ) { + user_mode = false; + rflags_ac = false; + }else { + user_mode =vmx_get_cpl (vcpu) ==3 ; +if (!user_mode) + rflags_ac = !!(kvm_get_rflags (vcpu) &X86_EFLAGS_AC ); + } + +if (user_mode != user_as) { +/* +* Supervisor-mode _data_ accesses to user address space +* cause LASS violations only if SMAP is enabled. +*/ +if (!user_mode && !(access &PFERR_FETCH_MASK )) { +return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set (vcpu,X86_CR4_SMAP ) && + !rflags_ac; + }else { +return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +static bool vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags) +{ +return is_long_mode (vcpu) &&__vmx_check_lass (vcpu, access, la, flags); +} +static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,@@ -8207,6 +8260,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp, .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, + + .check_lass = vmx_check_lass, };static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr (void )arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +2
-0@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool __vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags); +static inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 msr,int type,bool value) {
Re: [PATCH 2/6] KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS violation check
Quoted 4 lines · Binbin Wu
Quoted 1 line · Zeng Guang
Intel introduce LASS (Linear Address Separation) feature providing
/s/introduce/introduces
OK.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
an independent mechanism to achieve the mode-based protection.
LASS partitions 64-bit linear address space into two halves, user-mode address (LA[bit 63]=0) and supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). It stops any code execution or data access
1. from user mode to supervisor-mode address space
2. from supervisor mode to user-mode address space
and generates LASS violation fault accordingly.
Quoted 3 lines
IMO, the description of the point 2 may be misleading that LASS stops any data access from supervisor mode to user mode address space, although the description following adds the conditions.
May change to " It stops any code execution or conditional data access". The condition is illustrated in next paragraph.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
A supervisor mode data access causes a LASS violation only if supervisor mode access protection is enabled (CR4.SMAP = 1) and either RFLAGS.AC = 0 or the access implicitly accesses a system data structure.
Following are the rule of LASS violation check on the linear address(LA).
/s/rule/rules
OK.
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 37 lines
User access to supervisor-mode address space:
LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3) Supervisor access to user-mode address space: Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3) Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 && CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access)Add new ops in
kvm_x86_opsto do LASS violation check.Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1
-0@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed) KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons); +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(check_lass); #undef KVM_X86_OP #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONALarch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0
-0@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@#define KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_VALID_BITS (KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED | \ KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER)
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h line 73
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2
-0+/* x86-specific emulation flags */ +#define KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS _BITULL(1)Do you use the flag outside of emulator?
For LAM patch, it's planned to move the flags inside emulator.
IMO, the detailed flag is implementation specific. Is it necessary to bind with emulator though it's only used inside emulator ?
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h struct kvm_x86_ops { · line 1713
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +3
-0+/* x86-specific vcpu->requests bit members */ #define KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER KVM_ARCH_REQ(0)#define KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS KVM_ARCH_REQ(1)@@ -1706,6 +1709,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {* Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons */ unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +bool (*check_lass)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags);The flags may be dropped if the caller knows to skip it or not.
Probably I don't get you right. Do you mean it need define another function without flags ?
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0
-0};struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0@@ -8070,6 +8070,59 @@ static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)free_pages ((unsigned long )kvm_vmx->pid_table,vmx_get_pid_table_order (kvm)); }
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +4
-0+/* +* Determine whether an access to the linear address causes a LASS violation. +* LASS protection is only effective in long mode. As a prerequisite, caller +* should make sure VM Should be vCPU?
Similar meaning, I think. :)
Quoted 75 lines
Quoted 75 lines
running in long mode and invoke this api to do LASS
+ * violation check.
+ */arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +49
-0+bool __vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags) +{ +bool user_mode, user_as, rflags_ac; + +if (!!(flags &KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS ) || + !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set (vcpu,X86_CR4_LASS )) +return false; + +WARN_ON_ONCE (!is_long_mode (vcpu)); + + user_as = !(la >>63 ); + +/* +* An access is a supervisor-mode access if CPL < 3 or if it implicitly +* accesses a system data structure. For implicit accesses to system +* data structure, the processor acts as if RFLAGS.AC is clear. +*/ +if (access &PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS ) { + user_mode = false; + rflags_ac = false; + }else { + user_mode =vmx_get_cpl (vcpu) ==3 ; +if (!user_mode) + rflags_ac = !!(kvm_get_rflags (vcpu) &X86_EFLAGS_AC ); + } + +if (user_mode != user_as) { +/* +* Supervisor-mode _data_ accesses to user address space +* cause LASS violations only if SMAP is enabled. +*/ +if (!user_mode && !(access &PFERR_FETCH_MASK )) { +return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set (vcpu,X86_CR4_SMAP ) && + !rflags_ac; + }else { +return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +static bool vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags) +{ +return is_long_mode (vcpu) &&__vmx_check_lass (vcpu, access, la, flags); +} +static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops__initdata = { .name ="kvm_intel" ,@@ -8207,6 +8260,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp, .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, + + .check_lass = vmx_check_lass, };static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr (void )arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +2
-0@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool __vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags); +static inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 msr,int type,bool value) {
Re: [PATCH 2/6] KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS violation check
Quoted 3 lines · Zeng Guang
Quoted 1 line · Binbin Wu
[...]
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines · Zeng Guang
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1
-0@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed) KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons); +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(check_lass); #undef KVM_X86_OP #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONALarch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0
-0@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0
-0#define KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_VALID_BITS (KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED | \ KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER)+/* x86-specific emulation flags */
+#define KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS_BITULL(1)
Do you use the flag outside of emulator?
For LAM patch, it's planned to move the flags inside emulator.IMO, the detailed flag is implementation specific. Is it necessary to bind with emulator though it's only used inside emulator ?
For the rest part (i.e., VMExit handlings), the code is already in the vendor specific implementations. The callers are aware of the information to skip LASS check or not.
I plan to do a cleanup to consolidate the flags into one parameter for __linearize(). And the consolidated flags value will be extended for LAM and other features (e.g. LASS).
