file: explicitly disable seccomp
PATCH 1/1 file: explicitly disable seccomp
file will automatically enable seccomp if the seccomp headers are available, but the build will fail on Opensuse Tumbleweed because the include paths are wrong.
Enabling seccomp is a bad idea because it interacts badly with pseudo (causing build failures), so explicitly and globally disable seccomp.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +2 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git" inherit autotools update-alternatives +EXTRA_OECONF += "--disable-libseccomp" + ALTERNATIVE_${PN} = "file" ALTERNATIVE_LINK_NAME[file] = "${bindir}/file"
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 20 lines · Ross Burton
file will automatically enable seccomp if the seccomp headers are available, but
the build will fail on Opensuse Tumbleweed because the include paths are wrong.Enabling seccomp is a bad idea because it interacts badly with pseudo (causing
build failures), so explicitly and globally disable seccomp.Signed-off-by Ross Burton <[email protected]>--- meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +0
-0
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb S = "${WORKDIR}/git" · line 25
Quoted 5 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +2
-0@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git" inherit autotools update-alternatives +EXTRA_OECONF += "--disable-libseccomp" +
On host it makes sense but how about for target recipe ? We do have libseccomp support
Perhaps it’s best to disable it for native and native sdk alone ?
Quoted 13 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +0
-1ALTERNATIVE_${PN} = "file" ALTERNATIVE_LINK_NAME[file] = "${bindir}/file" --2.20.1
--
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Quoted 25 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 21 lines · Ross Burton
file will automatically enable seccomp if the seccomp headers are available, but
the build will fail on Opensuse Tumbleweed because the include paths are wrong.Enabling seccomp is a bad idea because it interacts badly with pseudo (causing
build failures), so explicitly and globally disable seccomp.Signed-off-by Ross Burton <[email protected]>--- meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +0
-0@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
Quoted 8 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb S = "${WORKDIR}/git" · line 25
Quoted 4 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +2
-0inherit autotools update-alternatives +EXTRA_OECONF += "--disable-libseccomp" +On host it makes sense but how about for target recipe ? We do have libseccomp support
Perhaps it’s best to disable it for native and native sdk alone ?
Given the problem reports in the media and the decisions made by most other distros I think disabling this is probably safest until its been make more usable (no other distro is shipping this enabled now).
Cheers,
Richard
Quoted 35 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 25 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 21 lines · Ross Burton
file will automatically enable seccomp if the seccomp headers are available, but
the build will fail on Opensuse Tumbleweed because the include paths are wrong.Enabling seccomp is a bad idea because it interacts badly with pseudo (causing
build failures), so explicitly and globally disable seccomp.Signed-off-by Ross Burton <[email protected]>--- meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +0
-0@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git"Quoted 8 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb S = "${WORKDIR}/git" · line 25
Quoted 4 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +2
-0inherit autotools update-alternatives +EXTRA_OECONF += "--disable-libseccomp" +On host it makes sense but how about for target recipe ? We do have libseccomp support
Perhaps it’s best to disable it for native and native sdk alone ?
Quoted 4 lines
Given the problem reports in the media and the decisions made by most other distros I think disabling this is probably safest until its been make more usable (no other distro is shipping this enabled now).
Ok makes sense
Quoted 9 lines
Cheers,
Richard
Quoted 35 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 25 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 21 lines · Ross Burton
file will automatically enable seccomp if the seccomp headers are available, but
the build will fail on Opensuse Tumbleweed because the include paths are wrong.Enabling seccomp is a bad idea because it interacts badly with pseudo (causing
build failures), so explicitly and globally disable seccomp.Signed-off-by Ross Burton <[email protected]>--- meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +0
-0@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git"Quoted 8 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb S = "${WORKDIR}/git" · line 25
Quoted 4 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +2
-0inherit autotools update-alternatives +EXTRA_OECONF += "--disable-libseccomp" +On host it makes sense but how about for target recipe ? We do have libseccomp support
Perhaps it’s best to disable it for native and native sdk alone ?
Quoted 3 lines
Given the problem reports in the media and the decisions made by most other distros I think disabling this is probably safest until its been make more usable (no other distro is shipping this enabled now).
