another small patch
This patch gives sysadm_t the privhome attribute (allowing it to create files under user home directories with the correct type), and removes my mistaken first attempt at doing this.
Also it allows xdm_t to read the default_context_t (otherwise XDM logins are impossible). It removes access to shadow_t because the "auth" attribute grants that anyway.
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I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software. If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
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From field.
domains/admin.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/admin.te +1 -1
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # # sysadm_t is the system administrator domain. -type sysadm_t, domain, privlog, privowner, admin, userdomain; +type sysadm_t, domain, privlog, privowner, admin, userdomain, privhome; # system_r is authorized for sysadm_t for single-user mode. role system_r types sysadm_t;
domains/program/xdm.te renamed from tmp/policy/domains/program/xdm.te +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ # Run the X Display Manager in its own domain. domain_auto_trans({ init_t initrc_t }, xdm_exec_t, xdm_t) -allow xdm_t shadow_t:file { read getattr }; +allow xdm_t default_context_t:file { read getattr }; allow xdm_t init_t:fd use;
macros/user_macros.te renamed from tmp/policy/macros/user_macros.te +0 -4
@@ -240,11 +240,7 @@ define(`full_user_role', ` # user_t/$1_t is an unprivileged users domain. -ifelse($1, sysadm, ` -type $1_t, domain, userdomain, privhome; -', ` type $1_t, domain, userdomain, unpriv_userdomain; -') # $1_r is authorized for $1_t for the initial login domain. role $1_r types $1_t;