I post the proposed patch as following, could you help to check wether it is OK for LASS to follow?
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +0 -0
@@ -687,8 +687,8 @@ static unsigned insn_alignment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned size)
static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct segmented_address addr,
unsigned *max_size, unsigned size,
- bool write, bool fetch,
- enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear)
+ u64 flags, enum x86emul_mode mode,
+ ulong *linear)
{
struct desc_struct desc;
bool usable;
@@ -696,6 +696,8 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 lim;
u16 sel;
u8 va_bits;
+ bool fetch = !!(flags & X86_EMULFLAG_FETCH);
+ bool write = !!(flags & X86_EMULFLAG_WRITE);
la = seg_base(ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea;
*max_size = 0;
@@ -757,7 +759,12 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong *linear)
{
unsigned max_size;
- return __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, size, write, false, + u64 flags = 0;
+
+ if (write)
+ flags |= X86_EMULFLAG_WRITE;
+
+ return __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, size, flags, ctxt->mode, linear);
}
@@ -768,10 +775,11 @@ static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst) unsigned max_size;
struct segmented_address addr = { .seg = VCPU_SREG_CS,
.ea = dst };
+ u64 flags = X86_EMULFLAG_FETCH;
if (ctxt->op_bytes != sizeof(unsigned long))
addr.ea = dst & ((1UL << (ctxt->op_bytes << 3)) - 1);
- rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 1, false, true, ctxt->mode, &linear); + rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 1, flags, ctxt->mode, &linear);
if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
ctxt->_eip = addr.ea;
return rc;
@@ -896,6 +904,7 @@ static int __do_insn_fetch_bytes(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int op_size) int cur_size = ctxt->fetch.end - ctxt->fetch.data;
struct segmented_address addr = { .seg = VCPU_SREG_CS,
.ea = ctxt->eip + cur_size };
+ u64 flags = X86_EMULFLAG_FETCH;
/*
* We do not know exactly how many bytes will be needed, and
@@ -907,8 +916,7 @@ static int __do_insn_fetch_bytes(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int op_size)
* boundary check itself. Instead, we use max_size to check
* against op_size.
*/
- rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 0, false, true, ctxt->mode,
- &linear);
+ rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 0, flags, ctxt->mode, &linear);
if (unlikely(rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE))
return rc;
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h +0 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ struct x86_instruction_info {
#define X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED 5 /* IO is needed to complete emulation */ #define X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED 6 /* Intercepted by nested VMCB/VMCS */
+/* x86-specific emulation flags */
+#define X86_EMULFLAG_FETCH _BITULL(0) +#define X86_EMULFLAG_WRITE _BITULL(1) +
struct x86_emulate_ops {
void (*vm_bugged)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt); /*
Quoted 108 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
+
/* x86-specificvcpu->requestsbit members */ #define KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMERKVM_ARCH_REQ(0)#define KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESSKVM_ARCH_REQ(1)Quoted 8 lines
Review struct kvm_x86_ops { · line 1714
Quoted 7 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0@@ -1706,6 +1709,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { * Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons */ unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + + bool (*check_lass)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64 la, u64 flags);The flags may be dropped if the caller knows to skip it or not.
Probably I don't get you right. Do you mean it need define another function without flags ?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
(quoted diff) +0
-0}; struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0@@ -8070,6 +8070,59 @@ static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) free_pages((unsigned long)kvm_vmx->pid_table, vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0}+/*
+ * Determine whether an access to the linear address causes a LASS violation.
+ * LASS protection is only effective in long mode. As a prerequisite, caller
+ * should make sure VMShould be vCPU?
Similar meaning, I think. :)
Quoted 77 lines
Quoted 77 lines
running in long mode and invoke this api to do LASS
+ * violation check.
+ */
+bool__vmx_check_lass(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64 la, u64 flags)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +13
-0+{ + bool user_mode, user_as, rflags_ac; + + if (!!(flags & KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS) || + !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_LASS)) + return false; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_long_mode(vcpu)); + + user_as = !(la >> 63); + + /* +* An access is a supervisor-mode access if CPL < 3 or if it implicitly
+ * accesses a system data structure. For implicit accesses to system
+ * data structure, the processor acts as if RFLAGS.AC is clear. + */
+ if (access &PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS) {
+user_mode= false;
+rflags_ac= false;
+ } else {
+user_mode=vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)== 3;
+ if (!user_mode)
+rflags_ac= !!(kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) &X86_EFLAGS_AC); + }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +18
-0+ + if (user_mode != user_as) { + /* + * Supervisor-mode _data_ accesses to user address space + * cause LASS violations only if SMAP is enabled. + */ + if (!user_mode && !(access & PFERR_FETCH_MASK)) { + return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP) && + !rflags_ac; + } else { + return true; + } + } + + return false; +} + +static bool vmx_check_lass(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64la, u64 flags)
+{
+ returnis_long_mode(vcpu)&&__vmx_check_lass(vcpu, access, la, flags);arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +2
-0+} +static struct
kvm_x86_opsvmx_x86_ops__initdata= {
.name = "kvm_intel",
@@ -8207,6 +8260,8 @@ static structkvm_x86_opsvmx_x86_ops__initdata= { .complete_emulated_msr =kvm_complete_insn_gp, .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector =kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, +
+ .check_lass =vmx_check_lass,
};
static unsigned intvmx_handle_intel_pt_intr(void)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +1
-0@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type); u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool __vmx_check_lass(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64 la, u64 flags); + static inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type, bool value){
Re: [PATCH 2/6] KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS violation check
In reply to Zeng GuangQuoted 5 lines · Zeng Guang
+/*
+ * Determine whether an access to the linear address causes a LASS violation.
+ * LASS protection is only effective in long mode. As a prerequisite, caller
+ * should make sure VM running in long mode and invoke this api to do LASS
+ * violation check.
Could you place the comment above vmx_check_lass()?
And for __vmx_check_lass(), just add:
A variant of vmx_check_lass() without the check for long mode.