Arch Linux enabled libseccomp as of today:
This breaks the use of file in do_package():
ERROR: base-files-3.0.14-r89 do_package: Fatal errors occurred in subprocesses:
Command '['file', '-b', '/home/martin/clients/connectedcars/yocto/build/tmp-glibc/work/iwg26-oe-linux-gnueabi/base-files/3.0.14-r89/package/etc/skel/.profile']' died with <Signals.SIGSYS: 31>.: Traceback (most recent call last):
File
"/home/martin/clients/connectedcars/yocto/poky/meta/lib/oe/utils.py", line 272, in run
ret = self._target(*self._args, **self._kwargs)
File
"/home/martin/clients/connectedcars/yocto/poky/meta/lib/oe/package.py", line 70, in is_elf
result = subprocess.check_output(["file", "-b", path],
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode("utf-8")
File "/usr/lib/python3.8/subprocess.py", line 411, in check_output
return run(*popenargs, stdout=PIPE, timeout=timeout, check=True,
File "/usr/lib/python3.8/subprocess.py", line 512, in run
raise CalledProcessError(retcode, process.args,
subprocess.CalledProcessError: Command '['file', '-b', '/home/martin/clients/connectedcars/yocto/build/tmp-glibc/work/iwg26-oe-linux-gnueabi/base-files/3.0.14-r89/package/etc/skel/.profile']' died with <Signals.SIGSYS: 31>.
Disabling libseccomp sandboxing at runtime fixes it for me:
meta/lib/oe/package.py +0 -0
index efd36b3758..bc46d7c27c 100644
--- a/meta/lib/oe/package.py
+++ b/meta/lib/oe/package.py
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ def is_kernel_module_signed(path):
# 16 - kernel module
def is_elf(path):
exec_type = 0
- result = subprocess.check_output(["file", "-b", path], stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode("utf-8")
+ result = subprocess.check_output(["file", "-S", "-b", path], stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode("utf-8")
if "ELF" in result:
exec_type |= 1
Quoted 101 lines · Martin Hundebøll
Quoted 35 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 25 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 21 lines · Ross Burton
file will automatically enable seccomp if the seccomp headers are available, but
the build will fail on Opensuse Tumbleweed because the include paths are wrong.Enabling seccomp is a bad idea because it interacts badly with pseudo (causing
build failures), so explicitly and globally disable seccomp.Signed-off-by Ross Burton <[email protected]>--- meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +0
-0@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git"Quoted 8 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb S = "${WORKDIR}/git" · line 25
Quoted 4 lines
meta/recipes-devtools/file/file_5.37.bb +2
-0inherit autotools update-alternatives +EXTRA_OECONF += "--disable-libseccomp" +On host it makes sense but how about for target recipe ? We do have libseccomp support
Perhaps it’s best to disable it for native and native sdk alone ?Quoted 3 lines
Given the problem reports in the media and the decisions made by most other distros I think disabling this is probably safest until its been make more usable (no other distro is shipping this enabled now).
Arch Linux enabled libseccomp as of today:
This breaks the use of
fileindo_package():ERROR: base-files-3.0.14-r89
do_package: Fatal errors occurred in subprocesses:Command '['file', '-b', '
/home/martin/clients/connectedcars/yocto/build/tmp-glibc/work/iwg26-oe-linux-gnueabi/base-files/3.0.14-r89/package/etc/skel/.profile']' died with <Signals.SIGSYS: 31>.: Traceback (most recent call last):File
"/home/martin/clients/connectedcars/yocto/poky/meta/lib/oe/utils.py", line 272, in runret = self._target(*self._args, **self._kwargs)File
"/home/martin/clients/connectedcars/yocto/poky/meta/lib/oe/package.py", line 70, inis_elfresult = subprocess.check_output(["file", "-b", path],stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode("utf-8")
File "
/usr/lib/python3.8/subprocess.py", line 411, incheck_outputreturn run(*popenargs, stdout=PIPE, timeout=timeout, check=True,
File "
/usr/lib/python3.8/subprocess.py", line 512, in runraise CalledProcessError(retcode, process.args,
subprocess.CalledProcessError: Command '['file', '-b', '
/home/martin/clients/connectedcars/yocto/build/tmp-glibc/work/iwg26-oe-linux-gnueabi/base-files/3.0.14-r89/package/etc/skel/.profile']' died with <Signals.SIGSYS: 31>.Disabling libseccomp sandboxing at runtime fixes it for me:
meta/lib/oe/package.py +0
-0index
efd36b3758..bc46d7c27c100644---
a/meta/lib/oe/package.py+++
b/meta/lib/oe/package.pymeta/lib/oe/package.py +0
-1@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ def is_kernel_module_signed(path): # 16 - kernel module def is_elf(path): exec_type = 0 - result = subprocess.check_output(["file", "-b", path],stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode("utf-8")
Quoted 3 lines
+ result = subprocess.check_output(["file", "-S", "-b", path],
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode("utf-8")
pseudo needs some love since it alters syscalls which go out of bounds what is allowed by libseccomp until then pin your file version to 5.37 in arch till a supported distro is affected by same problem. It wont be long better option is to fix pseudo
Quoted 7 lines
if "ELF" in result:
exec_type|= 1
Quoted 4 lines · Khem Raj
pseudo needs some love since it alters syscalls which go out of bounds what is allowed by libseccomp until then pin your file version to 5.37 in arch till a supported distro is affected by same problem. It wont be long better option is to fix pseudo
That's not quite right. pseudo LD_PRELOADs itself into file, and makes syscalls which are not whitelisted in file's seccomp configuration.
