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x86/altp2m: Hypercall to set altp2m view visibility

PATCH Superseded Alexandru Stefan ISAILA 4 participants 8 messages Feb 19, 2020 – Feb 20, 2020

v3 of 8 Superseded Latest is v8 →

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PATCH v3 1/1 x86/altp2m: Hypercall to set altp2m view visibility

At this moment a guest can call vmfunc to change the altp2m view. This should be limited in order to avoid any unwanted view switch.

The new xc_altp2m_set_visibility() solves this by making views invisible to vmfunc.
This is done by having a separate arch.altp2m_working_eptp that is populated and made invalid in the same places as altp2m_eptp. This is written to EPTP_LIST_ADDR.
The views are made in/visible by marking them with INVALID_MFN or copying them back from altp2m_eptp.
To have consistency the visibility also applies to p2m_switch_domain_altp2m_by_id().

---
CC: Ian Jackson <[email protected]>
CC: Wei Liu <[email protected]>
CC: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
CC: George Dunlap <[email protected]>
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>
CC: "Roger Pau Monné" <[email protected]>
CC: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
CC: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
CC: George Dunlap <[email protected]>
---
Changes since V2:
- Drop hap_enabled() check
- Reduce the indentation depth in hvm.c
- Fix assignment indentation
- Drop pad2.

Changes since V1:
- Drop double view from title.

---
 tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h   |  2 ++
 tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c         | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c          | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c      |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c       | 15 +++++++++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c       |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c           |  7 +++++--
 xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h    |  1 +
 xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h |  9 +++++++++
 9 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h +2 -0
index 99552a5f73..414adb143b 100644
@@ -1943,6 +1943,8 @@ int xc_altp2m_change_gfn(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                          xen_pfn_t new_gfn);
 int xc_altp2m_get_vcpu_p2m_idx(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
                                uint32_t vcpuid, uint16_t *p2midx);
+int xc_altp2m_set_visibility(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
+                             uint16_t view_id, bool visible);
 
 /** 
  * Mem paging operations.
tools/libxc/xc_altp2m.c +24 -0
index 46fb725806..6987c9541f 100644
@@ -410,3 +410,27 @@ int xc_altp2m_get_vcpu_p2m_idx(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
     xc_hypercall_buffer_free(handle, arg);
     return rc;
 }
+
+int xc_altp2m_set_visibility(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
+                             uint16_t view_id, bool visible)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER(xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t, arg);
+
+    arg = xc_hypercall_buffer_alloc(handle, arg, sizeof(*arg));
+    if ( arg == NULL )
+        return -1;
+
+    arg->version = HVMOP_ALTP2M_INTERFACE_VERSION;
+    arg->cmd = HVMOP_altp2m_set_visibility;
+    arg->domain = domid;
+    arg->u.set_visibility.altp2m_idx = view_id;
+    arg->u.set_visibility.visible = visible;
+
+    rc = xencall2(handle->xcall, __HYPERVISOR_hvm_op, HVMOP_altp2m,
+                  HYPERCALL_BUFFER_AS_ARG(arg));
+
+    xc_hypercall_buffer_free(handle, arg);
+    return rc;
+}
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +18 -0
index 00a9e70b7c..24035261f4 100644
@@ -4558,6 +4558,7 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
     case HVMOP_altp2m_get_mem_access:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_change_gfn:
     case HVMOP_altp2m_get_p2m_idx:
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_visibility:
         break;
 
     default:
@@ -4835,6 +4836,23 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
         break;
     }
 
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_visibility:
+    {
+        uint16_t altp2m_idx = a.u.set_visibility.altp2m_idx;
+
+        if ( a.u.set_visibility.pad )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else if ( !altp2m_active(d) )
+            rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        else if ( a.u.set_visibility.visible )
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[altp2m_idx] =
+                d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx];
+        else
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[altp2m_idx] =
+                mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
+        break;
+    }
+
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
     }
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
index bc2f48bf2c..90de909fec 100644
@@ -2140,7 +2140,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve(struct vcpu *v)
     {
         v->arch.hvm.vmx.secondary_exec_control |= mask;
         __vmwrite(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING);
-        __vmwrite(EPTP_LIST_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(d->arch.altp2m_eptp));
+        __vmwrite(EPTP_LIST_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp));
 
         if ( cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions )
         {
xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c +15 -0
index 3d93f3451c..5969ec8922 100644
@@ -488,8 +488,17 @@ int hap_enable(struct domain *d, u32 mode)
             goto out;
         }
 
+        if ( (d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp = alloc_xenheap_page()) == NULL )
+        {
+            rv = -ENOMEM;
+            goto out;
+        }
+
         for ( i = 0; i < MAX_EPTP; i++ )
+        {
             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[i] = mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[i] = mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
+        }
 
         for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
         {
@@ -523,6 +532,12 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
             d->arch.altp2m_eptp = NULL;
         }
 