Quoted 20 lines
+ */
(quoted diff) +17
-0+bool __vmx_check_lass(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64 la, u64 flags) +{ + bool user_mode, user_as, rflags_ac; + + if (!!(flags & KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS) || + !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_LASS)) + return false; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_long_mode(vcpu)); + + user_as = !(la >> 63); + + /* + * An access is a supervisor-mode access if CPL < 3 or if it implicitly + * accesses a system data structure. For implicit accesses to system + * data structure, the processor acts as if RFLAGS.AC is clear. + */
Review
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10
-0+ if (access & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS) { + user_mode = false; + rflags_ac = false; + } else { + user_mode = vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3; + if (!user_mode) + rflags_ac = !!(kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC); + } + + if (user_mode != user_as) {
to reduce one level of indentation, how about:
if (user_mode == user_as)
return false;
/*
* Supervisor-mode _data_ accesses to user address space
* cause LASS violations only if SMAP is enabled.
*/
if (!user_mode && !(access & PFERR_FETCH_MASK)) {
return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP) && !rflags_ac;
return true;Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +8
-0+/* +* Supervisor-mode _data_ accesses to user address space +* cause LASS violations only if SMAP is enabled. +*/ +if (!user_mode && !(access &PFERR_FETCH_MASK )) { +return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set (vcpu,X86_CR4_SMAP ) && + !rflags_ac; + }else {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) · line 8123
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +10
-0+return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +static bool vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags) +{ +return is_long_mode (vcpu) &&__vmx_check_lass (vcpu, access, la, flags);
Why not request all callers to check if vcpu is in long mode?
e.g.,
return is_long_mode(vcpu) && static_call(kvm_x86_check_lass)(...);
then you can rename __vmx_check_lass() to vmx_check_lass() and drop the original one.
Quoted 19 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+} +static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { .name = "kvm_intel",arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +2
-0@@ -8207,6 +8260,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp, .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, + + .check_lass = vmx_check_lass, };static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr (void )arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type); · line 437
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +2
-0@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool __vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags); +
no one uses this function. You can defer exporting it to when the first external caller is added.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +0
-0static inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 msr,int type,bool value) {Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH 2/6] KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS violation check
Quoted 43 lines · Chao
Quoted 5 lines · Zeng Guang
+/*
+ * Determine whether an access to the linear address causes a LASS violation.
+ * LASS protection is only effective in long mode. As a prerequisite, caller
+ * should make sure VM running in long mode and invoke this api to do LASS
+ * violation check.Could you place the comment above
vmx_check_lass()?And for
__vmx_check_lass(), just add:A variant of
vmx_check_lass()without the check for long mode.Quoted 19 lines
+ */
(quoted diff) +17
-0+bool __vmx_check_lass(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64 la, u64 flags) +{ + bool user_mode, user_as, rflags_ac; + + if (!!(flags & KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS) || + !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_LASS)) + return false; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_long_mode(vcpu)); + + user_as = !(la >> 63); + + /* + * An access is a supervisor-mode access if CPL < 3 or if it implicitly + * accesses a system data structure. For implicit accesses to system + * data structure, the processor acts as if RFLAGS.AC is clear. + */Review
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10
-0+ if (access & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS) { + user_mode = false; + rflags_ac = false; + } else { + user_mode = vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3; + if (!user_mode) + rflags_ac = !!(kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC); + } + + if (user_mode != user_as) {to reduce one level of indentation, how about:
Quoted 12 lines
if (user_mode == user_as)
return false;
/*
* Supervisor-mode _data_ accesses to user address space
* cause LASS violations only if SMAP is enabled.
*/
if (!user_mode && !(access & PFERR_FETCH_MASK)) {
return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP) && !rflags_ac;
return true;Looks better.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +8
-0+/* +* Supervisor-mode _data_ accesses to user address space +* cause LASS violations only if SMAP is enabled. +*/ +if (!user_mode && !(access &PFERR_FETCH_MASK )) { +return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set (vcpu,X86_CR4_SMAP ) && + !rflags_ac; + }else {arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) · line 8123
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +10
-0+return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +static bool vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags) +{ +return is_long_mode (vcpu) &&__vmx_check_lass (vcpu, access, la, flags);Why not request all callers to check if vcpu is in long mode?
Quoted 5 lines
e.g.,
return is_long_mode(vcpu) && static_call(kvm_x86_check_lass)(...);then you can rename
__vmx_check_lass()tovmx_check_lass()and drop the original one.
By design, __vmx_check_lass() is standalone to be used for checking LASS violation only. In some cases, cpu mode is already identified prior to performing LASS protection. please refer to patch 4. So we provide two interfaces, vmx_check_lass() with cpu mode check wrapped for other modules usage, e.g. kvm emulator and __vmx_check_lass() dedicated for VMX.
I would check the feasibility to re-organize code to be more optimal.
Thanks.
Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 19 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+} +static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { .name = "kvm_intel",arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +2
-0@@ -8207,6 +8260,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = { .complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp, .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, + + .check_lass = vmx_check_lass, };static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr (void )arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +0
-0arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type); · line 437
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +2
-0@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool __vmx_check_lass (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags); +no one uses this function. You can defer exporting it to when the first external caller is added.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +0
-0static inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 msr,int type,bool value) {Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 3/6 KVM: x86: Add emulator helper for LASS violation check
In reply to Zeng GuangWhen LASS is enabled, KVM need apply LASS violation check to instruction emulations. Add helper for the usage of x86 emulator to perform LASS protection.
--- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h +1 -0
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {int (*leave_smm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);void (*triple_fault)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);int (*set_xcr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,u32 index,u64 xcr); +bool (*check_lass)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags); };/* Type, address-of, and value of an instruction's operand. */
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +9 -0
@@ -8193,6 +8193,14 @@ static void emulator_vm_bugged(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)kvm_vm_bugged (kvm); } +static bool emulator_check_lass (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, +u64 access,u64 la,u64 flags) +{ +struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu =emul_to_vcpu (ctxt); + +return static_call (kvm_x86_check_lass)(vcpu, access, la, flags); +} +static const struct x86_emulate_ops emulate_ops = { .vm_bugged = emulator_vm_bugged, .read_gpr = emulator_read_gpr,
@@ -8237,6 +8245,7 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops emulate_ops = { .leave_smm = emulator_leave_smm, .triple_fault = emulator_triple_fault, .set_xcr = emulator_set_xcr, + .check_lass = emulator_check_lass, };static void toggle_interruptibility (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 mask)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 4/6 KVM: x86: LASS protection on KVM emulation when LASS enabled
In reply to Zeng GuangDo LASS violation check for instructions emulated by KVM. Note that for instructions executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check.