There's nothing pseudo can do to solve this.
Ross
Quoted 9 lines · Ross Burton
Quoted 4 lines · Khem Raj
pseudo needs some love since it alters syscalls which go out of bounds what is allowed by libseccomp until then pin your file version to 5.37 in arch till a supported distro is affected by same problem. It wont be long better option is to fix pseudo
That's not quite right. pseudo
LD_PRELOADsitself into file, and makes syscalls which are not whitelisted in file's seccomp configuration.
It’s is not different than what I was saying how it inserts itself into process is a detail which is hidden from operating system
However I think file is only one case when used along with libseccomp there could be more use cases if other host tools we use start using it
So I wonder If we should start building own native versions of tools or make it part of build tools tarball
Or perhaps just publish a self built container and not worry about what distros are doing underneath
Quoted 5 lines
There's nothing pseudo can do to solve this.
Ross
Hi,
Quoted 10 lines · Ross Burton
Quoted 4 lines · Khem Raj
pseudo needs some love since it alters syscalls which go out of bounds what is allowed by libseccomp until then pin your file version to 5.37 in arch till a supported distro is affected by same problem. It wont be long better option is to fix pseudo
That's not quite right. pseudo
LD_PRELOADsitself into file, and makes syscalls which are not whitelisted in file's seccomp configuration.There's nothing pseudo can do to solve this.
I stumbled across this thread when checking why libseccomp is not in oe-core or meta-oe. It seems to me that pseudo could intercept the seccomp(2) or libseccomps seccomp_* function calls and report them as unsupported to simulate running on a kernel without seccomp support.
What am I missing? :)
Regards,
Jan
Quoted 16 lines · Jan Luebbe
Hi,
Quoted 13 lines · Ross Burton
Quoted 7 lines · Khem Raj
pseudo needs some love since it alters syscalls which go out of bounds
what is allowed by libseccomp until then pin your file version to 5.37
in arch till a supported distro is affected by same problem. It wont
be long better option is to fix pseudoThat's not quite right. pseudo
LD_PRELOADsitself into file, and makes
syscalls which are not whitelisted in file's seccomp configuration.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
There's nothing pseudo can do to solve this.
I stumbled across this thread when checking why libseccomp is not in oe-core or meta-oe. It seems to me that pseudo could intercept the seccomp(2) or libseccomps seccomp_* function calls and report them as unsupported to simulate running on a kernel without seccomp support.
What am I missing? :)
I don't think we'd thought of that, I like the idea in principle...
Cheers,
Richard
Quoted 16 lines · Jan Luebbe
Hi,
Quoted 13 lines · Ross Burton
Quoted 7 lines · Khem Raj
pseudo needs some love since it alters syscalls which go out of bounds
what is allowed by libseccomp until then pin your file version to 5.37
in arch till a supported distro is affected by same problem. It wont
be long better option is to fix pseudoThat's not quite right. pseudo
LD_PRELOADsitself into file, and makes
syscalls which are not whitelisted in file's seccomp configuration.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
There's nothing pseudo can do to solve this.
I stumbled across this thread when checking why libseccomp is not in oe-core or meta-oe. It seems to me that pseudo could intercept the seccomp(2) or libseccomps seccomp_* function calls and report them as unsupported to simulate running on a kernel without seccomp support.
