Skip to contentSkip to conversation

every.te

DISCUSSION Russell Coker 2 participants 2 messages Apr 18, 2002 SELinux security module

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

The following operation from ls produces the access described below. _sysctl({{CTL_KERN, KERN_VERSION}, 2, 0xbffff5f4, 32, (nil), 0}) = 0

Apr 18 18:51:23 lyta kernel: avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=3006 
exe=/bin/ls
scontext=system_u:system_r:dpkg_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t 
tclass=dir
Apr 18 18:51:23 lyta kernel:
Apr 18 18:51:23 lyta kernel: avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=3006 exe=/bin/ls 

scontext=system_u:system_r:dpkg_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t tclass=file

Would it make sense to add this to every.te? It seems that almost everything wants to know the kernel version...

Signature · 9 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines
of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do
whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by
posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void.

--
You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Russell Coker

The following operation from ls produces the access described below. _sysctl({{CTL_KERN, KERN_VERSION}, 2, 0xbffff5f4, 32, (nil), 0}) = 0

Apr 18 18:51:23 lyta kernel: avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=3006
exe=/bin/ls
scontext=system_u:system_r:dpkg_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t
tclass=dir
Apr 18 18:51:23 lyta kernel:
Apr 18 18:51:23 lyta kernel: avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=3006 exe=/bin/ls
Quoted 5 lines

scontext=system_u:system_r:dpkg_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t tclass=file

Would it make sense to add this to every.te? It seems that almost everything wants to know the kernel version...

You might not want to grant read access to /proc/sys/kernel to every process on the system. Hence, I'd suggest that these kinds of permissions belong in macros within global_macros.te (e.g. the
existing general_proc_read_access macro or something finer-grained) that can be selectively applied to individual domains. In contrast, the init_t sigchld permission is essentially necessary from a functional perspective for all processes, so it makes sense to place it in every.te.

--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
[email protected]

--
You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.