boot loader
I am creating a policy for lilo.
I have defined it's type as follows:
type lilo_t, domain, privlog, privmem, boot_loader;
privmem is because lilo needs to read from /dev/mem to get BIOS data about boot devices. I have defined "boot_loader" as a type attribute for anything that needs to write to raw hard drive devices to install a boot loader (grub etc would need that too). Then I added boot_loader in assert.te as being allowed to write to fixed_disk_device_t.
What do you think?
Signature · 9 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void. -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
I don't know how granular these policies can get (I'm just a lurker on this list), but it would be cool if you could restrict boot_loader to access only the first couple disk blocks where lilo writes to, and privmem to only the less than 1MB region where BIOS values are.
Ivan...
Quoted 5 lines · Russell Coker
I am creating a policy for lilo.
I have defined it's type as follows:
typelilo_t, domain, privlog, privmem,boot_loader;
Quoted 19 lines
privmem is because lilo needs to read from
/dev/memto get BIOS data about boot devices. I have defined "boot_loader" as a type attribute for anything that needs to write to raw hard drive devices to install a boot loader (grub etc would need that too). Then I addedboot_loaderin assert.te as being allowed to write tofixed_disk_device_t.What do you think?
Signature · 9 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void. -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
--
You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 4 lines · Ivan Pulleyn
I don't know how granular these policies can get (I'm just a lurker on this list), but it would be cool if you could restrict
boot_loaderto access only the first couple disk blocks where lilo writes to, and privmem to only the less than 1MB region where BIOS values are.
They aren't that granular.
Probably the best way to achieve what you suggest would be to change the device drivers to have a separate device node for the first 512 bytes of the disk.
Signature · 9 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void. -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 5 lines · Russell Coker
I am creating a policy for lilo.
I have defined it's type as follows:
typelilo_t, domain, privlog, privmem,boot_loader;
Quoted 7 lines
privmem is because lilo needs to read from
/dev/memto get BIOS data about boot devices. I have defined "boot_loader" as a type attribute for anything that needs to write to raw hard drive devices to install a boot loader (grub etc would need that too). Then I addedboot_loaderin assert.te as being allowed to write tofixed_disk_device_t.What do you think?
This sounds fine. Once lilo has been moved into its own domain, you might try removing direct access to fixed_disk_device_t from sysadm_t (the admin_domain macro).
--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
[email protected]
--
You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 12 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Russell Coker
I am creating a policy for lilo.
I have defined it's type as follows:
typelilo_t, domain, privlog, privmem,boot_loader;privmem is because lilo needs to read from
/dev/memto get BIOS data about boot devices. I have defined "boot_loader" as a type attribute for anything that needs to write to raw hard drive devices to install a boot loader (grub etc would need that too). Then I addedboot_loaderin assert.te as being allowed to write tofixed_disk_device_t.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
What do you think?
This sounds fine. Once lilo has been moved into its own domain, you might try removing direct access to
fixed_disk_device_tfromsysadm_t(theadmin_domainmacro).
Removing the direct access sounds like a good idea.
Also I like Mark's suggestion, which means there's no need for boot_loader.
I've attached my new te file, and following is the lilo file_contexts entries:/etc/lilo.conf system_u:object_r:etc_bootloader_t/sbin/lilo.* system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t
Signature · 4 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void.
