Fix AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD event formatting
PATCH 1/1 Fix AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD event formatting
The AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD event has dangling text that means the same thing as the event type and is missing the uid and results field. The bigger issue is that in some failure cases no event is emitted. This patch fixes the noted problems.
---
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +10 -7
@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fil {ssize_t length;void *data =NULL ; +unsigned int result =0 ;mutex_lock (&sel_mutex);
@@ -525,24 +526,26 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fil length =sel_make_bools ();if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length =sel_make_classes ();if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length =sel_make_policycap ();if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length = count; + result =1 ; -out1: +out:audit_log (current->audit_context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD , -"policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u" , +"uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u res=%u" , +from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (current)),from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), -audit_get_sessionid (current)); -out: +audit_get_sessionid (current), result); +mutex_unlock (&sel_mutex);vfree (data);return length;
Quoted 6 lines · Steve Grubb
The
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOADevent has dangling text that means the same thing as the event type and is missing the uid and results field. The bigger issue is that in some failure cases no event is emitted. This patch fixes the noted problems.Signed-off-by Steve Grubb <[email protected]>
First off, for patches such as these, I think it is good to CC the affected subsystem, SELinux in this case (fixed).
Beyond that, I'm a little concerned that you adding fields to record in the middle. In the past you've warned against inserting fields in the middle of the record, or reordering fields in general ("you'll break the world") due to some poor userspace practices, yet you do these exact things when it suits you.
We need a consistent message when it comes to userspace record processing so we know what we can do in the kernel without causing massive failure.
Quoted 49 lines
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c 2016-11-21 12:16:08.046787604 -0500 renamed from security/selinux/selinuxfs.c 2016-11-16 15:16:34.738723900 -0500 +10
-8@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fil { ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + unsigned int result = 0; mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);@@ -525,24 +526,26 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fil length = sel_make_bools(); if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length = sel_make_classes(); if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length = sel_make_policycap(); if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length = count; + result = 1; -out1: +out: audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, - "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u", + "uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u res=%u", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), - audit_get_sessionid(current)); -out: + audit_get_sessionid(current), result); + mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex); vfree(data); return length; --Linux-audit mailing list [email protected]
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Signature · 7 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list [email protected] To unsubscribe, send email to [email protected] To get help, send an email containing "help" to [email protected]
Quoted 10 lines · EST Paul Moore
Quoted 6 lines · Steve Grubb
The
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOADevent has dangling text that means the same thing as the event type and is missing the uid and results field. The bigger issue is that in some failure cases no event is emitted. This patch fixes the noted problems.Signed-off-by Steve Grubb <[email protected]>First off, for patches such as these, I think it is good to CC the affected subsystem, SELinux in this case (fixed).
OK.
Quoted 5 lines
Beyond that, I'm a little concerned that you adding fields to record in the middle. In the past you've warned against inserting fields in the middle of the record, or reordering fields in general ("you'll break the world") due to some poor userspace practices, yet you do these exact things when it suits you.
Its not when its suits me, its when it makes sense. This aligns AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD with more event patterns. What I think the solution is is to have a logging function that takes care of the sequence so that people do not have to hand code it like this is.
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We need a consistent message when it comes to userspace record processing so we know what we can do in the kernel without causing massive failure.
I'd like to finish aligning all simple events to a standard for the next kernel release.
-Steve
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---
vanilla-4.9-rc5.orig/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c2016-11-16
15:16:34.738723900 -0500 +++linux-4.9.0-0.rc5.git0.1.fc24.x86_64/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c2016-11-21 12:16:08.046787604 -0500 @@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ static ssize_tsel_write_load(struct fil
{
ssize_t length; void *data = NULL;security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +10
-8+unsigned int result =0 ;mutex_lock (&sel_mutex);@@ -525,24 +526,26 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fil length =sel_make_bools ();if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length =sel_make_classes ();if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length =sel_make_policycap ();if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length = count; + result =1 ; -out1: +out:audit_log (current->audit_context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD , -"policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u" , +"uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u res=%u" , +from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (current)),from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), -audit_get_sessionid (current)); -out: +audit_get_sessionid (current), result); +mutex_unlock (&sel_mutex);vfree (data);return length; --Linux-audit mailing list
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Quoted 5 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 4 lines · Steve Grubb
The
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOADevent has dangling text that means the same thing as the event type and is missing the uid and results field. The bigger issue is that in some failure cases no event is emitted. This patch fixes the noted problems.