What am I missing? :)
I made a guess at a patch:
Just need someone with a system that can test it now!
Cheers,
Richard
Quoted 25 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 23 lines · Jan Luebbe
Hi,
Quoted 9 lines · Ross Burton
Quoted 7 lines · Khem Raj
pseudo needs some love since it alters syscalls which go out of bounds
what is allowed by libseccomp until then pin your file version to 5.37
in arch till a supported distro is affected by same problem. It wont
be long better option is to fix pseudoQuoted 5 lines
That's not quite right. pseudo
LD_PRELOADsitself into file, and makes
syscalls which are not whitelisted in file's seccomp configuration.There's nothing pseudo can do to solve this.
I stumbled across this thread when checking why libseccomp is not in oe-core or meta-oe. It seems to me that pseudo could intercept the seccomp(2) or libseccomps seccomp_* function calls and report them as unsupported to simulate running on a kernel without seccomp support.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
What am I missing? :)
I made a guess at a patch:
Just need someone with a system that can test it now!
seems pseudo still has same issue with archlinux latest file (file-5.38-3) utility
Command '['file', '-b', '/mnt/b/yoe/build/tmp/work/aarch64-yoe-linux/glibc/2.31+gitAUTOINC+71f2b249a2-r0/package/lib/libnss_db-2.31.so']' died with <Signals.SIGSYS: 31>.: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/mnt/b/yoe/sources/openembedded-core/meta/lib/oe/utils.py",
line 280, in run
ret = self._target(*self._args, **self._kwargs)
File "/mnt/b/yoe/sources/openembedded-core/meta/lib/oe/package.py",
line 74, in is_elf
result = subprocess.check_output(["file", "-b", path],stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode("utf-8")
File "/usr/lib/python3.8/subprocess.py", line 411, in check_output
return run(*popenargs, stdout=PIPE, timeout=timeout, check=True,
File "/usr/lib/python3.8/subprocess.py", line 512, in run
raise CalledProcessError(retcode, process.args,
Quoted 4 lines
Cheers,
Richard
Quoted 47 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 24 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 23 lines · Jan Luebbe
Hi,
Quoted 9 lines · Ross Burton
Quoted 7 lines · Khem Raj
pseudo needs some love since it alters syscalls which go out of bounds
what is allowed by libseccomp until then pin your file version to 5.37
in arch till a supported distro is affected by same problem. It wont
be long better option is to fix pseudoQuoted 5 lines
That's not quite right. pseudo
LD_PRELOADsitself into file, and makes
syscalls which are not whitelisted in file's seccomp configuration.There's nothing pseudo can do to solve this.
I stumbled across this thread when checking why libseccomp is not in oe-core or meta-oe. It seems to me that pseudo could intercept the seccomp(2) or libseccomps seccomp_* function calls and report them as unsupported to simulate running on a kernel without seccomp support.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
What am I missing? :)
I made a guess at a patch:
Just need someone with a system that can test it now!
seems pseudo still has same issue with archlinux latest file (file-5.38-3) utility
Command '['file', '-b', '
/mnt/b/yoe/build/tmp/work/aarch64-yoe-linux/glibc/2.31+gitAUTOINC+71f2b249a2-r0/package/lib/libnss_db-2.31.so']' died with <Signals.SIGSYS: 31>.: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/mnt/b/yoe/sources/openembedded-core/meta/lib/oe/utils.py",
line 280, in runret = self._target(*self._args, **self._kwargs) File "/mnt/b/yoe/sources/openembedded-core/meta/lib/oe/package.py", line 74, in is_elf result = subprocess.check_output(["file", "-b", path],
Quoted 5 lines
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT).decode("utf-8")
File "/usr/lib/python3.8/subprocess.py", line 411, incheck_output
return run(*popenargs, stdout=PIPE, timeout=timeout, check=True,
File "/usr/lib/python3.8/subprocess.py", line 512, in run
raise CalledProcessError(retcode, process.args,
There is a pretty horrendous hack in master-next which avoids this (I think). I went through the following:
a) Disabling seccomp syscall. It falls back to prctl().
b) Disabling prctl() (which is variadac) means file exits with an error, seccomp must be enabled.
c) Return success but do nothing (don't load the seccomp program)
It appears that returning success works.
Not convinced we want to do that mind...
Cheers,
Richard