+        if ( d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp )
+        {
+            free_xenheap_page(d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp);
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp = NULL;
+        }
+
         for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
             p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i]);
     }
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c +1 -0
index eb0f0edfef..6539ca619b 100644
@@ -1368,6 +1368,7 @@ void p2m_init_altp2m_ept(struct domain *d, unsigned int i)
     ept = &p2m->ept;
     ept->mfn = pagetable_get_pfn(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m));
     d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(i, MAX_EPTP)] = ept->eptp;
+    d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[array_index_nospec(i, MAX_EPTP)] = ept->eptp;
 }
 
 unsigned int p2m_find_altp2m_by_eptp(struct domain *d, uint64_t eptp)
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +5 -2
index 9f1c29d7ef..13b96715ba 100644
@@ -2519,6 +2519,7 @@ void p2m_flush_altp2m(struct domain *d)
     {
         p2m_reset_altp2m(d, i, ALTP2M_DEACTIVATE);
         d->arch.altp2m_eptp[i] = mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
+        d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[i] = mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
     }
 
     altp2m_list_unlock(d);
@@ -2638,7 +2639,9 @@ int p2m_destroy_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
         {
             p2m_reset_altp2m(d, idx, ALTP2M_DEACTIVATE);
             d->arch.altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_EPTP)] =
-            mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
+                mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[array_index_nospec(idx, MAX_EPTP)] =
+                mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);
             rc = 0;
         }
     }
@@ -2665,7 +2668,7 @@ int p2m_switch_domain_altp2m_by_id(struct domain *d, unsigned int idx)
     rc = -EINVAL;
     altp2m_list_lock(d);
 
-    if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp[idx] != mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
+    if ( d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[idx] != mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
     {
         for_each_vcpu( d, v )
             if ( idx != vcpu_altp2m(v).p2midx )
xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +1 -0
index 1843c76d1a..b039717778 100644
@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ struct arch_domain
     struct p2m_domain *altp2m_p2m[MAX_ALTP2M];
     mm_lock_t altp2m_list_lock;
     uint64_t *altp2m_eptp;
+    uint64_t *altp2m_working_eptp;
 #endif
 
     /* NB. protected by d->event_lock and by irq_desc[irq].lock */
xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h +9 -0
index b599d3cbd0..870ec52060 100644
@@ -318,6 +318,12 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_get_vcpu_p2m_idx {
     uint16_t altp2m_idx;
 };
 
+struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_visibility {
+    uint16_t altp2m_idx;
+    uint8_t visible;
+    uint8_t pad;
+};
+
 struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
     uint32_t version;   /* HVMOP_ALTP2M_INTERFACE_VERSION */
     uint32_t cmd;
@@ -350,6 +356,8 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
 #define HVMOP_altp2m_get_p2m_idx          14
 /* Set the "Supress #VE" bit for a range of pages */
 #define HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_multi 15
+/* Set visibility for a given altp2m view */
+#define HVMOP_altp2m_set_visibility       16
     domid_t domain;
     uint16_t pad1;
     uint32_t pad2;
@@ -367,6 +375,7 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_suppress_ve_multi    suppress_ve_multi;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_vcpu_disable_notify  disable_notify;
         struct xen_hvm_altp2m_get_vcpu_p2m_idx     get_vcpu_p2m_idx;
+        struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_visibility       set_visibility;
         uint8_t pad[64];
     } u;
 };
Signature · 6 lines
2.17.1

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#1 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

At this moment a guest can call vmfunc to change the altp2m view. This should be limited in order to avoid any unwanted view switch.

Quoted 9 lines

The new xc_altp2m_set_visibility() solves this by making views invisible to vmfunc.
This is done by having a separate arch.altp2m_working_eptp that is populated and made invalid in the same places as altp2m_eptp. This is written to EPTP_LIST_ADDR.
The views are made in/visible by marking them with INVALID_MFN or copying them back from altp2m_eptp.
To have consistency the visibility also applies to p2m_switch_domain_altp2m_by_id().

I'm just wondering, what prevents the guest from calling this HVM op before doing vmfunc? This seems to only make a difference in case the altp2m mode is either set as external or limited (or have a more fine-grained XSM policy loaded). Is that correct? If so, perhaps mention that in the commit message and as a comment on the libxc function so that people don't get a false sense of security when using the mixed mode.

Thanks,
Tamas

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#2 lore raw
Quoted 16 lines · Tamas K Lengyel
Quoted 4 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

At this moment a guest can call vmfunc to change the altp2m view. This should be limited in order to avoid any unwanted view switch.

Quoted 9 lines

The new xc_altp2m_set_visibility() solves this by making views invisible to vmfunc.
This is done by having a separate arch.altp2m_working_eptp that is populated and made invalid in the same places as altp2m_eptp. This is written to EPTP_LIST_ADDR.
The views are made in/visible by marking them with INVALID_MFN or copying them back from altp2m_eptp.
To have consistency the visibility also applies to p2m_switch_domain_altp2m_by_id().