A potential problem with this patch is that it changes the semantic meaning of this audit record, from meaning "a policy was loaded into the kernel" to "there was an attempt to load a policy, check the res= field to determine whether it succeeded". So anything in userspace that used the presence of this audit record to determine whether or not policy was successfully loaded (e.g. audit2allow -l) will be confused. While there were failure cases that would still generate the audit record previously, those were all selinuxfs node creation failures; the policy would nonetheless have been loaded into the kernel and would be active at that point, so saying res=0 is somewhat misleading. This overlaps with https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/1, which highlights the fact that we can end up in an intermediate state where policy is loaded but selinuxfs (particularly booleans, class/*, and policy_capabilities/*) has not been regenerated.
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Signed-off-by Steve Grubb <[email protected]>First off, for patches such as these, I think it is good to CC the affected subsystem, SELinux in this case (fixed).
Beyond that, I'm a little concerned that you adding fields to record in the middle. In the past you've warned against inserting fields in the middle of the record, or reordering fields in general ("you'll break the world") due to some poor userspace practices, yet you do these exact things when it suits you.
We need a consistent message when it comes to userspace record processing so we know what we can do in the kernel without causing massive failure.
Quoted 45 lines
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c 2016-11-21 12:16:08.046787604 -0500 renamed from security/selinux/selinuxfs.c 2016-11-16 15:16:34.738723900 -0500 +10
-7@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fil { ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + unsigned int result = 0; mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);@@ -525,24 +526,26 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fil length = sel_make_bools(); if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length = sel_make_classes(); if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length = sel_make_policycap(); if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length = count; + result = 1; -out1: +out: audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, - "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u", + "uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u res=%u", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), - audit_get_sessionid(current)); -out: + audit_get_sessionid(current), result); + mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex); vfree(data); return length;
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Quoted 8 lines · EST Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 5 lines · Steve Grubb
The
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOADevent has dangling text that means the same thing
as the event type and is missing the uid and results field. The bigger issue is that in some failure cases no event is emitted. This patch fixes the noted problems.
Quoted 6 lines
A potential problem with this patch is that it changes the semantic meaning of this audit record, from meaning "a policy was loaded into the kernel" to "there was an attempt to load a policy, check the res= field to determine whether it succeeded". So anything in userspace that used the presence of this audit record to determine whether or not policy was successfully loaded (e.g. audit2allow -l) will be confused.
I really can't have implicit success. I need to have a field to point to that says yes/no. It can be hard coded to res=1 (success), but it needs to be there.
Quoted 4 lines
While there were failure cases that would still generate the audit record previously, those were all selinuxfs node creation failures; the policy would nonetheless have been loaded into the kernel and would be active at that point, so saying res=0 is somewhat misleading.
OK. We can move the point where res=1 is set. But I would think that its a requirement to have an audit record that states that policy failed to load. FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization. Auditable events: All modifications of the initial value of security attributes. I would think this means changes such as booleans, modifying labels, loading a new policy, or failure to load a policy.
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This overlapswith https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/1,
which highlights the fact that we can end up in an intermediate state where policy is loaded but selinuxfs (particularly booleans, class/*, and policy_capabilities/*) has not been regenerated.
I see. That should be an audited event. If you have a datacenter with a thousand machines, its best to get this in the audit trail so it can be alerted on at a central collector.
So, what should we do about the patch? I'm willing to modify it.
