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module locking

PATCH In review Rolf Fokkens 3 participants 6 messages Apr 29, 2002 Proc sysctl

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 module locking

This patch adds the option op locking module operations, which means that no more insmod en rmmod operations are possible. This hopefully satisfies some security requirements that state that no modularized kernels should be used to be really safe in some environents.

It can be used during boot (i.e. initrd) to load modules as needed and afterwards locking module operations, making it a little harder for hackers to tamper with kernel functionality... though changing kmem still allows some changes...

It adds a /proc/sys/kernel/module-lock entry with default 0, which means that module operations aren't locked. This value can be changed to 1, which locks all module operations. Once the value is changed to 1 it cannot be changed back to 0.

kernel/kmod.c +3 -0
diff -ruN linux.orig/kernel/kmod.c linux/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 extern int max_threads;
+extern int module_lock;
 
 static inline void
 use_init_fs_context(void)
@@ -179,6 +180,8 @@
 	static atomic_t kmod_concurrent = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50	/* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
 	static int kmod_loop_msg;
+
+	if ( module_lock ) return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Don't allow request_module() before the root fs is mounted!  */
 	if ( ! current->fs->root ) {
kernel/module.c +8 -3
diff -ruN linux.orig/kernel/module.c linux/kernel/module.c
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@
 static int kmalloc_failed;
 
 /*
+ * This flag blocks any adding or removing of modules.
+ */
+int module_lock = 0;
+
+/*
  *	This lock prevents modifications that might race the kernel fault
  *	fixups. It does not prevent reader walks that the modules code
  *	does. The kernel lock does that.
@@ -296,7 +301,7 @@
 	struct module *mod;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+	if (module_lock || !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
 		return -EPERM;
 	lock_kernel();
 	if ((namelen = get_mod_name(name_user, &name)) < 0) {
@@ -351,7 +356,7 @@
 	unsigned long mod_user_size;
 	struct module_ref *dep;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+	if (module_lock || !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
 		return -EPERM;
 	lock_kernel();
 	if ((namelen = get_mod_name(name_user, &name)) < 0) {
@@ -599,7 +604,7 @@
 	long error;
 	int something_changed;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+	if (module_lock || !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	lock_kernel();
kernel/sysctl.c +23 -0
diff -ruN linux.orig/kernel/sysctl.c linux/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -49,9 +49,13 @@
 extern atomic_t nr_queued_signals;
 extern int max_queued_signals;
 extern int sysrq_enabled;
+extern int module_lock;
 extern int core_uses_pid;
 extern int cad_pid;
 
+extern int proc_module_lock(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+                            void *buffer, size_t *lenp);
+
 /* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */
 static int maxolduid = 65535;
 static int minolduid;
@@ -209,6 +213,8 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_KMOD
 	{KERN_MODPROBE, "modprobe", &modprobe_path, 256,
 	 0644, NULL, &proc_dostring, &sysctl_string },
+	{KERN_MODLOCK, "module-lock", &module_lock, sizeof (int),
+	 0644, NULL, &proc_module_lock},
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG
 	{KERN_HOTPLUG, "hotplug", &hotplug_path, 256,
@@ -998,6 +1004,23 @@
 {
     return do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,1,OP_SET);
 }
+
+/*
+ * Try to change the module-lock status. Once it's set it cannot
+ * be cleared however!
+ */
+int proc_module_lock(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+			void *buffer, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	int retval, sav;
+
+	sav = module_lock;
+	retval = do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,1,OP_SET);
+	if (!retval) module_lock = (sav || module_lock);
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
 
 /*
  *	init may raise the set.
include/linux/sysctl.h +1 -0
diff -ruN linux.orig/include/linux/sysctl.h linux/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@
 	KERN_CORE_USES_PID=52,		/* int: use core or core.%pid */
 	KERN_TAINTED=53,	/* int: various kernel tainted flags */
 	KERN_CADPID=54,		/* int: PID of the process to notify on CAD */
+	KERN_MODLOCK=65,	/* module_lock value */
 };
 
 
#1 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Rolf Fokkens

This patch adds the option op locking module operations, which means that no more insmod en rmmod operations are possible. This hopefully satisfies some security requirements that state that no modularized kernels should be used to be really safe in some environents.