Not all instruction emulation leads to accesses to guest linear addresses because 1) some instrutions like CPUID, RDMSR, don't take memory as operands 2) instruction fetch in most cases is already done inside the guest.
Four cases in which kvm may access guest linear addresses are identified by code inspection:
- KVM emulator uses segmented address for instruction fetches or data accesses.
- For implicit data access, KVM emulator gets address to a system data structure(GDT/LDT/IDT/TR).
- For VMX instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from "VM-exit instruction information" field in VMCS.
- For SGX ENCLS instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from registers.
LASS violation check applies to these linear address so as to enforce mode-based protections as hardware behaves.
As exceptions, the target memory address of emulation of invlpg, branch and call instructions doesn't require LASS violation check.
--- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +31 -5
@@ -687,7 +687,8 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,struct segmented_address addr, unsigned *max_size, unsigned size, bool write, bool fetch, - enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear) + enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear, + u64 flags) { struct desc_struct desc;bool usable;
@@ -695,6 +696,7 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,u32 lim;u16 sel;u8 va_bits; +u64 access = fetch ?PFERR_FETCH_MASK :0 ; la =seg_base (ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea; *max_size =0 ;
@@ -740,6 +742,10 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, }break ; } + +if (ctxt->ops->check_lass (ctxt, access, *linear, flags)) + goto bad; +if (la & (insn_alignment (ctxt, size) -1 ))return emulate_gp (ctxt,0 );return X86EMUL_CONTINUE ;
@@ -757,7 +763,7 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, {unsigned max_size;return __linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size, size, write, false, - ctxt->mode, linear); + ctxt->mode, linear,0 ); }static inline int assign_eip (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,ulong dst)
@@ -770,7 +776,10 @@ static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)if (ctxt->op_bytes !=sizeof (unsigned long )) addr.ea = dst & ((1UL << (ctxt->op_bytes <<3 )) -1 ); - rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,1 , false, true, ctxt->mode, &linear); + +/* LASS doesn't apply to address for branch and call instructions */ + rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,1 , false, true, ctxt->mode, + &linear,KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS );if (rc ==X86EMUL_CONTINUE ) ctxt->_eip = addr.ea;return rc;
@@ -845,6 +854,13 @@ static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)static int linear_read_system (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,ulong linear,void *data,unsigned size) { +if (ctxt->ops->check_lass (ctxt,PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS , linear,0 )) { + ctxt->exception.vector =GP_VECTOR ; + ctxt->exception.error_code =0 ; + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; +return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT ; + } +return ctxt->ops->read_std (ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }
@@ -852,6 +868,13 @@ static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear, void *data, unsigned int size) { + if (ctxt->ops->check_lass(ctxt, PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS, linear, 0)) { + ctxt->exception.vector = GP_VECTOR; + ctxt->exception.error_code =0 ; + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; +return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT ; + } +return ctxt->ops->write_std (ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }
@@ -907,7 +930,7 @@ static int __do_insn_fetch_bytes(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int op_size)* against op_size. */ rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,0 , false, true, ctxt->mode, - &linear); + &linear,0 );if (unlikely (rc !=X86EMUL_CONTINUE ))return rc;
@@ -3432,8 +3455,11 @@ static int em_invlpg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) {int rc;ulong linear; +unsigned max_size; - rc =linearize (ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem,1 , false, &linear); +/* LASS doesn't apply to the memory address for invlpg */ + rc =__linearize (ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem, &max_size,1 , false, false, + ctxt->mode, &linear,KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS );if (rc ==X86EMUL_CONTINUE ) ctxt->ops->invlpg (ctxt, linear);/* Disable writeback. */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +3 -0
@@ -4974,6 +4974,9 @@ int get_vmx_mem_address(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long exit_qualification,* destination for long mode! */ exn =is_noncanonical_address (*ret, vcpu); + +if (!exn) + exn =__vmx_check_lass (vcpu,0 , *ret,0 ); }else {/* * When not in long mode, the virtual/linear address is
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +2 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static int sgx_get_encls_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long offset, fault = true; }else if (likely (is_long_mode (vcpu))) { fault =is_noncanonical_address (*gva, vcpu); +if (!fault) + fault =__vmx_check_lass (vcpu,0 , *gva,0 ); }else { *gva &=0xffffffff ; fault = (s.unusable) ||
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH 4/6] KVM: x86: LASS protection on KVM emulation when LASS enabled
Quoted 6 lines · Zeng Guang
Do LASS violation check for instructions emulated by KVM. Note that for instructions executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check.
Not all instruction emulation leads to accesses to guest linear addresses because 1) some instrutions like CPUID, RDMSR, don't take memory as
/s/instrutions/instructions
Quoted 2 lines
operands 2) instruction fetch in most cases is already done inside the guest.
What are the instruction fetch cases not covered in non-root mode?
And IIUC, the patch actually doesn't distinguish them and alway checks LASS voilation for instruction fetch in instruction emulation, right?
Quoted 6 lines
Four cases in which kvm may access guest linear addresses are identified by code inspection:
- KVM emulator uses segmented address for instruction fetches or data accesses.
- For implicit data access, KVM emulator gets address to a system data
to or from?
Quoted 6 lines
structure(GDT/LDT/IDT/TR).
- For VMX instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from "VM-exit instruction information" field in VMCS.
- For SGX ENCLS instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from registers.LASS violation check applies to these linear address so as to enforce
address -> addresses
Quoted 143 lines
mode-based protections as hardware behaves.
As exceptions, the target memory address of emulation of invlpg, branch and call instructions doesn't require LASS violation check.
Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +31
-5@@ -687,7 +687,8 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,struct segmented_address addr, unsigned *max_size, unsigned size, bool write, bool fetch, - enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear) + enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear, + u64 flags) { struct desc_struct desc;bool usable;@@ -695,6 +696,7 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,u32 lim;u16 sel;u8 va_bits; +u64 access = fetch ?PFERR_FETCH_MASK :0 ; la =seg_base (ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea; *max_size =0 ;@@ -740,6 +742,10 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, }break ; } + +if (ctxt->ops->check_lass (ctxt, access, *linear, flags)) + goto bad; +if (la & (insn_alignment (ctxt, size) -1 ))return emulate_gp (ctxt,0 );return X86EMUL_CONTINUE ;@@ -757,7 +763,7 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, {unsigned max_size;return __linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size, size, write, false, - ctxt->mode, linear); + ctxt->mode, linear,0 ); }static inline int assign_eip (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,ulong dst)@@ -770,7 +776,10 @@ static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)if (ctxt->op_bytes !=sizeof (unsigned long )) addr.ea = dst & ((1UL << (ctxt->op_bytes <<3 )) -1 ); - rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,1 , false, true, ctxt->mode, &linear); + +/* LASS doesn't apply to address for branch and call instructions */ + rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,1 , false, true, ctxt->mode, + &linear,KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS );if (rc ==X86EMUL_CONTINUE ) ctxt->_eip = addr.ea;return rc;@@ -845,6 +854,13 @@ static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)static int linear_read_system (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,ulong linear,void *data,unsigned size) { +if (ctxt->ops->check_lass (ctxt,PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS , linear,0 )) { + ctxt->exception.vector =GP_VECTOR ; + ctxt->exception.error_code =0 ; + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; +return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT ; + } +return ctxt->ops->read_std (ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }@@ -852,6 +868,13 @@ static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear, void *data, unsigned int size) { + if (ctxt->ops->check_lass(ctxt, PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS, linear, 0)) { + ctxt->exception.vector = GP_VECTOR; + ctxt->exception.error_code =0 ; + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; +return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT ; + } +return ctxt->ops->write_std (ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }@@ -907,7 +930,7 @@ static int __do_insn_fetch_bytes(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int op_size)* against op_size. */ rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,0 , false, true, ctxt->mode, - &linear); + &linear,0 );if (unlikely (rc !=X86EMUL_CONTINUE ))return rc;@@ -3432,8 +3455,11 @@ static int em_invlpg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) {int rc;ulong linear; +unsigned max_size; - rc =linearize (ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem,1 , false, &linear); +/* LASS doesn't apply to the memory address for invlpg */ + rc =__linearize (ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem, &max_size,1 , false, false, + ctxt->mode, &linear,KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS );if (rc ==X86EMUL_CONTINUE ) ctxt->ops->invlpg (ctxt, linear);/* Disable writeback. */ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +3
-0@@ -4974,6 +4974,9 @@ int get_vmx_mem_address(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long exit_qualification,* destination for long mode! */ exn =is_noncanonical_address (*ret, vcpu); + +if (!exn) + exn =__vmx_check_lass (vcpu,0 , *ret,0 ); }else {/* * When not in long mode, the virtual/linear address is arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +2
-0@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static int sgx_get_encls_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long offset, fault = true; }else if (likely (is_long_mode (vcpu))) { fault =is_noncanonical_address (*gva, vcpu); +if (!fault) + fault =__vmx_check_lass (vcpu,0 , *gva,0 ); }else { *gva &=0xffffffff ; fault = (s.unusable) ||
Re: [PATCH 4/6] KVM: x86: LASS protection on KVM emulation when LASS enabled
Quoted 9 lines · Binbin Wu
Quoted 6 lines · Zeng Guang
Do LASS violation check for instructions emulated by KVM. Note that for instructions executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check.
Not all instruction emulation leads to accesses to guest linear addresses because 1) some instrutions like CPUID, RDMSR, don't take memory as
/s/instrutions/instructions
Oops. :P
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
operands 2) instruction fetch in most cases is already done inside the guest.
What are the instruction fetch cases not covered in non-root mode? And IIUC, the patch actually doesn't distinguish them and alway checks LASS voilation
for instruction fetch in instruction emulation, right?
Here states most of instruction needn't be fetched by KVM. KVM intercept the most of privileged instructions and complete the function emulation directly. But some instructions requires KVM to fetch the code and emulate further, e.g. lgdt/sgdt etc. KVM will always do LASS violation check on instruction fetch once it happens.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Four cases in which kvm may access guest linear addresses are identified by code inspection:
- KVM emulator uses segmented address for instruction fetches or data accesses.
- For implicit data access, KVM emulator gets address to a system datato or from?
It means the address pointing *to* a system data structure.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
structure(GDT/LDT/IDT/TR).
- For VMX instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from "VM-exit instruction information" field in VMCS.
- For SGX ENCLS instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from registers.LASS violation check applies to these linear address so as to enforce
address -> addresses
OK.
Quoted 144 lines
Quoted 144 lines
mode-based protections as hardware behaves.
As exceptions, the target memory address of emulation of invlpg, branch and call instructions doesn't require LASS violation check.
Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +31
-5@@ -687,7 +687,8 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,struct segmented_address addr, unsigned *max_size, unsigned size, bool write, bool fetch, - enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear) + enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear, + u64 flags) { struct desc_struct desc;bool usable;@@ -695,6 +696,7 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,u32 lim;u16 sel;u8 va_bits; +u64 access = fetch ?PFERR_FETCH_MASK :0 ; la =seg_base (ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea; *max_size =0 ;@@ -740,6 +742,10 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, }break ; } + +if (ctxt->ops->check_lass (ctxt, access, *linear, flags)) + goto bad; +if (la & (insn_alignment (ctxt, size) -1 ))return emulate_gp (ctxt,0 );return X86EMUL_CONTINUE ;@@ -757,7 +763,7 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, {unsigned max_size;return __linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size, size, write, false, - ctxt->mode, linear); + ctxt->mode, linear,0 ); }static inline int assign_eip (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,ulong dst)@@ -770,7 +776,10 @@ static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)if (ctxt->op_bytes !=sizeof (unsigned long )) addr.ea = dst & ((1UL << (ctxt->op_bytes <<3 )) -1 ); - rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,1 , false, true, ctxt->mode, &linear); + +/* LASS doesn't apply to address for branch and call instructions */ + rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,1 , false, true, ctxt->mode, + &linear,KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS );if (rc ==X86EMUL_CONTINUE ) ctxt->_eip = addr.ea;return rc;@@ -845,6 +854,13 @@ static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)static int linear_read_system (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,ulong linear,void *data,unsigned size) { +if (ctxt->ops->check_lass (ctxt,PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS , linear,0 )) { + ctxt->exception.vector =GP_VECTOR ; + ctxt->exception.error_code =0 ; + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; +return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT ; + } +return ctxt->ops->read_std (ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }@@ -852,6 +868,13 @@ static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear, void *data, unsigned int size) { + if (ctxt->ops->check_lass(ctxt, PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS, linear, 0)) { + ctxt->exception.vector = GP_VECTOR; + ctxt->exception.error_code =0 ; + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; +return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT ; + } +return ctxt->ops->write_std (ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }@@ -907,7 +930,7 @@ static int __do_insn_fetch_bytes(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int op_size)* against op_size. */ rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,0 , false, true, ctxt->mode, - &linear); + &linear,0 );if (unlikely (rc !=X86EMUL_CONTINUE ))return rc;@@ -3432,8 +3455,11 @@ static int em_invlpg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) {int rc;ulong linear; +unsigned max_size; - rc =linearize (ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem,1 , false, &linear); +/* LASS doesn't apply to the memory address for invlpg */ + rc =__linearize (ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem, &max_size,1 , false, false, + ctxt->mode, &linear,KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS );if (rc ==X86EMUL_CONTINUE ) ctxt->ops->invlpg (ctxt, linear);/* Disable writeback. */ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +3
-0@@ -4974,6 +4974,9 @@ int get_vmx_mem_address(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long exit_qualification,* destination for long mode! */ exn =is_noncanonical_address (*ret, vcpu); + +if (!exn) + exn =__vmx_check_lass (vcpu,0 , *ret,0 ); }else {/* * When not in long mode, the virtual/linear address is arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +2
-0@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static int sgx_get_encls_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long offset, fault = true; }else if (likely (is_long_mode (vcpu))) { fault =is_noncanonical_address (*gva, vcpu); +if (!fault) + fault =__vmx_check_lass (vcpu,0 , *gva,0 ); }else { *gva &=0xffffffff ; fault = (s.unusable) ||
Re: [PATCH 4/6] KVM: x86: LASS protection on KVM emulation when LASS enabled
In reply to Zeng GuangQuoted 75 lines · Zeng Guang
Do LASS violation check for instructions emulated by KVM. Note that for instructions executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the check.
Not all instruction emulation leads to accesses to guest linear addresses because 1) some instrutions like CPUID, RDMSR, don't take memory as operands 2) instruction fetch in most cases is already done inside the guest.
Four cases in which kvm may access guest linear addresses are identified by code inspection:
- KVM emulator uses segmented address for instruction fetches or data accesses.
- For implicit data access, KVM emulator gets address to a system data structure(GDT/LDT/IDT/TR).
- For VMX instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from "VM-exit instruction information" field in VMCS.
- For SGX ENCLS instruction emulation, KVM gets the address from registers.LASS violation check applies to these linear address so as to enforce mode-based protections as hardware behaves.
As exceptions, the target memory address of emulation of invlpg, branch and call instructions doesn't require LASS violation check.
Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +8
-2@@ -687,7 +687,8 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,struct segmented_address addr, unsigned *max_size, unsigned size, bool write, bool fetch, - enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear) + enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear, + u64 flags) { struct desc_struct desc;bool usable;@@ -695,6 +696,7 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,u32 lim;u16 sel;u8 va_bits; +u64 access = fetch ?PFERR_FETCH_MASK :0 ; la =seg_base (ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea; *max_size =0 ;@@ -740,6 +742,10 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, }break ; } + +if (ctxt->ops->check_lass (ctxt, access, *linear, flags)) + goto bad; +if (la & (insn_alignment (ctxt, size) -1 ))return emulate_gp (ctxt,0 );return X86EMUL_CONTINUE ;@@ -757,7 +763,7 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, {unsigned max_size;return __linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size, size, write, false, - ctxt->mode, linear); + ctxt->mode, linear,0 ); }static inline int assign_eip (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,ulong dst)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst) · line 782
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +4
-1@@ -770,7 +776,10 @@ static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)if (ctxt->op_bytes !=sizeof (unsigned long )) addr.ea = dst & ((1UL << (ctxt->op_bytes <<3 )) -1 ); - rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,1 , false, true, ctxt->mode, &linear); + +/* LASS doesn't apply to address for branch and call instructions */ + rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,1 , false, true, ctxt->mode, + &linear,KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS );
The emulator.c is common part of x86, so may more common abstraction like permiession_check_before_paging better ? Let's also wait other guy's input for this.