#
# Author: Russell Coker <[email protected]>
#
#################################
#
# Rules for the bootloader_t domain.
#
# bootloader_exec_t is the type of the bootloader executable. # type bootloader_t, domain, privlog, privmem; type bootloader_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type; type bootloader_tmp_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile; type etc_bootloader_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
role sysadm_r types bootloader_t;
role system_r types bootloader_t;
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, bootloader_exec_t, bootloader_t)
file_type_auto_trans(bootloader_t, tmp_t, bootloader_tmp_t)
allow bootloader_t { etc_t }:dir r_dir_perms;uses_shlib(bootloader_t)
allow bootloader_t { fixed_disk_device_t removable_device_t }:blk_file rw_file_perms; allow bootloader_t etc_bootloader_t:file r_file_perms;
can_exec(bootloader_t, { bootloader_exec_t bin_t }) allow bootloader_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir r_dir_perms; auditdeny bootloader_t sysadm_home_t:dir ~r_dir_perms;
allow bootloader_t boot_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow bootloader_t boot_t:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
allow bootloader_t self:capability { sys_rawio sys_admin };
# allow bootloader to get attributes of any device node
allow bootloader_t { devfs_t file_type }:dir_file_class_set getattr;
auditdeny bootloader_t devpts_t:dir ~create_dir_perms;allow bootloader_t self:process { fork sigchld };
allow bootloader_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
allow bootloader_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow bootloader_t proc_t:file r_file_perms; allow bootloader_t etc_runtime_t:file r_file_perms;
allow bootloader_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# for reading BIOS data allow bootloader_t memory_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
Quoted 3 lines · Russell Coker
I've attached my new te file, and following is the lilo
file_contextsentries:/etc/lilo.confsystem_u:object_r:etc_bootloader_t/sbin/lilo.*system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t
Thanks. I had to add a few permissions (search access to /dev, use descriptors created by newrole, write to the administrator's terminal) to bootloader.te. The first attached patch shows the changes. The second attached patch shows the changes to assert.te and admin_macros.te.
--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
[email protected]
bootloader.te renamed from bootloader.te.old +4 -1
@@ -17,10 +17,11 @@ role system_r types bootloader_t; domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, bootloader_exec_t, bootloader_t) +allow bootloader_t newrole_t:fd use; file_type_auto_trans(bootloader_t, tmp_t, bootloader_tmp_t) -allow bootloader_t { etc_t }:dir r_dir_perms; +allow bootloader_t { etc_t device_t }:dir r_dir_perms; uses_shlib(bootloader_t) allow bootloader_t { fixed_disk_device_t removable_device_t }:blk_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -47,6 +48,8 @@ allow bootloader_t etc_runtime_t:file r_file_perms; allow bootloader_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; +allow bootloader_t sysadm_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; +allow bootloader_t sysadm_devpts_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; # for reading BIOS data allow bootloader_t memory_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
Index: policy/assert.te
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/lsm/selinux/policy/assert.te,v
retrieving revision 1.13
assert.te +2 -3
@@ -45,10 +45,9 @@ neverallow ~admin { lib_t bin_t sbin_t }:file { write append unlink rename }; # -# Verify that only the administrator domain and the -# file system administration domain have access to the raw disk devices. +# Verify that only certain domains have access to the raw disk devices. # -neverallow ~{ admin fsadm_t mount_t } fixed_disk_device_t:devfile_class_set { read write append }; +neverallow ~{ bootloader_t fsadm_t mount_t } fixed_disk_device_t:devfile_class_set { read write append }; # # Verify that only the X server and klogd have access to memory devices.
Index: policy/macros/admin_macros.te
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/lsm/selinux/policy/macros/admin_macros.te,v retrieving revision 1.5
macros/admin_macros.te +0 -4
@@ -32,10 +32,6 @@ allow $1_t sysadmfile:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms; allow $1_t sysadmfile:dir create_dir_perms; -# Use /sbin/lilo to update the boot loader. -# XXX FIXME! Move lilo into separate domain. -allow $1_t fixed_disk_device_t:devfile_class_set rw_file_perms; - # Access removable devices. allow $1_t removable_device_t:devfile_class_set rw_file_perms;
Quoted 10 lines · you
Quoted 4 lines · Russell Coker
I've attached my new te file, and following is the lilo
file_contexts
entries:/etc/lilo.conf
system_u:object_r:etc_bootloader_t/sbin/lilo.*system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_tThanks. I had to add a few permissions (search access to /dev, use descriptors created by newrole, write to the administrator's terminal) to bootloader.te. The first attached patch shows the changes. The second attached patch shows the changes to assert.te and admin_macros.te.