you're describing exactly the bahaviour or using capabilities. see the capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) calls you removed with your patch.

tm

Signature · 1 line
in some way i do, and in some way i don't.
#2 lore raw
In reply to Rolf Fokkens

... oops, sorry

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +1 -1
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+	if (module_lock || !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))

the capable call is sthell there, but with the module_lock kind or redundant.

tm

Signature · 1 line
in some way i do, and in some way i don't.
#3 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Thomas 'Dent' Mirlacher

the capable call is sthell there, but with the module_lock kind or redundant.

once set module_lock cannot be cleared, not even by root. This differs from the CAP_SYS_MODULE which can be activated by root, if I'm correct.

module_lock is only a suggestion, w/o /dev/kmem write locking or even locking writes on other /dev/.. or doing mounts it won't be full proof.

#4 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Rolf Fokkens
Quoted 2 lines · Thomas 'Dent' Mirlacher

the capable call is sthell there, but with the module_lock kind or redundant.

once set module_lock cannot be cleared, not even by root. This differs from the CAP_SYS_MODULE which can be activated by root, if I'm correct.

module_lock is only a suggestion, w/o /dev/kmem write locking or even locking writes on other /dev/.. or doing mounts it won't be full proof.

*sigh*

RTFM man 2 sysctl

With your patch applied AND module_lock set to 1, anyone with sufficient privileges could still do:

#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>

_syscall1(int, _sysctl, struct __sysctl_args *, args); #define SIZE(x) sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0])

int main(void)

{
        int name[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_MODPROBE };
        int hack = 0;
        struct __sysctl_args args = { name, SIZE(name), 0, 0,
                        &hack, sizeof(hack) };

        if (_sysctl(&args)) {
                perror("sysctl failed");
                exit(1);
        }
        printf("module_lock has been zeroed! Muahaha!");
        return 0;
}

Good bye module_lock! /me waves

What was that about not being able to zero it again...?

Best regards,

Anton

Signature · 5 lines
  "I've not lost my mind. It's backed up on tape somewhere." - Unknown
-- 
Anton Altaparmakov <aia21 at cantab.net> (replace at with @)
Linux NTFS Maintainer / IRC: #ntfs on irc.openprojects.net
WWW: http://linux-ntfs.sf.net/ & http://www-stu.christs.cam.ac.uk/~aia21/
#5 lore raw
In reply to Rolf Fokkens

Three comments:

1) Unless I am missing something this is complete and utter nonsense! You are defining a proc_handler but not defining a strategy which means the kernel's automatic r/w will be used which means that I can just set your module_lock to zero using a sysctl() system call, thus defeating the whole point of your patch.

2) Even if you did add a strategy as to refuse changing the value from a sysctl() system call, as you say yourself, one can just set module_lock = 0 by accessing /dev/kmem, which makes any form of this patch completely pointless. If the CAP_SYS_MODULE capability is not sufficient to stop you from loading modules then your module_lock won't help, either...

3) Check your numbers, I think at the bottom of the patch, that was supposed to be KERN_MODLOCK=55 and not =65.

Best regards,

Anton

Quoted 146 lines · Rolf Fokkens

This patch adds the option op locking module operations, which means that no more insmod en rmmod operations are possible. This hopefully satisfies some security requirements that state that no modularized kernels should be used to be really safe in some environents.

It can be used during boot (i.e. initrd) to load modules as needed and afterwards locking module operations, making it a little harder for hackers to tamper with kernel functionality... though changing kmem still allows some changes...

It adds a /proc/sys/kernel/module-lock entry with default 0, which means that module operations aren't locked. This value can be changed to 1, which locks all module operations. Once the value is changed to 1 it cannot be changed back to 0.

diff -ruN linux.orig/kernel/kmod.c linux/kernel/kmod.c

kernel/kmod.c Sat Apr 27 22:23:07 2002 renamed from kernel/kmod.c Wed Jul 18 03:23:50 2001 +3 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 extern int max_threads;
+extern int module_lock;
 
 static inline void
 use_init_fs_context(void)
@@ -179,6 +180,8 @@
        static atomic_t kmod_concurrent = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50 /* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
        static int kmod_loop_msg;
+
+       if ( module_lock ) return -EPERM;
 