Quoted 83 lines
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +19
-2if (rc ==X86EMUL_CONTINUE ) ctxt->_eip = addr.ea;return rc;@@ -845,6 +854,13 @@ static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)static int linear_read_system (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,ulong linear,void *data,unsigned size) { +if (ctxt->ops->check_lass (ctxt,PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS , linear,0 )) { + ctxt->exception.vector =GP_VECTOR ; + ctxt->exception.error_code =0 ; + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; +return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT ; + } +return ctxt->ops->read_std (ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }@@ -852,6 +868,13 @@ static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear, void *data, unsigned int size) { + if (ctxt->ops->check_lass(ctxt, PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS, linear, 0)) { + ctxt->exception.vector = GP_VECTOR; + ctxt->exception.error_code =0 ; + ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = true; +return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT ; + } +return ctxt->ops->write_std (ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }@@ -907,7 +930,7 @@ static int __do_insn_fetch_bytes(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int op_size)* against op_size. */ rc =__linearize (ctxt, addr, &max_size,0 , false, true, ctxt->mode, - &linear); + &linear,0 );if (unlikely (rc !=X86EMUL_CONTINUE ))return rc;@@ -3432,8 +3455,11 @@ static int em_invlpg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) {int rc;ulong linear; +unsigned max_size; - rc =linearize (ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem,1 , false, &linear); +/* LASS doesn't apply to the memory address for invlpg */ + rc =__linearize (ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem, &max_size,1 , false, false, + ctxt->mode, &linear,KVM_X86_EMULFLAG_SKIP_LASS );if (rc ==X86EMUL_CONTINUE ) ctxt->ops->invlpg (ctxt, linear);/* Disable writeback. */ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +3
-0@@ -4974,6 +4974,9 @@ int get_vmx_mem_address(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long exit_qualification,* destination for long mode! */ exn =is_noncanonical_address (*ret, vcpu); + +if (!exn) + exn =__vmx_check_lass (vcpu,0 , *ret,0 ); }else {/* * When not in long mode, the virtual/linear address is arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +2
-1@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static int sgx_get_encls_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long offset, fault = true; }else if (likely (is_long_mode (vcpu))) { fault =is_noncanonical_address (*gva, vcpu); +if (!fault) + fault =__vmx_check_lass (vcpu,0 , *gva,0 ); }else { *gva &=0xffffffff ; fault = (s.unusable) || --2.27.0
PATCH 5/6 KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space
In reply to Zeng GuangLASS (Linear-address space separation) is an independent mechanism to enforce the mode-based protection that can prevent user-mode accesses to supervisor-mode addresses, and vice versa. Because the LASS protections are applied before paging, malicious software can not acquire any paging-based timing information to compromise the security of system.
The CPUID bit definition to support LASS:
CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6]
Advertise LASS to user space to support LASS virtualization.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -2
@@ -663,8 +663,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD );kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_7_1_EAX , -F (AVX_VNNI ) |F (AVX512_BF16 ) |F (CMPCCXADD ) |F (AMX_FP16 ) | -F (AVX_IFMA ) +F (AVX_VNNI ) |F (AVX512_BF16 ) |F (LASS ) |F (CMPCCXADD ) | +F (AMX_FP16 ) |F (AVX_IFMA ) ); kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_7_1_EDX,
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 6/6 KVM: x86: Set KVM LASS based on hardware capability
In reply to Zeng GuangHost kernel may clear LASS capability in boot_cpu_data.x86_capability besides explicitly using clearcpuid parameter. That will cause guest not being able to manage LASS independently. So set KVM LASS directly based on hardware capability to eliminate the dependency.
Add new helper functions to facilitate getting result of CPUID sub-leaf.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h +36 -0
@@ -127,6 +127,42 @@ static inline unsigned int cpuid_edx(unsigned int op)return edx; } +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_eax (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return eax; +} + +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_ebx (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return ebx; +} + +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_ecx (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return ecx; +} + +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_edx (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return edx; +} + static __always_inline bool cpuid_function_is_indexed(u32 function) {switch (function) {
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +4 -0
@@ -667,6 +667,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)F (AMX_FP16 ) |F (AVX_IFMA ) ); +/* Set LASS based on hardware capability */ +if (cpuid_count_eax (7 ,1 ) &F (LASS )) +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_LASS ); +kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined (CPUID_7_1_EDX ,F (AVX_VNNI_INT8 ) |F (AVX_NE_CONVERT ) |F (PREFETCHITI ) );
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH 6/6] KVM: x86: Set KVM LASS based on hardware capability
Quoted 1 line · Zeng Guang
Host kernel may clear LASS capability in boot_cpu_data.x86_capability
Is there some option to do it?
Quoted 74 lines
besides explicitly using clearcpuid parameter. That will cause guest not being able to manage LASS independently. So set KVM LASS directly based on hardware capability to eliminate the dependency.
Add new helper functions to facilitate getting result of CPUID sub-leaf.
Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h +36
-0@@ -127,6 +127,42 @@ static inline unsigned int cpuid_edx(unsigned int op)return edx; } +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_eax (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return eax; +} + +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_ebx (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return ebx; +} + +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_ecx (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return ecx; +} + +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_edx (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return edx; +} + static __always_inline bool cpuid_function_is_indexed(u32 function) {switch (function) {arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +4
-0@@ -667,6 +667,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)F (AMX_FP16 ) |F (AVX_IFMA ) ); +/* Set LASS based on hardware capability */ +if (cpuid_count_eax (7 ,1 ) &F (LASS )) +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_LASS ); +kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined (CPUID_7_1_EDX ,F (AVX_VNNI_INT8 ) |F (AVX_NE_CONVERT ) |F (PREFETCHITI ) );
Re: [PATCH 6/6] KVM: x86: Set KVM LASS based on hardware capability
Quoted 4 lines · Binbin Wu
Quoted 1 line · Zeng Guang
Host kernel may clear LASS capability in boot_cpu_data.x86_capability
Is there some option to do it?
Kernel supporting LASS will turn off the LASS capability with specific option, e.g. "vsyscall=emulate".
Quoted 74 lines
Quoted 74 lines
besides explicitly using clearcpuid parameter. That will cause guest not being able to manage LASS independently. So set KVM LASS directly based on hardware capability to eliminate the dependency.
Add new helper functions to facilitate getting result of CPUID sub-leaf.