Thanks.
Also I added devfs_t to the following line:
allow bootloader_t { etc_t device_t devfs_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
Signature · 9 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void. -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 2 lines · Russell Coker
Also I added
devfs_tto the following line:
allowbootloader_t{etc_tdevice_tdevfs_t}:dirr_dir_perms;
There is one other potential issue. If an administrator directly edits /etc/lilo.conf, it will revert to etc_t (and become inaccessible to lilo unless it is then relabeled by the administrator). Is there any strong reason to maintain a separate type on this file? It is problematic to keep it in a separate type from other /etc files, since it may be directly modified by the administrator and it doesn't live in its own separate subdirectory.
--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
[email protected]
--
You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 5 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 2 lines
Also I added
devfs_tto the following line:
allowbootloader_t{etc_tdevice_tdevfs_t}:dirr_dir_perms;There is one other potential issue. If an administrator directly edits
/etc/lilo.conf, it will revert toetc_t
Unless the administrator edits the file with vi (and not vim or at least not vim with the backup feature turned on). If you use nvi or vim without backups then the same file will be used, hard links won't be broken, SIDs won't change, etc.
Quoted 6 lines
(and become inaccessible to lilo
unless it is then relabeled by the administrator). Is there any strong reason to maintain a separate type on this file? It is problematic to keep it in a separate type from other /etc files, since it may be directly modified by the administrator and it doesn't live in its own separate subdirectory.
/etc/lilo.conf will (on any properly configured system) contain a boot password for the system, which is the best way of taking over a system entirely without disassembling the hardware. I think that this deserves a different type to world-readable files such as /etc/passwd!
I think that the situation is similar for other boot loaders.
Signature · 9 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void. -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 6 lines · Russell Coker
/etc/lilo.confwill (on any properly configured system) contain a boot password for the system, which is the best way of taking over a system entirely without disassembling the hardware. I think that this deserves a different type to world-readable files such as/etc/passwd!I think that the situation is similar for other boot loaders.
Physical access to the hardware always means you have lost (an encrypted filesystem being the exception). Moreover, a lot of properly configured systems do NOT have a boot password. If they are located in a physical secure location, then coming up again after a crash or power failure is more important than the off-chance that someone breaks into the hosting center just to reboot and take over your machine.
Signature · 8 lines
http://web.lemuria.org/pubkey.html pub 1024D/D88D35A6 2001-11-14 Tom Vogt <[email protected]> Key fingerprint = 276B B7BB E4D8 FCCE DB8F F965 310B 811A D88D 35A6 -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 9 lines · Tom
Quoted 6 lines · Russell Coker
/etc/lilo.confwill (on any properly configured system) contain a boot password for the system, which is the best way of taking over a system entirely without disassembling the hardware. I think that this deserves a different type to world-readable files such as/etc/passwd!I think that the situation is similar for other boot loaders.
Physical access to the hardware always means you have lost (an
Ability to disassemble the machine always means you have lost. Ability to access the keyboard, mouse, and (non-bootable) floppy drive should not cause a problem.
Think of terminals in Internet Cafe's and University computer labs.
Quoted 1 line
encrypted filesystem being the exception).
An encrypted file system is not a magic bullet. How does the machine with the encrypted file system get it's unlock password?
Quoted 5 lines
Moreover, a lot of properly
configured systems do NOT have a boot password. If they are located in a physical secure location, then coming up again after a crash or power failure is more important than the off-chance that someone breaks into the hosting center just to reboot and take over your machine.
Hosting centers that I am familiar with do not have enough security cameras, and the locks on cabinet doors are easily pickable. Someone who has authorised access to one company's equipment (authorisation being arranged by unencrypted and unsigned email over a public network) can do whatever they like to other machines.
But that's beside the point. The fact that some people choose to not use a particular security method does not mean that I will choose to not support it.
Signature · 9 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void. -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 7 lines · Russell Coker
Quoted 1 line
Physical access to the hardware always means you have lost (an
Ability to disassemble the machine always means you have lost. Ability to access the keyboard, mouse, and (non-bootable) floppy drive should not cause a problem.
