OpenSSH 3.3p1 - not functioning as advertised.
When running SE Linux there is no need to run as a separate process. It is easy to limit a root process to less access than a user process normally
gets.
In fact for the SE Linux policy I had to give the sshd_t domain MORE privs because of this change in sshd, I had to allow it the sys_chroot capability which it previously did not require.
One thing I would like to see in a future version of OpenSSH is to have it exec() itself when (and only when) it wants to run as a less privileged co-process. Then I could use the ruledomain_auto_trans(sshd_t, sshd_exec_t, sshd_separation_t)
to trigger a change in domain to sshd_separation_t when sshd exec's itself, and sshd_separation_t would have significantly less access to the system than a chroot'd UID=sshd co-process would normally have.
Of course chroot is incompatable with exec(), so this would have to be a configuration option, as you wouldn't want to turn off the chroot() for non-SE systems.
Also I believe that there is some DARPA funded development work on Domain-Type Enforcement for BSD, it would be good if the people working on OpenSSH would get some input from them too...
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I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software.
If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
Quoted 1 line
From field.
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