bpf, sockmap: Fix wrong rsge offset in bpf_msg_push_data()
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 bpf, sockmap: Fix wrong rsge offset in bpf_msg_push_data()
When bpf_msg_push_data() splits a scatterlist element into head and tail, the tail's page offset is advanced by start (absolute message byte offset) instead of start - offset (byte position within the element). This makes rsge.offset overshoot by offset bytes, pointing to the wrong location within the page or beyond its boundary. Consumers of the corrupted entry either silently read wrong data or trigger an out-of-bounds access.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_msg_pull_data (net/core/filter.c:2728) Read of size 32752 at addr ffff8881042f0010 by task poc/130 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) bpf_msg_pull_data (net/core/filter.c:2728) bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu (include/linux/bpf.h:1402) sk_psock_msg_verdict (net/core/skmsg.c:934) tcp_bpf_send_verdict (net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:421) sock_sendmsg_nosec (net/socket.c:727)
--- net/core/filter.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/filter.c +1 -1
@@ -2865,7 +2865,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, psge->length = start - offset; rsge.length -= psge->length; - rsge.offset += start; + rsge.offset += start - offset;sk_msg_iter_var_next (i);sg_unmark_end (psge);
--
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewSashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s): - [Critical] When appending data to a full or nearly full sk_msg, bpf_msg_push_data() reads the length of the wrong scatterlist element, leading to a…
Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] When appending data to a full or nearly full sk_msg, bpf_msg_push_data() reads the length of the wrong scatterlist element, leading to a buffer overflow or ring corruption.
- [Critical] Missing bounds check on the 'len' parameter causes an integer overflow and a massive Out-Of-Bounds write.
- [Critical] Scatterlist shifts fail to update the msg->sg.copy bitmap, allowing unauthorized modification of shared pages.
- [High] Uninitialized kernel memory allocation in bpf_msg_push_data() leads to an Information Leak.
--
commit 15a0d48ce1bdcc5941167a3e0c2a258bb5038277
Author: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>
bpf, sockmap: Fix wrong rsge offset in bpf_msg_push_data()
When bpf_msg_push_data() splits a scatterlist element into head and tail, the tail's page offset is advanced by start instead of start - offset. This overshoot points to the wrong location within the page or beyond its boundary.
net/core/filter.c BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, · line 2866
Quoted 13 lines
net/core/filter.c +1
-1@@ -2860,7 +2860,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, psge->length = start - offset; rsge.length -= psge->length; - rsge.offset += start; + rsge.offset += start - offset;sk_msg_iter_var_next (i);sg_unmark_end (psge);
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but looking at the earlier part of bpf_msg_push_data(), is the len parameter bounds-checked?
net/core/filter.c:bpf_msg_push_data() {
...
if (!space || (space == 1 && start != offset))
copy = msg->sg.data[i].length;
page = alloc_pages(__GFP_NOWARN | GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_COMP,
get_order(copy + len));
...
if (back) {
from += front;
to = raw + front + len;
memcpy(to, from, back);
}...
}
If a large value is provided for len (e.g., 0xFFFFFFFF), could copy + len overflow 32-bit arithmetic, resulting in a very small allocation?
Later, when calculating to = raw + front + len, does the zero-extended len advance the destination pointer out-of-bounds, causing a massive memory corruption during memcpy()?
Additionally, bpf_msg_push_data() uses alloc_pages() without the __GFP_ZERO flag. After copying the split element's front and back parts, do the middle len bytes remain uninitialized?
Could this allow uninitialized kernel heap data to be added to the sk_msg and leaked over the network when the message is transmitted?
Also, when appending data (start == msg->sg.size), the search loop terminates with i == msg->sg.end. If space <= 1, the code executes
copy = msg->sg.data[i].length.
Does this read from an unused slot?
If the slot has a garbage length from a previous pop or shift, could copy take that value, causing alloc_pages() to allocate a smaller size and leading to a kernel heap buffer overflow during the subsequent memcpy(raw, from, front)?
And if the garbage length is 0, could it skip the if (copy) block and increment msg->sg.end without space, corrupting the scatterlist ring array?
Finally, when scatterlist elements are shifted in bpf_msg_pop_data():
net/core/filter.c:sk_msg_shift_left() {
...
do {
prev = i;
sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
msg->sg.data[prev] = msg->sg.data[i];
} while (i != msg->sg.end);...
}
Should the msg->sg.copy bitmap also be shifted?
If a shared page (where the copy bit is 1) is shifted into a slot where the bit is 0, will it be falsely identified as a private page?
Could a subsequent bpf_msg_pull_data() then pass the !test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy) check and return a direct writable pointer to the shared page, enabling unauthorized modification of read-only memory?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Quoted 91 lines · On 26-04-24 15:59, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] When appending data to a full or nearly fullsk_msg,bpf_msg_push_data()reads the length of the wrong scatterlist element, leading to a buffer overflow or ring corruption.