Think of terminals in Internet Cafe's and University computer labs.
But how does a boot-password offer any protection in these settings?
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
encrypted filesystem being the exception).
An encrypted file system is not a magic bullet. How does the machine with the encrypted file system get it's unlock password?
The same way that it gets the boot password. :)
Quoted 5 lines
Hosting centers that I am familiar with do not have enough security cameras, and the locks on cabinet doors are easily pickable. Someone who has authorised access to one company's equipment (authorisation being arranged by unencrypted and unsigned email over a public network) can do whatever they like to other machines.
No security-aware hosting center will let run people around unsupervised unless every customer has a steel-cage of his own.
Quoted 3 lines
But that's beside the point. The fact that some people choose to not use a particular security method does not mean that I will choose to not support it.
I agree. The point was that lilo.conf may or may not be especially sensitive, depending on the setup. It may be, but similiar points may be made for many other files (/etc/ppp/*.secrets, snmp config files, quite a lot of things actually).
See my other posting - where the "line of authority" runs is a specific question. On some systems, root=god will still (largely) be true with SELinux installed, on other systems even two of the three admins may not be authorized to access lilo.conf.
Difficult to generalize.
Signature · 8 lines
http://web.lemuria.org/pubkey.html pub 1024D/D88D35A6 2001-11-14 Tom Vogt <[email protected]> Key fingerprint = 276B B7BB E4D8 FCCE DB8F F965 310B 811A D88D 35A6 -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 3 lines · Tom
Quoted 1 line
Think of terminals in Internet Cafe's and University computer labs.
But how does a boot-password offer any protection in these settings?
Simple, if you don't have a password then anyone can enter
"linux init=/bin/bash" at the lilo prompt and take over the machine entirely!
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
encrypted filesystem being the exception).
An encrypted file system is not a magic bullet. How does the machine with the encrypted file system get it's unlock password?
The same way that it gets the boot password. :)
No. To boot with the default parameters you don't need a password. You only need a password for maintenance mode.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Hosting centers that I am familiar with do not have enough security cameras, and the locks on cabinet doors are easily pickable. Someone who has authorised access to one company's equipment (authorisation being arranged by unencrypted and unsigned email over a public network) can do whatever they like to other machines.
No security-aware hosting center will let run people around unsupervised unless every customer has a steel-cage of his own.
There aren't many security aware hosting centers.
There was one time I accidentally locked my security pass and keys inside the hosting room, they let me in without even verifying that there were indeed keys and a pass inside the room! Then the cage in that room was always kept unlocked because the key was lost, and a window was open because the air-conditioning system was over-loaded. ;)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
But that's beside the point. The fact that some people choose to not use a particular security method does not mean that I will choose to not support it.
I agree. The point was that lilo.conf may or may not be especially sensitive, depending on the setup. It may be, but similiar points may be made for many other files (
/etc/ppp/*.secrets, snmp config files, quite a lot of things actually).
So we provide a different type for it and let the users decide who gets access to that type.
Signature · 9 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void. -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 2 lines · Russell Coker
Simple, if you don't have a password then anyone can enter
"linux init=/bin/bash" at the lilo prompt and take over the machine entirely!
dumb me. I thought disabling the prompt (as you would do in a cafe or university) takes care of that. A quick glance into the lilo doc shows that it doesn't.
Quoted 2 lines
No. To boot with the default parameters you don't need a password. You only need a password for maintenance mode.
right again.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
No security-aware hosting center will let run people around unsupervised unless every customer has a steel-cage of his own.
There aren't many security aware hosting centers.
then why spend much time on securing the system when any dumbass can just walk in and take control of it? most servers have easy access to stuff like hard disks. on a system you care about, you'll almost always run raid, so your evil neighbour may even be able to steal/swap a drive without you ever noticing, then take home his "copy" and do with it whatever he wants (like building up an almost identical system and swapping that in next time he's over).