-Steve
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Signed-off-by Steve Grubb <[email protected]>First off, for patches such as these, I think it is good to CC the affected subsystem, SELinux in this case (fixed).
Beyond that, I'm a little concerned that you adding fields to record in the middle. In the past you've warned against inserting fields in the middle of the record, or reordering fields in general ("you'll break the world") due to some poor userspace practices, yet you do these exact things when it suits you.
We need a consistent message when it comes to userspace record processing so we know what we can do in the kernel without causing massive failure.
Quoted 64 lines
---
vanilla-4.9-rc5.orig/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c2016-11-16
15:16:34.738723900 -0500 +++linux-4.9.0-0.rc5.git0.1.fc24.x86_64/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c2016-11-21 12:16:08.046787604 -0500 @@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ static ssize_tsel_write_load(struct fil
{
ssize_t length; void *data = NULL;security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +10
-8+unsigned int result =0 ;mutex_lock (&sel_mutex);@@ -525,24 +526,26 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fil length =sel_make_bools ();if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length =sel_make_classes ();if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length =sel_make_policycap ();if (length) - goto out1; + goto out; length = count; + result =1 ; -out1: +out:audit_log (current->audit_context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD , -"policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u" , +"uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u res=%u" , +from_kuid (&init_user_ns,task_uid (current)),from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), -audit_get_sessionid (current)); -out: +audit_get_sessionid (current), result); +mutex_unlock (&sel_mutex);vfree (data);return length; --Linux-audit mailing list
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Quoted 16 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 8 lines · EST Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 5 lines · Steve Grubb
The
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOADevent has dangling text that means the same thing
as the event type and is missing the uid and results field. The bigger issue is that in some failure cases no event is emitted. This patch fixes the noted problems.Quoted 6 lines
A potential problem with this patch is that it changes the semantic meaning of this audit record, from meaning "a policy was loaded into the kernel" to "there was an attempt to load a policy, check the res= field to determine whether it succeeded". So anything in userspace that used the presence of this audit record to determine whether or not policy was successfully loaded (e.g. audit2allow -l) will be confused.
Quoted 3 lines
I really can't have implicit success. I need to have a field to point to that says yes/no. It can be hard coded to res=1 (success), but it needs to be there.
Ok. Why is it you use res=1|0 in these records but success=yes|no in syscall records?
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While there were failure cases that would still generate the audit record previously, those were all selinuxfs node creation failures; the policy would nonetheless have been loaded into the kernel and would be active at that point, so saying res=0 is somewhat misleading.
OK. We can move the point where res=1 is set. But I would think that its a requirement to have an audit record that states that policy failed to load. FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization. Auditable events: All modifications of the initial value of security attributes. I would think this means changes such as booleans, modifying labels, loading a new policy, or failure to load a policy.
Failure to load a policy is not a modification to the initial value of the security attribute, is it?
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This overlapswith https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/1,
which highlights the fact that we can end up in an intermediate state where policy is loaded but selinuxfs (particularly booleans, class/*, and policy_capabilities/*) has not been regenerated.
Quoted 5 lines
I see. That should be an audited event. If you have a datacenter with a thousand machines, its best to get this in the audit trail so it can be alerted on at a central collector.
So, what should we do about the patch? I'm willing to modify it.
At present, we only generate AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, AUDIT_MAC_LOAD, and AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE on success (or at least partial success). If you truly need to audit failures, then it seems like you either need to
a) do it through syscall audit filters, which already provide a success= field or b) add new audit message types for this purpose (e.g. AUDIT_MAC_STATUS_FAIL, AUDIT_MAC_LOAD_FAIL, ...). To just add a res= field to the existing ones and change them to always be generated is a user-visible semantic change.
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Quoted 9 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines
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OK. We can move the point where res=1 is set. But I would think that its a requirement to have an audit record that states that policy failed to load. FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization. Auditable events: All modifications of the initial value of security attributes. I would think this means changes such as booleans, modifying labels, loading a new policy, or failure to load a policy.