- [Critical] Missing bounds check on the 'len' parameter causes an integer overflow and a massive Out-Of-Bounds write.
- [Critical] Scatterlist shifts fail to update themsg->sg.copybitmap, allowing unauthorized modification of shared pages.
- [High] Uninitialized kernel memory allocation inbpf_msg_push_data()leads to an Information Leak.
--commit
15a0d48ce1bdcc5941167a3e0c2a258bb5038277
Author: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>bpf, sockmap: Fix wrong rsge offset in
bpf_msg_push_data()When
bpf_msg_push_data()splits a scatterlist element into head and tail, the tail's page offset is advanced by start instead of start - offset. This overshoot points to the wrong location within the page or beyond its boundary.net/core/filter.c BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, · line 2866
Quoted 13 lines
net/core/filter.c +1
-1@@ -2860,7 +2860,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, psge->length = start - offset; rsge.length -= psge->length; - rsge.offset += start; + rsge.offset += start - offset;sk_msg_iter_var_next (i);sg_unmark_end (psge);This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but looking at the earlier part of
bpf_msg_push_data(), is the len parameter bounds-checked?net/core/filter.c:bpf_msg_push_data() {
...if (!space || (space == 1 && start != offset)) copy = msg->sg.data[i].length; page = alloc_pages(__GFP_NOWARN | GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_COMP, get_order(copy + len)); ... if (back) { from += front; to = raw + front + len; memcpy(to, from, back); }...
}If a large value is provided for len (e.g.,
0xFFFFFFFF), could copy + len overflow 32-bit arithmetic, resulting in a very small allocation?Later, when calculating to = raw + front + len, does the zero-extended len advance the destination pointer out-of-bounds, causing a massive memory corruption during
memcpy()?Additionally,
bpf_msg_push_data()usesalloc_pages()without the__GFP_ZEROflag. After copying the split element's front and back parts, do the middle len bytes remain uninitialized?Could this allow uninitialized kernel heap data to be added to the
sk_msgand leaked over the network when the message is transmitted?Also, when appending data (start ==
msg->sg.size), the search loop terminates with i ==msg->sg.end. If space <= 1, the code executes
copy = msg->sg.data[i].length.Does this read from an unused slot?
If the slot has a garbage length from a previous pop or shift, could copy take that value, causing
alloc_pages()to allocate a smaller size and leading to a kernel heap buffer overflow during the subsequentmemcpy(raw, from, front)?And if the garbage length is 0, could it skip the if (copy) block and increment
msg->sg.endwithout space, corrupting the scatterlist ring array?Finally, when scatterlist elements are shifted in
bpf_msg_pop_data():net/core/filter.c:sk_msg_shift_left() {
...do { prev = i; sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); msg->sg.data[prev] = msg->sg.data[i]; } while (i != msg->sg.end);...
}
Quoted 11 lines
Should the
msg->sg.copybitmap also be shifted?If a shared page (where the copy bit is 1) is shifted into a slot where the bit is 0, will it be falsely identified as a private page?
Could a subsequent
bpf_msg_pull_data()then pass the !test_bit(i,msg->sg.copy) check and return a direct writable pointer to the shared page, enabling unauthorized modification of read-only memory?Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
We verified the findings locally with QEMU. Two of the four issues are confirmed with reproducers:
- copy + len integer overflow leading to heap buffer overflow [1]
- uninitialized memory leak via alloc_pages without __GFP_ZERO [2]
Patches sent for both.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Quoted 18 lines · Weiming Shi
When
bpf_msg_push_data()splits a scatterlist element into head and tail, the tail's page offset is advanced bystart(absolute message byte offset) instead ofstart - offset(byte position within the element). This makes rsge.offset overshoot byoffsetbytes, pointing to the wrong location within the page or beyond its boundary. Consumers of the corrupted entry either silently read wrong data or trigger an out-of-bounds access.BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_msg_pull_data (net/core/filter.c:2728) Read of size 32752 at addr ffff8881042f0010 by task poc/130 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) bpf_msg_pull_data (net/core/filter.c:2728) bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu (include/linux/bpf.h:1402) sk_psock_msg_verdict (net/core/skmsg.c:934) tcp_bpf_send_verdict (net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:421) sock_sendmsg_nosec (net/socket.c:727)
Quoted 3 lines
Fixes 6fff607e2f14 ("bpf: sk_msg program helper bpf_msg_push_data")Reported-by Xiang Mei <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Weiming Shi <[email protected]>
Fix looks correct.
The bug only surfaces when the split branch is taken and start lands inside a non-first SG element (offset > 0).
It took me 2 hours to reproduce it. Repos or self-tests are welcome next time you reported a bug...
Quoted 19 lines
--- net/core/filter.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)net/core/filter.c +1
-2@@ -2865,7 +2865,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, psge->length = start - offset; rsge.length -= psge->length; - rsge.offset += start; + rsge.offset += start - offset;sk_msg_iter_var_next (i);sg_unmark_end (psge); --2.43.0