Quoted 4 lines

I'm just wondering, what prevents the guest from calling this HVM op before doing vmfunc? This seems to only make a difference in case the altp2m mode is either set as external or limited (or have a more fine-grained XSM policy loaded). Is that correct? If so, perhaps

Yes, that is correct.

Quoted 4 lines

mention that in the commit message and as a comment on the libxc function so that people don't get a false sense of security when using the mixed mode.

I will add this fact in the commit message and in libxc. Good thing to point that out.

Thanks,
Alex
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#3 lore raw
In reply to Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 8 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +4 -0
@@ -4835,6 +4836,23 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
         break;
     }
 
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_visibility:
+    {
+        uint16_t altp2m_idx = a.u.set_visibility.altp2m_idx;
+

xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c static int do_altp2m_op( · line 4852

Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +10 -0
+        if ( a.u.set_visibility.pad )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else if ( !altp2m_active(d) )
+            rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        else if ( a.u.set_visibility.visible )
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[altp2m_idx] =
+                d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx];
+        else
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[altp2m_idx] =
+                mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);

Don't you need to bounds check the index before its use? And shouldn't you return an error also for in-range ones which aren't actually valid?

Jan

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#4 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -4835,6 +4836,23 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
          break;
      }
 
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +4 -0
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_visibility:
+    {
+        uint16_t altp2m_idx = a.u.set_visibility.altp2m_idx;
+

xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c static int do_altp2m_op( · line 4852

Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +10 -0
+        if ( a.u.set_visibility.pad )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else if ( !altp2m_active(d) )
+            rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        else if ( a.u.set_visibility.visible )
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[altp2m_idx] =
+                d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx];
+        else
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[altp2m_idx] =
+                mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);

Don't you need to bounds check the index before its use?

Unless we want a index out of bounds from the user. Sorry for not having that, I will add a "altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)]" in place for the next version.

Quoted 3 lines

And
shouldn't you return an error also for in-range ones which aren't actually valid?

That is a good thing. Maybe -EINVAL could fit this?

And together with the bounds check it will end up something like this:

if ( !altp2m_idx < 0 || altp2m_idx >= min(ARRAY_SIZE(d->arch.altp2m_p2m), MAX_EPTP) || altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )

return -EINVAL;

And looking again, it could be coupled with the a.u.set_visibility.pad.

Thanks,
Alex
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#5 lore raw
Quoted 23 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -4835,6 +4836,23 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
          break;
      }
 
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +4 -0
+    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_visibility:
+    {
+        uint16_t altp2m_idx = a.u.set_visibility.altp2m_idx;
+

xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c static int do_altp2m_op( · line 4852

Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +10 -0
+        if ( a.u.set_visibility.pad )
+            rc = -EINVAL;
+        else if ( !altp2m_active(d) )
+            rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        else if ( a.u.set_visibility.visible )
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[altp2m_idx] =
+                d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx];
+        else
+            d->arch.altp2m_working_eptp[altp2m_idx] =
+                mfn_x(INVALID_MFN);

Don't you need to bounds check the index before its use?

Quoted 8 lines

Unless we want a index out of bounds from the user. Sorry for not having that, I will add a "altp2m_eptp[array_index_nospec(altp2m_idx, MAX_EPTP)]" in place for the next version.

Quoted 3 lines

And
shouldn't you return an error also for in-range ones which aren't actually valid?

That is a good thing. Maybe -EINVAL could fit this?

Sure.

Jan

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#6 lore raw
In reply to Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 12 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

At this moment a guest can call vmfunc to change the altp2m view. This should be limited in order to avoid any unwanted view switch.

The new xc_altp2m_set_visibility() solves this by making views invisible to vmfunc.
This is done by having a separate arch.altp2m_working_eptp that is populated and made invalid in the same places as altp2m_eptp. This is written to EPTP_LIST_ADDR.
The views are made in/visible by marking them with INVALID_MFN or copying them back from altp2m_eptp.
To have consistency the visibility also applies to p2m_switch_domain_altp2m_by_id().

So it looks like by default the views are visible, until they're made non-visible?

Also, does the last line mean that the toolstack can't change to a "non-visible" altp2m either?

-George

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#7 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 12 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA

At this moment a guest can call vmfunc to change the altp2m view. This should be limited in order to avoid any unwanted view switch.

The new xc_altp2m_set_visibility() solves this by making views invisible to vmfunc.
This is done by having a separate arch.altp2m_working_eptp that is populated and made invalid in the same places as altp2m_eptp. This is written to EPTP_LIST_ADDR.
The views are made in/visible by marking them with INVALID_MFN or copying them back from altp2m_eptp.
To have consistency the visibility also applies to p2m_switch_domain_altp2m_by_id().

Quoted 2 lines

So it looks like by default the views are visible, until they're made non-visible?

Yes, by default all the active views are visible until they're made non-visible.

Quoted 3 lines

Also, does the last line mean that the toolstack can't change to a "non-visible" altp2m either?

The last line means that xc_altp2m_switch_to_view() will not be able to switch to a non-visible view.

-Alex

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