Signed-off-by Zeng Guang <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h +36
-0@@ -127,6 +127,42 @@ static inline unsigned int cpuid_edx(unsigned int op)return edx; } +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_eax (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return eax; +} + +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_ebx (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return ebx; +} + +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_ecx (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return ecx; +} + +static inline unsigned int cpuid_count_edx (unsigned int op,int count) +{ +unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + +cpuid_count (op, count, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + +return edx; +} + static __always_inline bool cpuid_function_is_indexed(u32 function) {switch (function) {arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +4
-0@@ -667,6 +667,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)F (AMX_FP16 ) |F (AVX_IFMA ) ); +/* Set LASS based on hardware capability */ +if (cpuid_count_eax (7 ,1 ) &F (LASS )) +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_LASS ); +kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined (CPUID_7_1_EDX ,F (AVX_VNNI_INT8 ) |F (AVX_NE_CONVERT ) |F (PREFETCHITI ) );
Re: [PATCH 6/6] KVM: x86: Set KVM LASS based on hardware capability
In reply to Zeng GuangQuoted 4 lines · Zeng Guang
Host kernel may clear LASS capability in boot_cpu_data.x86_capability besides explicitly using clearcpuid parameter. That will cause guest not being able to manage LASS independently. So set KVM LASS directly based on hardware capability to eliminate the dependency.
...
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) · line 673
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +4
-0+/* Set LASS based on hardware capability */ +if (cpuid_count_eax (7 ,1 ) &F (LASS )) +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_LASS ); +
What if LASS is cleared in boot_cpu_data because not all CPUs support LASS?
In arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c, identify_cpu() clears features which are not supported by all CPUs:
/*
* On SMP, boot_cpu_data holds the common feature set between
* all CPUs; so make sure that we indicate which features are
* common between the CPUs. The first time this routine gets
* executed, c == &boot_cpu_data.
*/
if (c != &boot_cpu_data) {
/* AND the already accumulated flags with these */
for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS; i++)
boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[i] &= c->x86_capability[i];LA57 seems to have the same issue. We may need to add some checks for LA57 in KVM's cpu hotplug callback.
Quoted 6 lines
kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_7_1_EDX, F(AVX_VNNI_INT8) | F(AVX_NE_CONVERT) | F(PREFETCHITI) );Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Quoted 6 lines · Zeng Guang
Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious software will provide no paging-based timing information.
Quoted 8 lines
LASS works in long mode and partitions the 64-bit canonical linear address space into two halves:
1. Lower half (LA[63]=0) --> user space
2. Upper half (LA[63]=1) --> kernel spaceWhen LASS is enabled, a general protection #GP fault or a stack fault #SS will be generated if software accesses the address from the half in which it resides to another half,
The accessor's mode is based on CPL, not the address range, so it feels a bit inaccurate of descripton "in which it resides".
Quoted 6 lines
e.g., either from user space to
upper half, or from kernel space to lower half. This protection applies to data access, code execution.This series add KVM LASS virtualization support.
Quoted 8 lines
When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the LASS violation check, while KVM also needs to apply LASS to instructions emulated by software and injects #GP or #SS fault to the guest.
Following LASS voilations check will be taken on KVM emulation path.
/s/voilations/violations
Quoted 15 lines
User-mode access to supervisor space address:
LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3) Supervisor-mode access to user space address: Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3) Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 && CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access)We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As current KVM unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule that kernel should run in the upper half, we use kernel module and application test to verify LASS functionalities in guest instead. The data access related x86 emulator code is verified with forced emulation prefix (FEP) mechanism. Other test cases are working in progress.
Quoted 3 lines
How to add tests for LASS in KUT or kselftest is still under investigation.
[1] Intel Architecutre Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features
/s/Architecutre/Architecture
Quoted 25 lines
Programming Reference: Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368Zeng Guang (6):
KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
KVM: VMX: Add new ops inkvm_x86_opsfor LASS violation check
KVM: x86: Add emulator helper for LASS violation check
KVM: x86: LASS protection on KVM emulation when LASS enabled
KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space
KVM: x86: Set KVM LASS based on hardware capabilityarch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 7 +++- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 8 +++-- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ 12 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Quoted 12 lines · Binbin Wu
Quoted 11 lines · Zeng Guang
Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious software will provide no paging-based timing information.
LASS works in long mode and partitions the 64-bit canonical linear address space into two halves:
1. Lower half (LA[63]=0) --> user space
2. Upper half (LA[63]=1) --> kernel space
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
When LASS is enabled, a general protection #GP fault or a stack fault #SS will be generated if software accesses the address from the half in which it resides to another half,
The accessor's mode is based on CPL, not the address range, so it feels a bit inaccurate of descripton "in which it resides".
This is alternative description to implicitly signify the privilege level, i.e. code running in upper half means it is in supervisor mode, otherwise it's in user mode. :)
Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 6 lines
e.g., either from user space to
upper half, or from kernel space to lower half. This protection applies to data access, code execution.This series add KVM LASS virtualization support.
Quoted 8 lines
When platform has LASS capability, KVM requires to expose this feature to guest VM enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H.ECX=1):EAX.LASS[bit 6], and allow guest to enable it via CR4.LASS[bit 27] on demand. For instruction executed in the guest directly, hardware will perform the LASS violation check, while KVM also needs to apply LASS to instructions emulated by software and injects #GP or #SS fault to the guest.
Following LASS voilations check will be taken on KVM emulation path.
/s/voilations/violations
Quoted 15 lines
User-mode access to supervisor space address:
LA[bit 63] && (CPL == 3) Supervisor-mode access to user space address: Instruction fetch: !LA[bit 63] && (CPL < 3) Data access: !LA[bit 63] && (CR4.SMAP==1) && ((RFLAGS.AC == 0 && CPL < 3) || Implicit supervisor access)We tested the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS enumeration and enabling in non-root and nested environment. As current KVM unittest framework is not compatible to LASS rule that kernel should run in the upper half, we use kernel module and application test to verify LASS functionalities in guest instead. The data access related x86 emulator code is verified with forced emulation prefix (FEP) mechanism. Other test cases are working in progress.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
How to add tests for LASS in KUT or kselftest is still under investigation.
[1] Intel Architecutre Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features
/s/Architecutre/Architecture
Sorry for typos above. Thanks.
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 25 lines
Programming Reference: Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368Zeng Guang (6):
KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS
KVM: VMX: Add new ops inkvm_x86_opsfor LASS violation check
KVM: x86: Add emulator helper for LASS violation check
KVM: x86: LASS protection on KVM emulation when LASS enabled
KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space
KVM: x86: Set KVM LASS based on hardware capabilityarch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 7 +++- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 8 +++-- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++ 12 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)