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I agree. The point was that lilo.conf may or may not be especially sensitive, depending on the setup. It may be, but similiar points may be made for many other files (
/etc/ppp/*.secrets, snmp config files, quite a lot of things actually).So we provide a different type for it and let the users decide who gets access to that type.
the point I was trying to make is whether we really want to provide different types for almost everything inside /etc. if the answer is yes, I'll shut up, just wanted to point out that lilo won't be the last program to warrant that kind of attention.
Signature · 8 lines
http://web.lemuria.org/pubkey.html pub 1024D/D88D35A6 2001-11-14 Tom Vogt <[email protected]> Key fingerprint = 276B B7BB E4D8 FCCE DB8F F965 310B 811A D88D 35A6 -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 8 lines · Tom
Quoted 3 lines · Russell Coker
Simple, if you don't have a password then anyone can enter "linux init=/bin/bash" at the lilo prompt and take over the machine entirely!
dumb me. I thought disabling the prompt (as you would do in a cafe or university) takes care of that. A quick glance into the lilo doc shows that it doesn't.
Also you definately don't want to totally disable it. You want to allow authorised people to perform maintenance on the machines without taking them apart (with machines that have no other boot device than a hard drive it's mandatory to allow "linux init=/bin/bash" for emergencies).
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
No security-aware hosting center will let run people around unsupervised unless every customer has a steel-cage of his own.
There aren't many security aware hosting centers.
Quoted 7 lines
then why spend much time on securing the system when any dumbass can just walk in and take control of it? most servers have easy access to stuff like hard disks. on a system you care about, you'll almost always run raid, so your evil neighbour may even be able to steal/swap a drive without you ever noticing, then take home his "copy" and do with it whatever he wants (like building up an almost identical system and swapping that in next time he's over).
1) You do the best you can.
2) Walking into a hosting center with a set of lock picks and a fake ID takes more guts than most attackers have.
3) Not all hosting environments are insecure.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I agree. The point was that lilo.conf may or may not be especially sensitive, depending on the setup. It may be, but similiar points may be made for many other files (
/etc/ppp/*.secrets, snmp config files, quite a lot of things actually).
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So we provide a different type for it and let the users decide who gets access to that type.
the point I was trying to make is whether we really want to provide different types for almost everything inside /etc. if the answer is yes, I'll shut up, just wanted to point out that lilo won't be the last program to warrant that kind of attention.
Actually there's many things that are currently in different types which don't need it IMHO. Such as resolv.conf. Probably most daemon config files could be etc_t except where the daemon re-writes it's own config.
Signature · 9 lines
If you send email to me or to a mailing list that I use which has >4 lines of legalistic junk at the end then you are specifically authorizing me to do whatever I wish with the message and all other messages from your domain, by posting the message you agree that your long legalistic sig is void. -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 3 lines · Russell Coker
Actually there's many things that are currently in different types which don't need it IMHO. Such as resolv.conf. Probably most daemon config files could be
etc_texcept where the daemon re-writes it's own config.
resolv.conf has a separate type to support the dhcpc and pump domains.
--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
[email protected]
--
You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
There is one other potential issue. If an administrator directly edits
/etc/lilo.conf, it will revert toetc_t(and become inaccessible to lilo unless it is then relabeled by the administrator). Is there any strong reason to maintain a separate type on this file? It is problematic to keep it in a separate type from other /etc files, since it may be directly modified by the administrator and it doesn't live in its own separate subdirectory.
It may be more tricky even. I'm thinking about split administrator access here. Say you have one network and one system admin. Network admin needs to access stuff in /etc (such as interface configs, maybe some or all network daemons, depending on where authorities are split) while system admin needs access to other /etc files (cron and startup files, among others).
Signature · 8 lines
http://web.lemuria.org/pubkey.html pub 1024D/D88D35A6 2001-11-14 Tom Vogt <[email protected]> Key fingerprint = 276B B7BB E4D8 FCCE DB8F F965 310B 811A D88D 35A6 -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.