Failure to load a policy is not a modification to the initial value of the security attribute, is it?
It is definitely relevant, if it falls under another category. Either a failed malicious intent or a failed supervisory function.
LCB
Quoted 16 lines · EST Stephen Smalley
Quoted 15 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 13 lines · EST Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 4 lines · Steve Grubb
The
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOADevent has dangling text that means the same thing as the event type and is missing the uid and results field. The bigger issue is that in some failure cases no event is emitted. This patch fixes the noted problems.A potential problem with this patch is that it changes the semantic meaning of this audit record, from meaning "a policy was loaded into the kernel" to "there was an attempt to load a policy, check the res= field to determine whether it succeeded". So anything in userspace that used the presence of this audit record to determine whether or not policy was successfully loaded (e.g. audit2allow -l) will be confused.
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I really can't have implicit success. I need to have a field to point to that says yes/no. It can be hard coded to res=1 (success), but it needs to be there.
Ok. Why is it you use res=1|0 in these records but success=yes|no in syscall records?
Success is only used in syscall records. It was created to disambiguate the exit field which can look like a failure on some arches but is actually OK. Originally the exit field was all that existed. We found that one or two arches actually have 2 return codes. The whole rest of the audit system uses res= to mean a crisp yes/no this did or didn't happen. This predates the creation of the success field. It could be argued success should have been res, but ausearch/report will use either to mean the same thing.
The new auparse field classifier work will also map both to mean the same thing. That is how I found AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD missing any kind of success/fail indication.
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While there were failure cases that would still generate the audit record previously, those were all selinuxfs node creation failures; the policy would nonetheless have been loaded into the kernel and would be active at that point, so saying res=0 is somewhat misleading.
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OK. We can move the point where res=1 is set. But I would think that its a requirement to have an audit record that states that policy failed to load.
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization. Auditable events: All modifications of the initial value of security attributes. I would think this means changes such as booleans, modifying labels, loading a new policy, or failure to load a policy.
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Failure to load a policy is not a modification to the initial value of the security attribute, is it?
Sure. If the state is intended to enabled and enforcing and its not, that would be a surprising result that there was no indication in the audit trail. Also, if for some reason it booted fine and a new policy was loaded at some point in the future and it failed, then we have a modification to initial state.
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This overlapswith
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/1, which highlights the fact that we can end up in an intermediate state where policy is loaded but selinuxfs (particularly booleans, class/*, and policy_capabilities/*) has not been regenerated.I see. That should be an audited event. If you have a datacenter with a thousand machines, its best to get this in the audit trail so it can be alerted on at a central collector.
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So, what should we do about the patch? I'm willing to modify it.
At present, we only generate
AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,AUDIT_MAC_LOAD, andAUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGEon success (or at least partial success). If you truly need to audit failures, then it seems like you either need to
a) do it through syscall audit filters, which already provide a success= field
I can't imagine what to audit on. There is an open syscall that has a path. But I suspect that does not fail because policy has not be written. There is a write syscall but triggering on that is pretty generic. This is not ideal.
Quoted 4 lines
or b) add new audit message types for this purpose (e.g.
AUDIT_MAC_STATUS_FAIL,AUDIT_MAC_LOAD_FAIL, ...). To just add a res= field to the existing ones and change them to always be generated is a user-visible semantic change.
OK. This is do-able. I'll hard code the 'res' field for each of them.
-Steve
Quoted 77 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 16 lines · EST Stephen Smalley
Quoted 15 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 13 lines · EST Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 4 lines · Steve Grubb
The
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOADevent has dangling text that means the same thing as the event type and is missing the uid and results field. The bigger issue is that in some failure cases no event is emitted. This patch fixes the noted problems.A potential problem with this patch is that it changes the semantic meaning of this audit record, from meaning "a policy was loaded into the kernel" to "there was an attempt to load a policy, check the res= field to determine whether it succeeded". So anything in userspace that used the presence of this audit record to determine whether or not policy was successfully loaded (e.g. audit2allow -l) will be confused.