        /* Don't allow request_module() before the root fs is mounted!  */
        if ( ! current->fs->root ) {

diff -ruN linux.orig/kernel/module.c linux/kernel/module.c

kernel/module.c Sat Apr 27 22:25:01 2002 renamed from kernel/module.c Sat Nov 24 02:05:28 2001 +8 -3
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@
 static int kmalloc_failed;
 
 /*
+ * This flag blocks any adding or removing of modules.
+ */
+int module_lock = 0;
+
+/*
  *     This lock prevents modifications that might race the kernel fault
  *     fixups. It does not prevent reader walks that the modules code
  *     does. The kernel lock does that.
@@ -296,7 +301,7 @@
        struct module *mod;
        unsigned long flags;
 
-       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+       if (module_lock || !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
                return -EPERM;
        lock_kernel();
        if ((namelen = get_mod_name(name_user, &name)) < 0) {
@@ -351,7 +356,7 @@
        unsigned long mod_user_size;
        struct module_ref *dep;
 
-       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+       if (module_lock || !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
                return -EPERM;
        lock_kernel();
        if ((namelen = get_mod_name(name_user, &name)) < 0) {
@@ -599,7 +604,7 @@
        long error;
        int something_changed;
 
-       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+       if (module_lock || !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
                return -EPERM;
 
        lock_kernel();

diff -ruN linux.orig/kernel/sysctl.c linux/kernel/sysctl.c

kernel/sysctl.c Sat Apr 27 22:44:16 2002 renamed from kernel/sysctl.c Sat Apr 27 22:44:10 2002 +4 -0
@@ -49,9 +49,13 @@
 extern atomic_t nr_queued_signals;
 extern int max_queued_signals;
 extern int sysrq_enabled;
+extern int module_lock;
 extern int core_uses_pid;
 extern int cad_pid;
 
+extern int proc_module_lock(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+                            void *buffer, size_t *lenp);
+
 /* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and 

GID */
static int maxolduid = 65535;
static int minolduid;

kernel/sysctl.c Sat Apr 27 22:44:16 2002 renamed from kernel/sysctl.c Sat Apr 27 22:44:10 2002 +19 -0
@@ -209,6 +213,8 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_KMOD
        {KERN_MODPROBE, "modprobe", &modprobe_path, 256,
        0644, NULL, &proc_dostring, &sysctl_string },
+       {KERN_MODLOCK, "module-lock", &module_lock, sizeof (int),
+       0644, NULL, &proc_module_lock},
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG
        {KERN_HOTPLUG, "hotplug", &hotplug_path, 256,
@@ -998,6 +1004,23 @@
 {
     return do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,1,OP_SET);
 }
+
+/*
+ * Try to change the module-lock status. Once it's set it cannot
+ * be cleared however!
+ */
+int proc_module_lock(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+                       void *buffer, size_t *lenp)
+{
+       int retval, sav;
+
+       sav = module_lock;
+       retval = do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,1,OP_SET);
+       if (!retval) module_lock = (sav || module_lock);
+
+       return retval;
+}
+
 
 /*
  *     init may raise the set.

diff -ruN linux.orig/include/linux/sysctl.h linux/include/linux/sysctl.h

include/linux/sysctl.h Sat Apr 27 22:45:18 2002 renamed from include/linux/sysctl.h Sat Apr 27 22:44:10 2002 +0 -0
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@
        KERN_CORE_USES_PID=52,          /* int: use core or core.%pid */
        KERN_TAINTED=53,        /* int: various kernel tainted flags */
        KERN_CADPID=54,         /* int: PID of the process to notify on 

CAD */

include/linux/sysctl.h Sat Apr 27 22:45:18 2002 renamed from include/linux/sysctl.h Sat Apr 27 22:44:10 2002 +1 -1
+       KERN_MODLOCK=65,        /* module_lock value */
 };
 
 
-

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Signature · 5 lines
  "I've not lost my mind. It's backed up on tape somewhere." - Unknown
-- 
Anton Altaparmakov <aia21 at cantab.net> (replace at with @)
Linux NTFS Maintainer / IRC: #ntfs on irc.openprojects.net
WWW: http://linux-ntfs.sf.net/ & http://www-stu.christs.cam.ac.uk/~aia21/