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I really can't have implicit success. I need to have a field to point to that says yes/no. It can be hard coded to res=1 (success), but it needs to be there.
Ok. Why is it you use res=1|0 in these records but success=yes|no in syscall records?
Success is only used in syscall records. It was created to disambiguate the exit field which can look like a failure on some arches but is actually OK. Originally the exit field was all that existed. We found that one or two arches actually have 2 return codes. The whole rest of the audit system uses res= to mean a crisp yes/no this did or didn't happen. This predates the creation of the success field. It could be argued success should have been res, but ausearch/report will use either to mean the same thing.
The new auparse field classifier work will also map both to mean the same thing. That is how I found
AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOADmissing any kind of success/fail indication.Quoted 13 lines
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While there were failure cases that would still generate the audit record previously, those were all selinuxfs node creation failures; the policy would nonetheless have been loaded into the kernel and would be active at that point, so saying res=0 is somewhat misleading.
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OK. We can move the point where res=1 is set. But I would think that its a requirement to have an audit record that states that policy failed to load.
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization. Auditable events: All modifications of the initial value of security attributes. I would think this means changes such as booleans, modifying labels, loading a new policy, or failure to load a policy.Quoted 2 lines
Failure to load a policy is not a modification to the initial value of the security attribute, is it?
Sure. If the state is intended to enabled and enforcing and its not, that would be a surprising result that there was no indication in the audit trail. Also, if for some reason it booted fine and a new policy was loaded at some point in the future and it failed, then we have a modification to initial state.
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This overlapswith
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/1, which highlights the fact that we can end up in an intermediate state where policy is loaded but selinuxfs (particularly booleans, class/*, and policy_capabilities/*) has not been regenerated.I see. That should be an audited event. If you have a datacenter with a thousand machines, its best to get this in the audit trail so it can be alerted on at a central collector.
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So, what should we do about the patch? I'm willing to modify it.
At present, we only generate
AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,AUDIT_MAC_LOAD, andAUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGEon success (or at least partial success). If you truly need to audit failures, then it seems like you either need to
a) do it through syscall audit filters, which already provide a success= field
Quoted 3 lines
I can't imagine what to audit on. There is an open syscall that has a path. But I suspect that does not fail because policy has not be written. There is a write syscall but triggering on that is pretty generic. This is not ideal.
Can't you write an audit syscall filter or watch on /sys/fs/selinux/load? Ditto for /sys/fs/selinux/enforce, /sys/fs/selinux/commit_pending_bools, etc.
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or b) add new audit message types for this purpose (e.g.
AUDIT_MAC_STATUS_FAIL,AUDIT_MAC_LOAD_FAIL, ...). To just add a res= field to the existing ones and change them to always be generated is a user-visible semantic change.OK. This is do-able. I'll hard code the 'res' field for each of them.
-Steve
Quoted 6 lines · EST Stephen Smalley
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At present, we only generate
AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,AUDIT_MAC_LOAD, andAUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGEon success (or at least partial success). If you truly need to audit failures, then it seems like you either need to
a) do it through syscall audit filters, which already provide a success= field
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I can't imagine what to audit on. There is an open syscall that has a path. But I suspect that does not fail because policy has not be written. There is a write syscall but triggering on that is pretty generic. This is not ideal.
Can't you write an audit syscall filter or watch on
/sys/fs/selinux/load? Ditto for/sys/fs/selinux/enforce,/sys/fs/selinux/commit_pending_bools, etc.
Yes, you can. But this is for the open syscall. sel_write_load() is the function where the auditing is done but its mapped to the .write member of sel_load_ops. Auditing on write is not a good thing.
So, if AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD must only appear when there is success, then its best to create a second event for failure and hard code the 'res' fields for both.
-Steve